HeinzGud
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An Indian government led by Narendra Modi is now officially upon us and Sri Lanka has to take stock of the situation and weigh its options. The good news is that the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance has secured a landslide victory winning 339 seats in the 543 member Lok Sabha. The BJP on its own has won 282 seats, more than the 272 required for a simple majority in parliament."‚ As such the BJP is in a position to form a government even without its alliance partners. The best part of this good news is that Tamil Nadu's contribution to the BJP victory is almost zero, with the BJP led Alliance in Tamil Nadu"‚ winning only two Lok Sabha seats. The BJP has no truck with the major parties in Tamil Nadu with both the DMK and Jayalalitha's AIADMK remaining aloof from the BJP. Sri Lanka's ultimate nightmare would have been if Modi came into power with Jayalalitha as a partner in the BJP-led NDA. The nightmare would have turned into a fully fledged horror story if the BJP government had actually been dependent on Jayalalitha to keep the government going
If by some misfortune, the Indian central government had been dependent on Tamil Nadu votes to remain in power, they would have been forced to obey Tamil Nadu diktat on a range of issues from the apportioning of the water of the Cavery river, raising the threshold for personal income tax, the pricing of fuel, the apportionment of electricity etctera. The AIADMK manifesto was in fact written on the expressly stated assumption that it would be a member of the coalition that governs at the centre. The AIADMK wanted greater devolution of power to the states and even to dislodge the preeminent position of Hindi as the only official language of India. The AIADMK even demanded that sovereign power be shared EQUALLY between the states and the centre. To make a long story short, neither the Congress nor the BJP could have ruled India with the AIADMK as a coalition partner given the range of issues that it intended dictating terms on. Furthermore, these are not just idle election promises – if the AIADMK helped prop up the government at the centre, they would have expected the centre to deliver so that the AIADMK could continue to tell the people of Tamil Nadu that they had got this or that done for the Tamil people. As time went on, and the anti-incumbency feeling in Tamil Nadu increased, Jayalalitha would have been making increasingly shrill demands from the central government in order to bolster her support back home.
The BJP has managed to avoid a terrible fate by not being dependent on the AIADMK to form a government. What this means is that all of Jayalalitha's plans have come a cropper. The very reason why she contested the election on her own without going into a partnership with any national political party was to have the maximum bargaining power to wring the maximum out of a central government. She did achieve one part of her goal which is to win almost all the seats in Tamil Nadu – she did win 37 out of 39 seats but even with such a victory, she now finds herself without any hold over the central government and has been reduced to expressing the hope that the BJP government which has been formed without her help will be friendly towards Tamil Nadu. So now we have a situation where for the first time since the late 1980s, where the Sri Lankan government can deal with an Indian central government which is independent of Tamil Nadu. Without the Tamil Nadu factor, the bilateral relationship between India and Sri Lanka can be like the relationship that should exist between two sovereign states. Now India need no longer vote against SL in the UNHRC, nor would it have to call for a UN supervised referendum in SL to form a separate Tamil state."‚
On the other hand, without China's protection, there's no telling what will happen to Sri Lanka with a rejuvenated and belligerent India on our doorstep. This is why this writer has been pressing for a defence pact with China or at the very least a JR-Rajiv style exchange of letters between the leaders of China and Sri Lanka setting out certain understandings. We all know that this is exactly the kind of thing that will really irritate Modi, but that should not deter us from exercising our sovereign right to deal with whatever party we may wish. Besides, though we know that Modi is independent of Tamil Nadu for the time being, how long will that last? We can give it five years at most until the next election. "‚The BJP's victory is based on doing exceptionally well in a relatively small number of states. The BJP won all 26 seats in Gujerat, all 25 in Rajasthan, all seven in Delhi, all five in Uttarakhand, 71 out of 80 in Uttar Pradesh, 27 out of 29 in Madhya Pradesh, 12 out of 14 in Jaharkhand, seven out of 10 in Haryana, 41 out of the 48 seats in Maharashtra (along with its closest ally the Shiv Sena) and so on.
There is even the danger of Modi trying to fulfill some of the Tamil Nadu demands relating to Sri Lanka to compensate for not being able to meet the demands made by Tamil Nadu in relation to domestic policy. We have to re-examine D.S.Senanayake's policy towards India which was based entirely on containment and deterrence. In order to counterbalance Indian's might, he entered into a mutual defence pact with Britain which also helped Britain by giving them a hold over Indian Ocean trade routes. But after 1956, S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike jettisoned that policy of deterrence and initiated a follow-the –leader policy. Under Bandaranaike, SL became basically a clone of India by adopting a foreign policy closer to the socialist bloc and a domestic policy of import substitution – just like India. This phase lasted for nearly two decades from 1956 to 1977 during which period it was the SLFP that ruled the country most of the time. Though the UNP ruled the country between 1965 to 1970, they were not able to make much of a change in things.
