OBOR News & Developments

[Suryavanshi]

Argument b/w Chinese CPEC engineers and Pakistani policement escalates into a physical fight


Click for video

The chincom grab one of the pork by the hair and straight up smah that nigga on to the car

 

[Kalki_2018]

Just the trailer. Expect many more and more violent incidents.

 

[Butter Chicken]

IMF head warns China on exporting debt through 'Silk Road'

BEIJING: IMF chief Christine Lagarde warned China on Thursday about saddling other countries with a "problematic increase in debt" through its ambitious global trade infrastructure project.

"These ventures can also lead to a problematic increase in debt, potentially limiting other spending as debt service rises, and creating balance of payment challenges," Lagarde told the crowd of Chinese and foreign officials.

"In countries where public debt is already high, careful management of financing terms is critical," she said.

Some countries like Sri Lanka have already ended up deeply in debt and been left with little choice but to turn over crucial assets to Beijing as way to restructure the loans. In Sri Lanka's case, the island nation handed over a long term lease on the strategically located and bustling Hambantota Port to pay down debt.

 

[Butter Chicken]

CPEC will become next East India Company-Pak Media

 

[Butter Chicken]

CPEC bridge built 3 months ago collapses in Sindh

Notice the lack of support structures

 

[Gaurav Rai]

Cheeni master giving porkis some iron love

This proves if we want, we can thrash Muslims too. They aren't god elite which they try to show to us.

 

[Samsung J7]

This proves if we want, we can thrash Muslims too. They aren't god elite which they try to show to us.

Wow , what has religion to do with this. Are u suffering from inferiority complex?

 

[Gaurav Rai]

Yes i am, most of my encounters with muslim made me a person with inferiority complex.

Wow , what has religion to do with this. Are u suffering from inferiority complex?

 

[Samsung J7]

Yes i am, most of my encounters with muslim made me a person with inferiority complex.

Then better shave your moustache
Moustache r not for low self esteem individuals .


Pakis r Muslims. We thrashed them in 3 wars. Entire middle East is muslim. Nato is bombing entire middle east. These things hav nothing to do with religion. See a doctor to cure your low self esteem.
..........
..............

 

[Suryavanshi]

Then better shave your moustache
Moustache r not for low self esteem individuals .


Pakis r Muslims. We thrashed them in 3 wars. Entire middle East is muslim. Nato is bombing entire middle east. These things hav nothing to do with religion. See a doctor to cure your low self esteem.
..........
..............

Cut him some slack the dude was going through depression so it is expected of him talk like that.
And let's not act like there isn't a communal problem in india mostly instigated by peace lovers.

 

[Flame Thrower]

CPEC bridge built 3 months ago collapses in Sindh

Notice the lack of support structures

Who would build such bridges man.

What for!!!

Now the real question is how did it stand still for 3 months and the construction time!!!

I know Pakis are beggars and selling their blood in the name of CPEC, but if it is for this kind of Infra then.............

Any source for this info

 

[Gaurav Rai]

Then better shave your moustache
Moustache r not for low self esteem individuals .

Pakis r Muslims. We thrashed them in 3 wars. Entire middle East is muslim. Nato is bombing entire middle east. These things hav nothing to do with religion. See a doctor to cure your low self esteem.
..........
..............

Thanks for your kind words....................................

 

[Gaurav Rai]

Cut him some slack the dude was going through depression so it is expected of him talk like that.
And let's not act like there isn't a communal problem in india mostly instigated by peace lovers.

Thanks bro but i am used to it now.

 

[john70]

Is China's Belt and Road working? A progress report from eight countries
Beijing's infrastructure push clouded by project delays and mounting debt


GWADAR, Pakistan -- The idea of transforming the ancient fishing village of Gwadar into a bustling port city has been around since at least 1954, when Pakistan commissioned the U.S. Geological Survey to examine its coastline. Their conclusion: Gwadar, which sits on the Arabian Sea, would be an ideal location for a deep-water port.

Gwadar's potential went unrealized for decades, but it is now at the heart of a hugely ambitious plan known as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, or CPEC. China has pledged to spend $63 billion to bolster Pakistan's power plants, ports, airports, expressways and other infrastructure under the initiative, which Beijing positions as one of the pillars of its $1 trillion global Belt and Road Initiative championed by Chinese President Xi Jinping.

The investment is clearly visible at Gwadar. More than 1,000 people, about half of whom are Chinese, work at a recently completed 660-meter container terminal. Nearby is a hospital built using Chinese funds. Pearl Continental Hotel, a luxury hotel owned by a local company, stands on a hill overlooking the port. The pier is dotted with Pakistani naval and coast guard ships. Armed boats and pickup trucks patrol the area, while wooden fishing boats float in the distance.


