As good as the T-34 was, the crucial thing was the numbers: 60000 made during the war. I would not count out German tanks: one Finnish guy recruited to SS Panzer and commandeered a Panzer V had 34 kills by himself of T34s. Also some individual Finns armed with Panzerfaust claimed a lot of kills against T 34s.
The same design philosophy stands: Leo 2 is designed to take out at least 3 Russian tanks before being knocked out. Of course we know that the real number is not three
Just a recap to put the issue in the correct perspective.
For the attack on Kursk, Germany had grouped 900,000 soldiers in the region, 10,000 artillery guns, 2,700 tanks and 2,000 aircraft. About 1/3rd of all Germany’s military strength was concentrated in the area. Elite Luftwaffe units were ordered there.
The Russians had also placed vast numbers of men and equipment in the Kursk bulge. 1.3 million soldiers were based there, 20,000 artillery pieces, 3,600 tanks and 2,400 planes. The Russians had guessed where the Germans would try to use their tanks in depth – and placed a large number of their anti-tank artillery guns there.
Germany started her attack at 04.30 with an artillery barrage. A tank and infantry attack started at 05.30 once air cover had arrived. The main thrust contained 500 tanks; heavy tanks at the front, supported by medium ones behind with infantry behind these. The Germans tried to break through on four occasions. They gained 6 miles of land in the first 24 hours of fighting but at a cost. 25,000 men had been killed or wounded, 200 tanks and self-propelled guns had been lost and 200 aircraft. A similar pattern occurred over the next few days. Ferocious German attacks were met with ferocious Russian defence. By July 10th, the German IX Army had lost 2/3rds of its tanks. Even the mighty Tiger tanks were falling victim to the Russians anti-tank guns. Russian tank commanders also quickly learned that if they attacked a Tiger side-on, its armour was thinner and more vulnerable.
The greatest tank battle of
World War Two place on July 12th. In total, 1,500 tanks were involved at Prokhorovka, some 50 miles to the south-east of Kursk. By nightfall, the Germans had not achieved the desired breakthrough. They had lost another 350 tanks and 10,000 men. The strength of the Germans in the south of the Kursk salient had been broken and the Russians launched a major counter-offensive. By July 23rd, the Germans had been pushed back to where they had stated their attack. The initiative now lay with the Russians who had a forward momentum to their advantage. The Germans were literally on the back foot.
On July 12th, the Russians launched another counter-offensive in the north of the salient in an effort to relieve Orel. They outnumbered the Germans two to one in all areas. Unable to call in reinforcements from their men fighting in the south, the Germans were unable to hold off the Russian offensive. By July 19th, the Russians had pushed forward 45 miles. The Russian Air Force ensured that the Luftwaffe was incapable of giving the army the support it needed. Faced with the collapse of its forces in Orel, General Model asked Hitler's permission to withdraw to the Hagen Line. Model warned Hitler that the Wehrmacht faced another Stalingrad if the withdrawal was not allowed. The German Army in and around Orel pulled back 60 miles in an effort to regroup. However, by the time the withdrawal had occurred, German troops were exhausted after constant harassment from the air by the Russian Air Force. By August 5th 1943, Orel was back in the hands of the Russians.
The German retreat was severely hindered by
partisans who destroyed many miles of rail line which ensured that train engines piled up at rail heads, making them an easy target for the Russian Air Force.
A similar situation occurred in the southern sector of the salient. Here the German Army was facing a formidable enemy that had the advantage of being on the offensive. In this sector, the Germans had 300,000 men and about 600 tanks. The Russians had nearly 1 million men in the region, including reserves, and many more tanks. Their counter-offensive in this sector started on August 3rd and two days later Russian forces entered Belgorod. The partisans who operated in this area derailed more than 1,000 train loads of troops in August - a major factor to explain why the Germans could not move their men around with ease. Morale among the German troops who fought in this sector plummeted. On August 13th, the Russians had broken through the outer defences of the city of Kharkov and by August 23rd, the city was liberated. The retaking of the city of Kharkov is seen as the end of the Battle of Kursk.
The Battle of Kursk was to have major consequences for the Germans. It was the last major offensive they launched in Russia. Now, their forces only faced retreat and attempting to stop the onslaught of the Red Army. The material damage done to the German Army was massive - 500,000 men were killed, wounded or missing; vast amounts of armour had been lost.
Therefore, what of the German tank philosophy beyond giving you a 'feel good' feeling and a false bravado?