What this shows is that the only policy towards India that will work in the long term is containment and deterrence. J.R. Jayewardene"‚thought the Americans would 'deter' the Indians from intervening overtly in Sri Lanka but at that time, Sri Lanka was too unimportant in the larger scheme of things for the Americans to rub India on the wrong side. The Americans didn't need a foothold in the Indian Ocean through SL. They already had Diago Garcia. So JRJ was left to his own devices and was forced to surrender to the Indians and to accept virtual vassal status. But today, we have a different situation where China is the rising power in the world and in order to reach super-power status China needs to ensure the security of its trade routes across the Indian Ocean which it cannot do without Sri Lanka. Likewise, the only hope that Sri Lanka has of preventing overt Indian intervention in Sri Lanka is the presence of China. A permanent defence arrangement between China and Sri Lanka will certainly be a source of disquiet and irritation to India, but then perhaps they should learn to live with it. The Indian central government should realize that because of the Tamil Nadu factor and the vagaries of Indian politics, Sri Lanka has no option but to seek the protection of powerful friends.
The point would of course be to be in a position where no Indian government can dictate terms to Sri Lanka on anything. In the coming months and years, this is going to be a tall order in a situation where India now has a leader who is arguably more aggressive than Nehru but it will have to be done nevertheless. Sri Lanka can cooperate fully with India to prevent the infiltration of South India by Tamil speaking Muslim extremists and Tamil separatist terrorists as those issues are of concern to Sri Lanka as well. But beyond that, it should be strictly business and tourism that should define the relationship between India and Sri Lanka. Though it may irritate the Indians, the Chinese will be here to stay and the India will have to live with it. Some may argue that an India under Modi"‚will never put up with a Sri Lanka that openly plays host to China right on its own doorstep. But the question is why would Modi not be able to put up with what happens in a sovereign neighbouring country when he has to put up with much worse in the domestic sphere?
Besides the Chinese presence in Sri Lanka was already a reality by the time he assumed power and to force Sri Lanka to expel the Chinese would be interpreted as a hostile act by China which is also one of India's neighbours. For India to tell one neighbour not to have anything to do with another one of its neighbours would be a ridiculous state of affairs. In any case the Chinese presence in Sri Lanka is not because the Chinese have any designs on India but only because of the need to protect its shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean – a perfectly legitimate aspiration. It's not as if China is hoping to penetrate Indian territory from the South through Sri Lanka. "‚Perhaps the Indians should realize this and learn to ignore the Chinese presence in SL in exchange for SL's full cooperation in preventing Islamic extremists from infiltrating South India – a task that SL should do with enthusiasm and relish. Indeed even the Chinese will cooperate in that sphere because Islamic extremism is a problem for China as well. So we are now looking at a new phase in India-SL relations where SL interacts with India not as a pushover client state but as a friendly sovereign neighbour with Chinese protection and strong business ties with India.
Sri Lankans Should Exult Because Narendra Modi’s BJP Government is not Dependent on Tamil Nadu and Jayalalithaa’s AIADMK Party. « dbsjeyaraj.com
If by some misfortune, the Indian central government had been dependent on Tamil Nadu votes to remain in power, they would have been forced to obey Tamil Nadu diktat on a range of issues from the apportioning of the water of the Cavery river, raising the threshold for personal income tax, the pricing of fuel, the apportionment of electricity etctera. The AIADMK manifesto was in fact written on the expressly stated assumption that it would be a member of the coalition that governs at the centre. The AIADMK wanted greater devolution of power to the states and even to dislodge the preeminent position of Hindi as the only official language of India. The AIADMK even demanded that sovereign power be shared EQUALLY between the states and the centre. To make a long story short, neither the Congress nor the BJP could have ruled India with the AIADMK as a coalition partner given the range of issues that it intended dictating terms on. Furthermore, these are not just idle election promises – if the AIADMK helped prop up the government at the centre, they would have expected the centre to deliver so that the AIADMK could continue to tell the people of Tamil Nadu that they had got this or that done for the Tamil people. As time went on, and the anti-incumbency feeling in Tamil Nadu increased, Jayalalitha would have been making increasingly shrill demands from the central government in order to bolster her support back home.
