Pak Nuke Arsenal Bigger, More Advanced Than India

[SHASH2K2]

india tested nuke twice , 1974 & 1998 ...pakistan just once tested it's nukes..

do any body belived that one can make 60-70 warheads by just testing it once or twice...

Their weapons are Imported ones so obviously quality will be better . Theirs is made in China and ours is made in India.

 

[Param]

Deterrents are always a top secret in any nation's security. I hope no one would have shared that our hydrogen bomb is dud, if someone shared pls do take care to elaborate that.

So do you think Santhanam was blabbering ? And he is not the only one there are others like Iyengar

 

[ajtr]

Why you people are fighting if pakistan has more bombs or not.One thing indian must remember.

1 pakistani bumb=10 kafir indian bumbs

Hence premise is proved that pakistan has more bumbs than india....:emot15:

 

[luckyy]

if these paki's nuke are imported then the number can't be more then just 5-6 inplace of 50-60..

musharaf made a very intresting statements after they test their nuke in 1998 , he said " india should not think that after conducting two nuke explosions , pakistan now has less weapons left..

abiously he was worried about losing his two warheads...clearly it was not a test , they indeed exploded a warhead,,,and clearly they won't have many..

 

[Yusuf]

Shash pakistan nukes are based on 70s design Chinese bombs. India tested a design in 74 and then refined it and tested again in 98.

Paramvir shantaram made the statements to make sure the govt was under pressure not to sign CTBT at the height of bush-MMS nuke bonhomie. It was probably a govt done thing to tell bush india cannot sign. Notice how things have all died down since.

 

[JBH22]

India has the ability to take bombs unfortunately many of us will be dead but when we will retaliate all the war mongers across the border will get their much prized 72 homo virgins.

 

[hit&run]

We drove out our nukes from our laboratories and tested them. It is a testimony to the fact that we have a active nuclear weapon program (still testing our nukes in simulation). In Pakistan's case they said they took out their nukes out of their inventory (why would you have sub kiloton yield nuke in your inventory when even a tactical nuke used will ensure overwhelming nuclear retaliation, and sub kiloton yeild will neither deter your large army nor population)? It means they telling a lie. Few experts are saying that they screwed the detonation even when Chinese were there at the site to assist. But in my opinion it also proved to the world that even Chinese nukes are crap. Bravo to India who tested its nuke and out jealousy Pakistan exposed not herself but her nuclear guru China as well. ''nakal main be akal chahiyea''

 

[LETHALFORCE]

I am more concerned about how we will test the SLBM that will go in our future Nuclear subs (Arihant) and the future AGNI MIRV tests then these silly comparisions.

 

[Yatharth Singh]

No one knows about any nation`s nuke arsenal. The numbers are just estimated to have been existed. No Government or army will show their complete arsenal for any weapon or anything else and not even the world`s biggest democracy(i.e. India). So just chill because nukes are just meant for counting as no country can currently dare to nuke any nation or organisation(not even Taliban) of the world.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

No one knows about any nation`s nuke arsenal. The numbers are just estimated to have been existed. No Government or army will show their complete arsenal for any weapon or anything else and not even the world`s biggest democracy(i.e. India). So just chill because nukes are just meant for counting as no country can currently dare to nuke any nation or organisation(not even Taliban) of the world.

There are reports a Neutron Bomb was used in Iraq by USA.
http://www.workers.org/2007/world/neutron-bomb-0510/
http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread276940/pg1
http://searchwarp.com/swa150515.htm

 

[Iamanidiot]

the chinese don't send their nukes witheir boomers so do we I think

 

[shuvo@y2k10]

if pakistan has better and more nukes than india then JF17 is 10 times better than american F-22 RAPTOR.

 

[Param]

if pakistan has better and more nukes than india then JF17 is 10 times better than american F-22 RAPTOR.

For us that may be funny but the Pakis might actually believe that.

 

[Rebelkid]

Who cares ?? Half a dozen nukes are more than enough to destroy a nation..... its not like we r going to use the entire nuke arsanal

 

[Yusuf]

Don't know about better but even if they do have more bombs than india, it still doesn't trouble us.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

One future AGNI MIRV with 10 warheads is counted as one bomb, 10 will be counted as 10 bombs but in reality they can deliver a 100 warheads.

 

[Iamanidiot]

Yusuf post sundarjis nuclear doctrine and stuart slades links our members need to be taught how nuclear warfare is fought.You will be the teacher this time

 

[Yusuf]

JP, I think we need to dig out the thread on shantarams revelation and the discussion in it for the members.

 

[Param]

Who cares ?? Half a dozen nukes are more than enough to destroy a nation..... its not like we r going to use the entire nuke arsanal

I believe an all out nuclear war is not going to happen but still we need a proven H-bomb to place us in the big league. ICBMs & h-bombs have become a symbol for big global powers. China attained that before 1979 eventhough they did not have anything else worth mentioning.Unfortunately it is not hard to come across people from foreign countries who are surprised that India has nukes. And most of them compare us with Pakistan as if we are in the same level.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

JP, I think we need to dig out the thread on shantarams revelation and the discussion in it for the members.

http://www.ipcs.org/article/nuclear/the-logic-of-the-sundarji-doctrine-3029.html

THE LOGIC OF THE 'SUNDARJI DOCTRINE'

Deterrence theory has understandably been imported into South Asia with the onset of nuclearization in the late eighties. It, having contributed to keeping the Cold War 'cold', has much to offer on how the nuclear equation is to be managed. Simply put deterrence posits making a credible threat of nuclear retaliation to ensure that the enemy desists from using nuclear weapons in first place.

Official Indian nuclear doctrine has predicated deterrence on assured nuclear retaliation that promises to be 'massive' to enemy first use. This is a controversial extension of the promise of inflicting 'unacceptable damage' that had been suggested by the earlier Draft Nuclear Doctrine. Unacceptable damage does not require 'massive' numbers, when 'sufficient' would do. Both, 'massive' nuclear retaliation and infliction of 'unacceptable damage' have been queried by this author in earlier contributions here ('The illogic of massive punitive retaliation' and 'The illogic of 'unacceptable damage'). It is only fair that an alternative be suggested. This article makes such an attempt.

The doctrinal options for India that practices No First Use are: 'massive' nuclear retaliation as currently posited; infliction of 'unacceptable damage' with 'sufficient' numbers as in the Draft Nuclear Doctrine; 'flexible' nuclear retaliation depending on nature of enemy first use, desired effects and demands of in-conflict deterrence; and lastly, ending a nuclear exchange at the lowest possible level. As argued earlier, inflicting 'unacceptable damage' on the enemy without also degrading his means of retaliation could result in receiving like 'unacceptable damage' in its counter strike.

In conflict, deterrence would have it that the power to destroy the enemy with the remainder of one's arsenal would deter his infliction of unacceptable damage on us. Such self-deterrence in the enemy after receiving 'unacceptable' levels of damage is wishful. Since a counter of like proportions is virtually assured, and would be unacceptable to us also, it makes sense not to get into a position of receiving such a counter strike. This means our retaliatory strike should not be of the order as to provoke a counter that inflicts 'unacceptable damage'.

'Flexible' nuclear retaliation, implying a measured retaliatory strike, suggests itself as a suitable option. It is permissive of a wider range of options than strikes causing 'unacceptable' levels of damage. The problem with this is that there is no guarantee against escalation and termination of exchange(s).

It is here that the less-discussed 'Sundarji doctrine' has advantages. This requires termination of the exchange(s) at the lowest levels of escalation. It explicitly states the intent not to escalate by promising to remain at the lowest level and promising to end the exchange earliest. This gives incentives to the enemy to stay at the lower end himself and not to go in for further exchanges, hoping to give us similar incentives. This is at variance with deterrence philosophy that is instead a competition in showing resolve and willingness to face even 'unacceptable' punishment.

Such a doctrine makes better sense for India. Firstly, India, just as its putative nuclear adversaries, has vulnerabilities that aggravate 'unacceptable damage'. It would not be able to cope with the aftermath, even if emergency is invoked. It has repeatedly been demonstrated that India's disaster response mechanisms are weak. While these will strengthen over time, Cold War experience indicates that protection through anti missile defences and shelters etcetera is an expensive chimera.

Secondly, the poor would suffer more, especially the long term impact. Unprecedented breakdown of order, in multiples of the Partition experience, would occur. India though powerful, is also a 'weak' state. The verities of national life, as we know it, will be challenged. The impact on polity could be a lurch towards the Right and authoritarianism. In case of Pakistan being the nuclear adversary, internal communal harmony may not withstand the strain of misplaced perceptions and those taking political advantage of the situation. Thus, even if the enemy is 'finished', 'India' as we know it, would also cease to exist. Receipt of 'unacceptable damage' would be equivalent to shocks administered by Timur, Nadir Shah and Abdali in history.

Lastly, provinces that have borne the impact of an 'unacceptable damage' in the form of loss of an urban centre would be miffed. The balance of ethnicities and communities that is India in reality would be upset. Appraisal of the changed local balance would be likely to make the groups effected disillusioned enough to reopen sovereignty issues.

In deterrence theory, self-deterrence occurs due to such negative prognostications. Therefore, theory has it that political 'resolve' has to be cultivated and demonstrated. Doing so reinforces deterrence. But consideration as to the response when deterrence for some reason or other has broken down, requires moving away from the promise of inflicting punishment to preserving oneself from unacceptable punishment.

In this light, the Sundarji doctrine recommends itself. It would help preserve India, even while sparing the nuclear opponent the temerity to break the nuclear taboo. Its expectation that nuclear escalation can be avoided needs debate. Measures that need to be instituted for its success, such strategic dialogue in a permanent nuclear risk reduction and management mechanism, can then be emplaced.