The gains for China in all of this development are perhaps less visible, but potentially far more significant. A major goal for China is to link its landlocked western region to the port at Gwadar. This would allow ships carrying oil and other goods from the Persian Gulf to avoid the "choke point" of the Strait of Malacca, shaving thousands of kilometers off existing routes frequently patrolled by foreign navies.

has high hopes for the deep-water port being developed in Gwadar, Pakistan. © Reuters
For all this grand ambition, some analysts have doubts. Pakistan's trade deficit with China has been rising, and there are concerns about what happens if it is unable to repay its debt. As with other countries that have benefited recently from Beijing's largesse, some in Pakistan worry that the price of such investment could be a huge debt burden.

The China-Pakistan corridor "will no doubt be a game changer for Pakistan, but we need to be careful," said Ehsan Malik, the CEO of Pakistan Business Council, a business policy advocacy forum. "Ten years' tax concessions, 90-year leases for Chinese companies and cheap imports will impact the competitiveness of existing domestic industries."

Pakistan symbolizes both the promise and the potential peril for countries participating in China's BRI undertaking -- arguably the largest investment drive ever launched by a single country -- and its related projects.

For countries needing infrastructure, the BRI holds the promise of investment in new railways, roads, ports and other projects. But as the Nikkei Asian Review and The Banker magazine discovered in producing this special report, participating countries also have worries, ranging from a lack of participation by local workers and banks to unmanageable debt hangovers.

The Nikkei Asian Review and The Banker examined how BRI projects are unfolding in eight countries: Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Kazakhstan, Bangladesh, India, Poland, Laos and Pakistan. We also collaborated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies' Reconnecting Asia Project to aggregate key BRI infrastructure projects worldwide.

Key findings include:

Project delays After initial fanfare, projects sometimes experience serious delays. In Indonesia, construction on a $6 billion rail line is behind schedule and costs are escalating. Similar problems have plagued projects in Kazakhstan and Bangladesh.

Ballooning deficits Besides Pakistan, concerns about owing unmanageable debts to Beijing have been raised in Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Laos.

Sovereignty concerns In Sri Lanka, China's takeover of a troubled port has raised questions about a loss of sovereignty. And neighboring India openly rejects the BRI, saying China's projects with neighboring Pakistan infringe on its sovereignty.

Mushtaq Khan, an economist and former chief economic adviser at the State Bank of Pakistan, acknowledges that the country's debt to China is rising. But he says Beijing "cannot afford" to bankrupt Pakistan -- in part because of the country's importance as a counterweight to India, a regional rival of China's.

"China's primary interest in Pakistan is geopolitical rather than strictly economic, and therefore, for China, repayment of the debt burden will be secondary to maintaining a good political and economic relationship with Pakistan," he said.

Gwadar, with a population of 110,000, is 90 minutes west by propeller plane from the mercantile city of Karachi in southern Pakistan and just 70km from the border with Iran. China refers to neighboring Pakistan as its "all-weather friend," but the country is not known for having a healthy business climate. Pakistan ranked 147th out of 190 countries and regions in the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business 2018.

The deeper ties with China come amid strains between Pakistan and the U.S. In January, the U.S. State Department announced that it would suspend security assistance to Pakistan over what it called a failure to clamp down on terror groups.

The country's economy has been battered over the years by terrorism, fuel shortages and tattered governance, but it grew 5.4% in the year through June 2017, the fastest pace in 10 years. The State Bank of Pakistan forecasts growth to approach 6% in the year ending June 2018.



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The projects are underway with the belief that the troubled nation can join the vibrant club of emerging Asian economies. The government of Pakistan plans to transform Gwadar into one of the world's largest port cities by 2055, housing steel mills, terminals for liquefied natural gas, oil refineries and other facilities. Under the plan, trade and industrial zones will be concentrated on the city's east side, while the western side of the peninsula will serve as residential and tourism areas.

"Gwadar port will be a hub to link Afghanistan and Central Asia, but it is not just a trade and logistics center," said Dostain Khan Jamaldini, chairman of Gwadar Port Authority. "We will set up an industrial estate with export manufacturing zones, and invite the motorcycle and electronics industries."

"Gwadar port is not given to China only," Jamaldini said, stressing the authority's willingness to welcome U.S., European and Asian companies.


