Discussion in 'China' started by cinoti, Dec 5, 2012.
China sure requires training.
Sure, the more the better
But too much of anything, tires one out and it becomes routine wherein when the chips are down, the results are not commensurate.
Training is important. The indian army doesn't train as much (as you say, it tires one out) which is why its very slow and heavy.
More training will get you up to US standards.
Training has to be innovative and should create interest.
Routine training turns out to be a bore.
Earlier we used to have operational art training regularly.
It became routine.
Now, there is a gap and so it is quite exciting to be a part of the large scale exercises.
US standards are not really the standards that one aspires for since their operation doctrines are different and so is their threat perceptions.
We have our own standards and it may interest you to know that western armies come to India to train with Indian troops and learn.
I dont understand what CCP feeds you..
Anyways, What CCP feeds its soldiers and how much water a hour on Field duty ..
Let talk about training..
I don't think you've been in a modern military. I have trained in the ADF as an army officer many years ago, and training is suppose to be repetitive and routine, so the soldiers know what to do instinctively.
I suppose you are right with different doctrine, but US doctrine takes advantage of high tech which india doesn't have so it will follow different doctrine. However, fitness is the same everywhere which is what training also addresses.
India should aspire to US fitness levels. Patrolling in the mountains require fitness.
Western nations go to india to train as part of improving relations. We do have lots to learn from india as your forces approximate the kinda forces we might face in Egypt or kenya or Myanmar.
Don't post bull-crap here, we know Ex-ADF personal and there views, let alone officer you are not capable of a private..
Kunal, no need to get personal. Also, I am ex Army and you don't know our views. You are not Australian.
Unfortunately for you, I have been in a modern army with modern training methods.
I was a career soldier and not one who joined because of conscription or just to have 'fun'.
Training cannot be routine.
Imagine yourself every year in Class I having failed and made to repeat.
Sure, you would know all of Class I within three years of your being in the same class, but thereafter it would be boring.
Take firing on a range.
If it is the same range practice, you will go through it like a dream since you are bored, having done it over and over again.
But add a a bit of field tactics, it will make it interesting and more topical.
As far as SDF is concerned, we rather not talk about it since it is more of a Territorial Army as far as India is concerned.
Patrolling in the mountains is sure important. I don't think the US has seen higher mountains than India and that too in active combat. I take it that you have heard of Siachen and Kargil. Been operating at both!
Please read the after action report of the US in Afghanistan and you will realise which tech worked.
Western Nations do not come to India to 'improve relations'. Disabuse yourself of such a thought. They come to learn.
Gen (then Lt Gen) Sir Micheal Rose of the British Army, before taking over as Commander UNPROFOR Bosnia, and he was an SAS officer, toured India to learn how we combated Insurgency. I happen to know this since I interacted with him!
The (ADF) is the military organisation responsible for the defence of Australia. It consists of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), Australian Army, Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and a number of 'tri-service' units. The ADF has a strength of just under 81,000 full-time personnel and active reservists.
Everything that is defence including reservist!
While the Australian Army is principally a light infantry force, it is currently being 'hardened and networked' and expanded to enable it to conduct higher-intensity operations.
Note: Light infantry force!
You are talking to battle hardened soldiers out here!
Theories are wonderful, but facts are stranger than fiction!
Some rookies are trying to be over smart Ray Sir. He does not know anything about you and the way INDIAN forces train.....
The Americans have latest technology but still are not able to do anything in Afghanistan, but INDIA had nothing compared with pakistan in 1971, but still INDIANS captured pakistan in 10 days. The INDIAN ARMY achieved the goal in 10 days, what the Americans are trying to achieve in 10 years.....
I hope people know the difference between 10 days and 10 years. This is the difference between the training which the INDIAN ARMED FORCES and Americans undergo......
Having latest technology and equipment contributes only 10 percent, the rest is the contribution and dedication of the soldier....
Seeing Armed forces in movies, like what the Americans show in their movies is different from what they are originally in the real world.....
U.S. Marines find Iraq tactics don't work in Afghanistan
The Marines, weighted down with 60 pounds of body armor each, struggled to climb up Saradaka Mountain. Once at the top, it was clear to everyone that the Taliban would get away. Second Lt. Phil Gilreath, 23, of Kingwood, La., called off the mission.,,,,,,
Body armor is critical to warding off snipers in Iraq, where Sunni Muslim insurgents once made video of American soldiers falling to well-placed sniper shots a staple of recruiting efforts. But the added weight makes Marines awkward and slow when they have to dismount to chase after Taliban gunmen in Afghanistan's rough terrain.
Even the Humvees, finally carrying heavy armor after years of complaints that they did little to mitigate the impact of roadside explosives in Iraq, are proving a liability. Marines say the heavy armor added for protection in Iraq is too rough on the vehicles' transmissions in Afghanistan's much hillier terrain, and the vehicles frequently break down â€” so often in fact that before every patrol Marine units here designate one Humvee as the tow vehicle....
U.S. Marines find Iraq tactics don't work in Afghanistan | McClatchy
Here is hi tech for you
THE U.S. TROOPS at Jaghatu are about as isolated as soldiers can be in Afghanistan. Surrounded by mountains and enemy-controlled terrain, the Americans receive almost all of their supplies by helicopter and weekly parachute drops.
Six months ago, before the current soldiers came, the troops' mission was clearer: to rout the Taliban from the area. In May, a platoon of Americans in Jaghatu fought a four-hour battle with the Taliban for "Antennae Hill," a large outcropping of rock, scrub, and dirt with a commanding view of the valley to the south.
When 3rd Platoon, part of the 2nd Battalion of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, arrived this summer, its members watched the shaky helmet-cam footage that their predecessors had taken as they cursed, sprinted, and fought their way to the top of the hill without serious casualties. Pfc. Dillon Guillory, 24, played and replayed the video on his laptop, anxiously waiting for his moment.
Except for occasional patrols, Guillory has spent most of his deployment manning a guard post that overlooks a tattered Afghan flag and the crumbling government building. In Jaghatu, U.S. troops don't charge up hills after the enemy anymore. They don't search houses, and they rarely meet with Afghan village elders. Those jobs are supposed to be done by the Afghans.
To pass the time, Guillory and the other soldiers lift weights and box on a small square of dirt to the screams of Rage Against the Machine's "Street Fighting Man." They eat Baskin-Robbins ice cream that floats to earth in weekly parachute drops.
Guillory speaks via Skype to his wife in Lafayette, La., as often as twice a day, more frequently than he talks to any Afghan and many of his fellow soldiers.
She sends him video real-estate listings of houses she dreams of buying when his enlistment ends. The latest is a four-bedroom with crown molding, a glass-enclosed fireplace, and a $313,000 list price. "I've watched it three times, and I can see us living there," he messages his wife.
In his three months in Afghanistan, Guillory has experienced only one moment when the war seemed real, immediate, and dangerous. In late July, the platoon was sitting on a ridgeline watching some Afghan troops when a burst of enemy machine-gun fire exploded around them. Guillory threw himself on the ground, crushing his compass with his body armor, and slid to cover on his stomach.
"The whole thing only lasted 15 or 20 seconds," he recalls.
One of the enemy rounds ricocheted off a rock and struck Pfc. Adam Ross, 19, in the back of the head just below his helmet. The medic worked to stanch the bleeding and called out the details of the injury to Guillory, who scribbled the information on his hand and then radioed the outpost.
The soldiers did not learn that Ross was dead until they were back in their tent. There was no cursing or screaming. Just silence. Guillory, who had not known Ross well, snapped a picture of the writing on his left hand. He had been so shaken that instead of writing "Back of Head," he had scrawled "Head Back."
The next day, the medic carved Ross's last name and the date of his death into a piece of splintering wood in Guillory's guard shack. Guillory added the 173rd Airborne's winged insignia in white marker and wondered how he had not been struck as well. Weeks passed and the memory gradually faded, just another memorial scratched into a piece of wood and surrounded by graffiti from previous units' tours.
Now the video real-estate listing from his wife seems as real as anything in his life. It is sundown, and Taliban gunfire pops in the distance. Afghan troops respond with a machine-gun blast. "Why would you need a fireplace in Louisiana?" Guillory wonders aloud.
ON A FRIDAY when no patrols are scheduled, Second Lt. Andrew Beck, the leader of 3rd Platoon, pays a visit to America's longest-serving and most loyal ally in Jaghatu â€” the district's 24-year-old police chief. He walks through Guillory's gate and into an adjoining, walled compound that houses the government center building with the hole in the roof.
Beck and a few of his soldiers have come to take pictures of the police chief's men decked out in new body armor, helmets, and goggles that the Americans had given them earlier that morning. The Afghan police stand stiffly between a flower bed and a wall scorched from insurgent rocket-propelled grenade blasts. A U.S. soldier adjusts a helmet that is slightly askew.
"A picture with your gun?" the police chief asks one of Beck's men.
So far this year, Afghan soldiers or police officers have been accused of killing more than 50 U.S. and allied troops. There's an awkward pause as the soldier glances at Beck for guidance and then strikes a compromise, popping the magazine out of his gun, checking the chamber for a stray round, and handing it to the police chief.
The chief doesn't register the soldier's move as a slight, but it bothers Beck. "He is the guy we trust most, and we have to take the magazine out of the rifle," Beck says.
Beck hands the young police chief his loaded M-4. "One more picture by the truck," he says.
"When you guys leave, you are going to take everything?" the chief asks. "All of the helos and the armor?"
"I don't know," Beck replies. "You'll probably know before me."
"I think your Army is tired," the chief says.
Before Beck returns to his base, the police chief has one more request. There's a pile of cardboard left from one of the American airdrops that morning, and the chief asks if he can have it. They need something they can burn to cook their dinner.
FINALLY, AFTER WEEKS of waiting, Beck's soldiers get word that at last there is going to be a mission. It will be their biggest since arriving in Afghanistan. More than 100 Afghan soldiers, 15 Afghan police, and about 40 Americans will return to the area where Ross was killed. Everyone is expecting a firefight.
The night before they leave, Guillory talks to his wife on Skype. "Hey, babe, I got to wake up early for work tomorrow," he tells her at 8:15 p.m. He flips off the light in his bunk, but his wife keeps talking. He tries again 14 minutes later: "Okay, I need to go to bed, babe. I'll call you tomorrow."
After two more tries, she says goodnight around 8:40 p.m.
By 3 a.m. the tent is bustling. Boots thump on the plywood floor, and soldiers stuff bottles of water and prepackaged meals into their assault packs.
By 3:30 a.m. they are gathered in front of their trucks. The platoon sergeant double-checks the soldiers' body armor, thumping the ceramic plates with his fist and tugging on loose straps. The medic reminds the men that they need to act quickly to stabilize wounded colleagues. "Stop the bleeding and then go to the airway," he says. "If you lose the airway, you lose the patient."
The platoon's trucks roll through the outpost gate, pausing on the edge of the desert. One by one, they test fire their heavy machine guns as the sun peeks over the mountains of the Jaghatu bowl. The .50-caliber gun on Guillory's truck is one of the last to shoot, the loud ca-chunk thundering through the valley.
"The terrorists are up now," Guillory yells.
"All right, let's fire these weapons at the f---ing Taliban," the gunner says.
The armored trucks lumber down the deeply rutted dirt road past a handful of wary-looking Afghan families. At first the soldiers joke with one another to stay loose, but as the truck edges closer to the insurgent-controlled villages the chatter ebbs.
Over the radio, there is an order to halt the convoy. The armored vehicles edge to the side of the road and wait for more instructions. A few minutes later, they receive a second order: Return to base.
Hundreds of miles away in Helmand province, Taliban fighters dressed in Army uniforms have penetrated the heavily defended Camp Bastion, where they killed two Marines and incinerated six U.S. fighter jets, each worth about $25 million. Senior military officials in Kabul are advising their field commanders to scale back missions with Afghan forces for a few days.
The platoon sergeant and Guillory climb down from their armored vehicles and walk back to the outpost. The soldiers who had steeled themselves to fight are once again preparing to sit.
"We look really bad to the Afghans right now," the platoon sergeant says to Guillory. "We are supposed to be supporting them, and we left them."
"I don't understand why we aren't just going out anyway," Guillory replies.
Instead, Guillory returns to his war: a view of the mortar hole in the government building and a guard post with little to do. He chews through a pack of gum. There are six months left in his tour and 26 months left before U.S. combat troops leave Afghanistan. "I am sure there are people that have a bigger understanding of the war than us little guys," he says. "But at my level, it seems so stupid." On the other hand, they didn't fire their guns at the enemy. They didn't do a thing. The mission was a success.
Â©2012 by The Washington Post.
The U.S. soldiers babysitting Afghanistan - The Week
Time for you to wake up and smell the coffee!
Time for you to quit bullshtting real soldiers with mundane theory!
It is fun to hear the hyperbole of the people who claim to be soldiers having just seen a parade ground and a rifle!
The US troops who have been to Afghanistan and who have trained in our High Altitude School and practised in HA warfare in Ladakh know what it is all about and they are those who are holding on in the mountains of Afghanistan with, yes, low tech stuff with high tech electronics and air.
To get there is all high tech and to fight is all low tech.
Sir, my post was in reply to the rookie who posted boasting about himself as a soldier......
Any more interesting Counter Insurgency stories, Brig?
Let me put this way, all the things you have written above tells how much you are Australian on first place..
Well, if you typify the indian soldier, then I can see why the Australian army soldier is light years ahead of their indian counterpart.
Both in doctrine and tactics. We actually teach our soldiers to think. To stay alert, to have situational awareness.
To know what to do when to do it and not hesitate. This is why fieldcraft and training for specified activitites is done over and over until it is routine.
Unfortunately india does not have the money for training regimes like Australia does let alone the US, so you have had to improvise. or make do with what you have and claim it to be the best.
Lack of training is why you let a bunch of terrorist take over the mountains in kargil. Kinda sleeping at the wheel as we say it. You only regained it after massive losses, almost the same amount as the defenders.
Perhaps you are part of the old gaurds where modernisation had not reach you yet. I was reading a article where your defense minister was alarmed at the modernisation of china, and that india must catch up. So I assume that india is still requiring alot of modernisation and that china had surpass you. You can tell alot about his confidence or lack there of.
The problem is its easy to teach these modern tactics, but difficult to build a culture of this particularly in the indian army. The way you retook the mountain in kargil really left alot to be desired. Not really modern tactics at all and the casualties wouldn't be tolerated in the western world or in Oz for that matter.
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