Pakistani war games to test anti-cold start strategy

[A.V.]

April 5, 2010

Pakistani countermeasures to Cold Start Strategy–battle-ready nuclear weapons


Responding to the “Surgical Strikes”: Neutralizing Delhi’s Cold Start strategy:

* These exercises will be focused only on conventional war on the eastern border,” Major-General Muzamil Hussain, director-general of army training, told a news briefing.

* Pakistan’s army will launch its biggest manoeuvres in 20 years next week to deal with the threat of conventional war with old rival India, military officials said on Monday.

* “These exercises will be focused only on conventional war on the eastern border,” Major-General Muzamil Hussain, director-general of army training, told a news briefing.

* Military spokesman Major-General Athar Abbas said India had been informed of the exercise.

* The army conducted its biggest-ever exercises involving 200,000 soldiers in 1989.

* The wargame, to begin on April 10 and continue till May 13, will be the largest manoeuvres conducted by the army since the Zarb-e-Momin exercise in 1989.

* The wargame will be conducted in Punjab and Sindh provinces, which border India, officials said.

RAWALPINDI, Pakistan — Pakistan’s military will on Saturday launch war games allowing thousands of troops to road test new tactics near its eastern border with India, a military official said.

“The exercise is aimed at validating and refining newly evolved doctrines,” the head of the army’s military training directorate, Muzammil Hussain, told foreign media in the garrison town of Rawalpindi, neighbouring Islamabad.

The “Azm-e-Nau-3″ or New Resolve exercise will mobilise 20,000 troops in the beginning, rising to 40,000 to 50,000 towards the end, he said.

The exercises will involve all branches of the military, including the air force, and will focus on the possibility of “conventional war on the country’s eastern border,” Hussain said.

Relations between Pakistan and India have been bedevilled by an atmosphere of mistrust and tensions over the unresolved Jammu and Kashmir dispute.

* During the exercises, plans prepared for prevention of terrorist attacks will be implemented and capabilities of Pakistan army in times of peace as well as war will be improved.

* Furthermore, attention will be given to communication, intelligence information and modern technology.

* Responding to the “Surgical Strikes”: Neutralizing Delhi’s Cold Start strategy:

* Nuclear deterrence & Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) blunts Bharat’s Cold Start Strategy

* Why India did not attack Pakistan in 2002 and 2008?
* The India-Pakistan war
* Delhi’s Cold Start Strategy Frozen DOA (Dead on Arrival)
* Responding to the “Surgical Strikes”: Neutralizing Delhi’s Cold Start strategy:

* Pakistani response to “India’s Cold start strategy”: Limited strikes against targets vs Hot War leading to Nuclear Armageddon

* Indian Airforce crying wolf? or facing shortage of jets?

* India’s Cold War strategy guarantees hot war—Nuclear annihilation

Last February, the two nuclear-armed South Asian neighbours held their first official talks since the 2008 Mumbai attacks …

Under US pressure, Pakistan has diverted troops … — although the establishment still sees India as the primary threat.

India and Pakistan have fought three wars since independence in 1947 — two of them over the fate of the Himalyan territory of Kashmir.

“We cannot remain oblivious to what happens on our eastern borders,” Hussain told reporters.

“Pakistan desires peace and security both within and beyond,” he said, adding that maintaining peace and security is the army’s “key strategic policy”.

* The six-week field exercise will involve troops from all arms and services and aircraft and equipment of the Pakistan Air Force, he said.

* “The exercise is the culmination of a long and deliberate process of wargames, discussions and logical evolution of the concept of warfare that is fully responsive to a wide range of emerging threats,” Hussain said.

* The exercise is also aimed at validating and refining tactics and operations, he said.

* It will validate concepts formulated during the year of training initiated by army chief Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, he added.

* A special feature of the exercise will be the use of technological achievements and advancement in intelligence-gathering, surveillance, reconnaissance and communication.

* These measures will reduce the reaction time of troops, Hussain said.

* The essence of the Cold Start doctrine is reorganising the army’s offensive power that resides in the three strike corps into eight smaller division-sized integrated battle groups (IBGs) consisting of armour and mechanised infantry and artillery, closely supported by helicopter gunships, air force and airborne troops (parachute and heliborne).

* The IBGs are to be positioned close to the border so that three to five are launched into Pakistan along different axes within 72 to 96 hours from the time mobilisation is ordered.

* Cold Start thus envisages rapid thrusts even when the defensive corps’ deployment is yet to be completed, and high-speed operations conducted day and night until the designated objectives are achieved

* The probable objective areas for Cold Start could be (1) Ravi-Chenab corridor from two directions, an IBG along Jammu-Sialkot-Daska axis and another across the Ravi to link up with the first IBG, and (2) in the south against Reti-Rahim Yar Khan-Kashmore complex.

* To counter Cold Start, the Pakistan Army will have to create more armour-dominated brigade-sized reserves from the existing resources if possible, and a more flexible military system and structure.

* For Pakistan the dimensions of time and space assume paramount importance as it lacks territorial depth, is opposed by a larger adversary and lacks the resources to fight a protracted war.

* The strategy of pre-emption is thus imposed on Pakistan in the same way it was imposed on Israel prior to the 1967 war.

* The fact that the Pakistani Army can occupy their wartime locations earlier than the Indian army confers on it the ability to pre-empt Cold Start;

* failure to do so could lead to firing of low-yield tactical warheads at IBGs as they cross the start line or even earlier







http://militarystrat.wordpress.com/2010/04/05/pakistani-war-games-to-test-anti-cold-start-strategy/

 

[DaRk WaVe]

20,000 troops to take part in war games ‘Azm-e-Nau-3’
​

Tuesday, April 06, 2010
By Mariana Baabar

ISLAMABAD: For the first time in the history of Pakistan’s military exercises, 20,000 troops from all arms and services, including the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), are set to try the “Modular Method” of field exercises in the Punjab and Sindh.

The last large-scale field exercise, Zarb-e-Momin, was held in 1989, when the Army chief was General Mirza Aslam Beg and the prime minister was Benazir Bhutto. Defence attaches from selected embassies would be invited to witness and evaluate these war games, while India has been informed about these exercises.

“These Army war games, Azm-e-Nau-3,” will be held from April 10 to May 13, which sees the culmination of a long and deliberate process of war games, discussions and logistic evolution of the concept of warfare that is fully responsive to a wide menu of emerging threats. “The exercise is a concept of validation stage of the operational thought process manifested in the form of tactical, operational and organisational aspects, which would be validated and refined through the lessons learnt,” said Director General Military Training Major General Muzammal Hussain while talking in Rawalpindi to the print and electronic media flown in from all over Pakistan.

Though Hussain lacked the eloquence and sophistication of media handling, help was at hand with DG ISPR Major General Athar Abbas, who handled the “trickier” questions thrown by the media in his normal graceful and professional manner.

However, the general was not willing to get into the financial aspect of these field exercises, by giving a definite sum, only saying they would be paid from the Army budget already in place for the fiscal.

The Azm-e-Nau, which will see the Modular Method, might be smaller in size than the Zarb-e-Momin, but it will have the capability to expand on a much larger scale, keeping in mind the present environment and challenges that the nation faces.

According to Muzammal Hussain, India is still the major and very serious concern for Pakistan because of its capabilities and till all the political issues between the two countries are resolved, “no nation could afford to lower its guard.”

He said special care would be taken to ensure that there was no harm to civilian areas or crops and the recent PAF exercise on the motorway in no way created any damage while landing and take-off.

Hussain said the Army was not only training in areas of conventional warfare but training in urban terrorism was also included. He added that today, the Army, while trying to reduce the space for war, was being trained to take on threats, not only from its eastern and western borders, but also from urban terrorism.

Answering a question, Athar Abbas said whether the Army could be involved in matters of internal security, like cleaning and lining of water canals as it had been in the past under General (retd) Pervez Musharraf, was a decision that could only be taken by the Army chief.

“A special feature of this exercise would be harvesting the technological advancements in intelligence gathering, surveillance, reconnaissance and communication means that have revolutionised the warfare. These shall be optimally leveraged in the forthcoming exercise. These capabilities are expected to act as force multipliers by reducing the fog of war for own troops, obviating enemy surprise and reducing own reaction time. All the available surveillance and reconnaissance assets would be practised/utilised in the exercise to validate their efficacy,” General Hussain added.

 

[DaRk WaVe]

Azm-e-Nau & renewed security trends​

The production of indigenous unmanned aircraft famously known as drones by the collaboration of an Italian company at Kamra based Pakistan Aeronautical complex is one of the biggest achievements so far in the war against terrorism that may aid the Pakistan Army to root out extremist occupation on its land with much more ease and efficacy. This can be done without the need for US intervention as the US drone strikes had caused severe collateral damage while infuriating the inhabitants of tribal areas that in turn resort to violent reaction against them by targeting various sensitive institutions.

The drone codenamed ‘Falco’ which according to a Pakistan Air Force spokesperson, is an advanced, tactical UAV designed by Selex Galileo Italy which would address current and future surveillance and reconnaissance needs of the Pakistan Air Force. Apparently, the Pakistan government had been for a long time now, urging the US to provide drone technology so that aid the forces in combating militancy as the Pakistani forces were way behind in technology in comparison to the militants who possessed arms and war gadgets of a much technologically higher quality. The constant and vehement denial of the US in supplying drone technology despite continuous and repetitive demands from president Zardari based on allegations on Pakistan for being susceptible to leak precious information to the Taliban by warning them prior to the attacks, had changed into semi acceptance after the strategic dialogue as the US had agreed to provide the technology which portrays a changed US stance towards Pakistan. This enables the Pakistan armed forces to take matter into their capable hands to carry out a productive, and less destructive in terms of collateral damage, operation to rid their soil from a deeply infested evil.

However, the armed forces of Pakistan are seen to be conducting various exercises in which the PAF war exercise named ‘High Mark 2010’ in which the pilots of the Pakistan air force have successfully conducted landing and takeoff operations from the motorway. This has come as a response to the blatant Indian show of air power conducted a few months back, a demonstration of war exercises during which mock enemy bunkers were hit and targeted with rockets and bombs that hid the entire desert of Pokhran on the Pakistan border in dust. A display of Indian air power right on the border had signified India’s deep rooted need to establish supremacy by revealing its war readiness which the PAF has shattered as the Indian exhibition was nothing in match to the awesome presentation of firepower and aerobatics by the Pakistan Air Force. There has always been a trust deficit between the two countries as the biggest hindrance in the initiation of peace process has remained India’s hegemonic mindset. Apparently this lack of trust compels India to keep a high vigilance on its borders with Pakistan, a fact that is confirmed by India’s jumping to the immediate conclusions of blaming Pakistan for the 26/11 attacks which legitimizes India’s occupation in building a war empire as it is seen busy in modernizing itself militarily.

This exercise ‘High Mark 2010’ has proved as a landmark development in the defense of the country as it is for the first time ever that such a feat was accomplished. This valiant act of flawless accuracy and precision shows a newly developed flexibility in the security doctrine of the air force which aims to address the internal threat while making it clear that this exercise is not aimed to threaten but to defend the space against India. This has helped to include Pakistan in the short list of countries that are able to use the motorway as a runway in cases of emergencies. Many witnessed this sheer display of metal and might which made the nation proud of its guardians and protectors. Furthermore, one of the biggest field exercise ‘Azm-e-Nau of the Pak army is scheduled on the 10th of May 2010 during which more than 20000 jawans and officers will take part. This exercise would basically revolve around fighting terrorism along with traditional warfare as it encompasses a comprehensive conceptual framework of warfare that deals with a much wider and diverse threat. This exercise that is to follow shortly after the PAF war exercise ‘High Mark 2010’ is indicative of the strength of the Pakistan armed forces that addresses the aggressive enemy policy which has been displayed in various instances. Chief of army staff Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani had declared the years 2009-2010 as the ‘year of training’ based on the current security scenario that engulfs the nation in the clutches of the terrorists while a threat lies on the eastern borders as well. Under this back drop the army exercise Azm-e-Nau has come as the most significant episode of the ‘year of training’ as it aims to fulfill the main objectives that had been set forth for this training that was supposed to spread over a period of two years.

Apparently, the Pakistan armed forces have modified their doctrine, which was much needed, as Pakistan is facing an increased threat from multiple horizons on both the western and eastern borders, which compels Pakistan to use both air and land forces simultaneously while launching operations against the terrorists. The previous India-centric policy has seen a major shift as it incorporates skillfully delineated plan to counter home grown insurgents most effectively and completely by using similar guerilla tactics used by the militants themselves.

While the acquisition of drone technology that finally has materialized plays a pivotal role as it would increase the efficiency that may result in a quick and immediate conclusion to this war that has besieged the nation in its clutches. It is hoped that with this shift in the war paradigm and a renewed security trend Pakistan will finally be free from a grotesque era of an interminable conflict to move towards genuine progress that every citizen desperately awaits.

 

[DaRk WaVe]

Azm-i-Nau-III begins today​

Islamabad/Rawalpindi—The Pakistan Army will conduct a major field exercise from today (Saturday) to validate the concept of a new defensive doctrine for countering conventional threats.

The six-week field exercise, code-named Azm-i-Nau 3, involves troops belonging to all arms and services besides engagement of various aircraft and equipment of the Pakistan Air Force, military sources informed Online.

It will be the largest since the Zarb-i-Momin war-games. The ongoing PAF’s exercise High Mark 2010 will be fully integrated with the army field exercise which will continue till May 13.