The chairman denied speculation that China could try to make Gwadar a military port in the future. "Gwadar is 100% commercial. If China [has military] needs, we have Ormara naval base near here," he said. "We have nothing to hide."

Such developments have unnerved neighboring India, which has rejected the BRI program because China is financing projects on land that is claimed by both India and Pakistan. Arun Jaitley, India's finance minister, says the BRI violates India's sovereignty. "We are not a part of the project, and the proposed [BRI] road passes through what we regard as Indian territory," Jaitley said, referring to a project in the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Kashmir. Both India and Pakistan claim the Kashmir region.

"We had to get out of this debt trap"

When Sri Lanka handed over its southern port of Hambantota to China in December 2017, many saw it as a cautionary tale for other nations that are eagerly accepting Chinese help to build grand infrastructure projects.

The country granted a 99-year lease on the port to China Merchants Port Holdings in hopes of cutting its debt, which is among the highest of the emerging economies. For its part, China gained an important beachhead for its attempt to expand its military influence in the Indian Ocean.

Chinese construction workers take a break in the Sri Lankan capital of Colombo in October 2015. © Getty Images
Construction of the $1.5 billion Hambantota Port started in 2008 under former President Mahinda Rajapaksa. The first phase of the project, which ended in 2010, cost $361 million. While details of the second phase are unknown, Export-Import Bank of China financed 85% of the first phase of work.

But as the port's losses began to mount, the government in Colombo found itself unable to repay its debts. The country had an external debt of $48.3 billion at the end of 2017, and its annual external financing needs are $11 billion -- roughly the same as its annual tax revenue. Sri Lanka's debt to China totals $8 billion and is said to carry an interest rate of 6%.

"We had to take a decision to get out of this debt trap," said Mahinda Samarasinghe, Sri Lanka's ports and shipping minister, of the reasoning behind the 99-year lease.

Government critics have said Sri Lanka's sovereignty has been compromised by the port episode, which came only two months before the former president of neighboring Maldives warned that its debts to Beijing could force the country to cede territory to China as early as next year.

Sri Lanka is located at a strategic point for the BRI. The port of Hambantota is indispensable for China's energy security because the country imports two-thirds of its oil through shipping lanes south of the port.

Jonathan Hillman, director of the Reconnecting Asia Project at the CSIS, says India has been watching China's activity in Sri Lanka with concern. "The docking of a Chinese submarine at the port of Colombo in 2014 is one reason why the handover of a port at Hambantota in December 2017 raised alarms in Delhi. The nature of the Hambantota transaction, a debt-for-equity deal, also raised concerns," he said.

In 2009, President Rajapaksa put an end to Sri Lanka's civil war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and shifted government policy from fighting toward improving infrastructure ahead of the presidential election in 2010. The development of Hambantota Port, located within his constituency, was a typical project.

Rajapaksa kicked off the construction of Sri Lanka's second international airport in Mattala, an inland town 20km from the port, in 2009. Of the $209 million construction cost, Exim Bank of China put up $190 million with a concessionary loan. Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport is now called "the world's emptiest international airport" because it has only four regular flights arriving and departing per week. The Sri Lankan government plans to sell the airport, too.

India is afraid that if the airport is purchased by China, it will become a Chinese air force base. A delegation from India visited the airport last year to discuss taking it over, but an airport official said, "I heard that it was not going well due to a mismatch in conditions from both sides."

China is also involved in a $15 billion project to build "Port City Colombo" on reclaimed land in the capital. The $1.4 billion first phase of the project is being undertaken by a subsidiary of China Communications & Construction Co., which is shouldering the total cost of reclaiming 269 hectares of land.

Sri Lanka's debt equals 81.6% of its gross domestic product, which the International Monetary Fund says is the third-highest ratio among emerging economies.

Yet even after the debt problems at Hambantota were clear, China last year proposed to Sri Lanka two joint construction projects around the port: a $3 billion oil refinery and a $125 million cement factory.

To the Sri Lankan government, "there is no country or institution with ready cash other than China," a senior economic official said.

Rail lines in Southeast Asia

In the middle of a tea plantation outside Bandung, Indonesia's third-largest city, sits the future site of one of the four stations on the country's first high-speed railway.

A Chinese high-speed train exhibition in Jakarta in August 2015: Progress on a Chinese-backed railway project in Indonesia has been slow. © Reuters
The railway is one of two ongoing projects under the BRI in Indonesia. Launched in January 2016, the planned 142km railway that will connect Jakarta and Bandung was supposed to illustrate China's expanding economic power and influence. But as of late February, local officials said only 10% of the work had been completed, making it impossible for operations to start next year as scheduled. A funding crunch is also starting to raise concerns over the financial health of Indonesian companies involved.

