Re-engineering Afghanistan
The coalition has spent hundreds of millions trying to give Afghanistan electricity. Unfortunately, it made many of the mistakes it made in Iraq
By GLENN ZORPETTE / OCTOBER 2011
Kandahar is Afghanistan's second city, behind Kabul in the north. But where Kabul has nearly round-the-clock power now, Kandahar's 850 000 people have it only fitfully, about 40 megawatts at most. For comparison, NATO's airbase nearby, with about 30 000 people, has about 100 MW.
As they did in Iraq, the coalition forces in Afghanistan have spent or committed tens of billions of dollars to building and refurbishing infrastructure, including roads, schools, hospitals, and water systems. It is an enormous effort involving dozens of government agencies and hundreds of contractors. Among the government organizations, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is dominant, but the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and other military organizations have big roles as well. The Asian Development Bank and the governments of India and Germany have also funded a few large projects.
Having spent an estimated $55 billion on Afghan reconstruction over the past decade, the U.S. government is the largest contributor by far. And, as in Iraq, much of that money has been wasted or badly spent, particularly in the electrical sector. The goals of reconstruction are pretty basic: to stimulate economic activity and create jobs; to make life more comfortable and secure; to give people a more attractive alternative to the typically medieval societies imposed by insurgents. And last, but certainly not least, to win the allegiance of citizens and build their confidence in fledgling government institutions and officials who are all too often bungling or corrupt. Or both.
Full Article here :
Re-engineering Afghanistan - IEEE Spectrum
:cool2:
The coalition has spent hundreds of millions trying to give Afghanistan electricity. Unfortunately, it made many of the mistakes it made in Iraq
By GLENN ZORPETTE / OCTOBER 2011
STREET SCENES: A line worker in Kabultakes some readings. In the stalls of the markets in Kandahar city, such as this one, close to the governor's palace, gasoline-powered electrical generators are a popular offering.
Kandahar is Afghanistan's second city, behind Kabul in the north. But where Kabul has nearly round-the-clock power now, Kandahar's 850 000 people have it only fitfully, about 40 megawatts at most. For comparison, NATO's airbase nearby, with about 30 000 people, has about 100 MW.
As they did in Iraq, the coalition forces in Afghanistan have spent or committed tens of billions of dollars to building and refurbishing infrastructure, including roads, schools, hospitals, and water systems. It is an enormous effort involving dozens of government agencies and hundreds of contractors. Among the government organizations, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is dominant, but the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and other military organizations have big roles as well. The Asian Development Bank and the governments of India and Germany have also funded a few large projects.
Afghanistan's lack of electricity is acute in the city of Kandahar, near which Canadian soldiers patrolled in November 2009 [top]. A woman walks at night near a market in Kabul [lower left], which benefits from electrical interconnections to Afghanistan's northern neighbors. In Kabul, a lineman [lower right] works on distribution lines.
Having spent an estimated $55 billion on Afghan reconstruction over the past decade, the U.S. government is the largest contributor by far. And, as in Iraq, much of that money has been wasted or badly spent, particularly in the electrical sector. The goals of reconstruction are pretty basic: to stimulate economic activity and create jobs; to make life more comfortable and secure; to give people a more attractive alternative to the typically medieval societies imposed by insurgents. And last, but certainly not least, to win the allegiance of citizens and build their confidence in fledgling government institutions and officials who are all too often bungling or corrupt. Or both.
Full Article here :
Re-engineering Afghanistan - IEEE Spectrum
:cool2: