PART 4
Reasons for Opposition to the Agreement
The following are the major reasons for the opposition to the agreement:
(i) The LSA envisages Indian and American armed forces providing logistical support, transportation including airlift, refuelling, and storage services for each other's warships and aircraft on a reciprocal basis at the time of joint military exercises and disaster relief operations. Though the US government has been persistently urging India to sign the agreement soon to facilitate such cooperation, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government remains reluctant to do so because of the resistance from opposition political parties. The left-wing political parties, Communist Party of India (CPI) and Communist Party of India-Marxist CPI (M), had earlier contended that the agreement would give the US unfettered access to Indian military bases.31 The opposition leaders also alleged that it could lead India getting caught up in US regional military operations.32 The provisions of similar agreements that the US has signed with a number of countries do not allow permanent basing rights or carry any commitment to assist each other during military conflicts;
however, such oppositions hinder in building political consensus in signing the agreement.
(ii) The critics of the agreement argue that the proposed agreement is not simply an agreement governing minor courtesies extended by one friendly country to another but extension of such support services has a clear military purpose. The growing India-US defence relations and especially the escalating joint military exercises between their armed forces are also seen by the critics as pretext to create military alliance in Asia and to put more pressure on India to purchase expensive weaponry from the US.33 The recent
tranche of US embassy cables made public by WikiLeaks show how an anxious Washington over the last several years has tried to push these agreements but failed to get anywhere.34 Moreover, the Indian armed forces do not want to be 'tied down to only one (US) system'.35 These security concerns arise despite LSA being seen as a mutually beneficial and cost-effective arrangement to provide logistical support for each other's armed forces during joint operations.
(iii) India-US joint military exercises aim at advancing closer military-to-military relations, greater familiarity with each other's equipment, and operational systems, and interoperability in joint operations where LSA will be very critical. India, in fact, 'conducts more exercises and personnel exchanges with the United States than with any other country',36 and this is the most visible aspect of the growing India-US defence relationship. In the last one decade, India has conducted over 60 joint military exercises with the US in an effort to build the capacity of the armed forces for peacekeeping and disaster relief operations. However, this has triggered spirited protests by the opposition political parties, particularly by left-wing parties. They object to the exercises on the ground that these will further draw India into the strategic orbit of the US and integrate India more closely with
Washington's global agenda, which they oppose on security and political grounds.37 It needs to be pointed out here that India is not a small country and its foreign policy decisions cannot be dictated by any other country, and that bilateral defence cooperation is solely based on mutually beneficial national interests.
(iv) The critics of the agreement also point out that United States military forces are operating all over the world including the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The LSA with India would, therefore, benefit the US more than India because currently India's military forces are not operating near America.38 The critics argue that the dividends of logistical cooperation and on-going joint military exercises are skewed in favour of the US. The fact is that the US has signed logistics support agreements with South East, South Asian, and also with Middle East countries. If India will not sign the agreement it will not affect much the US military operational capability in these regions. However, as India looks for playing a larger role in these regions and wants to protect its key foreign policy interests by countering emerging security challenges, its closer strategic relationship with the US in this context will thus
be in its interest.
(v) The US demands that unless India signs LSA along with two other technology safeguard agreements—the Communication Interoperability and Security Agreement (CISMOA), and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation (BECA)39—the advance of bilateral defence cooperation will be hampered and India will keep itself away
from obtaining cutting-edge defence technologies which will affect operational capability of its armed forces. As the former US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, stated on a visit to
New Delhi in January 2010, that not getting the outstanding agreements signed 'is an obstacle to Indian access to the very highest level of technology.'40 The US maintains that deficiencyof these equipment hamper the ability of the Indian armed forces to better perform in contingency operations. Despite these claims, however, senior Indian armed forces officials pointed out that the absence of these agreements will not make any substantial difference to India's operational capabilities.41 These proposed agreements are also seen as the strings attached to the development of defence cooperation.
(vi) Critics also cast doubt on the reliability of the US as a logistics support and supply partner. These doubts have their origin in its imposition of sanctions after India's nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998. The US also cut off weapons supplies to India after war broke out between India and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971. India's defence establishment has had a residual distrust of the US since then, and this has not changed despite subsequent, positive developments in the bilateral relations.42 An enduring trust deficit is thus hindering in building consensus on key security areas for cooperation.
(vii) India seeks recognition from the US that it is a special partner entitled to receive certain priorities and concessions that are not extended universally. In this regard, Michael Mazza of the American Enterprise Institute, addressing India's recent decision against buying an American-made fighter jet in its Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA), argued that 'the United States requires all foreign buyers to sign up to end-use monitoring agreements (EUMAs). That includes our oldest and closest allies. The Brits and the Australians can find this just as frustrating as the Indians do. I sometimes get the sense that folks in India expect special treatment from the United States as a show of good faith.'43 Sunil Dasgupta and Stephen P. Cohen also make a similar point when they argue that 'as long as Washington is unwilling to grant India special privileges, it will not be able to turn endless
discussions into genuine cooperation.'44 Thus, strategic analysts contend that if the US wants its appropriate share of the large economic opportunity presented by India's defence market45 and if it wants to build up 'a long-term strategic partnership with India',46 it is necessary for the political and bureaucratic leadership in the US to remove these strings and extend administrative and regulatory preferences to India.
(viii) Finally, India does not want to be seen as a military ally of the US. Instead, it wants to develop a mutually beneficial relationship with all major powers, including United States. Kanwal Sibal, former Foreign Secretary of India, expresses this sense when he states that 'India wants to develop broad-based mutually beneficial relations with various global power centres rather than being seen as excessively leaning towards one power centre.'47 India now has signed 'strategic partnerships' with over 30 countries and the significance of each of these strategic partnerships differs from one another because of their different political, economic, nd security dimensions.48 It is thus believed that the proposed agreement may upset India's other strategic partners, particularly Russia. As Brahma Challeney pointed out: 'If India gets sucked into the US strategic dominion through EUMA and other arrangements—with the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) next on Washington's list, along with the Mutual Logistic Support Agreement (MLSA)—its special relationship with Moscow is bound to change.'49 Furthermore, at a time when the United States economic and political power is relatively declining, and India's regional and international profile is growing, it is perceived that its balanced relationship with all the major countries of the world is very critical to its rise as a major power in the twenty-first century.
Benefits of the Agreement
In spite of the above security concerns and domestic political compulsions, the agreement offers several benefits to both the nations and provides best opportunities for their armed forces to work together to counter the security challenges of the twenty-first century. The following are the key benefits of the agreement.
(i)
The logistics support agreement will enhance operationalcapabilities of Indian armed forces and help mitigate logistics shortfalls. The June 2005 India-US new defence framework agreement had laid out a road-map for joint military exercises, training, and service exchanges. Since then their armed forces have conducted the maximum number of joint military exercises, and their growing strategic partnership is taking these operations to highly advanced levels. Service officers have been attending expert exchanges and participating in joint seminars, conferences, and observer programmes. In this regard, General V.P. Malik, former Chief of Army Staff, pointed out that Indian exposure to the combined arms training at the US National Training Centre has been very useful. Such training contributes to further refinement of the Indian military's war doctrine, rapid force deployment, higher defence management, etc. Officers have also benefited from the US experience of fighting cyber terrorism, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) defeating mechanism in
Iraq and Afghanistan,50 infrastructure development in strife- torn regions and inaccessible areas, and execution of rescue and relief operations during natural disasters. On the other hand, the Indian military has invaluable operational experience in all types of terrain, dealing with sub-conventional wars, conflicts in ethnically diverse societies, and international peacekeeping. These are essential aspects in the nature of current conflicts and come handy in conflict resolution. Therefore, the two countries can share their respective operational capabilities and experiences for further strengthening the capabilities of their armed forces to counter the non-traditional security challenges of the twenty- first century. This will further get institutionalized and regularized once both the nations operationalize the proposed agreement. The Pentagon also argues that the signing of the LSA would ease accounting and book-keeping hassles during frequent joint exercises between the two sides.51 The US, thus, believes that India-US defence cooperation will get further impetus with
having proper logistics support mechanism.
