JayATL
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Should the U.S. Deem Pakistan a State Sponsor of Terrorism? - Global Spin - TIME.com
For its part, the United States should not be timid about publicly discussing the ISI's record of sponsoring terrorist networks in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Pakistani and Afghan networks that the ISI created in the late 1980s and the 1990s and have fostered inside Pakistan are the main source of the Islamist terrorism ripping apart Afghanistan and threatening the United States and its allies. Three ISI connected Pakistani religio-terrorist organizations—Lashkar-i Taiba, Jaish-i Mohammad and Harakat ul Mujahidin—are on the State Department's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The three ISI-supported Afghan terrorist groups keeping Afghanistan in a state of continuous war are the Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Omar plus the Haqqani and Hekmatyar fronts. They are lined up shoulder-to-shoulder on the Afghan-Pakistani border with the Afghan Taliban in northwest Pakistan, the Haqqani network in the central sector, and the Hekmatyar group in far northeastern Pakistan. Despite the killing of thousands of U.S.-led coalition troops, foreign aid workers attempting to reconstruct Afghanistan, as well as Afghan security personnel and civilians, Washington has still not designated these three Afghan terrorist groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Long overdue and mandated by U.S. law, this action should be taken immediately.
Tomsen goes on to stress that the same tired approach of mixed messaging and high-profile summitry with counterparts in Pakistan has got U.S. officials nowhere and that Washington should not underestimate the leverage it has over the Pakistanis. Pakistan may invoke the China card, but the Sino-Pakistani relationship is bound by thin thread and the U.S., Tomsen suggests, should call their bluff.
He suggests severing aid to Pakistan and even presenting Islamabad in the U.N. Security Council as a regime that sponsors terrorism. From Tomsen's perspective, nobody from the Taliban, including those in the notorious Haqqani network, should be allowed a place at the table in any future Afghan coalition government. "They are poison pills that have destroyed past Afghan peace efforts," he says.
And therein lies the rub, for it's impossible to imagine peace in Afghanistan — especially as the U.S. prepares to withdraw by 2014 — without some negotiated accommodation with the Taliban. Nor is it possible to imagine the U.S. right now risking such diplomatic brinkmanship with the Pakistanis. But, as the steady drumbeat of attacks continues with little real cooperation from the Pakistanis in sight, something will have to give.
For its part, the United States should not be timid about publicly discussing the ISI's record of sponsoring terrorist networks in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Pakistani and Afghan networks that the ISI created in the late 1980s and the 1990s and have fostered inside Pakistan are the main source of the Islamist terrorism ripping apart Afghanistan and threatening the United States and its allies. Three ISI connected Pakistani religio-terrorist organizations—Lashkar-i Taiba, Jaish-i Mohammad and Harakat ul Mujahidin—are on the State Department's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The three ISI-supported Afghan terrorist groups keeping Afghanistan in a state of continuous war are the Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Omar plus the Haqqani and Hekmatyar fronts. They are lined up shoulder-to-shoulder on the Afghan-Pakistani border with the Afghan Taliban in northwest Pakistan, the Haqqani network in the central sector, and the Hekmatyar group in far northeastern Pakistan. Despite the killing of thousands of U.S.-led coalition troops, foreign aid workers attempting to reconstruct Afghanistan, as well as Afghan security personnel and civilians, Washington has still not designated these three Afghan terrorist groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Long overdue and mandated by U.S. law, this action should be taken immediately.
Tomsen goes on to stress that the same tired approach of mixed messaging and high-profile summitry with counterparts in Pakistan has got U.S. officials nowhere and that Washington should not underestimate the leverage it has over the Pakistanis. Pakistan may invoke the China card, but the Sino-Pakistani relationship is bound by thin thread and the U.S., Tomsen suggests, should call their bluff.
He suggests severing aid to Pakistan and even presenting Islamabad in the U.N. Security Council as a regime that sponsors terrorism. From Tomsen's perspective, nobody from the Taliban, including those in the notorious Haqqani network, should be allowed a place at the table in any future Afghan coalition government. "They are poison pills that have destroyed past Afghan peace efforts," he says.
And therein lies the rub, for it's impossible to imagine peace in Afghanistan — especially as the U.S. prepares to withdraw by 2014 — without some negotiated accommodation with the Taliban. Nor is it possible to imagine the U.S. right now risking such diplomatic brinkmanship with the Pakistanis. But, as the steady drumbeat of attacks continues with little real cooperation from the Pakistanis in sight, something will have to give.