"After the project launch, there was almost no activity besides the land being cleared," said local villager Asep as he looked over the construction site at the Walini tea plantation. "No rail tracks. Nothing. Work only restarted around three months ago, for the underground tunnel."

Paperwork and permit problems halted the project in its first several months, after which land acquisition proved to be a major headache. Only half of total land needed has been secured. Rising land prices during the delays is partially responsible for the project's growing price tag -- from $5.5 billion when it was announced to $6 billion.

Sluggish land acquisition has had other consequences: China Development Bank, which agreed to cover 75% of the cost with loans, has repeatedly delayed disbursement, further hampering progress.

"The CDB will [start] loan disbursement this month," Chief Maritime Minister Luhut Panjaitan, whose office oversees joint Belt and Road projects with China, said on March 9. But since the bank signed the loan agreement during the BRI forum in Beijing last May, deadlines for distributing the money have been pushed back time and again.

Analysts say it is unlikely China will cancel its funding given Indonesia's strategic importance as Southeast Asia's largest economy. But some think China has other, more pressing, priorities.

"[High-speed railway] in Java island is an investment that could wait, as China has more immediate incentives to strengthen its trade routes in its neighboring countries first that are not separated by seas," brokerage Reliance Sekuritas Indonesia said in a note.

The second active BRI project in Indonesia is the Morowali Industrial Park on Sulawesi island. The island already hosts Chinese nickel smelters and a stainless steel factory. A $1.6 billion deal was signed in Beijing last year that includes the construction of a carbon steel factory and a power plant. Additionally, Indonesia's Investment Coordinating Board has designated three provinces -- North Sulawesi, North Kalimantan and North Sumatra -- for BRI investment. Future plans include the development of new industrial parks, ports, airports and tourism.

Despite the delayed railway construction, Indonesia continues to have high hopes that BRI will help cover the funding gap in President Joko Widodo's $355 billion infrastructure drive.

Bangladesh's experience has been similar. Its BRI projects were given a huge boost by Chinese President Xi's momentous 2016 state visit -- the first by a Chinese head of state in 30 years.

Schoolchildren cross a road in Dhaka in March. Bangladesh's huge infrastructure needs make it a promising partner for China. © Reuters
But after an initial spike in activity, construction has slowed. "It started off pretty well, but while it's a bilateral initiative, it's not really just bilateral. There are other geopolitical issues which can play a part in actual execution. We see a bit of a slowdown," said Naser Ezaz Bijoy, CEO at Standard Chartered Bangladesh.

The CSIS Reconnecting Asia Project has identified three key BRI projects in Bangladesh: the Dhaka-Jessore rail line, the Payra power plant and the Karnaphuli Tunnel -- the country's first-ever underwater tunnel. Chinese development banks dominate the projects' financing, while Chinese contractors often take over the construction process.

Construction has already started for the $1.65 billion coal-fired power plant by the port of Payra. The plant is a joint venture involving Chinese power company CMC and Bangladesh's state-owned North-West Power Generation Co. While the equity will be split in half, the project's financing is fully provided by China. The plant is scheduled to be operational by December 2019.

The $4.4 billion Dhaka-Jessore rail line is still in its preparatory phase. Announced in 2016, the line is expected to launch in 2022. State-owned China Railway Construction is the project's contractor.

The construction stage for the Karnaphuli Tunnel is less clear. State-owned China Communications Construction Co. signed a $705 million contract with the Bangladesh Bridge Authority back in 2015. But in November 2017, Bangladeshi newspaper Financial Express reported that construction work had not started because the BBA was waiting for the Exim Bank of China to release funds for the project.

Whatever the delay, Bijoy notes that the two countries are a good fit. "China has overcapacity onshore and it's not growing as fast as it did in the past, so it would require external demand to support its production. Countries like Bangladesh growing at 7% will have that demand."

A BRI rail project in Laos is further along. Construction of a 414km railway linking Vientiane, the capital, to the China-Laos border is scheduled to be completed in December 2021.

A hydropower project in Phongsaly Province, Laos: China is investing big in energy infrastructure in its southern neighbor. © Getty Images
Talks on a possible rail project began in 2001, long before Xi introduced the idea of building a "new Silk Road." The two countries did not sign a memorandum of understanding until April 2010, however. After a number of further delays, a ceremony marking the official start of construction was held in December 2016 at Luang Prabang, Laos' ancient royal capital, which will be one of the main stations on the new rail line.