(ii) As part of the March 2006 India-US Maritime Cooperation Framework,52 they had agreed to conclude LSA at the earliest that would allow each side to use maintenance, berthing, and support services of the other side during deployments. The agreement is important because the MCF provides for joint Indo-US maritime operations, including joint-patrolling of energy trade routes including the Malacca Strait, anti-piracy, and other transnational crimes at sea, search and rescue operations, anti-pollution at sea, and rescue and relief operations during natural disasters. The Pentagon believes that 'Deepening maritime security cooperation with India holds great potential over the next five years across'53 these security issues. Furthermore, expressing growing concern over pirates' influence beyond the western Indian Ocean, Thomas P. Kelly, US Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political Military Affairs, in a briefing said that 'India's a critical partner in our multilateral efforts to combat piracy.'54 The US also sees the Indian Navy's growth in capability as an adjunct to its own progressively swelling operational commitments in South Asian waters. They see such an agreement as a logical conclusion to the escort assistance provided by the Indian Navy to American merchant vessels passing through the Malacca Strait after the September 11 terrorist attacks.55 Thus, India and the US can be key security partners in the vast expanses of the IOR and the LSA will be very useful in mitigating capability gaps and logistics shortfalls while addressing regional contingencies.
(iii) The exchange of the LSSS facilities between the two countries around the world would also enhance India's strategic role, keeping in mind the projected expansion of the Indian Navy and its growing footprint. Since India's economic and foreign policy interests are no more confined to the South Asian region, its close defence and strategic relationship with the US would be a critical factor in its larger desire to be able to protect and promote its foreign policy interests well beyond South Asia. On the other hand, the US would be unlikely to sniff at the opportunity to take advantage of Indian logistics support facilities in an institutionalized manner as it already has a respectable number of options in the IOR. One of them is at Diego Garcia.56
(iv) The agreement will thus help increase the operational outreach of Indian armed forces and strengthen the Indo-US strategic relationship. The US even regards India as 'a rising power and a responsible global power'. US President Barack Obama has called, 'the relationship between the United States and India will be a defining partnership in the 21st century', rooted in common values and interests.57 At the same time, the US government also stresses upon India to play a larger role in Asia and beyond in the coming years. As former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton pointed out: 'the United States is making a strategic bet on India's future—that India's greater role on the world stage will enhance
peace and security.'58
(v) The proposed agreement has economic benefits too. Once the agreement comes into force, India would be able to save around $20 million per war game, when Indian forces take part in any of the joint military exercises with the US on American soil, such as the Red Flag War Games held in 2008;59 this is because India would not have to pay the money for receiving logistics support while participating in such military exercises. Instead, it would be able to provide reciprocal logistics support under the provision of replacement in kind and equal value exchange in this country whenever the US defence forces require them.60 India would save money by providing LSSS items because of the cost differences
between India and the US. The countries under the agreement also share the costs and burdens of logistics support, supplies, and services. This sharing results in efficiency and reduction of the logistics shortfalls. In addition, sharing of the burden leads to a common operating picture and start-point, and provides the commanders with a unified, multinational perspective.61
(vi) Some argue that the ongoing Indo-US joint military exercises and the benefits of logistical cooperation are at present tilted in favour of the US. However, it is pertinent to point out here that the current global geo-strategic environment is marked by a contradiction. On the one hand, countries are forging 'promiscuous' politico- diplomatic partnerships. On the other, they are adopting hedging strategies as a result of uncertainties about the intentions of the emerging poles. For India, joint military exercises with the United States serve both imperatives concurrently.62 Consequently, identifying convergence of interests between the two countries and absolute gains are more crucial for India than extracting a 'balance-of-dividends' and relative gains.