Russia is strategically embracing China ?

[LTE-TDD]

And who needs Chinese care.....

You have enough to care for such as Pakistan..

Do not think India is important, in China's list, you are far behind. So do not pinic.

 

[roma]

another solid reason why china has to avoid war with india is that they have far more to lose - all the developed cities and all the painstaking care they have put in will go down the drain if their beautiful cities are nuked , compared with what india has to lose ...... plus the economic development, the industries and their closeness to achieving their objectives in overtaking the usa as would number 1

but india has to go for a nuclear stockpile which is more that what we know is being reported

 

[amoy]

Among the so-called BRICS groupe Russia and China are the most compatible and complemental to one another.

After Soviet's collapse Russia has experienced kind of "de-industrialization" . A resource-rich Russia and a manufacturing based China are a good match.

And a true answer to "Melacca Dilemma"

More share of fossile fuel export to Asia (China in particular) to faciliate Russia's "Renaissance":thumb:

 

[huaxia rox]

another solid reason why china has to avoid war with india is that they have far more to lose - all the developed cities and all the painstaking care they have put in will go down the drain if their beautiful cities are nuked , compared with what india has to lose ...... plus the economic development, the industries and their closeness to achieving their objectives in overtaking the usa as would number 1

but india has to go for a nuclear stockpile which is more that what we know is being reported

then i reckon you must be able to give the exactly same 'reason' to avoid war with pakistan.......very solid i must say......

 

[t_co]

then i reckon you must be able to give the exactly same 'reason' to avoid war with pakistan.......very solid i must say......

@roma, @huaxia rox, stay on topic.

As for Russia's strategic partnership with China, both sides should go for a increased cross-border trade, a fully demilitarized border, and then a step-by-step mil-mil alliance.

Since Russia loves defense exports, China could pursue a quid pro quo with Russia whereby Chinese and Russian defense manufacturers promise not to eat each other's lunch in export markets, and promise not to object to defense sales to regimes either country finds questionable (in much the same way that Britain doesn't mind France selling Argentina loads of missiles and fighter jets.) This would allow Chinese sales to Pakistan and Russian sales to India to continue without a hitch.

Energy and raw materials sales should be encouraged on a market basis, using much the same model that the Canada-US trade operates under. The natural incentives of the market will prod the growth of trade much more quickly than political fiat from Moscow or Beijing would. Governmental support should be limited to infrastructure coordination - Chinese expansion and modernization of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, for example, or construction of permanent, paved highways from Xinjiang and Heilongjiang to Siberian cities and onward to European Russia. European Russia can then act as a sort of a land bridge between Western Europe and East Asia, plugging Russia into the global economy in a way not dependent on energy sales.

Joint basing rights should be considered - Russian subs based in ice-free Chinese ports could keep Japan from getting any funny ideas about the Sakhalins, cut down the costs of operating remote bases in Far Eastern Siberia, and also reduce the risk of Vladivostok's role as the only substantial Pacific naval facility Russia has, plus give Russia's Pacific Fleet reach into, well, the actual Western Pacific. They would also give Chinese naval bases a degree of political immunity should fighting break out between China and Japan - the USN/JMSDF will be hard-pressed to indiscriminately strike Chinese bases if they knew they might accidentally hit a nuclear-armed Russian sub or two.

Russia and China could also integrate of national defense grids, in the same way that the US partners with the UK/Aus/NZ/Japan to host ELINT and SIGINT facilities. It's pretty expensive to keep shining those electronic lamps in Russia's Far East on Alaska and western Canada - maybe China could pick up the bill there and take over those facilities, especially since any reinforcement US aircraft to the Western Pacific and/or airborne resupply (if naval routes were contested by Chinese subs) would likely get shuttled through Elmendorf AFB and other northern facilities. A dozen S-400 sites there, plus two or so squadrons of multirole (ASuW + AAW) aircraft, would greatly complicate any Japanese attempt to exert pressure on China, as well as giving China a variety of subtle ways to exert pressure - say, by moving subs into all Japanese shipping lanes along the east coast of Honshu while mounting 'routine air patrols' against all Japanese air cargo routes and sealanes from the north, south, and west.