"When it comes to Laos, China has for many years had a strategy to use its railway system to drive into Southeast Asia to bind these countries to China," said James Stent, who served for 13 years on the boards of China Minsheng Bank and China Everbright Bank in Beijing.

There are complaints among Laotians that the labor on the rail line is predominantly Chinese, detracting from any knock-on benefits to the economy. Development banks worry that the $6 billion rail project will exacerbate Laos' already precarious debt levels, which reached 68% of GDP in 2016, increasing the debt distress level from "moderate" to "high" in the recent World Bank/IMF Debt Sustainability Analysis. Laos' budget deficit in 2017 was 4.8% of GDP, compared with 4.6% in 2016.

"There was some impact from the rail project because the government has to contribute $250 million to the project over the next five years, or $50 million a year from domestic revenues," said one development bank economist. "This money will mainly pay for the compensation to affected people along the railway line."

China and Laos have set up a 70/30 joint venture to finance the railway project. Each side needs to contribute 40% of their investment commitment in cash, which means that Laos, with 30% of the joint venture, needs to contribute $715 million over the five-year construction period. Of this, $250 million will come from the national budget. The remaining $465 million will be borrowed from the Exim Bank of China at a 2.3% interest with a five-year grace period and a 35-year maturity.

A worry hanging over the joint venture is: Who will pick up the tab if the railway does not make money? That may be more of a concern for Laos than for China. "It probably is not a commercially viable project in the time frame of a Western bank," Stent said. "But once you add in what China's objectives are, it makes sense for China."

Nikkei staff writers Yuji Kuronuma and Erwida Maulia, and The Banker contributing writer Peter Janssen contributed to this report.

 

[john70]

The numbers behind China's overseas development loan risks
Figures show Belt and Road strategy favors countries with low credit ratings

https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/D...ehind-China-s-overseas-development-loan-risks

Having gone from being mainly a recipient country to one of the world's largest donors of foreign aid, China has built up a complex network of relationships with its development partners around the world.

But, according to analysis of one of the most comprehensive studies on Chinese development aid to date, not all partners appear to receive equal treatment.

AidData, a research lab at College of William & Mary in the U.S., tracked over 4,000 records of Beijing's official finance projects between 2000 and 2014.


Nikkei Asian Review evaluated interest rates attached to the aid packages different countries received based on AidData's figures, and contrasted them with numerical credit risk scorescompiled by data analytics company Trading Economics.

The figures for the Americas correlated according to a standard lending pattern of higher rates for higher risk loans. Those for Africa and Asia, however, did not display the expected pattern.

The findings suggest that factors other than creditworthiness may have at play when Beijing made investment decisions between 2000 and 2014.

Weighted interest rates were estimated by accounting for loan amounts. The rates were then plotted against risk evaluations for a sample of 46 countries. Trading Economics' default-risk figures scores range from 0, likely to default, to 100, or riskless.

Bradley C. Parks, the project's chief researcher and executive director of AidData, suggested one potential explanation for the imbalance.

Beijing provides government financing for highly concessional development projects that meet the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Developement's criteria for official development assistance, which includes grants and soft loans with a large grant element.

It also provides funding through what the OECD terms "other official flows." These are official transactions that do not meet the body's ODA criteria, and are either for essentially commercial purposes or intended for development but have a grant element of less than 25%.

ODA typically comes with lower interest rates, meaning a country receiving more ODA than OOF tends to have a lower borrowing rate.

Kenya, for example, had a risk score of 20, well below the sample average of 37. But only three out of 26 projects qualified as OOF. This had the effect of dragging down the average weighted borrowing rate to 2.38%.

According to Parks, China's decisions on ODA grants appear to be largely guided two principles.

On the one hand, poorer, more populous countries tend to receive a higher amount of Chinese ODA. On the other, foreign policy considerations have a significant bearing on where money is lent. A country that recognizes Taiwan diplomatically would automatically be excluded from consideration, for example.

Parks and his colleagues recently published a study analyzing the voting behavior of recipient countries in the U.N. General Assembly.

The findings indicate that countries that align their votes with China often receive ODA.

"Chinese OOF is more commercially oriented and as such it tends to go to more creditworthy countries, while it also tends to go to China's trading partners and countries that are rich in natural resources," he says.

The risks involved are brought into contrast when considering Beijing's recent investment strategy.

Findings published by Washington-based think tank the Center of Global Development suggest that, of the 68 countries hosting projects linked to China's Belt and Road Initiative, 23 are currently at risk of debt distress, with eight planned projects adding considerably to the risk.

Even when it comes to commercially oriented OOF, said Parks, there are a number of cases in which non-concessional or weakly concessional loans have been issued to countries with a questionable ability to repay them.

"Venezuela may be the canary in the coal mine," he said.

As one of the world's 10 richest countries in terms of iron, natural gas and oil, the country received very little in the way of ODA classified loans from China between 2000 and 2014. Beijing did, however, provide significant amounts of OOF.

"China lent billions of dollars to the Venezuelan authorities, where it now seems very unlikely that they will repay those loans given the country's precarious economic circumstances."

In cases like Lebanon, commercial interest may become harder to disentangle from official aid. The country neighbors war-torn Syria and has received interest-free ODA loans.

It also lies at the crossroads of Africa, Asia and Europe, in a location of huge strategic importance, particularly with reference to Belt and Road and, according to reports in the Financial Times, China is eyeing opportunities of a more commercial nature. The country is in search of funding for numerous projects, not least a $58bn project to widen and deepen the port at Tripoli.



Datawatch is a new series jointly produced by the Nikkei Asian Review and FT Confidential Research.

 

[john70]

Chinese investment risks Pakistan running into debt trap: Husain Haqqani

Read more at:
//economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/63771700.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst

New Delhi, April 15 (IANS) Pakistan runs the risk of falling into a debt trap with China's multi-billion dollar infrastructure investment, especially as a volatile security situation and tensions with neighbours threatens the economic viability of such projects, says Husain Haqqani, Islamabad's former envoy to the US.

In an interview with IANS, he said Pakistan, which has been using religion as an instrument of foreign policy, needed to shift its focus more to geo-economics rather than geo-politics and mend its ties with its neighbours, including India and Afghanistan, for the betterment of its own people.

He said Pakistan's love for conflict had cost its "somewhat a myopic foreign policy" dearly and now "ran the risk of greater international isolation unless Islamabad changes its outlook".

"Has it really brought any benefit to Pakistan? Economically, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has thrown up some opportunities -- but again, they are infrastructure projects. A port is useful when ships come there. A road is useful when trucks move on it," said Haqqani, one of the sharp-witted veterans of Pakistani politics who served as its ambassador in Washington from 2008 to 2011 when the ties between the two countries started souring amid tension and mistrust.

He said economic activities on these projects would only be possible when the security situation turns peaceful and "if these projects do not become economically viable, then Pakistan will face a debt trap".

Haqqani, 61, an author of four books including the latest, "Reimagining Pakistan", is better known for a controversial memo he as the Ambassador in Washington allegedly wrote, roughly a week after Osama Bin Laden was killed in a US raid, to the then US military chief Admiral Mike Mullen.

The memo, seeking US help to rein in the powerful Pakistani military, created a political storm in Islamabad and forced Haqqani to quit. He returned to Pakistan in 2011, only to leave the country a year later and has never been there again.

His latest book, published by Harper Collins, calls for "a bold re-conceptualisation" of Pakistan and dissects its origins and current failings, with suggestions for reconsidering its ideology, and identifies a new national purpose greater than the rivalry with India.

"Pakistan limited its foreign policy options by wanting parity with India, resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Even with the US, Pakistan's interaction has been always about getting economic aid and military assistance -- and leverage in relation to India," Haqqani told IANS.

Haqqani suggested that Pakistan needed to focus on the economy more than what its political and military leadership describes as an unfinished business of the subcontinent's partition.

"Pakistan has to stop thinking only in terms of geo-strategic interests. It should start also thinking in terms of geo-economics... so that it is (not) seen by the rest of world as a problem. Right now, the Pakistani view of Pakistan and the rest of the world's view of Pakistan are... too far apart."

He said Kashmir is a dipute, but both Pakistan and India needed to work together to give an opportunity to people of the state on both sides to have a more normal life than they have had.

"Pakistan's role has not benefitted people of Kashmir, even though Pakistan champions the cause of its self-determination. I think, from Pakistan's point of view, it would make sense to start saying that we want better relations with India before we can resolve any disputes and then give an opportunity to the people of Kashmir to have a better life irrespective of who is administrating their territory right now.

"Indian needs to make sure that its attitude towards Kashmiris is not punitive but rather one of respect and accommodation. Instead of trying to impose the will of the central government on Kashmir, the representatives of people of Jammu and Kashmir should be allowed to work towards improvement of life in Kashmir. It should be genuine representation."

He said religion as an instrument of foreign policy has had some usefulness for Pakistan until a few years ago.

"But now (even Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia and Iran) look at their own interest and say it is all good to be brothers in Islam, but it is even better to have strong economic ties and economic relations.