The exercise is being organized in areas of Southern Punjab, Sialkot and Sindh and would be participated by more than 20,000 officers and Jawans belonging to all armed services.

Director General of Military Training Maj-Gen Muzammil Hussain

said India had been informed about the exercise. He said the field exercise involving troops belonging to all arms and services would be a culmination of a long and deliberate process of war-games, discussions and logistic evolution of the Concept of Warfare fully responsive to a wide menu of emerging threats.—Online

 

[DaRk WaVe]

Military launches biggest-ever war games ​

KARACHI: Pakistan’s military forces launched the country’s biggest military war games on Saturday.

The exercises, code named ‘Azm-e-Nau,’ will deploy 50,000 soldiers from the artillery, infantry and armoured corps units for one month.

Azm-e-Nau is said to be Pakistan’s biggest war-games in more than 20 years, and will be carried out near Pakistan’s eastern border with India

Earlier his month, Pakistan Air Force held a demonstration for invited guests, including foreign defence officials, in Punjab to show its capacity to contribute to the fight against militants.

The military says all available surveillance and reconnaissance assets will be utilised in the exercise to validate their efficiency.

Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani declared the years 2009-2010 as the ‘year of training’ based on the current security situation.

The exercise will culminate on May 13. —DawnNews

 

[gogbot]

to be honest i was kind of shocked at the number of Troops but still it was pre-planned , it seems to me that PA is feeling somewhat secured from Afghan Border(remember they have already No Operation in 2010) & moreover the integration of these 'games' with High mark seems to me like a practice to counter 'Cold Start '(i may be wrong just my feeling)

War games , in the middle of war.

Pakistan is supposed to be fighting the WOT , war or terror.

The battlefield of which runs right through Pakistan.

An entire year with no operations against an enemy that takes advantage of vast swats of the country , but has the resources and the manpower to have 6 months worth war game's .

The Taliban are literally at the doorsteps of town and villages along the Afghan border and in and around the City Peshawar .

50,000 troops could be found to play games on the other end of the border .

You want preparedness against , India fair enough.

But given the state of affairs , diverting all these resources .
Especially given the death toll the past few months.
Shouldn't there have been more urgent concerns.

I am not even going to ask about all the refuges of the recent campaigns in waziristan , some still stuck fearing to return home.
why don't they get the added security or manpower to speed up the operation do they can return home.

And even then there are still more Taliban strongholds left in Pakistan , and its not as if they are just quietly minding their own business.
They still attack frequently

Has the political establishment not received any criticism .

 

[DaRk WaVe]

haaa, as usual Indians concerned about Taliban, ahh well Indians are so concerned about Taliban, God I love Indians, any ways

War games , in the middle of war.

Pakistan is supposed to be fighting the WOT , war or terror.

The battlefield of which runs right through Pakistan.

An entire year with no operations against an enemy that takes advantage of vast swats of the country , but has the resources and the manpower to have 6 months worth war game's .

fuuny man, hahahaha, funny seriosuly ;DD

There is a thing called 'threat perception', you are no one to define it for Pakistan, Pakistan's leadership is clever enough to define it, there is no doubt threat from Terror but why should we close our eyes & follow what Indians are telling us?
WOT is going on, do i need to tell you that the myth of 'Taliban's invincibility' is dying

Taliban Leaders

By Bill Roggio, LWJ, February 23, 2010 12:33 AM

Over the past two months, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency has captured four senior leaders of the Afghan Taliban, including Mullah Omar's deputy who served as the head of the top shura, the leader of a regional shura, and two shadow governors. These captures, combined with the US-led offensive in Helmand which will expand into Kandahar and the Afghan East later this year, have given rise to reports of the potential collapse of the group.

The Afghan Taliban's leadership council and its regional shuras and committees have weathered the capture and death of senior leaders in the past. The Taliban have a deep bench of leaders with experience ranging back to the rise of the Taliban movement in the early 1990s. On prior occasions, younger commanders are known to have stepped into the place of killed or captured leaders. It remains to be seen if the sustained US offensive and possible future detentions in Pakistan will grind down the Taliban's leadership cadre.

This report looks at the Afghan Taliban's top leadership council, the Quetta shura; its four regional military councils; the 10 committees; and existing as well as killed or captured members of the shura. Because the Taliban is a deliberately opaque movement, it is difficult to gain real-time intelligence on the structure of the Taliban command. The following information on the structure of the Taliban and its key leaders has been gathered from press reports and studies on the Taliban, and from discussions with US intelligence officials.

The Afghan Taliban leadership council

The Afghan Taliban leadership council, or rahbari shura, is often referred to as the Quetta Shura, as it is based in the Pakistani city of the same name. The Quetta Shura provides direction to the four regional military shuras and the 10 committees. The Quetta Shura is ultimately led by Mullah Mohammed Omar, the ‘leader of the faithful,’ who is the top leader of the Taliban, but Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar directed the Quetta Shura. Baradar was the Afghan Taliban's second in command and the group's operational commander who was detained in Karachi sometime in January or February 2010. Over the past several months, members of the Quetta Shura have been reported to be relocating to Karachi to avoid potential US airstrikes.

Regional military shuras

The Afghan Taliban have assigned regional military shuras for four major geographical areas of operations. The shuras are named after the areas in which they are based; note that all four of the regional military shuras are based in Pakistan (Quetta, Peshawar, Miramshah in North Waziristan, and Gerdi Jangal in Baluchistan).

• Quetta Regional Military Shura - This military shura, like the Taliban’s top council, takes its name from its base in the city of Quetta in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province. The Quetta Regional Military Shura directs activities in southern and western Afghanistan. It is currently led by Hafez Majid.
• Peshawar Regional Military Shura - Based in the city of Peshawar in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province, the Peshawar Regional Military Shura directs activities in eastern and northeastern Afghanistan. Abdul Latif Mansur is thought to currently lead the Peshawar shura. It was led by Maulvi Abdul Kabir before his arrest in Pakistan in February 2010.
• Miramshah Regional Military Shura - Based in Miramshah, the main town in Pakistan’s Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan, the Miramshah Regional Military Shura directs activities in southeastern Afghanistan, including the provinces of Paktika, Paktia, Khost, Logar, and Wardak. The Miramshah Regional Military Shura is led by Siraj Haqqani, the son of Jalaluddin Haqqani.
• Gerdi Jangal Regional Military Shura - Based in the Gerdi Jangal refugee camp in Baluchistan, this regional military shura focuses exclusively on Helmand Province and perhaps Nimroz province. The Gerdi Jangal Regional Military Shura is led by Mullah Adbul Zakir.

The 10 committees

Along with the four regional commands, the Afghan Taliban have 10 committees which address specific issues. Some of the members of the committees are also members of the Quetta Shura.