The BJP has managed to avoid a terrible fate by not being dependent on the AIADMK to form a government. What this means is that all of Jayalalitha's plans have come a cropper. The very reason why she contested the election on her own without going into a partnership with any national political party was to have the maximum bargaining power to wring the maximum out of a central government. She did achieve one part of her goal which is to win almost all the seats in Tamil Nadu – she did win 37 out of 39 seats but even with such a victory, she now finds herself without any hold over the central government and has been reduced to expressing the hope that the BJP government which has been formed without her help will be friendly towards Tamil Nadu. So now we have a situation where for the first time since the late 1980s, where the Sri Lankan government can deal with an Indian central government which is independent of Tamil Nadu. Without the Tamil Nadu factor, the bilateral relationship between India and Sri Lanka can be like the relationship that should exist between two sovereign states. Now India need no longer vote against SL in the UNHRC, nor would it have to call for a UN supervised referendum in SL to form a separate Tamil state."‚
On the other hand, without China's protection, there's no telling what will happen to Sri Lanka with a rejuvenated and belligerent India on our doorstep. This is why this writer has been pressing for a defence pact with China or at the very least a JR-Rajiv style exchange of letters between the leaders of China and Sri Lanka setting out certain understandings. We all know that this is exactly the kind of thing that will really irritate Modi, but that should not deter us from exercising our sovereign right to deal with whatever party we may wish. Besides, though we know that Modi is independent of Tamil Nadu for the time being, how long will that last? We can give it five years at most until the next election. "‚The BJP's victory is based on doing exceptionally well in a relatively small number of states. The BJP won all 26 seats in Gujerat, all 25 in Rajasthan, all seven in Delhi, all five in Uttarakhand, 71 out of 80 in Uttar Pradesh, 27 out of 29 in Madhya Pradesh, 12 out of 14 in Jaharkhand, seven out of 10 in Haryana, 41 out of the 48 seats in Maharashtra (along with its closest ally the Shiv Sena) and so on.
There is even the danger of Modi trying to fulfill some of the Tamil Nadu demands relating to Sri Lanka to compensate for not being able to meet the demands made by Tamil Nadu in relation to domestic policy. We have to re-examine D.S.Senanayake's policy towards India which was based entirely on containment and deterrence. In order to counterbalance Indian's might, he entered into a mutual defence pact with Britain which also helped Britain by giving them a hold over Indian Ocean trade routes. But after 1956, S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike jettisoned that policy of deterrence and initiated a follow-the –leader policy. Under Bandaranaike, SL became basically a clone of India by adopting a foreign policy closer to the socialist bloc and a domestic policy of import substitution – just like India. This phase lasted for nearly two decades from 1956 to 1977 during which period it was the SLFP that ruled the country most of the time. Though the UNP ruled the country between 1965 to 1970, they were not able to make much of a change in things.
What this shows is that the only policy towards India that will work in the long term is containment and deterrence. J.R. Jayewardene"‚thought the Americans would 'deter' the Indians from intervening overtly in Sri Lanka but at that time, Sri Lanka was too unimportant in the larger scheme of things for the Americans to rub India on the wrong side. The Americans didn't need a foothold in the Indian Ocean through SL. They already had Diago Garcia. So JRJ was left to his own devices and was forced to surrender to the Indians and to accept virtual vassal status. But today, we have a different situation where China is the rising power in the world and in order to reach super-power status China needs to ensure the security of its trade routes across the Indian Ocean which it cannot do without Sri Lanka. Likewise, the only hope that Sri Lanka has of preventing overt Indian intervention in Sri Lanka is the presence of China. A permanent defence arrangement between China and Sri Lanka will certainly be a source of disquiet and irritation to India, but then perhaps they should learn to live with it. The Indian central government should realize that because of the Tamil Nadu factor and the vagaries of Indian politics, Sri Lanka has no option but to seek the protection of powerful friends.
The point would of course be to be in a position where no Indian government can dictate terms to Sri Lanka on anything. In the coming months and years, this is going to be a tall order in a situation where India now has a leader who is arguably more aggressive than Nehru but it will have to be done nevertheless. Sri Lanka can cooperate fully with India to prevent the infiltration of South India by Tamil speaking Muslim extremists and Tamil separatist terrorists as those issues are of concern to Sri Lanka as well. But beyond that, it should be strictly business and tourism that should define the relationship between India and Sri Lanka. Though it may irritate the Indians, the Chinese will be here to stay and the India will have to live with it. Some may argue that an India under Modi"‚will never put up with a Sri Lanka that openly plays host to China right on its own doorstep. But the question is why would Modi not be able to put up with what happens in a sovereign neighbouring country when he has to put up with much worse in the domestic sphere?
Besides the Chinese presence in Sri Lanka was already a reality by the time he assumed power and to force Sri Lanka to expel the Chinese would be interpreted as a hostile act by China which is also one of India's neighbours. For India to tell one neighbour not to have anything to do with another one of its neighbours would be a ridiculous state of affairs. In any case the Chinese presence in Sri Lanka is not because the Chinese have any designs on India but only because of the need to protect its shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean – a perfectly legitimate aspiration. It's not as if China is hoping to penetrate Indian territory from the South through Sri Lanka. "‚Perhaps the Indians should realize this and learn to ignore the Chinese presence in SL in exchange for SL's full cooperation in preventing Islamic extremists from infiltrating South India – a task that SL should do with enthusiasm and relish. Indeed even the Chinese will cooperate in that sphere because Islamic extremism is a problem for China as well. So we are now looking at a new phase in India-SL relations where SL interacts with India not as a pushover client state but as a friendly sovereign neighbour with Chinese protection and strong business ties with India.
Sri Lankans Should Exult Because Narendra Modi’s BJP Government is not Dependent on Tamil Nadu and Jayalalithaa’s AIADMK Party. « dbsjeyaraj.com