"Pakistan must reimagine the foundation of its national identity and stop seeing itself as an ideological nation. Pakistan must start thinking of itself as a functional state. Some 95 per cent of Pakistan's population comprises people who are born after the partition. We are Pakistanis by birth -- and people who are born with a certain citizenship and nationality do not need an ideology to have that citizenship and nationality."

 

[Butter Chicken]

What Is China Doing To Pakistan? The Same Thing It Did To Sri Lanka

One day, China will turn Pakistan into its own “semi-colony,” as it did recently with Sri Lanka.

China has been nice to Pakistan, on the surface that is. It has been building the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which will connect Western China with the Indian Ocean, provided of course that India will allow it. That could certainly benefit Pakistan, helping the country make a big step forward, from an emerging to a mature economy, creating a lot of jobs in the process.But it could hurt Pakistan, too. Like adding to Pakistan’s corruption, which keeps pushing the costs of the project higher by the day, making Pakistan more indebted to China, which has been financing the project.

Rising indebtedness comes at a time when the country is already living beyond its means, as evidenced by persistent current account deficits, government debt, and external debt.
Pakistan recorded a Current Account deficit of 3867 USD Million in the fourth quarter of 2017, according to Tradingeconomics.com. The country’s Current Account averaged -587.18 USD Million from 1976 until 2017, reaching an all-time high of 1418 USD Million in the Q3 of 2002 and a record low of -4419 USD Million in the Q2 of 2017.

Pakistan accumulated a government debt equivalent to 67.20% of the country's Gross Domestic Product in 2017. The country’s government debt to GDP averaged 69.30% from 1994 until 2017, reaching an all-time high of 87.90% in 2001 and a record low of 56.40% in 2007.
External Debt in Pakistan jumped to 88891 USD Million in the fourth quarter of 2017 from 85052 USD Million in the third quarter of 2017. The country’s external debt averaged 53029.34 USD Million from 2002 until 2017, reaching an all-time high of 88891 USD Million in the fourth quarter of 2017 and a record low of 33172 USD Million in the third quarter of 2004.

 

[AMCA]

EU ambassadors band together against Silk Road

EU ambassadors to Beijing warn that China’s Silk Road project flouts international transparency norms and is aimed at furthering Chinese interests. The paper reflects Beijing’s strategy to divide the bloc.

By

• Dana Heide
• Till Hoppe
• 
  

Published onApril 17, 2018 12:00 pm

No compromises. Source: DPA
Twenty-seven of the 28 national EU ambassadors to Beijing have compiled a report that sharply criticizes China’s “Silk Road” project, denouncing it as designed to hamper free trade and put Chinese companies at an advantage.

The report, seen by Handelsblatt, said the plan, unveiled in 2013, “runs counter to the EU agenda for liberalizing trade and pushes the balance of power in favor of subsidized Chinese companies.”

The unusually biting contents, which only Hungary’s ambassador refused to sign, are part of the EU’s preparations for an EU-China summit in July. The EU Commission is working on a strategy paper to forge a common EU stance on China’s prestige project to build roads, ports and gas pipelines to connect China by land and sea to Southeast Asia, Pakistan and Central Asia, and beyond to the Middle East, Europe and Africa. The new Silk Road will run through some 65 countries in six economic corridors.

“We shouldn’t refuse to cooperate but we should politely yet firmly state our terms,” said one high-ranking EU diplomat, adding that Chinese firms must not receive preferential treatment in the awarding of public contracts.

One German economics ministry official said the Silk Road initiative “must take account of the interests of all participants” and was still a long way off.

Chinese politicians have been banging the drum for the vast project, officially called “One Belt, One Road”. They’re mobilizing around $1 trillion in what would be the biggest international development program since the US launched the Marshall Plan after World War Two.

“China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ will be the new World Trade Organization – whether we like it or not,” CEO of German industrial giant Siemens, Joe Kaeser, told the World Economic Forum in January.

In their report, the ambassadors wrote that China wanted to shape globalization to suit its own interests. “At the same time the initiative is pursuing domestic political goals like the reduction of surplus capacity, the creation of new export markets and safeguarding access to raw materials,” it read.

They warned that European companies could fail to clinch good contractsif China isn’t pushed into adhering to the European principles of transparency in public procurement, as well as environmental and social standards.

EU officials said China was trying to divide Europe to strengthen its hand in relations with individual member states. Countries such as Hungary and Greece, which both rely on Chinese investment, have in the past shown they’re susceptible to pressure from China.

