Russia may renounce START Treaty, Medvedev says: Voice of Russia
Russia may renounce START Treaty, Medvedev says
In a recent announcement that is seen as a "reset" between Russia and the US, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has warned that Moscow might opt out of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with the US and stop other arms control talks if the US proceeds with its controversial European missile defense shield. Medvedev said the US and NATO had failed to take Russia's concerns over the European missile defense into account and offered a list of retaliatory measures.
Dr. Aleksei Arbatov, Head of the Center for the International Security of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
Pardon my candor, Doctor, but this seems like something that is not good for the betterment of relations between the US and Russia. Fill us in on what is happening.
President Medvedev put a great stake on achieving an agreement with the US on ballistic missile defense cooperation. There was the START Treaty that you mentioned – but in this START Treaty there wasn't anything qualitatively new. We had a number of START Treaties before, over the previous 20 years. And this was just a continuation of the familiar strategic offensive arms control process. But coming to an agreement on ballistic missile defense cooperation was really something new and President Medvedev had a great hope that he would be able to achieve that. The failure put him and his policy in a quite disadvantageous position. He was deeply disappointed by it. That's why his today's statement was very harsh politically. But what he described as Russia's possible countermeasures wasn't really something new, or something unexpected, or something that could be perceived by the US as threatening.
As you mentioned, the US and Russia – specifically President Barack Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev – were very proud of the "reset" on the American-Russian relations. Now, to bring our audience up to speed, NATO and the US wanted to place their missile defense shield in a very close proximity to Russia. I believe the area that was talked about was in Poland. Is that accurate?
Yes, that was their tentative plan. Whether it will happen or not depends on the circumstances. But Russia, planning its negotiations for at least 10-15 years ahead due to the specific nature of this subject, has to have some certainty.
Absolutely. President Medvedev along with PM Putin were very adamant telling NATO and the US "perhaps, you can put your missile defense shield here, but we need written legal assurances that these missiles are not aimed at Russia. And NATO and the US weren't able to provide them with this.
Yes. But let me correct you a little bit. Russia wanted legal assurances that those missiles would not acquire the capability to intercept Russian ballistic missiles – that is to undermine Russian strategic nuclear deterrence and strategic parity between Russia and the US, which is still the basis for their military relationship.
President Medvedev said that "The United States and its NATO partners as of now aren't going to take our concerns about the European missile defense into account." He also went on to say that he feels as if this could be a threat to Russia's interests. What do you think?
If the US doesn't provide legal assurances about the scale and scope of defense deployments in Europe, then it's easy to imagine that the next administration – that' the one that comes after that – would take a decision to greatly expand these defenses, which would really put under threat reliability of Russia's strategic nuclear deterrence. Then Russia would have to take countermeasures, expanding its offensive and defensive capabilities. That may require withdrawal from the recently ratified START Treaty. But that's in the future. Medvedev didn't say we were planning to withdraw. He said that, depending on developments, we may consider such a step because the treaty's provisions are incompatible with the substance of the treaty, each side may withdraw. The same provision was in every treaty of that kind signed before. Actually, America used this provision when, in 2002, the US withdrew from the treaty on the limitation of ballistic missile systems, the ABM Treaty.
One other announcement that President Medvedev made is that Russia will station missile systems in its western-most Kaliningrad region and other areas if Russia and NATO officials fail to reach a deal on the US-led missile defense programs. Do you think this perhaps could be perceived as an act of aggression on the part of Russia by Western Europe if these missiles are stationed in Kaliningrad?
Missiles cannot conduct any aggression on their own. And Russia doesn't have and doesn't plan to have forces capable of aggression against NATO countries. If American missile defense sites are deployed in Poland and undercut Russian strategic deterrent, then Russia would consider itself entitled to deploy short-range offensive missiles in Kaliningrad area to negate this missile defense. Hopefully, there will be some kind of agreement or understanding and cooperation that will make it not necessary for Russia to go for such deployments.
Are relations between Russia and NATO growing more tense over this issue or is this a minor or a major problem for diplomatic people from Russia and NATO?
I think it's quite a big problem, because, on the one hand, this deployment can deprive Russia of the only pillar of its security, which is strategic nuclear deterrence. Everybody knows that Russian conventional forces are relatively weak, that NATO has attained huge superiority as a result of disbanding of the Warsaw Pact and then of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of Russian forces etc. So, strategic nuclear deterrence and tactical nuclear forces are the only reliable pillar of Russian security from the military point of view. I don't mean to say it's the only thing, on which Russia relies. There are many other things in terms of economic, political and diplomatic cooperation. But, as far as strategic relationships, nuclear offensive forces are the pillar of Russian security, because Russia cannot compete in conventional forces, Russia cannot compete in ballistic missile defenses, Russia cannot compete in new space systems, which are greatly enhancing the capability of precision-guided long-range conventional weapons. All these are the areas of Russian inferiority. So, deployments, which are going forward in Europe and which cannot be justified by the threat that is officially, according to the US, threat of Iranian missiles – such deployment, which is disproportionally greater than the threat, would make Russia think that this ballistic missile defense is against Russia. But let me pose you just one question, to which no American expert or a politician has ever given a reasonable answer: the US, on the one hand, is saying that under no circumstances will they permit Iran to acquire nuclear weapons; but, on the other hand, they are building ballistic missile defense to intercept Iranian ballistic missiles. Does it mean that such expensive defense is needed to intercept missiles armed with conventional warheads? If Iran has missiles with conventional warheads the threat of such missiles is negligible. It's not necessary to build such an expensive defense to intercept them. It's possible to rely on conventional strike capability against Iran, to deter Iran, and, in case Iran launches several missiles with conventional warheads, to retaliate with devastating force. This is something which makes Russia suspicious that this plan of Phased Adaptive Approach isn't aimed only against Iran, that it's not confined to Iranian threat – it's an open-end program, which, if successful technically, can acquire capabilities against Russia. That's why Russia is insisting on legally binding commitments, which mean some kind of limitations that would make Russia assured that this defense is only against Iran, that it cannot acquire capabilities against Russian strategic force.