Revived: plan to give access to bases to US

[Ray]

The final point I would like to make is by asking what benefits USA will have using Indian bases ? I mean India will be better off in the scheme of things than USA.

It will dominate the Indian Ocean with what is known as Sea Control from bases close to the Indian Ocean, wherein the response will be faster and cheaper logistically.

 

[DingDong]

What does India get from this deal? US may refuse us access to the US controlled bases citing various reasons. I don't think that India is planning to venture outside the Indian Ocean for at least next two decades.

I read this on another forum a person saying that both India and the US are dangling carrot to each other. This might actually be a correct assessment, the deal will go nowhere.

 

[The Messiah]

What does India get from this deal? US may refuse us access to the US controlled bases citing various reasons. I don't think that India is planning to venture outside the Indian Ocean for at least next two decades.

I read this on another forum a person saying that both India and the US are dangling carrot to each other. This might actually be a correct assessment, the deal will go nowhere.

Another question that needs to be raised is can usa grant access to India on certain bases that were given to usa itself on the basis of bilateral agreement between the host country and usa ? Im sure India wont allow usa to grant access to another country to its base in India.

I dont think our navy needs any bases in Indian ocean but air force could do with bases in afghanistan, taiwan namaste, singapore. And i bet we wont be allowed so we gain nothing while uncle gains everything. Plus we could ourselves have an agreement with vietnam and afghanistan to have bases.

And what use is of israel apart from getting latest tech without strings ? We dont need yank tech laced with strings when we can get equally on par tech from israel without any such strings which would itself be a temporary because we should be focussing on making our own.

 

[The Messiah]

The problem is not giving logistics assistance to US Forces or their air/naval craft. The problem begins with their text of the treaty.

CISMOA and BECA which Americans want India to sign, mentions quite restrictive use of their technological products and restrictive procedures to maintain and replace them. The restrictions were so severe that after a few years of operating INS Jalashwa/USS Trenton, Indian Navy decided to replace all of their electronic gadgets with Indian/Israeli/French replacements, just to avoid their intrusive inspections, which was nothing but an affront to Indian operational sovereignty. Hello, we bought with hard cash, NO? Its not an aid !!

Similarly, India bought Boeing BBJ for VIP travel and installed RWR, MAWS and other EW safety electronics in them from Americans. After a year, there was serious friction between Indian Air Force and US DOD over annual intrusive inspections and annual counting of their products. That was one reason why when Americans wanted India to sign CISMOA, BECA and LSA during 2005-2009, 1. AK Antony was pressurised by Indian Military services to not sign those restrictive clauses. The benefit was minor which could be supplanted by electronic stuff from other countries but loss of operational sovereignty was severe. So we got P-8I, C-17, C-130J without their electronic gadgets and we have not missed their gadgets so far.

LSA had some other kind of opposition. 2. As I said earlier, India has no problem with supplying or maintaining American air/naval craft at Indian bases. What India will never agree to is the expectation that a portion of all Indian bases would be reserved for exclusive American use (with perfunctory annual Indian inspection). Logistical assistance is different than logistical basing and India will never agree to the latter. So, instead of Americans insisting India to ign these three agreements, need of the hour is mutually writing a fresh agreement which is a win-win for both parties.

1. Im sure according to casper they too were anti us lobby out to butcher any venture.

2. Agreed

 

[Ray]

What does India get from this deal? US may refuse us access to the US controlled bases citing various reasons. I don't think that India is planning to venture outside the Indian Ocean for at least next two decades.

I read this on another forum a person saying that both India and the US are dangling carrot to each other. This might actually be a correct assessment, the deal will go nowhere.

if US does not allow, then would India?

Who has more to lose?

 

[Zebra]

@The Messiah,

Indian Military Services had conveyed their go ahead message to defence minister, since 2011.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

US is already supporting Balichistan seperatists thru covert and clandestine operations, this is common knowledge. Afgjanistan will be absorbed in the Sino-Russian sphere under SCO and will not go against it by aiding USA against Pakistan.
Bakckwater has largely been pulled back in the aftermath of the Raymond Davis affair and the killing of Bin Laden. Their presence peaked under Zardari who issued more than 65.000 unchecked visas to the US citizens including what is believed to be 5000 blackwater agents. Still according to some sources there are almost 2000 blackwater agents operating in the country.

Do you realise that if China officially announced the plans to go for Gwadar naval base, it is no longer US vs Pakistan? Chinese will be involved too against any agression or sabaotage from USA.

Do you believe Chinese would involve themselves in any conflicts? Past history says
Otherwise.

 

[hit&run]

It will dominate the Indian Ocean with what is known as Sea Control from bases close to the Indian Ocean, wherein the response will be faster and cheaper logistically.

Sir, even in that case nothing will be sinister.

1. They will be doing it with Indian consent, we will be aware of their movements especially in and out of Indian bases or more depending on our range of detection, if not exact whereabouts.

2. In an event of conflict India can influence if not dictate the narrative of their presence.

3. India is not their enemy, even when we are not having any alliance today.

4. They will bring our cost down of guarding the trade lanes and checking and out scouting Chinese fleet which we have failed to deter as they have already started docking Sri Lankan ports, not to mention they are just short of dumping ammunition on Pakistani ports.

5. In an Ideal situation where India is suppose to be a formidable naval force who wouldn't ran out of missiles and fuel taking down entire Chinese fleet paroling South Vietnam sea, one can deffer such alliance with USA, but with depleting sub surface fleet and immediate threats, I see such alliance if not permanent but long and credible enough to fill the gaps till the time we catch up with our own numbers which are in line or limbo.

 

[hit&run]

What does India get from this deal? US may refuse us access to the US controlled bases citing various reasons. I don't think that India is planning to venture outside the Indian Ocean for at least next two decades.

I read this on another forum a person saying that both India and the US are dangling carrot to each other. This might actually be a correct assessment, the deal will go nowhere.

Treat me like your elder brother if your are younger than 35; I am sorry to say you lack attitude of Big Boys.

India has been never independent for its security needs since its inception (1947). So the points becoming slave of some hyper power is moot.

The discussion should not be focused on the details of such agreements because it quite premature to assume or being judgmental about other nations, but why there was need of such revelations to be made public by GOI.

In my understanding present government is showing a brave face and taking a radical stand (Paradigm shift) against some thing that might have gone wrong or going to be wrong against Indian interests.

Since rejection of Mig-35 the Russians have started speaking in varying tones. Following money trail is always a safest bet while predicting soundness of relation between two nations. The trade between Russia and China has reached to astronomical amounts and it is not only about trade of goods but deals of strategic/logistic nature. I don't think India will now be enjoying the same luxury/buffer of Russia suspicious of China.

Our strategic thinkers failed to foresee fall of USSR because we never had the culture of it. We remained in the same camp when Chinese opened the door to USA. Now they are weaning off their dependence on USA and diversifying their alliances with the same wealth they earned from USA. But here in India we are still behaving like stuck up bimbos.

 

[blueblood]

I cannot deny that if we sign the treaty, there will not be Jaichand at a later date.

The flip side is sign and foster the bond to our advantage so that Jaichands of the future are hamstrung. Also has a clause that it will be reviewed every 5 years (term of the Govt).

Further, there is no guarantee that a Jaichand of the future will not totally sell the country.

Since we don't know the clauses and proposals in the agreement we won't know for sure.

Actually, the joint exercises are more dangerous since they learn of our tactics, mindset etc. After all, wars are won by men and men who man machines and not machines.

If one knows how an Army 'ticks', then one is armed to take on that Army.

If that's true then it works both ways, I think.

Well, after Independence, the meagre wealth we inherited only lay with the Govt. Therefore, there was no option but to adopt a command economy. But Indians are sharp cookies and so they started milking the system, but you can hardly blame the idea that necessitated the command economy. With all its disadvantages, it did lay the foundations of modern India on which we are now build upon. Just look at Pakistan. It had laissez faire. See where it is. To be frank, it was Indira Gandhi, who did good work otherwise, but she exploited the system to its being reviled totally. Narashima Rao, was the real architect who turned India. And today, we are in a different ballpark. That, however, does not mean that the earlier system before the morass set in, was totally flawed.

Sir, I am not criticizing the decision to go with the mixed economy (term used in text books back then) but to stick with it until we went broke and only after IMF kicked our backsides did we agree to open the economy.

Of course, China would like to look East. That is where the gold lies in the Sea.

But she will spout pious platitudes and homilies to 'disarm' India that a border agreement is near and then after consolidating in the East, will turn with vengeance to India. Why do you think they are building infrastructure rapidly in Tibet and Xinjaing? They love the Tibetans and Uighurs? Not at all. They are deep thinkers and sees ahead. That is why they lulled India and then attacked in 1962, They had plans to expand their hold over area that bordered Tibet claiming it was a part of Tibet. The problem festers even now and which they want to fester so that India is diverted from becoming stronger by squandering finances on defence.

Why do you think the occupied Tibet? They see way way ahead, unlike us, who are lulled by sweet words and our ego massaged regularly.

And never forget the "Peaceful Rise" humbug that took in the US. During the so called 'Peaceful Rise', she rose with all asset that was hardly peaceful and now the US regrets it.

Trusting a Communist Chinaman is facing a bowler who bowls a Chinaman. Dicey and Deceptively Dangerous.

Sir, India is not as weak vis a vis China as portrayed by "Desi Dork Media". China was a military power even in 1962 or rather 1950s, India was about as powerful as Bangladesh is today. If we can and sooner than later we will have to negotiate some kind of agreement with China or else we might loose a lot of resources competing with them militarily.

The latest ego massage by certain countries who have their axe to grind and to which we have succumbed is that India is a budding superpower. We are hardly anywhere near it.

Earlier it was Hindi- Chini bhai bhai, today it is Hindi-Amreeki bhai bhai.

 

[sorcerer]

Part 1

Logistics Support Agreement
A Closer Look at the Impact on India-US Strategic Relationship

Saroj Bishoyi*
Logistics support between the armed forces of India and the US will be a vital aspect for enhancing cooperation in capability development to respond to natural disasters and address emerging security threats of the twenty-first century. As the 2005 India-US New Framework Defence Agreement highlights the broader areas of convergence of security nterests, the exchange of logistics support facilities would further enhance bilateral defence cooperation as well as India's strategic role, keeping in view the projected expansion of the Indian Navy's role beyond the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The absence of appropriate logistics support mechanism between the two countries would hamper such capabilities to effectively deal with the security challenges during emergency situations. This article argues that the logistics support agreement the US has signed with many other countries and a similar agreement that it had proposed for India, is a mutually beneficial agreement. However, both sides need to make efforts to arrive at a consensus that is consistent with their national interests and policies.



introduction
Cooperation in the fields of defence and security has been central to the recent upsurge in the India-US strategic relationship. The Indo-US defence relationship has, in fact, grown from solely military-to-military links into a mature partnership that encompasses dialogues on a range of issues, including military exercises, defence technology sales, professional
military education exchanges, and practical cooperation. The crux of the defence cooperation is related to defence procurements, transfer of dual-use technologies, research and development, and India's defence industrialization.