• Military - This committee was led by Mullah Nasir, the former shadow governor of Ghazni. It is not clear who currently leads the military committee.
• Ulema Council - Also known as the religious committee, it is currently led by Mawlawi Abdul Ali.
• Finance - This committee is led by Abdulhai Mutma’in.
• Political Affairs - This committee is reported to have been led by Maulvi Abdul Kabir before his capture in February 2010. His replacement is not yet known.
• Culture and Information - This committee, which deals with Taliban propaganda, is led by Amir Khan Mutaqqi.
• Interior Affairs - This committee is led by Mullah Jalil.
• Prisoners and Refugees - This committee is led by Mawlawi Wali Jan.
• Education - This committee is led by Mawlawi Ahmad Jan, however it may have been disbanded.
• Recruitment - This committee was led by Mullah Ustad Mohammad Yasir before he was arrested in Peshawar in January 2009. Yasir’s replacement is not known.
• Repatriation Committee - This committee is led Mullah Abdul Zakir.

Known active members of the Quetta Shura

The list below consists of the known members of the Quetta Shura. There may be additional members who are not listed, while some leaders on this list may no longer be on the shura.

• Hafiz Abdul Majeed is the current leader of the Quetta Regional Military Shura. He served as the Taliban’s intelligence chief.
• Mullah Mohammad Hassan Akhund was the governor of Kandahar and the Minister of Foreign Affairs during Taliban rule in Afghanistan.
• Mullah Mohammad Hassan Rehmani is considered to be very close to Mullah Omar. Rehmani has been described as his "shadow." He was the governor of Kandahar province during the reign of the Taliban.
• Mullah Abdul Qayum Zakir is the head of the Gerdi Jangal Regional Military Shura (Helmand and Nimroz provinces) and the Taliban's ‘surge’ commander in the South. Zakir is a former detainee of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility in Cuba who currently serves as the Taliban’s ‘surge commander’ in the Afghan South.
• Amir Khan Muttaqi is the chief of the Information and Culture Committee.
• Siraj Haqqani is the leader of the Miramshah Regional Military Shura and the commander of the Haqqani Network. He is also the Taliban’s regional governor of Paktika, Paktia, and Khost.
• Mullah Mohammad Rasul was the governor of Nimroz province during the reign of the Taliban.
• Abdulhai Mutma’in is the chief of the Finance Committee. His served as a minister during the Taliban regime.
• Abdul Latif Mansur is the commander of the Abdul Latif Mansur Network in Paktika, Paktia, and Khost. He serves on the Miramshah Shura and was the former Minister of Agriculture for the Taliban regime. Mansur is thought to lead the Peshawar Regional Military Shura.
• Mullah Abdur Razzaq Akhundzada is the former corps commander for northern Afghanistan. He also served as the Taliban regime’s Interior Minister.
• Maulvi Hamdullah is the Taliban representative for the Gulf region. Hamdullah is considered to have been since 1994 one of Mullah Omar's most confidential aides. In addition, Hamdullah led the Finance Department in Kandahar during Taliban rule from 1994 until November 2001.
• Maulvi Qudratullah Jamal runs an investigative committee that deals with complaints from Afghan citizens against local Taliban personnel. Jamal also operates as a liaison to the Taliban's global supporters. He served as the Taliban’s chief of propaganda from 2002-2005.
• Maulvi Aminullah is the Taliban commander for Uruzgan province.
• Mullah Jalil is the head of the Taliban's Interior Affairs Committee.
• Qari Talha is the chief of Kabul operations for the Taliban.
• Sheikh Abdul Mana Niyazic is the Taliban shadow governor for Herat province.

Shura and committee members killed or captured:

• Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar directed the Quetta Shura. Baradar was the Afghan Taliban's second in command and the group's operational commander, and was detained in Karachi sometime in January or February 2010.
• Maulvi Abdul Kabir led the Peshawar Regional Military Council before he was captured by Pakistani intelligence in February 2010. He served as the Taliban's former shadow governor of the eastern Afghan province of Nangarhar, as well as the governor of Nangarhar during the Taliban’s reign.
• Mullah Mir Mohammed served as the shadow governor in the northern province of Baghlan. He was detained in February 2010.
• Mullah Abdul Salam served as the shadow governor in the northern province of Kunduz. He was detained in February 2010.
• Mullah Dadullah Akhund was the Taliban’s top military commander in the South. He was killed in May 2007 by British special forces in Helmand province.
• Akhtar Mohammad Osmani was a member of the Quetta Shura and was the Taliban's chief of military operations in the provinces of Uruzgan, Nimroz, Kandahar, Farah, Herat, and Helmand, as well as a top aide to Mullah Omar. He also personally vouched for the safety of Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar. He was killed by Coalition forces while traveling near the Pakistani border in December 2006.
• Mullah Obaidullah Akhund was the Taliban Defense Minister during the reign of the Taliban from 1996 until the US toppled the government in the fall of 2001. He was close to Mullah Omar. His status is uncertain; he has been reported to have been arrested and released several times by Pakistani security forces. He was last reported in Pakistani custody in February 2008.
• Mullah Mansur Dadullah Akhund, who is also known as Mullah Bakht Mohammed, replaced his brother Mullah Dadullah Akhund as the top commander in the South during the summer of 2007. His status is uncertain; he was last reported to have been arrested by Pakistani security forces in January 2008 but is thought to have been exchanged as part of a hostage deal.
• Anwarul Haq Mujahid was a member of the Peshawar Regional Military Shura and the commander of the Tora Bora Military Front, which is based in Nangarhar province. He was detained in Peshawar in June 2009. Mujahid is the son of Maulvi Mohammed Yunis Khalis, a senior mujahedeen leader who was instrumental in welcoming Osama bin Laden into Afghanistan after he was ejected from the Sudan in 1996.
• Mullah Ustad Mohammed Yasir was the chief of the Recruitment Committee and a Taliban spokesman before he was arrested in Peshawar in January 2009.
• Mullah Younis, who is also known as Akhunzada Popalzai, was a former shadow governor of Zabul. He served as a police chief in Kabul during Taliban rule. He was captured in Karachi in February 2010.

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/02/the_talibans_top_lea.php#ixzz3pJyzJ7Bu

resources are there to be used it has been repeatedly clarified that our armed forces will remain India Centric but still people don't miss any chance to rant

The Taliban are literally at the doorsteps of town and villages along the Afghan border and in and around the City Peshawar .

this is 2010 not 2007 or 2008, I have repeatedly Explained why Peshawar gets kicked, but here i go again
its the biggest city of NWFP & also a city surrounded by volatile regions & also the biggest city near the Disturbed areas

the security at borders of Provinces & at entry & exit points of Big cities is extremely tight, Most of time they don't get through
so Peshawar becomes a target of Choice, moreover there cannot be a 100% elimination of insurgents, its a long process no insurgency dies within a limited times

50,000 troops could be found to play games on the other end of the border .

You want preparedness against , India fair enough.

