Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist

[LETHALFORCE]

my point is we have to test TN, can we rely on TN on Agni III SL to be fired from ATV II/III or from rail or road mobile platform after we take nuclear strike from China or Pakistan ???

Remember this device is tested just once......

we should wait before signing any treaty CTBT or NPT......

too late,we already signed the US nuke deal that includes these things in different language

 

[sayareakd]

Dr. Santhanam is one of the most respected scientist of our country, he is pointing fingurs on not signing anything and to test our nuclear deteriance..... so that desired result must be achived.

at least he has started debate within the country about our nuclear weapons, it may be possible that MMS after his sucessess with nuclear deal, might give assurance to US about the CTBT or NPT or both.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

He needed to start this debate 10 years ago before our nuke deal with USA, debate now is useless, USA would find any testing now unacceptable and cancel the deal which may not be bad but it could impact the NSG agreement and deals with other countries..

 

[Daredevil]

my point is we have to test TN, can we rely on TN on Agni III SL to be fired from ATV II/III or from rail or road mobile platform after we take nuclear strike from China or Pakistan ???

Remember this device is tested just once......

we should wait before signing any treaty CTBT or NPT......

There is a reason why we haven't signed CTBT or NPT right after nuclear tests. Because, we know we have to test these weapons with modifications and refinements some time in the future. Only when we are sure that we don't have to test any more that we will sign CTBT. Moreover, it is not easy for GoI to sign CTBT whenever it wants without taking the opposition into confidence and the opposition in parliament, for sure, will not allow GoI to sign it.

 

[Yusuf]

Ok late in here. But my take is that this maybe a ploy to prevent the government from signing the CTBT. There is definite politics behind this. But if true we have every reason to be angry at our govt for lying to the nation.

But to look at it in a different way, even if the test had failed, it would have given the scientists enough data both to catch the flaw and to generate data to simulate later. A test is a test. We learn from both success and failure. But this statement from the scientist has made sure there is enough presuure on the govt to not sign the CTBT.

 

[Antimony]

Ok late in here. But my take is that this maybe a ploy to prevent the government from signing the CTBT. There is definite politics behind this. But if true we have every reason to be angry at our govt for lying to the nation.

But to look at it in a different way, even if the test had failed, it would have given the scientists enough data both to catch the flaw and to generate data to simulate later. A test is a test. We learn from both success and failure. But this statement from the scientist has made sure there is enough presuure on the govt to not sign the CTBT.

I am with Yusuf on this one.

Tests allow the scientists to validate their theoretical and practical models. In the event of a failure, it makes them go back to the drawing board and investigate. In some cases, there may be issues which would have been overlooked in case of a "success". Reexamining a failure may allow the scientists to find such dormant issues.

Also, what kind of failure is this? Is this a design failure or a component failure? Did this fail because someone failed to do proper QC?

The part that I find more interesting is that the Congress government is protecting BJP, instead of jumping on them for misleading the nation. This can be a rare event where a government sets aside narrow political interests and speak as a nation, as they should.

 

[advaita]

I am with Yusuf on this one.

I am still undicided. This fresh statement does change the situation, given the fact that the whole excercise is so opaque (and quite understandably so).

The part that I find more interesting is that the Congress government is protecting BJP, instead of jumping on them for misleading the nation. This can be a rare event where a government sets aside narrow political interests and speak as a nation, as they should.

Both Congress & BJP understand political expediency better then long term survival of the country.

If there is a disagreement amongst Congress & BJP. The public will treat both as traitors. And both know that.

 

[thakur_ritesh]

it will be a shame if this were to be true, for some weird reason we most of the time keep claiming something and in reality something else keeps on happening and it gets so disappointing. there has to be a sense of accountability brought in or else we are for sure in for more rude shocks every now and then and if this were to continue like this it will only get more hopeless.

i will like to believe this has to do with ctbt and a pressure group trying to make sure that india does not sign the ctbt but cant get a sense when was india contemplating to do that, nothing like that got spoken and it is highly unlikely that the present government would have done that over night, thankfully that does not happen in a democratic setup like india, so then what was the need to do this, something really is amiss.

cant imagine the scientist to have woken up one fine morning gone through a few foreign journals who have a contrary take on the issue and picking up from there he goes to press and makes a highly irresponsible statement. hope he is not going to launch any book soon!

 

[Antimony]

it will be a shame if this were to be true, for some weird reason we most of the time keep claiming something and in reality something else keeps on happening and it gets so disappointing. there has to be a sense of accountability brought in or else we are for sure in for more rude shocks every now and then and if this were to continue like this it will only get more hopeless.

i will like to believe this has to do with ctbt and a pressure group trying to make sure that india does not sign the ctbt but cant get a sense when was india contemplating to do that, nothing like that got spoken and it is highly unlikely that the present government would have done that over night, thankfully that does not happen in a democratic setup like india, so then what was the need to do this, something really is amiss.

cant imagine the scientist to have woken up one fine morning gone through a few foreign journals who have a contrary take on the issue and picking up from there he goes to press and makes a highly irresponsible statement. hope he is not going to launch any book soon!

The failure itself is not a shame. After all, we developed it on our own. The shameful part was

1. Not testing enough to gather meaningful data
2. Masking a failure as a success
3. Bragging about it and goading the irresponsible kid next door to go and get a big gun which he doesn't know how to use

 

[LETHALFORCE]

The failure itself is not a shame. After all, we developed it on our own. The shameful part was

1. Not testing enough to gather meaningful data
2. Masking a failure as a success
3. Bragging about it and goading the irresponsible kid next door to go and get a big gun which he doesn't know how to use

and now the kid next door has a gun that works from his friend and we don't?

 

[Antimony]

and now the kid next door has a gun that works from his friend and we don't?

I wouldn't say that. I do believe we have an arsenal. However, once that arsenal starts aging we would have to work on improving our design and creating new ones.

At that point testing would be critical. If we had done enough testing the first time around we would have been in a better position

About the kid next dorr, think about it this way. At least we developed ours, they got it delivered to them by a vendor who now has signed a treaty that would not allow it to do so later.

When China gave Pakistan the designs, they were not part of NPT. Now they are.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

I wouldn't say that. I do believe we have an arsenal. However, once that arsenal starts aging we would have to work on improving our design and creating new ones.

At that point testing would be critical. If we had done enough testing the first time around we would have been in a better position

About the kid next dorr, think about it this way. At least we developed ours, they got it delivered to them by a vendor who now has signed a treaty that would not allow it to do so later.

When China gave Pakistan the designs, they were not part of NPT. Now they are.

i hope our computer simulations are matured, i don't see any political will to test in the next 10 years+.

 

[IBRIS]

Pokhran-II nulcear tests were successful, insists Kalam

Seeking to put a lid on the controversy over Pokhran-II nuclear explosions, former president APJ Abdul Kalam on Thursday said the tests were successful and had generated the desired yield.

"After the test, there was a detailed review, based on the two experimental results: (i) seismic measurement close to the site and around and (ii) radioactive measurement of the material after post shot drill in the test site," Kalam told PTI in New Delhi.

"From these data, it has been established by the project team that the design yield of the thermo-nuclear test has been obtained," said Kalam, who as Director General of the Defence Research and Development Organisation, spearheaded the nuclear tests in 1998.

India conducted five nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998 at the Pokhran range in Rajasthan which included a 45 kiloton (kt) thermonuclear device, called as hydrogen bomb in common parlance.

The other tests on May 11 included a 15 kt fission device and a 0.2 kt sub-kiloton device. The two simultaneous nuclear tests on May 13 were also in the sub-kiloton range -- 0.5 and 0.3 kt.

Kalam, also Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister, R Chidambaram who was chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and Anil Kakodkar, then Director of Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, were key players in the Pokhran-II nuclear tests.

Pokhran-II nulcear tests were successful, insists Kalam- Hindustan Times

 

[Antimony]

i hope our computer simulations are matured, i don't see any political will to test in the next 10 years+.

Our moratorium not to test is a self imposed one, not by virtue of any treaty.

However, apart from a lack of political will and the international sactions on tests, I see another problem. Any overt tests would be interpreted by our oppoments as indicative of an aging arsenal, and may give them ideas.

 

[F-14]

Pokhran-II nulcear tests were successful, insists Kalam

Seeking to put a lid on the controversy over Pokhran-II nuclear explosions, former president APJ Abdul Kalam on Thursday said the tests were successful and had generated the desired yield.

"After the test, there was a detailed review, based on the two experimental results: (i) seismic measurement close to the site and around and (ii) radioactive measurement of the material after post shot drill in the test site," Kalam told PTI in New Delhi.

"From these data, it has been established by the project team that the design yield of the thermo-nuclear test has been obtained," said Kalam, who as Director General of the Defence Research and Development Organisation, spearheaded the nuclear tests in 1998.

India conducted five nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998 at the Pokhran range in Rajasthan which included a 45 kiloton (kt) thermonuclear device, called as hydrogen bomb in common parlance.

The other tests on May 11 included a 15 kt fission device and a 0.2 kt sub-kiloton device. The two simultaneous nuclear tests on May 13 were also in the sub-kiloton range -- 0.5 and 0.3 kt.

Kalam, also Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister, R Chidambaram who was chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and Anil Kakodkar, then Director of Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, were key players in the Pokhran-II nuclear tests.

Pokhran-II nulcear tests were successful, insists Kalam- Hindustan Times

there you have it folks right from the horses mouth

 

[Daredevil]

More credible news about this issue. See the highlighted portion

Fizzle claim for thermonuclear test refuted

Siddharth Varadarajan

The government on Thursday strongly refuted claims that the 1998 test of a thermonuclear device had been a failure, with Principal Scientific Adviser R. Chidambaram telling The Hindu that those questioning the tests yield had an obligation to back up their charge with scientific evidence.

He was responding to the recent statement by a former defence scientist, K. Santhanam, that “the yield in the thermonuclear device test was much lower than what was claimed.” Mr. Santhanam, who cited only unspecified “seismic measurements and expert opinion from world over,” went on to say that this was the reason India should not sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

The stated success of the second generation nuclear device tested on May 11, 1998, was questioned at the time by a number of Western seismologists who said the seismic signatures detected by them were at variance with the claimed yield of 45 kilotons. Although the controversy subsided somewhat once scientists from the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre — which designed the weapon — published their scientific evidence, it is likely to be reignited once again since Mr. Santhanam represented the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) team at the Pokhran-II tests and is the first member of that group to echo the arguments of those who say the thermonuclear device failed to work properly.

“If Mr. Santhanam has any scientific data to back up what he has claimed, I am sure BARC scientists would be more than happy to debate it,” said Dr. Chidambaram. “Without that, this kind of statement means nothing.”

In a 2000 article, The May 1998 Pokhran tests: Scientific aspects, republished in 2008 with some updated details, in a French journal, ‘Atoms for Peace,’ Dr. Chidambaram has argued that western seismologists who under-estimated the Pokhran yields did so because they did not take into account the geological structure at the Indian testing range. They also failed to appreciate that India’s weapons designers purposely went for lower yields because the shots had to be fired in existing shafts which could not be dug any deeper for fear of detection. Higher yields, then, would have caused damage to nearby villages and also led to the possible venting of radioactivity.

Dr. Chidambaram wrote that the thermonuclear device tested was “a two-stage device of advanced design, which had a fusion-boosted fission trigger as the first stage and a fusion secondary stage which was compressed by radiation implosion and ignited.” He said the argument that the secondary stage failed to perform is belied by post-shot radioactivity measurements on samples extracted from the test site which showed significant activity of sodium-22 and manganese-54, both by-products of a fusion reaction rather than pure fission. “From a study of this radioactivity and an estimate of the cavity radius, confirmed by drilling operations at positions away from ground zero, the total yield as well as the break-up of the fission and fusion yields could be calculated.” Based on this, he said, BARC scientists worked out a total yield of 50 +/- 10 kt for the thermonuclear device, which was consistent with both the design yield and seismic estimates.

As for the sub-kiloton tests of 0.3 and 0.2 kt of 13 May 1998, which the International Monitoring System for verifying CTBT compliance failed altogether to detect, he said “the threshold limit for seismic detection is much higher in, say a sand medium than in hard rock; the Pokhran geological medium comes somewhere in between” and so it was not surprising these two tests did not show up on the IMS.

“Let someone refute what we have written, then we can look at it,” said Dr. Chidamabaram, adding that he was yet to see a published critique of BARC’s scientific assessment by any laboratory-based scientist abroad.

A former senior official of the erstwhile Vajpayee government confirmed to The  Hindu that there had been differences of opinion between BARC and DRDO scientists after the May 1998 tests, with the latter asserting that some of the weapons tests had not been successful. The internal debate was complicated by the fact that the DRDO experts, including Mr. Santhanam, were not privy to the actual weapon designs, which are highly classified. But the issue was resolved after a high-level meeting chaired by Brajesh Mishra, who was National Security Advisor at the time, in which the BARC experts established that DRDO had underestimated the true yields due to faulty seismic instrumentation. And the radioactivity analysis provided the clincher.

Since 1998, whatever his private reservations might have been, Mr. Santhanam appears to have stuck closely to the official line in his public pronouncements.

On the fifth anniversary of Pokhran-II, for example, he said in an article in Outlook that “the asymmetry with respect to China stands largely removed” thanks to the 1998 tests. Since China was a proven thermonuclear power at the time and India was not, it is hard to reconcile this optimistic assertion with the scientist’s current claim that the thermonuclear device India tested was “a fizzle.”

Similarly, in June 2007, Mr. Santhanam declared on CNN-IBN on a programme about the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal in which this correspondent was also a participant: “After May 1998, there was a clear declaration from India that we don’t have to conduct any more nuclear tests. India should not have any problem legalising this position. But this is subject to the condition that if the international security condition changes, then we should be allowed to test."

 

[INDIANBULL]

One thing some people forget to take notice of is that one single test of a thermonuclear device and that too in an incomplete form cannot give us a credible, stable and proven H-bomb that can be mated on land and sub based missiles and no amount of simulation can substitute for a real test. Its like saying that i can transplant human hearts in computer simulators so its proven that i should go in a operation theatre try it on a real patient because it has been certified by my PC that i can do it, guys how we can certify a computer simulated design that whether it works in actual situation????????

 

[Daredevil]

Pokhran II total success: Kalam

N-test yield was sufficient; rubbishes Santhanam claim

Experts, including former President Dr Abdul Kalam, have rubbished the sensational claim by a former top Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) scientist K Santhanam that the thermo-nuclear bomb tested in 1998 at Pokhran failed to yield the desired result.

Kalam, who was the DRDO chief when the tests were carried out, was backed by the then Atomic Energy Commission chief R Chidambaram, who termed Santhanam’s claim “absurd”. “The tests were completely successful. There is no ambiguity on its success,” said Kalam.

Former National Security Adviser (NSA) Brajesh Mishra also brushed aside the scientist’s assertion and said all the parameters were met in the five tests conducted in May 1998.

Santhanam had said in a seminar here on Tuesday that the first and most powerful of the three tests — conducted on May 11, 1998, and involving a thermo-nuclear or hydrogen bomb — was a “fizzle”. In technical terms, the word means that the bomb failed to meet the desired yield.

In this backdrop, India should not sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and conduct more thermo-nuclear tests, he said, adding that no country in the world having thermo-nuclear weapons achieved this expertise after just one test.

Kalam said that after the tests, there was a detailed review based on the two experimental results — including seismic measurement close to the site and around and radioactive measurement of the material after post-shot drill — at the test site. Kalam said the analysis of the data by scientists involved in the tests established that the desired yield of the thermo-nuclear test was obtained.

India conducted five nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998, at the Pokhran range in Rajasthan, which included a 45 kiloton (kt) thermo-nuclear device or hydrogen bomb. The other tests on May 11 included a 15-kt fission device and a 0.2-kt device. The two simultaneous nuclear tests on May 13 were also in the sub-kiloton range — 0.5 and 0.3 kt.

Reacting to Santhanam’s so-called revelation, Union Home Minister P Chidambaram said he was “puzzled”. He said, “Somebody has made a statement. I was puzzled by the statement. If you are not puzzled, you are a genius.” The Government would look into these claims, he added.

Brajesh Mishra said R Chidambaram had reported to him on May 13 that year that all parameters had been met in the five tests carried out and there was no need to undertake a sixth one. “It was clear to us that the thermo-nuclear as also the nuclear tests have been successful,” Mishra said.

Dismissing Santhanam”s claims as absurd, Chidambaram said, “There is no controversy over the yield of Pokhran-II nuclear tests.” The former Atomic Energy Commission chief, who is now the principal scientific adviser to the Government, said, “If he has any new scientific data that has not been answered in the results of the test published by us, we will be happy to look into it.”

He said the results of the 1998 nuclear tests were published in great detail in international journals and it also took into account studies by several global experts. As regards Santhanam’s claim that the international seismological community had concluded that the yield from the device was below than claimed by India, Chidambaram said, “Who are the seismologists he is referring to? We will go and look back.”

Chidambaram said the scientists at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre had conducted measurements on site during the Pokhran-II experiments, analysed global seismic data and examined the radioactivity in the samples after the tests from near the emplacement points of the nuclear devices.

Six months after the tests, scientists had dug out rocks from the emplacement points where the nuclear device was exploded and found that they had signatures of neutron-induced radioactivity, Chidambaram said.

“They (rocks from emplacement points) have signatures of neutron-induced radioactivity, which can come only if the 14 MeV neutrons have been generated, which means that the thermo-nuclear explosive device had worked,” the scientist explained. “The total yield comes out as 50 (+/- 10) kt for the thermo-nuclear device, consistent with the design yield and with the seismic estimate of the total yield,” he said.

Chidambaram said an article in the New Scientist in 1998 stated that the combined yield of the nuclear tests was about 60 kt. Renowned seismologist Jack Evernden “prefers the use of surface wave magnitudes to body wave magnitudes and his analysis of the May 11, 1998, seismic data is consistent with ours,” the scientist said.

Chidambaram said a decision to test the thermo-nuclear device at a controlled yield of 45 kt was taken because of the proximity of Khetolai village, at about five km from the test site, to ensure that the houses suffer negligible damage.

“All the design specifications were validated by the test. Thermo-nuclear weapons of various yields up to around 200 kt can be confidently designed on the basis of this test,” Chidambaram added.

Commenting on Santhanam’s remarks, Navy chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta said India’s nuclear deterrence capabilities were “proven and capable enough”. Talking to reporters a few days before superannuating, he said, “As far as we are concerned, we go by the views of scientists. They have given us certain capability and that is capable enough to provide deterrence and they are proven.”

Pointing out that India follows the ‘no first strike’ policy, the Navy chief said, “We are a nation that maintains a credible deterrence and that is more than enough to deter anybody.”

 

[Daredevil]

For those of you who have academic interest in Pokhran-II tests, I suggest you to go through this article written by Dr. R Chidambaram who was the main guy responsible for the test.

THE MAY 1998 POKHRAN TESTS: Scientific Aspects

Conclusions of the article

The May 1998 tests were fully successful in terms of achieving their scientific objectives:

* Certification of the fission nuclear weapon of 15 kt yield, evolved from the PNE device tested in 1974, with substantial changes that were needed to make it smaller in size and weight from the point of view of weaponisation. It was gratifying that it functioned perfectly in all aspects , certifying the quality and robustness of the design.

* Testing a two-stage thermonuclear device with a fusion-boosted fission trigger as the first stage and with the features needed for integration with delivery vehicles at the controlled yield of 45 kt with the purpose of developing nuclear weapon systems with yields upto around 200 kilotons.

* Testing sub-kiloton devices, with all the features needed for integration with delivery vehicles, from the point of view of developing low-yield weapons and of validating new weapon-related ideas and subsystems.