There should also be a mutual nuclear retargeting agreement, where both sides agree not to aim nukes at each other. This would magnify the strength of both sides' nuclear arsenals by reducing the number of targets either side has to consider. Cyber could operate under a similar 'no-hack' or 'minimum-hack' gentleman's agreement, again, focusing national security resources on more appropriate targets.

Such treaties would improve the national security of both states to a far higher level than selling a few shiny planes or submarines would imply. It is also a move that could be neatly spun with the rhetoric of disarmament and world peace.

 

[no smoking]

well china want to teach a lesson to india , china is making sure russia will not help india in any way .

Why, why do we want to teach one of our cash cow a lesson?

In next few year china will try to break india with help of indian neighbour.

Yes, so China can create a big refugee disaster for itself instead of a big market! wake up my friend.

Well china know only india can be future problem , but its chinise good luck that we are just sleeping.

It is really a big news for China!

Most of members say just imaginations but remember a thinktank should be based on imaginations .

That is exactly the reason that we don't see india as a problem.

 

[bose]

in fact china's official media doesn't care much about india.

Your official Media ?? It is a propaganda tool...

 

[Armand2REP]

Amur deal might be a 2+2 model...2 made in Russia ,and China shipyard would built the other 2 which means TOT is the part of Deal...and Russia would get the TOT of Stirling Engine AIP tech from China...

Russia made it clear this comes with no ToT. As far as a Chinese Stirling Engine...

 

[amoy]

Foreign policy: Changing faces | The Economist

Staying cordial with Russia is a priority for China. A Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s taught both countries how draining tensions can be along a border that today stretches more than 4,000km (2,500 miles). Yet for all their "strategic friendship", relations are not as good as they could be. To Chinese chagrin, the Russians have supplied advanced weaponry to India and Vietnam, two countries that are not on stellar terms with China. From Russia's perspective, whereas China was until recently a chief buyer of Russian arms, it has now become a chief competitor—often with copied Russian designs.

Energy also reveals the limits to Russian and Chinese cosiness. The two countries have bickered long and hard over China's request for access to more of Russia's oil and gas. Proposals to pipe natural gas from Russia to China have been stalled for years because of haggling over prices (see article). Hopes were raised last month when Gazprom, a Russian energy giant close to Mr Putin, said it would sign a gas deal with China by the end of the year. There have been false dawns before, though recent negotiations have been unusually intense.

Mr Xi is certainly fond of nationalist rhetoric. On March 17th, at the end of the 13-day annual session of the NPC, he repeated some favourite catchphrases. The country had to "strive to achieve the Chinese dream of the great renaissance of the Chinese nation". The army issued a circular to troops promising to provide "robust support" for this endeavour. That will not reassure neighbours who worry about China's growing assertiveness in disputed regional waters, and who turn to America for help.

However, Mr Xi is not intending to turn his back on America. President Barack Obama's new treasury secretary, Jack Lew, visited Beijing this week. Mr Xi assured him that ties with America were of "great importance". His trip marks a resumption of high-level contact between the two countries after a hiatus of several months, while America was absorbed by its presidential election and China by the handover to Mr Xi. The new secretary of state, John Kerry, is likely to visit Beijing in April.

 

[amoy]

Russia's Strategic Pivot To Asia Pacific – Analysis | Albany Tribune News

By Dr. Subhash Kapila

Russia's strategic pivot to the Asia Pacific indicated in his address at the APEC Meet in September 2012 at Vladivostok has all the ingredients of emerging as a strategic game-changer in the highly militarised region dominated by any number of conflictual flashpoints from North Korea down to the South China Sea disputes.

Russia's strategic pivot to Asia Pacific undoubtedly will prove a strategic game-changer both in terms of its timing and in its underlying intent. President Putin has well-timed his declaration at a time when the United States own declared strategic pivot to Asia has a tough challenge to restore the balance of power against China-induced military turbulence. In terms of intentions, President Putin has given notice that Russia after a decade and a half of resurgence under President Putin has now consolidated itself, and has now arrived on the Asia Pacific strategic scene.

In my last Paper focussing on United States strategic blunders in East Asia, a pointed reference was made that the United States most significant strategic blunder was not co-opting Russia in the management of the Asia Pacific security despite the much US publicised "reset" of relations with Russia in the first Obama Administration. Such a glaring omission hard to explain by Washington policy establishment was attributed by me to intense pressure from the "Cold War Gladiators" who still distort US policy- making and with their narcisstic fixations with China prefer ring a 'US-Threatening China' for management of Asia Pacific security, in preference to Russia having proven credentials of being a responsible stakeholder in global affairs.

Russia's geopolitical significance cannot be missed as a recent Carnegie feature by Dmitri Trennin states: "In sheer geopolitical terms—landmass, natural resources and military capabilities, Russia remains a major power in the region. It also sits in close proximity to several of key countries in the Asia Pacific. It has a 4,355 kilometres long border with China, and a short land frontier with North Korea, and is only separated by narrow straits from the United States and its principal ally, Japan".

Evidently, and it happens with foreign policy establishments of many countries, especially democracies, that they do not ponder over geographical maps oblivious to the fact that it is geographical determinants that drive strategy. Otherwise the planners in Washington would not have been seriously amiss in overlooking Russia's strategic significance in the Asia Pacific as outlined above.

Setting the above aside a belated realisation seems to be taking shape in Washington that Russia indeed may turn out to be a positive force in the management of Asia Pacific security. Some observers have inferred that the United States lack of any adverse reaction to President Putin's Vladivostok Declaration offers a clue that something deeper is afoot between the United States and Russia on Asia Pacific security.

Realistically the United States cannot expect that Russia would play second fiddle to the United States in the Asia Pacific strategic affairs. Nor should the United States expect that Russia would totally break away from its linkages with China. The latter can be brought about by the United States if it accords Russia the status and respect of a strategic co-equal in Asia Pacific affairs.

In the balance of power strategies that have always dominated the Asia Pacific security environment for decades when the United States played the 'China Card' against the Former Soviet Union and China itself exploited the 'China Card' to extract political and economic mileage from the United States, would it be too wild an expectation to assess that the United States may now at an opportune moment play the "Russia Card' against China?

Russia's strategic pivot to Asia needs also to be analysed in light of the current state of Russia-China relations. Two accepts from a CSIS publication of July 2011 by Shoichi Itoh elaborate this lucidly. The first excerpt runs as follows; "Paradoxically however it appears that Moscow and Beijing will never be freed from their everlasting mistrust regardless of how many new projects they may develop. In short the so-called Sino-Russian energy partnership has been largely a political show wrapped in a deep-rooted mutual distrust that contradicts the surface impression of an evolutionary consolidation of bi-lateral relations." Further, the same report adds that: "Russia's deep-rooted geopolitical distrust about China and Beijing's mistrust of Moscow have been and will be ineradicable, regardless of how diplomatically their strategic partnership will be orchestrated in world politics"

President Putin has been careful in not projecting Russia's strategic pivot to Asia in military terms even though that import cannot be side-lined. President Putin has projected his strategic foray in the Asia Pacific in economic terms of a comprehensive development of energy-rich Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East and integrating North East Asia into the Russian energy grid in the offing. Such strategies would offer lucrative business prospects for not only Japan and South Korea besides China, but more importantly to American oil giants now that their gaze from Middle East oil dependency is shifting.

The Asia Pacific security environment today is in a deep flux with China's switch from a strategy of 'soft power' to a strategy of 'hard power'. China's aggressive military postures in the South China Sea and East China Sea have been directed not only to subdue the smaller countries of the region but also erode the image of the United States as a reliable and credible power to underwrite Asia Pacific security. It was this which prompted the United States strategic pivot to Asia.

While the United States have been able to marshal the South East nations and Japan and India too in this direction, their combined weight cannot match the strategic weight of Russia emerging in the Asia Pacific as a substantial stakeholder in North East Asia security even if not the whole of Asia Pacific.

Concluding, it can be said that Russia's strategic pivot and more assertive profile in Asia Pacific security while not being part of any United States strategy of containment of China, could definitely induce strategic concerns in China, to the benefit of Asia Pacific security and stability as a whole.