But given the state of affairs , diverting all these resources .
Especially given the death toll the past few months.
Shouldn't there have been more urgent concerns.

seriously people I love Indians for been so much concerned about us, our country our problem, is that hard to understand, I am not going to get into poverty rant

I am not even going to ask about all the refuges of the recent campaigns in waziristan

yeah don't ask about it, because you know it was successful

some still stuck fearing to return home.
why don't they get the added security or manpower to speed up the operation do they can return home.

in which world are you living, fear will remain, there is nothing 'unnatural' in it

Swat people happy with anti-Taliban banners

PESHAWAR: The display of anti-Taliban banners by unknown persons in various areas of Kabal(don't confuse it with Kabul) was the topic of discussion in Swat on Monday and majority of people hailed the move as a sign of an end to the Taliban era.

Kabal residents said on Sunday that they saw anti-Taliban banners calling leader of the Swat militants Maulana Fazlullah a “shameless” person. “Where is the shameless Fazlullah?” was the slogan inscribed on one of the banners. One can infer from the writing on the banner that those having displayed the banners were criticising the Taliban leader for going underground.

Other slogans included, “Taliban’s friend is the nation’s foe,” and “The Taliban movement is virtually the movement of oppressors.”

“Taliban network has been dismantled and their leaders killed or arrested. The supply of money and arms and ammunition to the militants has been stopped and now they are hiding,” PPP-Sherpao Swat President Sher Shah Khan said when asked to comment on the display of anti-Taliban banners.

People said the display of banners had proved the militants had been eliminated from the valley, an impression that would prove a shot in the arm for the government to win the confidence of the Swat people.

At one stage, the distrust between the people and security forces had alienated the people of Swat.

“The militants have been routed and order restored in Swat, and today people feel secure,” said the former nazim of Koza Bandai Union Council Sher Khan. The display of banners in their strongholds left no doubt that Taliban had now become history, he said.

Who has displayed these banners? People in Swat believed the military might have done that. However, Sher Khan said the people would also take such measures to prove that Taliban had no place in the valley.

Restoring peace and arresting and killing some of the top Taliban commanders in a massive military operation launched in May this year, the security forces are yet to track down the most wanted Fazlullah.

Some of his key lieutenants have also managed to remain at large even after six and a half months of the offensive, aimed at driving the militants out of Swat and capturing the top leadership.

The federal ministers and government authorities have stated several times that the Taliban chief in Swat had lost his one or both legs during the operation, but this claim could not be confirmed from independent sources.

“Previously, Taliban were throwing away bodies of people but today their corpses are being plunked,” a resident of Mingora said on condition of anonymity.

A member of Global Peace Council, Ibarahim Dewlai, brother of slain Taliban leader Ali Bakht, said the display of banners was the final nail in Taliban’s coffin.

The residents said it would help remove fear of Taliban from the hearts of people and bury the myth about their power. “In an area where Taliban would behead people for uttering a word of dissent, the display of banners is people’s victory,” Muhammad Yar of Kanju remarked. He said people were now doing their routine work without any fear.

The militants have been unable to launch any attack during the last 75 days, a tremendous success in an area from where several incidents of violence were reported daily.

Life returns to Pakistan's Swat Valley


I had the rare opportunity to tour the conflict-affected areas by helicopter, where access has been restricted due to security concerns. Flying at treetop level provides an eerie sense of omniscience, looking onto rooftops and into courtyards. The contours of the land, the underlying patterns of villages and roads become clear, especially in the rugged mountains of Swat where the roads snake over passes and along ridges, houses hug the mountainside alongside terraced ridges.

Displaced families are returning to their homes in Pakistan's Swat Valley, months after fleeing a Taliban onslaught. Photo: Reuters/Faisal Mahmood, courtesy of Reuters AlertNet - Homepage

As we flew yesterday, we passed over a long line of trucks, rickshaws, cars and buses filled with the displaced residents of Swat returning home. The "all clear" has been sounded for all of Buner and most of Swat, the two districts of Pakistan where conflict had pushed out most of the residents in a terrifying exodus — most of them left with minimal possessions, and many of whom walked for several days until they reached either transport or shelter. The elderly and infirmed were often left at home, unable to withstand the journey and taking their chances as the Pakistan military sought to crush the Taliban insurgency once and for all.

Most importantly, traveling with Pakistan country director Steve Claborne, we were able to make a quick aerial assessment of the damage that awaited the returnees. Thousands of people have returned over the last two weeks. Once again, I was struck by the extraordinary resilience of people.

We touched down in Mingora, Swat's largest city, and toured the already-bustling marketplace, perhaps already 30 percent back in business. Open-front shops were selling produce, household goods, flowers and — most interestingly — radios, cassettes and videos, which were banned under the Taliban rule of the last several months. Women were on the streets, after having been forced inside under the Taliban. Laundry flapped in nearly half the houses and children tumbled out to wave at us.

Damage is centered on buildings near the roadside, on the 230 schools destroyed by the Taliban and in the buildings that housed the insurgents. There is rubble; there is damage, but the determination of the people to return from the ferocious heat and hopelessness of the camps is clear. Mercy Corps will focus our return programs on helping people quickly recover and get back to school and work.

And even then there are still more Taliban strongholds left in Pakistan , and its not as if they are just quietly minding their own business.
They still attack frequently

which stronghold, South Waziristan has been cleaned, they are dispersed

Has the political establishment not received any criticism .

no, they think there is a problem with our Eastern border & they think they must 'Hope for the best & plan for the Worst' ..-0p+=..-0p+=

BTW your post was totally offtopic

 

[DaRk WaVe]

Pakistan Army Begins War Games " Azm-e-Nau-3 " - (April 10,2010)

 

[ajtr]

India-Pakistan war games, and Cold Start

Shashank Joshi has a good piece up at RUSI explaining the limitations of India’s military ”Cold Start” doctrine, meant to allow the army to mobilise rapidly for war against Pakistan. The doctrine is intended to ensure Indian forces deploy faster than in 2001/2002 when India mobilised troops along the Pakistan border after an attack on its parliament blamed on Pakistan-based militants. It would also aim to integrate army operations with those of the Indian Air Force and to a lesser extent its navy.

The doctrine has caused much alarm in Pakistan which sees it as evidence of a threat from its much bigger neighbour which it says forces it to keep the bulk of its army on its border with India rather than fighting militants on the Afghan border.

The problem is, as Joshi writes, Cold Start does not actually work — or at least has yet to be developed in ways which would make it effective in an environment where both countries have nuclear bombs.

The Indian National Interest website argues that by refusing to admit that Cold Start never really got off the drawing board, India does itself a disservice by giving Pakistan a reason to play up the threat from India.

“…the army’s armored units have continued to be focused on a doctrine that is unlikely to be employed in the event of even a limited war in a nuclear environment, in which air power is likely to play a greater role in any case. The army clinging to Cold Start is in many respects impractical, and diverts resources and attention from more meaningful and creative endeavours related to its military preparedness,” it says.

“Second, the political costs of leaving the doctrine announced but unexplained are not insignificant. As is its wont, Pakistan has framed Cold Start as evidence … of imminent Indian plans to initiate hostilities or invade. India also gets questioned unnecessarily by friendly powers for its apparent recklessness in contemplating limited warfare in a nuclear environment.”

“The responsibility lies with the Ministry of Defence and the national security apparatus, if not the Prime Minister himself, to affirm Cold Start as a work in progress or admit that it never left the drawing board. Either would render advantages—operational or political—that six years of ambiguity has not.”

With both India and Pakistan planning war games this month, there will be much attention on each country’s military capabilities. What is probably equally important is how each sees the other – Cold Start is seen as much more of a threat in Pakistan than in India, where it is regarded with scepticism.

The same was true with comments made in December by the Indian army chief, who was reported to have said India should be able to fight a war on two fronts with both Pakistan and China. Presented in India as an aspirational comment reflecting the reality of two disputed borders, the remarks — made at a closed door conference — were seen as a clear threat in Pakistan.

Both countries tend to think they know each other well, and yet repeatedly see each other’s military intentions differently. That is not a good thing when over-confidence could one day lead them to misjudge the other’s red lines on the use of nuclear weapons.

 

[ajtr]

Cold Stop


Affirm Cold Start as a work in progress or admit that it never left the drawing board. Either would render advantages—operational or political—that six years of ambiguity has not.
Shashank Joshi has a readworthy piece for RUSI on India’s ability—or rather, inability—to fight conventional wars against Pakistan or China, in the light of Gen. Deepak Kapoor’s reported statements in December about planning for a two-front war, and the announcement in 2004 of the equally infamous ‘Cold Start’ doctrine.
Leaving aside, for a moment, whether Gen. Kapoor’s remarks were uttered, accurate or correctly-interpreted (briefly: possibly not, probably not, and definitely not), something does need to be said about Cold Start, which has been the subject of considerable interest and study, particularly outside India. For a quick sampling, see Walter Ladwig in International Security, Shaukat Qadir in the Daily Times, and Dan Blumenthal in The Wall Street Journal.
The main problem with Cold Start is that, well, it’s really No Start. The doctrine was a direct product of the failure of the Indian Army, and especially its armored units, to play a critical role during the border mobilisation of 2002 (Operation Parakram). With the subcontinent nuclearised, and the air force and navy likely to assume enhanced roles in the event of limited wars between India and its neighbours, the army was—rightly—concerned about becoming increasingly irrelevant.
In the six years after Cold Start has been announced, it remains unclear, and unlikely, whether the doctrine has been acknowledged or adopted by the other services, let alone civilian leaders. And unlike Pakistan, or even the United States, where the military exercises considerable control over doctrine, a doctrinal development of this magnitude in India necessitates the active participation of the political leadership. As K. Subrahmanyam writes:
[T]he Indian army chief is not the final authority to decide on the strategy to be adopted in case of any hostilities…Unlike in China, the Indian army does not function under party control with a military commission which excludes the prime minister and has a majority of the military leadership and is dominated by it. In other words, strategic policy-making in India is exclusively a political function and not a military one.
So, we have here an announced doctrine that has not been operationalised and apparently not been bought into outside the army. The national security establishment maintains an ambiguous stance on whether, and how much, Cold Start fits into its strategic planning. Is that a problem?
Yes. For two reasons. First, the army’s armored units have continued to be focused on a doctrine that is unlikely to be employed in the event of even a limited war in a nuclear environment, in which air power is likely to play a greater role in any case. The army clinging to Cold Start is in many respects impractical, and diverts resources and attention from more meaningful and creative endeavours related to its military preparedness.
Second, the political costs of leaving the doctrine announced but unexplained are not insignificant. As is its wont, Pakistan has framed Cold Start as evidence (or is it “literature“?) of imminent Indian plans to initiate hostilities or invade. India also gets questioned unnecessarily by friendly powers for its apparent recklessness in contemplating limited warfare in a nuclear environment.
The responsibility lies with the Ministry of Defence and the national security apparatus, if not the Prime Minister himself, to affirm Cold Start as a work in progress or admit that it never left the drawing board. Either would render advantages—operational or political—that six years of ambiguity has not.

 

[ajtr]

India and the Four Day War


The Indian military is caught between preparing for conventional war against neighbouring powers, Pakistan and China, and reorganising as an asymmetric deterrent against cross-border terrorism. It seems they are struggling on both counts.



By Shashank Joshi for RUSI.org

South Asia remains one of the last holdouts of symmetric, conventional warfare. Even with nuclear tipped missiles directed across the Indo-Pakistani border, wars between the two enduring rivals have been drawn out affairs. Ten years ago, the Kargil War stretched to twenty weeks. Accordingly, the prospect of a four-day war would pique the interest of any observer. At the beginning of this year, the media in both countries breathlessly reported that the Indian Chief of the Army Staff, General Deepak Kapoor, had boasted that India could win a two-front war against Pakistan and China within 96 hours, prompting Pakistan's foreign ministry to attack his 'hostile intent' and 'hegemonic and jingoistic mindset'.

But the most eye-catching claim, that India envisions a four day war, is an almost comic perversion of the reality. India's new offensive doctrine calls for rapid thrusts into Pakistani territory, but these are to begin, rather than end, within four days of the order being given - before diplomatic pressure can enmesh the political leadership and preclude a strike. The irony, overlooked in the public maelstrom, is that these war plans are now a full six years old, and the military remains far from being capable of actually executing an attack in anything like an effective manner.

The context

In 2002, Pakistan-based terrorists of the Lashkar-e-Taiba group (LeT), historically supported by the Pakistani military establishment, assaulted the Indian parliament. They inflicted grave symbolic and human damage, compounding the military standoff resulting from an earlier attack. India responded with the largest military exercise ever carried out by an Asian country, Operation Parakram, during which half a million troops were mobilised in an attempt to coerce Pakistan into curbing its passive tolerance of, and active support to, terrorism. Ten months later and with nearly 800 Indian soldiers dead (in mine-clearing, accidents, and skirmishes), India called off 'arguably the most ill-conceived manoeuvre in [its] military history', an ignominious end to the polity's most severe challenge since the Kargil War.

For a variety of reasons, the Indian political leadership deemed that it could not retaliate with a punitive or deterrent military attack on Pakistani soil. Some contest that it was the very existence of nuclear weapons that stayed India's hand, others that the restraint was a result of commercial and diplomatic pressure from Washington. Regardless, one important factor in the accretion of that pressure was judged to be the delay in mobilisation. India's three inertial 'strike corps' took nearly a month to arrive at the border from Central India by virtue of their enormous size and distance from the prospective theatre (although some contest that their speed was not unimpressive). Furthermore, once arrived the massed forces - trained to dismember Pakistan - seemed unable to offer a finessed response that would be narrow enough to avert nuclear retaliation.

Cold Start

In April 2004, the Indian military announced a new doctrine, Cold Start, which sought to integrate India's apparently discordant military and political strategies. Characterized as a doctrine of 'blitzkrieg', the strategy had three principal components.

First, army units would be reorganised into eight forward deployed and division-sized 'integrated battle groups' (IBGs), replacing the more cumbersome earlier formations held further from the border. Each, encompassing armour, artillery, infantry and air support, would theoretically be able to operate autonomously on the battlefield.

Second, India would rely on speed, both in mobilisation and in manoeuvre. To retain 'strategic surprise', the battle groups would punch into Pakistan at different and unpredictable points - to the extent that anyone can be surprised by a division-sized mass of weaponry headed towards an international border - and operate continuously. This would irrevocably commit the civilian leadership to a military solution, surmounting the perceived civilian reticence that has been the bane of a subordinate military. And, in contrast to the previous plan's 'armoured formations slicing towards the Indus', the battle groups would traverse only thirty to forty miles past the border (though this is still much further than has ever been attempted in an Indo-Pakistani war). This restraint would allow the IBGs to target the military, disrupting its command and control networks, but stop well short of locations more likely to trigger nuclear retaliation, such as population centres - 'flexible response' redux.

Third, the doctrine would exploit combined arms, relying on the Indian Air Force (IAF) (and, to a lesser extent, naval air power) to support the army by seeking air superiority and engaging in ground attack, the intended result being a massing of firepower rather than forces.

The overarching objective would be, as Walter Ladwig has argued in International Security, to 'establish the capacity to launch a retaliatory conventional strike against Pakistan that would inflict significant harm on the Pakistani Army before the international community could intercede, and at the same time, pursue narrow enough aims to deny Islamabad a justification to escalate the clash to the nuclear level'. In other words, the plan stems from , a particular diagnosis of deterrence failure over the last decade: what the political scientist Barry Posen has called 'political-military disintegration', a failure of extant military plans to mesh with political imperatives. Those imperatives are sharpened by India's democratic institutions, with the populace increasingly frustrated at the government's seeming impotence in the aftermath of not one but two attacks of Pakistani provenance. One of India's UN representatives, Arundhati Ghose, suggested that another attack would demand that 'we should go in and bomb the daylights out of them'. Arun Shourie, a prominent MP, demanded 'not an eye for an eye', but 'for an eye, both eyes'. And on a trip to New Delhi in January 2010, US defense secretary Robert Gates acknowledged that 'I think it is not unreasonable to assume Indian patience would be limited were there to be further attacks'.

The reality

However, it is not clear if military deterrence is a solution. It will not have escaped attention that these battle groups were conspicuously absent when LeT struck again in November 2008, wreaking havoc in Mumbai and unambiguously originating in Pakistan. Sumit Ganguly and Paul Kapur argue that 'although Pakistan is largely to blame for creating and nurturing the jihadis, it is no longer wholly in control of them', so 'they should not be seen simply as tools of Pakistan's policy'. Yet even if Pakistan could be coerced into suppressing terrorism, for a number of reasons India remains profoundly ill equipped for credible deterrence.

First, no amount of doctrinal innovation will eliminate the nuclear shadow. In the war of 1999 and the subsequent crises, Indian decision makers were acutely conscious of Pakistan's deterrent. For reasons including Pakistan's posture and India's politics and strategic culture, it may be that no Indian government will ever countenance military operations on undisputed Pakistani soil because of the intolerably high risk of a nuclear exchange. The reported deployment of battlefield nuclear weapons in 2002 and the publicly articulated threat to use 'a few nuclear weapons on [Pakistan's] own soil against Indian attacking forces' underscores how simple it has been for Pakistan to lower its red lines. A flexible response to a flexible response, and one that will likely become even more supple over time.

Second, many other non-doctrinal factors, such as US pressure, were at work in restraining India in 2002 and 2008. India's diplomacy has made considerable ground in the last eight years, but American reliance on Pakistani intelligence and supply routes to Afghanistan places natural limits on American support for any Indian offensive.

Third, the emphasis on speed of response and movement would present challenges to civilian decision-making by lowering the threshold at which Indian leaders could make decisions to cross the border and, once an offensive began, reducing their reaction times. The compression of the military timetable and consequent pressure on civilian leadership would create resistance to the strategy's institutionalisation. This may be no bad thing for India, if the end result is a 'threat that leaves something to chance', but it could generate greater uncertainty.

Fourth, inter-service rivalry has hobbled various efforts at modernisation, and doctrine is no exception. Just as the role of an Indian Chief of Defense Staff has never materialised, for fear that it would be army-dominated, Cold Start has been stalled as it appears to threaten the organisational essence of the air force. Not only does it underplay strategic bombing, but it also ties down air force units to the fixed operational areas of battle groups and tasks them with close air support, rather than allowing them to use their larger numbers over the Pakistani Air Force. One former senior air force officer at the official Centre for Air Power Studies bluntly insisted that 'there is no question of the air force fitting itself into a doctrine propounded by the army', dismissing this as 'a concept dead at inception'. Without better coordination, whether politically imposed or organically developed, the army will struggle to bring others on board. The largely non-specialist civilian bureaucrats in the defense ministry have so far proven unable to arbitrate these 'turf considerations', and the numerous exercises since 2004 have highlighted the obstacles to effective joint warfare.

Fifth, the military's readiness is remarkably poor. Ammunition holdings remain well below the necessary levels, much ordnance is defective, the artillery shortage is worse than ever, only a minority of the army is able to move freely around the country, and there is a substantial shortage of the officers necessary to operationalise a plan that relies on initiative. During 1997-2002, Indian government auditors found that the army could make only 10 per cent of its planned acquisitions. During 2002-7, only a third of the necessary tanks could be procured. Nor is the logistical infrastructure of Cold Start in place. Shortages, inefficiencies, and corruption afflict the full range of the armed forces, from the highest level (vide the saga of the delayed aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov) to the lowest. After Mumbai, the army was forced to tell politicians that 'it would take them several weeks before it could prudently commence operations'. Its inertia at that time precluded even a strike from the navy or air force, since there was no guarantee the army could deal with a Pakistani response.

Sixth, even as the army is still grappling with the half-decade old doctrinal shift, it is trying to accommodate new tasks. When it met in 2009 to review the progress made in instituting Cold Start, it undertook a 'reconfiguration of threat perceptions and security challenges'. In particular, it emphasized what the army chief called 'a proportionate focus towards the western and north-eastern fronts' - meaning not only Pakistan, but also China. Given the embryonic status of Cold Start, this represents a severe challenge. The defense ministry affiliated Indian think-tank Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis (IDSA) wrote that 'logically' a two-front war plan 'comprises first knocking Pakistan down by a blow from a Cold Start and then transferring the centre of gravity to the relatively slower paced, but more portentous conflict in the eastern Himalaya': to put it mischievously, a South Asian Schlieffen Plan. But with nine divisions already oriented to China, and the border dispute simmering, it is hard to see how the army is equipped for this.

The future

The Indian army's doctrine of 2004 had called for it to 'effectively project deterrence and dissuasion through the medium of strong, well-structured combat capability'. The strategic predicament in which India has found itself, facing terrorism originating from a country which is a 'major non-NATO ally' of the US, is a stringent one, compounded by raging insurgencies within. The failure of deterrence on 26 November 2008 in Mumbai was down to a great deal more than the army's posture, but to the extent that the Indian army of 2002 was the wrong one for the task, there are few signs of radical change.

The views expressed above are the author's own, and do not necessarily reflect those of RUSI.

 

[tarunraju]

The likelihood of a 26/11-style attack is most possible, since Pakistan's attempt to keep India off Afghanistan is failing at the moment, and it would want to hit India in its mainland instead of its installations in A'stan. If such an attack happens with 50,000 PA troops on the border, I doubt cold-start will be able to have much of an impact.

 

[DaRk WaVe]

Military exercises Azm-e-Nau-3 starts; troops carry out ‘Dispersal’ ​

FROM EASTERN BORDER,(APP) Apr 10: The country’s ever largest and comprehensive military exercises “ Azm-e-Nau-3” started here Saturday on the eastern borders with the demonstration of ‘Dispersal Techniques’ by the troops in ‘battle-like’ situation. The exercises, to continue till May 15, will be participated by the soldiers numbering more than 20,000 belonging to all arms and services.

The ongoing exercise is the culmination of yearlong training process in light of the directives of Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Parvez Kayani who had declared 2009-10 as ‘Year of Training’.
To provide the troops the real “ feel of battle ground, the troops have been divided into two groups, namely Blue Land and Fox Land with the former as defendant and the latter as adversary. A Heavy Anti-Tank battalion of Blue Land demonstrated the Dispersal Techniques in Cholistan desert sector and demonstrated the capabilities operating Armored Personnel Carrier (APC).
Other supporting units including Tanks, Infantry, Artillery Guns, Anti-Aircraft, Engineers, Electrical and Mechanical Engineering, Signals and others are also actively taking part in the exercises.
The teams, being commanded by a battalion commander, rolled out the camouflaged APC within minutes and moved to the ‘battle field.’
The exercise is a culmination of a long and deliberate process of war games, discussions and logistic evolution of “ Concept of Warfare” that is fully responsive to a wide menu of emerging threats.
This is a concept validation stage of the operational thought to be manifested in the form of tactical, operational and organizational aspects which would be validated and refined through the lessons learnt.
The process commenced with Army War Games named Exercise AZM-E-NAU-2, conducted in February 2010.
PAF’s ongoing exercise namely “High Mark 2010” would be fully integrated with Army Field Exercise.

 

[DaRk WaVe]

Pakistan's largest ever War Game Azm-e-Nau-3 starts; troops carry out 'Dispersal'

 

[DaRk WaVe]

Army drills Azm-e-Nau-3 enter 2nd day​

BAHAWALPUR: The country’s ever largest and comprehensive military exercises “ Azm-e-Nau-3” Sunday entered the second day on the eastern borders with the demonstration of ‘Dispersal Techniques’ by the troops in ‘battle-like’ situation.

The exercises, to continue till May 13, are being participated by the soldiers numbering more than 20,000 belonging to all arms and services.

Commander Southern Command Lt. Gen Khalid Shamim visited the drills areas in Bahawalpur at the start of the second day of the exercises.

The ongoing exercise is the culmination of yearlong training process in light of the directives of Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Parvez Kayani who had declared 2009-10 as ‘Year of Training’.

To provide the troops the real “ feel of battle ground, the troops have been divided into two groups, namely Blue Land and Fox Land with the former as defendant and the latter as adversary. A Heavy Anti-Tank battalion of Blue Land demonstrated the Dispersal Techniques in Cholistan desert sector and demonstrated the capabilities operating Armored Personnel Carrier (APC).

Other supporting units including Tanks, Infantry, Artillery Guns, Anti-Aircraft, Engineers, Electrical and Mechanical Engineering, Signals and others are also actively taking part in the exercises.

The teams, being commanded by a battalion commander, rolled out the camouflaged APC within minutes and moved to the ‘battle field.’

The exercise is a culmination of a long and deliberate process of war games, discussions and logistic evolution of “ Concept of Warfare” that is fully responsive to a wide menu of emerging threats.

This is a concept validation stage of the operational thought to be manifested in the form of tactical, operational and organizational aspects which would be validated and refined through the lessons learnt.

The process commenced with Army War Games named Exercise AZM-E-NAU-2, conducted in February 2010.

 

[DaRk WaVe]

PA exercises near Bhawalpur...............................................

 

[IBRIS]

@ EMO GiRl

Day time army maneuvers are very dangerous and vulnerable to airstrikes of enemy bombers. Night vision devices have now made it possible for modern armies to fight round the clock. Not all arms of the service or units of Pakistan, however, are endowed with an equal night vision capability. To take an example, during recent military exercises in Pokhram Range Indian Air Force did Night Bombing Runs against convoys and fixed positions.

 

[DaRk WaVe]

First phase of Azm-e-Nau concludes​

BAHAWALPUR, Apr 18 (APP): The first phase of military exercise Azm-e-Nau - III culminated with an impressive Integrated Fire Power Exercise at Khairpur Tamewali here on Sunday. Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani, federal ministers, parliamentarians, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Tariq Majid, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Services Chiefs, Foreign Defence Attaches and a number of retired and serving military officers witnessed the spectacular fire power exercise.

While explaining the concept of exercise, the Chief of Army Staff said that exercise Azm-e-Nau III was conceived and executed as a concept validation exercise; a part of the eternal preparedness philosophy of Pakistan Army.

He said that the exercise has helped in evolving a timely and effective response to emerging challenges.

While talking on the occasion Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani congratulated Pakistan Army for holding exercise Azm-e-Nau III and commended the professionalism displayed.

He also admired the success achieved in counter terrorism operations and acknowledged the sacrifices made by the Army and other law enforcement agencies.

The audience witnessed the integrated firing of various ground weapons, cobra gunship helicopters and Pakistan Air Force fighter aircrafts.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

EG how does this strategy do anything against the air doctrine that is a big part of cold start??

 

[BunBunCake]

EG how does this strategy do anything against the air doctrine that is a big part of cold start??

I'm sure this is just another exercise the Pakistani Army is holding. The media labeled the headers as Cold Stop, Anti-Cold Start, etc just spice up things.
Gotta love the media.