* Establishing the computer simulation capability to predict the yields of nuclear weapons--fission, boosted fission and two-stage thermonuclear - of designs related to the designs of the devices tested by us.

* Thus the carefully-planned series of tests carried out in May 1998 gave us the capability to design confidently and build nuclear weapons from low yields upto around 200 kilotons. A great deal of further scientific and technical development work has taken place since then.

 

[INDIANBULL]

Interesting analysis:
Bharat Rakshak • View topic - Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist

Make nuclear programme accountable


28 Aug 2009, 0252 hrs IST, Brahma Chellaney, ET Bureau


India’s cosseted nuclear programme has been shielded from parliamentary scrutiny and CAG audit. So, it is hard to reliably determine whether the sole thermonuclear test fizzled out quickly or was a success, however, modest. But some facts speak for themselves.

One telling fact is that more than 11 years later, India has not weaponised the thermonuclear technology, even though the test in 1998 was supposed to have catapulted the country into the big-power league.

The thermonuclear test, obviously, was not merely intended as a technology demonstrator. Therefore, it is legitimate to ask: What has been the security benefit for the country from that test? Even more glaring is another fact: More than 35 years after Pokhran I, India stands out as a reluctant and tentative nuclear power, still lacking even a barely minimal deterrent capability against China.

Given the growing military asymmetry with China, a proven and weaponised Indian thermonuclear capability, backed by long-range missiles, is critical to deter the assertive and ambitious northern neighbour. But today, India does not have a single Beijing-reachable missile in deployment.

Had India developed and deployed a minimal but credible nuclear-weapons capability, China would not have dared to mess with India. But the increasing Chinese bellicosity, reflected in rising border incursions and hardening of Beijing’s stance on territorial disputes, suggests China is only getting emboldened against a weaker India.

Consider yet another unpalatable fact: No country has struggled longer to build a minimal deterrent or paid heavier international costs for its nuclear programme than India. The history of India’s nuclear-weapons programme is actually a record of how it helped establish multilateral technology controls. Pokhran I, for example, impelled the secret formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). India’s space programme helped give birth to the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Yet, before it has built a credible minimal deterrent, India came full circle when it entered into a civilian nuclear deal with the US and secured an exemption from NSG last year to import high-priced commercial nuclear power reactors and fuel. In doing so, it had to accept non-proliferation conditions that aim to stunt its nuclear-deterrent development.

Through this deal, India is seeking to replicate in the energy sector the very mistake it has made on armaments. Now the world’s largest arms importer, India spends more than $6 billion every year on importing conventional weapons, some of dubious value, while it neglects to build its own armament-production base.
Conventional weapons simply cannot deter a nuclear adversary.

Deterrence against a nuclear foe can only be built on nuclear capability, especially a second-strike capability that can survive the enemy’s first strike to inflict massive retaliation.

More broadly, Indian policymakers have yet to recognise that no nation can be a major power without three attributes: A high level of autonomous and innovative technological capability; a capacity to meet basic defence needs indigenously; and a capability to project power far beyond its borders, especially through intercontinental-range weaponry. India is deficient in all the three areas.

It is not an accident that all the countries armed with intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are permanent members of the UN Security Council. But rather than aim for a technological leap through a crash ICBM programme, India remains interminably stuck in the Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) stage.

Against this background, the latest claim that the 1998 thermonuclear test performed well under par can only further damage the credibility of India’s nuclear posture. The controversy over the thermonuclear test, however, is nothing new. No sooner had the test been conducted than a former head of the Indian nuclear programme, P K Iyengar, questioned official claims of success.

In such a setting — with critics within and outside the country questioning the success of the test — India must be ready to convincingly re-demonstrate its thermonuclear capability, should a propitious international opportunity arise from a nuclear test conducted by another power.

Nuclear deterrence, after all, is like beauty: It lies in the eyes of the beholder. It is not what India’s nuclear establishment claims but what outsiders, especially regional adversaries, believe that constitutes deterrence (or the lack of it).

(Brahma Chellaney is a nuclear and strategic affairs expert)