The two countries now talk about collaborating on multinational operations and strengthening the ability of their armed forces to respond quickly to disaster situations by mitigating logistics shortfalls. The US even looks towards building a long-term strategic partnership with India to support its ability to counter the emerging security threats and to develop procedures for facilitating cooperation in future contingencies. However, such practical cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries and their ability to perform effectively get affected by the absence of proper logistics support arrangements. For removing such barriers and enabling practical cooperation, the US first proposed a Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), the India-specific version of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), at the sixth meeting of the India-US Defence Policy Group (DPG) in June 2004.3

The arrangement aimed at the exchange of logistics support, supplies, and services between the armed forces of the two countries on reciprocal basis. In pursuit of their shared vision of an expanded and deeper strategic relationship, in June 2005, they signed the New Framework for Defence Cooperation in which they agreed to work together to further develop their defence relationship by expanding defence trade, technology transfer, conducting joint military exercises, training, and building worldwide capacity to conduct successful peacekeeping and disaster relief operations.

In the March 2006 strategic partnership agreement, they agreed to finalize an LSA at the earliest to facilitate logistics support during joint military exercises, peacekeeping, and disaster relief operations.5 They also agreed to the conclusion of a Maritime Cooperation Framework (MCF) to enhance maritime security to prevent piracy and other transnational crimes at sea, respond to natural disasters, address emergent threats, and enhance cooperative capabilities, through logistics support. Since then the US has been insisting on signing the LSA to overcome the barriers that stand in the way of further developing the defence and strategic relationship between the two countries.6 But India has been citing domestic political compulsions and stating that the agreement needs closer scrutiny and assessment from the viewpoint of the benefits that India would accrue by signing it.7 It is now pending before the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) for clearance at the time of going to press. This article argues that India can obtain more defence and strategic benefits by signing the logistics support agreement with the US and should, therefore, move ahead to do so. However, both sides need to make efforts to arrive at an agreement that is consistent with their national interests and policies. The article examines and analyses in detail the LSA and its implications for India's independent foreign policy as well as for the India-US strategic relationship.

The key issues it covers are: What is the LSA and what are its main characteristics? How can the agreement be operationalized? Does LSA compromise India's independent foreign policy? Whether India has to provide basing rights under this agreement? What are the main reasons for opposition to this agreement? What are the benefits that India will accrue through this agreement? And, finally, how it will affect the evolving India-US strategic relationship?



===

Article is in 5 Parts..

 

[sorcerer]

Part 2

Logistics Support Agreement

As already mentioned, the LSA is similar to the ACSA that the US has with many of its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies. The ACSA statute, formerly known as 'NATO Mutual Support Act', was enacted in 1979 to simplify exchanges of logistics support, supplies, and services between the US and other NATO forces. Subsequently, it was amended in 1986, 1992, and 1994 to permit acquisition and cross- servicing agreements with non-NATO eligible countries or international organizations.8 At present, the US has signed such agreements with over 80 countries around the world, including NATO member countries. In South Asia, it signed this agreement with Afghanistan in February 2004 and with Sri Lanka in March 200710 for ten years to transfer and exchange logistics supplies, support, and re-fuelling of services during joint military exercises, peacekeeping missions, and humanitarian relief operations. 11 It is quite pertinent to mention here that the US Department of Defense (DoD) and the Pakistan's Ministry of Defence had also signed this agreement in February 2002 which lapsed in February 2012.12 In a recent report, Pakistan's Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS) recommended that the agreement 'may only be renewed if required on new terms and conditions that should include respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan and ensures the national interests.'13

Besides India, the US is currently negotiating with other South Asian countries14 for signing this agreement which will enhance DoD's rapid deployment capacity and capability to conduct global operations by adding logistical options in South Asia, which ultimately reduces cost and provides flexibility to US forces moving through the region.


Defining LSA
The US DoD defines LSA—which is also referred to as Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA)—as an international agreement between the DoD and an eligible country or international organization under which the US agrees to provide Logistics Support, Supplies and Services (LSSS) to military forces of eligible countries or organizations and in return for
the reciprocal provision of logistics support, supplies and services by such governments or organizations to the US military forces.15 It is, thus, an arrangement between the US and host nations to exchange LSSS for their armed forces in a more collaborative environment.


Objective of the Agreement
The objective of the agreement is to provide legal authority for LSSS. It is used for joint military exercises, training requirements, deployments, unforeseen emergencies, exigent circumstances, peacekeeping and disaster relief operations, and wartime needs, and also exercises to correct logistic deficiencies which cannot be met by a nation on its own.16 It is considered to be a 'critical logistics enabler' by providing commanders enhanced operational readiness and cost effective mutual support. It provides flexibility to commanders for engagement and also for worldwide military- to-military interoperability between the signatories. Interoperability between the armed forces means that military personnel of India and the US can use each other's equipment and better conduct joint operations such as peacekeeping and disaster relief operations.17 At the strategic level, the agreement provides for timely, flexible, and efficient logistics. Since the agreement is cooperative in nature, it also strengthens the relationship between the countries and promotes the goals of foreign policy interests.


Operationalization of the Agreement

Once the proposed agreement comes into force, either India or the US can indicate its requirement in a prescribed form to the other. The requirements permitted to be fulfilled under the agreement entail LSSS items only. In other words, the agreement allows the participants to exchange food, water, clothing, medical services, billeting (accommodation), transportation including airlift, petroleum, oils, lubricants, storage services, communication services, base operations support (and construction incident to base operations support), use of facilities, training services, spare parts and components, repair and maintenance services, and air and sea port services. General purpose vehicles and other items of non-lethal military equipment not designated as Significant Military Equipment on the United States Munitions List (USML) may be leased or loaned for temporary use.18
But the agreement prohibits the exchange of major-end items: fighter aircrafts, missiles, bombs, gunship, etc.; weapon systems such as guidance systems for missiles, torpedoes, aerial bombs and naval guns; deterrent systems such as chaffs and chaff dispensers; ammunition as covered in the USML; and nuclear and chemical ammunition.19 Items not eligible
for transfer under this agreement also include 'those items which are barred for transfer under the national laws of the two countries'.20 On the receipt of the request, the recipient may review the request and should decide whether or not it can fulfil the requested requirement. The order for LSSS should be mutually agreeable and consistent with each party's
priorities. Moreover, it does not place any obligations on the number or value of transaction to be provided by either party. Any transaction may be declined by the potential provider as deemed necessary.21 If the request is accepted, the order is counter-signed; the logistics support, supplies and services are delivered or provided; and the participants have a specified period of time from billing date to settling date.

 

[sorcerer]

PART 3

Methods of Payment for LSSS
A logistics support agreement enables the exchange of LSSS through three types of transactions—cash, replacement in kind (RIK), or equal value exchange (EVE). At present, for logistical supports including food, fuel and stores, both the Indian and the US governments pay in cash only.22 However, it should be noted that the agreement does not aim at making
or receiving donations. What has been obtained should be paid for within a reasonable time period according to the agreed terms. It also does not aim at making additional profits. The agreement requires the participants to charge each other what they charge themselves. This gives both parties a substantial cost benefit by reducing overheads. In other words, the lowest rates applied to the Defence Ministry will be charged from the recipient (US), not the usual higher rates applied for foreign military sales (FMS). The three types of transactions are explained below.2


(i) The first mode of payment for LSSS is through standard Cash:
cash transactions. For instance, if the US provides $2 million worth of food, water, oil, medical services to the Indian armed orces engaged in a joint military exercise, India can settle the amount by paying the same to the US in cash.

(ii) In this case, the receiving party replaces logistics support, RIK:
supplies, and services that it receives with logistics support, supplies, and services of an identical, or substantially identical, nature. For instance, if the US armed forces in a peacekeeping or disaster relief operation get $2 million worth of food and oil for its armed forces from India, the US government can settle that amount by providing food and oil worth the same amount to the Indian armed forces going to US harbour.

(iii) In a transaction conducted under this agreement, payment EVE:

by the receiving nation of LSSS is made by exchanging LSSS of an equal value to those received. This process allows the participants to exchange different goods and services of equal
worth. For instance, if the US provides $2 million worth of food and water to the Indian armed forces, India may provide clothing and medical services of equal worth to the United States armed forces and settle the amount.

The LSA and India's Independent Foreign Policy
In a written reply to questions in the Lok Sabha, India's former External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, said that the agreement 'will not affect the independence of India's foreign policy.' It would rather provide a 'framework for mutual logistical support when deploying defence resources in disaster relief operations or joint exercises.' Further, the logistical support, supplies, and services 'that will be provided in disaster relief operations abroad will enhance India's ability to assist affected countries efficiently.'24
Logistical support between the armed forces of India and the US is not something new. During the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War, in fact, 'India granted overflight rights for Desert Shield missions through the Pacific.'25

In January 1991, it also permitted US military aircraft to refuel in Bombay. However, this decision of the Chandra Shekhar government stirred domestic controversy which withdrew the refuelling privileges in February 1991 to deflect the criticism of the Congress Party that India's nominal pro- US tilt betrayed the country's non-aligned principles.26 Nevertheless, since the relationship between the two countries has improved in recent years, their armed forces have cooperated operationally on important occasions.

During the December 2004 tsunami, they successfully conducted humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.27 In January 2006, the American Navy rescued Indian mariners off the Horn of Africa whose ship had been hijacked by Somali pirates. Under the India-US disaster relief initiative, approved in July 2005, India airlifted supplies and made
a contribution to the American Red Cross following Hurricane Katrina.28 Both navies are also conducting counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden since 2008. As a result of these practices, cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries, the operational capabilities of the Indian armed forces and their ability to better perform in such situations
has been enhanced.


The LSA and Basing or Access Rights
The agreement does not permit permanent basing rights for the militar forces in either country. It is also not an agreement for access to rights for foreign troops. If India signs the proposed agreement, it will not compel India to support or make an alliance with the US. There are no requirements to commit Indian forces or in any way participate in any ongoing US military operations. As India's former External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee said that 'This (LSA) does not envisage providing military facilities to US forces. Neither does it provide for unqualified Indian support to the US in any armed conflict to which India is not a party.'29 He had also made it clear that the proposed agreement 'does not carry any commitment to assist each other during periods of armed conflict.'30 Thus, it gives freedom to both the sides to decline any request for logistical support if that is not in their national interests.

 

[sorcerer]

PART 4

Reasons for Opposition to the Agreement
The following are the major reasons for the opposition to the agreement:

(i) The LSA envisages Indian and American armed forces providing logistical support, transportation including airlift, refuelling, and storage services for each other's warships and aircraft on a reciprocal basis at the time of joint military exercises and disaster relief operations. Though the US government has been persistently urging India to sign the agreement soon to facilitate such cooperation, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government remains reluctant to do so because of the resistance from opposition political parties. The left-wing political parties, Communist Party of India (CPI) and Communist Party of India-Marxist CPI (M), had earlier contended that the agreement would give the US unfettered access to Indian military bases.31 The opposition leaders also alleged that it could lead India getting caught up in US regional military operations.32 The provisions of similar agreements that the US has signed with a number of countries do not allow permanent basing rights or carry any commitment to assist each other during military conflicts;
however, such oppositions hinder in building political consensus in signing the agreement.

(ii) The critics of the agreement argue that the proposed agreement is not simply an agreement governing minor courtesies extended by one friendly country to another but extension of such support services has a clear military purpose. The growing India-US defence relations and especially the escalating joint military exercises between their armed forces are also seen by the critics as pretext to create military alliance in Asia and to put more pressure on India to purchase expensive weaponry from the US.33 The recent
tranche of US embassy cables made public by WikiLeaks show how an anxious Washington over the last several years has tried to push these agreements but failed to get anywhere.34 Moreover, the Indian armed forces do not want to be 'tied down to only one (US) system'.35 These security concerns arise despite LSA being seen as a mutually beneficial and cost-effective arrangement to provide logistical support for each other's armed forces during joint operations.

(iii) India-US joint military exercises aim at advancing closer military-to-military relations, greater familiarity with each other's equipment, and operational systems, and interoperability in joint operations where LSA will be very critical. India, in fact, 'conducts more exercises and personnel exchanges with the United States than with any other country',36 and this is the most visible aspect of the growing India-US defence relationship. In the last one decade, India has conducted over 60 joint military exercises with the US in an effort to build the capacity of the armed forces for peacekeeping and disaster relief operations. However, this has triggered spirited protests by the opposition political parties, particularly by left-wing parties. They object to the exercises on the ground that these will further draw India into the strategic orbit of the US and integrate India more closely with
Washington's global agenda, which they oppose on security and political grounds.37 It needs to be pointed out here that India is not a small country and its foreign policy decisions cannot be dictated by any other country, and that bilateral defence cooperation is solely based on mutually beneficial national interests.

(iv) The critics of the agreement also point out that United States military forces are operating all over the world including the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The LSA with India would, therefore, benefit the US more than India because currently India's military forces are not operating near America.38 The critics argue that the dividends of logistical cooperation and on-going joint military exercises are skewed in favour of the US. The fact is that the US has signed logistics support agreements with South East, South Asian, and also with Middle East countries. If India will not sign the agreement it will not affect much the US military operational capability in these regions. However, as India looks for playing a larger role in these regions and wants to protect its key foreign policy interests by countering emerging security challenges, its closer strategic relationship with the US in this context will thus
be in its interest.

(v) The US demands that unless India signs LSA along with two other technology safeguard agreements—the Communication Interoperability and Security Agreement (CISMOA), and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation (BECA)39—the advance of bilateral defence cooperation will be hampered and India will keep itself away
from obtaining cutting-edge defence technologies which will affect operational capability of its armed forces. As the former US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, stated on a visit to
New Delhi in January 2010, that not getting the outstanding agreements signed 'is an obstacle to Indian access to the very highest level of technology.'40 The US maintains that deficiencyof these equipment hamper the ability of the Indian armed forces to better perform in contingency operations. Despite these claims, however, senior Indian armed forces officials pointed out that the absence of these agreements will not make any substantial difference to India's operational capabilities.41 These proposed agreements are also seen as the strings attached to the development of defence cooperation.

(vi) Critics also cast doubt on the reliability of the US as a logistics support and supply partner. These doubts have their origin in its imposition of sanctions after India's nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998. The US also cut off weapons supplies to India after war broke out between India and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971. India's defence establishment has had a residual distrust of the US since then, and this has not changed despite subsequent, positive developments in the bilateral relations.42 An enduring trust deficit is thus hindering in building consensus on key security areas for cooperation.

(vii) India seeks recognition from the US that it is a special partner entitled to receive certain priorities and concessions that are not extended universally. In this regard, Michael Mazza of the American Enterprise Institute, addressing India's recent decision against buying an American-made fighter jet in its Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA), argued that 'the United States requires all foreign buyers to sign up to end-use monitoring agreements (EUMAs). That includes our oldest and closest allies. The Brits and the Australians can find this just as frustrating as the Indians do. I sometimes get the sense that folks in India expect special treatment from the United States as a show of good faith.'43 Sunil Dasgupta and Stephen P. Cohen also make a similar point when they argue that 'as long as Washington is unwilling to grant India special privileges, it will not be able to turn endless
discussions into genuine cooperation.'44 Thus, strategic analysts contend that if the US wants its appropriate share of the large economic opportunity presented by India's defence market45 and if it wants to build up 'a long-term strategic partnership with India',46 it is necessary for the political and bureaucratic leadership in the US to remove these strings and extend administrative and regulatory preferences to India.

(viii) Finally, India does not want to be seen as a military ally of the US. Instead, it wants to develop a mutually beneficial relationship with all major powers, including United States. Kanwal Sibal, former Foreign Secretary of India, expresses this sense when he states that 'India wants to develop broad-based mutually beneficial relations with various global power centres rather than being seen as excessively leaning towards one power centre.'47 India now has signed 'strategic partnerships' with over 30 countries and the significance of each of these strategic partnerships differs from one another because of their different political, economic, nd security dimensions.48 It is thus believed that the proposed agreement may upset India's other strategic partners, particularly Russia. As Brahma Challeney pointed out: 'If India gets sucked into the US strategic dominion through EUMA and other arrangements—with the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) next on Washington's list, along with the Mutual Logistic Support Agreement (MLSA)—its special relationship with Moscow is bound to change.'49 Furthermore, at a time when the United States economic and political power is relatively declining, and India's regional and international profile is growing, it is perceived that its balanced relationship with all the major countries of the world is very critical to its rise as a major power in the twenty-first century.

Benefits of the Agreement
In spite of the above security concerns and domestic political compulsions, the agreement offers several benefits to both the nations and provides best opportunities for their armed forces to work together to counter the security challenges of the twenty-first century. The following are the key benefits of the agreement.

(i)
The logistics support agreement will enhance operationalcapabilities of Indian armed forces and help mitigate logistics shortfalls. The June 2005 India-US new defence framework agreement had laid out a road-map for joint military exercises, training, and service exchanges. Since then their armed forces have conducted the maximum number of joint military exercises, and their growing strategic partnership is taking these operations to highly advanced levels. Service officers have been attending expert exchanges and participating in joint seminars, conferences, and observer programmes. In this regard, General V.P. Malik, former Chief of Army Staff, pointed out that Indian exposure to the combined arms training at the US National Training Centre has been very useful. Such training contributes to further refinement of the Indian military's war doctrine, rapid force deployment, higher defence management, etc. Officers have also benefited from the US experience of fighting cyber terrorism, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) defeating mechanism in
Iraq and Afghanistan,50 infrastructure development in strife- torn regions and inaccessible areas, and execution of rescue and relief operations during natural disasters. On the other hand, the Indian military has invaluable operational experience in all types of terrain, dealing with sub-conventional wars, conflicts in ethnically diverse societies, and international peacekeeping. These are essential aspects in the nature of current conflicts and come handy in conflict resolution. Therefore, the two countries can share their respective operational capabilities and experiences for further strengthening the capabilities of their armed forces to counter the non-traditional security challenges of the twenty- first century. This will further get institutionalized and regularized once both the nations operationalize the proposed agreement. The Pentagon also argues that the signing of the LSA would ease accounting and book-keeping hassles during frequent joint exercises between the two sides.51 The US, thus, believes that India-US defence cooperation will get further impetus with
having proper logistics support mechanism.

(ii) As part of the March 2006 India-US Maritime Cooperation Framework,52 they had agreed to conclude LSA at the earliest that would allow each side to use maintenance, berthing, and support services of the other side during deployments. The agreement is important because the MCF provides for joint Indo-US maritime operations, including joint-patrolling of energy trade routes including the Malacca Strait, anti-piracy, and other transnational crimes at sea, search and rescue operations, anti-pollution at sea, and rescue and relief operations during natural disasters. The Pentagon believes that 'Deepening maritime security cooperation with India holds great potential over the next five years across'53 these security issues. Furthermore, expressing growing concern over pirates' influence beyond the western Indian Ocean, Thomas P. Kelly, US Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political Military Affairs, in a briefing said that 'India's a critical partner in our multilateral efforts to combat piracy.'54 The US also sees the Indian Navy's growth in capability as an adjunct to its own progressively swelling operational commitments in South Asian waters. They see such an agreement as a logical conclusion to the escort assistance provided by the Indian Navy to American merchant vessels passing through the Malacca Strait after the September 11 terrorist attacks.55 Thus, India and the US can be key security partners in the vast expanses of the IOR and the LSA will be very useful in mitigating capability gaps and logistics shortfalls while addressing regional contingencies.

(iii) The exchange of the LSSS facilities between the two countries around the world would also enhance India's strategic role, keeping in mind the projected expansion of the Indian Navy and its growing footprint. Since India's economic and foreign policy interests are no more confined to the South Asian region, its close defence and strategic relationship with the US would be a critical factor in its larger desire to be able to protect and promote its foreign policy interests well beyond South Asia. On the other hand, the US would be unlikely to sniff at the opportunity to take advantage of Indian logistics support facilities in an institutionalized manner as it already has a respectable number of options in the IOR. One of them is at Diego Garcia.56

(iv) The agreement will thus help increase the operational outreach of Indian armed forces and strengthen the Indo-US strategic relationship. The US even regards India as 'a rising power and a responsible global power'. US President Barack Obama has called, 'the relationship between the United States and India will be a defining partnership in the 21st century', rooted in common values and interests.57 At the same time, the US government also stresses upon India to play a larger role in Asia and beyond in the coming years. As former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton pointed out: 'the United States is making a strategic bet on India's future—that India's greater role on the world stage will enhance
peace and security.'58

(v) The proposed agreement has economic benefits too. Once the agreement comes into force, India would be able to save around $20 million per war game, when Indian forces take part in any of the joint military exercises with the US on American soil, such as the Red Flag War Games held in 2008;59 this is because India would not have to pay the money for receiving logistics support while participating in such military exercises. Instead, it would be able to provide reciprocal logistics support under the provision of replacement in kind and equal value exchange in this country whenever the US defence forces require them.60 India would save money by providing LSSS items because of the cost differences
between India and the US. The countries under the agreement also share the costs and burdens of logistics support, supplies, and services. This sharing results in efficiency and reduction of the logistics shortfalls. In addition, sharing of the burden leads to a common operating picture and start-point, and provides the commanders with a unified, multinational perspective.61

(vi) Some argue that the ongoing Indo-US joint military exercises and the benefits of logistical cooperation are at present tilted in favour of the US. However, it is pertinent to point out here that the current global geo-strategic environment is marked by a contradiction. On the one hand, countries are forging 'promiscuous' politico- diplomatic partnerships. On the other, they are adopting hedging strategies as a result of uncertainties about the intentions of the emerging poles. For India, joint military exercises with the United States serve both imperatives concurrently.62 Consequently, identifying convergence of interests between the two countries and absolute gains are more crucial for India than extracting a 'balance-of-dividends' and relative gains.

 

[sorcerer]

Part 5

The Way Ahead
The logistics support agreements that the US has signed with many other countries are mutually beneficial agreements. India thus should move on the pending LSA to strengthen defence and strategic relationship with the US. So far, the Indian government has not clearly indicated any objections to the provisions of the agreement. If there is any objectionable
element in the proposed agreement, then it should be identified and the two sides should negotiate to arrive at an agreement that is consistent with their national interests and policies. As mentioned above, the agreement has several benefits from both the defence and strategic aspects. It helps in mitigating capability gaps and logistics shortfalls. The systems and methods of LSSS, when integrated and supplemented with the proposed agreement, would decrease wait time and increase sustainable capabilities.
Since it is a two-way agreement, the two countries would share both the responsibility and benefits of the agreement.

The increasing seriousness of non-traditional security challenges, coupled with the criticality of the South Asian region on the stability and security of both the world and India, also increases the importance of the agreement to have all the needed LSSS in a timely, efficient, and effective manner. Moreover, as India's role and foreign policy interests are growing
in the world, to match its growing role the need of logistics support is very clear. The agreement will help Indian armed forces to develop their capabilities, play better humanitarian assistance and relief operations, and to operate beyond the South Asian region in safeguarding its vital national interests. At present, however, it seems that political sensitivity,
deep-seated distrust, bureaucratic and procedural hurdles, and some short-sighted domestic policies in both countries are stalling this process.63 Yet, despite these difficulties, the India-US relationship has witnessed a remarkable transformation in the last decade. The US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta's visit to India in June 2012 further highlighted
the growing convergence of India-US strategic interests and rising India's significance to the United States' Asia-pivot strategy.64 Now both sides need to sustain the momentum on the issues where they have made progress, including cooperation on defence, technology transfer, trade, energy, the environment, and education. They need to move their
disagreements towards cooperation, without reverting to the acrimony that characterized past relations.65 The 'wider public in India accepts that establishing good relationship with the US is a desirable objective. Pragmatic thinking in India supports the inclination of the government to bring India and the US closer.'66 On the other hand, the US government
has also placed its strategic focus on improving its relations with India. The scope of the opportunity, diplomacy, and negotiations between the two countries are also underway to iron out the existing disagreements in a manner acceptable to both sides. These efforts would put a promising India-US strategic relationship back on track. They now need to turn
their common interests into complimentary policies.


Acknowledgements
The author would like to express his sincere thanks to Dr G. Balachandran, Dr S. Kalyanaraman, Col Vivek Chadha, Dr Anit Mukherjee, Cdr Sarabjit Singh Parmar, and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions which were of great help to the enrichment of the paper.


Source http://www.idsa.in/system/files/jds_7_1_SarojBishoyi.pdf

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@Ray @roma @pmaitra @Casper @ladder @blueblood @sob @SajeevJino @EXPERT @LETHALFORCE @ezsasa @PaliwalWarrior @Razor @The Messiah @Otm Shank2 @Bangalorean @hit&run


and all others


=

 

[sorcerer]

CISMOA - ISSUE - THE INDIAN SIDE
Most of the concerns India on the CISMOA and BECA are not vague or blunt but real technical and is very strategic concern.

India averse to inking military pacts with U.S.


The U.S. argues that there is no hidden aim behind the LSA. It is an inter-bank type of clearing arrangement — there will be periodical settlement of accounts for the use of each other's facilities.

For instance, Indian naval ships have had 45 refuellings from the U.S. ships in the Gulf of Aden. Under the LSA, payments need not be made each time. The expenses could be adjusted against the money owed to India if U.S. ships came calling here.

But the Indian leadership feels that the LSA will give the impression of a strategic agreement with the Pentagon in military operations.

After the Defence-Secretary level Defence Policy Group (DPG) meeting in Washington earlier this year, both sides agreed to work towards a more "mature arrangement.'' But there was no "question of a blanket agreement,'' said the official sources.

India confronts a technical issue in signing the CISMOA, though officials feel it sounds heavier than it is. They also feel that interoperability, as argued by the U.S., need not be dependent on signing the CISMOA.

The communication will be encrypted and no other algorithm can be used on the system. During joint exercises, U.S. personnel sit on Indian ships with their own equipment.

But on aircraft there is no space for two or three different kinds of equipment.

The Navy and the Air Force have said they had no problems either way but politically this remains a sensitive issue though officials say it is not as heavy as it sounds.

India also has reservations on the third military agreement sought by the U.S. — BECA. The U.S. says the pact will enable C-130 and C-17 planes to fly close to the ground.

This entails installation of ground sensors, which none in the security establishment, except the Defence Research & Development Organisation is keen on.

India averse to inking military pacts with U.S. - The Hindu

Well!! Seems like India is worried about US Snooping ! Which is very much real

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INDIA plugs the gap on CISMO

By now, it seems pretty clear that military interoperability agreements like the Communications Interoperability & Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) are on ice as far as Indo-US relations are concerned. I've posted quite a bit in the last two years about the equipment and kit that the US government is constrained to withhold from India as a result of Delhi's resistance to entering into a CISMOA with Washington. This has typically included encrypted voice, IFF and advanced secret communication equipment, all administered by one US armed service or the other. So far, even though the Indian military has said the lack of equipment protected by agreements like CISMOA, didn't make the platforms contracted any less capable or effective, there was no real sense about how the military was actually filling those gaps. Let's be clear: those were gaps, despite what certain military chiefs said.

]it was in a presentation that Boeing made today to a group of us visting journalists in Washington. It illustrates just how the Indian Navy has plugged the CISMOA-induced gaps on the American platform -- notably, speech secrecy kit by India's state-owned Electronics Corporation of India Ltd (ECIL), IFF interrogator and transponder by BEL and HAL respectively, mobile satellite system by Avantel and fingerprinting kit by BEL. All very interesting.

The gear on the P-8 platform that was held off as a result of the absence of a CISMOA, are understood to include a Raytheon IFF transponder (Mode IV Crypto), SINCGARS radio, TACTERM/ADVT secure voice (HF) terminals and Rockwell-Collins SATCOM transceivers.

http://www.livefistdefence.com/2012/07/without-cismoa-indian-navy-works-p-8i.html

Intersting... very interesting!!

 

[sorcerer]

What is CISMOA?

17 Dec 2009 Jason Verdugo: The Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement or "CISMoA" is another facet of bureaucratic and sometimes political attributes of doing business and allying with the United States. The CISMoA should not be confused with the EULA which is a totally different agreement covering the use of systems purchased. The CISMoA provides guidance on how the systems will function with other systems. The CISMoA however, can be abused as an agreement and become an extension of /or a replacement for a EULA which can defeat the entire purpose of any cooperation and the purpose of the CISMoA.

The recent exercises between the Indian and U.S. militaries were a success and both sides are continuing to get acquainted with each others people, equipment, and doctrine. There were probably issues with interoperability that were uncovered for which, neither side is telling. They will however work to fix any technical and collaborative issues, so that when the next joint exercise occurs, at least those first problems will be fixed.

In the 21st century, communications equipment aren't just some solid state radios where each side only needs to know a particular frequency to communicate on. Communications equipment are highly complex pieces of computerized hardware running equally complex software and encryption products. Sometimes it's difficult to get the same equipment with the same country to work properly much less trying to conduct joint operations with different countries using different equipment.

The CISMoA attempts to facilitate agreements on how each nation's radios will communicate with each other effectively. For example, India troops may want to call in an air strike with U.S. air assets, this will require Indian ground radios to be compatible with U.S. strike aircraft radios to include encryption. Likewise, U.S. Special Ops may want to call in Indian long range artillery. The U.S. SpecOps on the ground will need their radios to communicate with Indian ground based artillery batteries.

Communications such as these are only a fraction of what CISMoA can cover. Going back to the air strike scenario, if laser guided bombs are employed, the Indian ground troops may require a laser designator. It's not just point and the aircraft shoots as the press and media will have you believe. That laser designator must be set to a specific agreed upon frequency of invisible laser light. The laser guided bombs loaded on the aircraft will also be set to accept that specific frequency. You can't have the enemy using a similar frequency of laser light to direct our bombs back on us (unlikely). If the frequencies do not match, the bombs won't register a signal.

Another real world example is with the Patriot missile system that the U.S. has sold to Japan. It turns out that the frequency the U.S. system uses to send a launch command to the missiles is the same frequency used by Japanese commercial cell phone carriers. OOPS! This required a tweaking of the Patriot systems in Japan to use a different frequency that likewise while good for military use in Japan, can not be used inside the U.S.

A current real world problem for which the U.S. and other allies in the war theater's (possibly even Indian units) are experiencing issues with unmanned air vehicles (UAV's) communications. The frequencies are becoming ever more difficult to manage and they are jamming each other, making command and control more and more difficult if not impossible. Actually, the U.S. lost another Reaper last week in Afghanistan for an "unknown" reason which has already been traced to a loss of comm link.

A further problem is the creation of device to defeat the improvised explosive device or IED. The U.S. Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization or JIEDDO based out of the Pentagon has poured billions of dollars in development & deployment of specialized electronic equipment. One such device is used to jam the cell phones and other devices used to remote detonate IED's. Unfortunately one of these devices uses the same frequency that the Blackhawk helicopter uses for firing IR countermeasure flares. OOPS!

Ultimately the term for this is called "Spectrum Management" and the U.S. and her allies try diligently to prevent problems like this from occurring. CISMoA helps, but in a fluid theater of operations with many different nations with many different types of communications platforms operating, this is showing to be impossible.

CISMoA may also cover electronic warfare or EW. (see the EW article link). EW, if properly employed can be a powerful weapon against your enemies. However, since it's an area weapon with broad reach, if the management of operations and spectrum are not perfect, then you may jam your own forces and/or your allies to your own detriment.

At least with India and the U.S. there will be fewer different systems and only two players. Theoretically spectrum management should be easier and more feasible.

CISMoA does not just cover hardware and software; it also covers doctrine and interaction. We can share a command center which could be transferring Indian commanders to U.S. ships or transferring U.S. Commanders to Indian ground command facilities. These commanders will be responsible for their respective forces. They will need to know how each other works. One Generals decision to bomb a target may be in conflict with the other Generals plan to take the target, hence, friendly fire incident. Or one General may want to continue negotiating while another General might want to bypass a village instead. CISMoA tries to create a framework for commanders to operate in so that they don't have to halt operations and call Washington or New Delhi for guidance. One regulating factor for a CISMoA can be the Rules of Engagement or ROE.

An example is the ongoing media blitz of the German commander in Afghanistan who called in an American aircraft to conduct an airstrike on a fuel tanker truck that had been compromised. Needless to say there was a lot of death and destruction. The communications and weapons performed exactly as designed and agreed upon, however the politics and media have twisted the event from a proper combat decision of a valued commander to a television treasure trove that the Taliban and or Al-Qaeda can take to the Pakistani mountains.

A CISMOA can be a powerful tool to help operations, but it can be horribly tainted and twisted into a hindrance or a scapegoat of policy because of politics.


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I would say...NO Go.

IMO, CISMOA can KISSMOIASSMUAAH

Signing CISMOA means quiet a compormise

Right Sir? @Ray, @pmaitra, @Kunal Biswas

 

[sorcerer]

Excerpts from the draft Communication Interoperability & Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) that the US wants the Indian government to sign. Gives you a sense of why the Indian armed forces and government are so reluctant to proceed with it. The US Embassy here has been tasked with (in their words) "educating" the Indian government about how CISMOA is simply an enabler of more substantive cooperation.

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[PaliwalWarrior]

on one hand in this part four

it is interesting line

"(vi) Some argue that the ongoing Indo-US joint military exercises and the benefits of logistical cooperation are at present tilted in favour of the US. However, it is pertinent to point out here that the current global geo-strategic environment is marked by a contradiction. On the one hand, countries are forging 'promiscuous' politico- diplomatic partnerships. On the other, they are adopting hedging strategies as a result of uncertainties about the intentions of the emerging poles.
For India, joint military exercises with the United States serve both imperatives concurrently.62 Consequently, identifying convergence of interests between the two countries and absolute gains are more crucial for India than extracting a 'balance-of-dividends' and relative gains.

so in essence this lines advises india that it should not look at mutual benefit from US for allowing basses to US on indian soil
and that it should be grateful to maibaap US that they have choosen India to do its dirty work and that the Indians should be garteful that US is even asking India instead of Others

haha with this kind of attitude we are going nowhere

 

[PaliwalWarrior]

my gut feeling

neither CISMAO or other interoperability agreements happening

nor

this basin LSA LSSS etc happening

this is simply not happening

i think it was a trial ballon floated to put the india govt under pressure to do something to show some achievements for both sides with Nuke deal not happening

dont think Indian Govt will agree