Whenever European politicians travel to China nowadays they’re put under pressure by their hosts to sign agreements for the joint expansion of the Silk Road. “This bilateral structure leads to an unequal distribution of power which China exploits,” their report said.

The Silk Road isn’t the only issue between the EU and China right now. Like US President Donald Trump, the EU is also fed up with the obstacles China has put up for foreign investors, including the forced transfer of know-how to Chinese partners.

But the bloc isn’t resorting to one-sided tariffs to push China to open its markets. Instead, it’s working in an investment agreement with China. Progress has been painfully slow, but the EU hopes the looming global trade war may speed up the talks. Negotiators from the two sides plan to meet this week.

One EU diplomat said China was very good at exploiting grey areas in WTO law on the protection of intellectual property, for example, and didn’t shy away from breaking rules. “When we point that out to our Chinese negotiating partners they always show a lot of understanding but in reality hardly anything changes,” the diplomat said.

In a speech last week, President Xi Jinping said the Silk Road project “isn’t a Chinese conspiracy as some people abroad claim.” China, he insisted, has no intention of playing “self-serving geopolitical games.”

However, China has yet to provide exact information on which foreign firms have so far directly benefited from the Chinese development program. The $40 billion Silk Road Fund was set up in 2014 to invest in countries along the road but it’s unclear who is eligible for investment, and on what terms.

A German study released in February by the government’s GTAI foreign trade and investment marketing agency and the Association of German Chambers of Commerce and Industry concluded that the Silk Road project was often focused on politically unstable countries with uncertain legal frameworks. GTAI’s managing director said that around 80 percent of projects funded by Chinese state banks had gone to Chinese companies in the past.

German government papers seen by Handelsblatt indicate that China isn’t interested in transparency when it comes to procurement. Last May, when former Economics Minister Brigitte Zypries traveled to Beijing for the grand launch of the Silk Road initiative, she and other EU officials were meant to sign a joint declaration with the Chinese government. It didn’t happen.

The Europeans wanted to change much of the agreement’s wording, saying it should guarantee “equal opportunities for all investors in transport infrastructure” as well as international standards of transparency.

The Chinese refused to incorporate any amendments.

Dana Heide is a political correspondent for Handelsblatt in Berlin. Till Hoppe is Handelsblatt’s Brussels correspondent. Stephan Scheuer is the head of Handelsblatt’s features desk. Klaus Stratmann covers energy policy and politics for Handelsblatt in Berlin. To contact the authors:

 

[Suryavanshi]

EU ambassadors band together against Silk Road

EU ambassadors to Beijing warn that China’s Silk Road project flouts international transparency norms and is aimed at furthering Chinese interests. The paper reflects Beijing’s strategy to divide the bloc.

By

• Dana Heide
• Till Hoppe

Published onApril 17, 2018 12:00 pm

No compromises. Source: DPA
Twenty-seven of the 28 national EU ambassadors to Beijing have compiled a report that sharply criticizes China’s “Silk Road” project, denouncing it as designed to hamper free trade and put Chinese companies at an advantage.

The report, seen by Handelsblatt, said the plan, unveiled in 2013, “runs counter to the EU agenda for liberalizing trade and pushes the balance of power in favor of subsidized Chinese companies.”

The unusually biting contents, which only Hungary’s ambassador refused to sign, are part of the EU’s preparations for an EU-China summit in July. The EU Commission is working on a strategy paper to forge a common EU stance on China’s prestige project to build roads, ports and gas pipelines to connect China by land and sea to Southeast Asia, Pakistan and Central Asia, and beyond to the Middle East, Europe and Africa. The new Silk Road will run through some 65 countries in six economic corridors.

“We shouldn’t refuse to cooperate but we should politely yet firmly state our terms,” said one high-ranking EU diplomat, adding that Chinese firms must not receive preferential treatment in the awarding of public contracts.

One German economics ministry official said the Silk Road initiative “must take account of the interests of all participants” and was still a long way off.

Chinese politicians have been banging the drum for the vast project, officially called “One Belt, One Road”. They’re mobilizing around $1 trillion in what would be the biggest international development program since the US launched the Marshall Plan after World War Two.

“China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ will be the new World Trade Organization – whether we like it or not,” CEO of German industrial giant Siemens, Joe Kaeser, told the World Economic Forum in January.

In their report, the ambassadors wrote that China wanted to shape globalization to suit its own interests. “At the same time the initiative is pursuing domestic political goals like the reduction of surplus capacity, the creation of new export markets and safeguarding access to raw materials,” it read.

They warned that European companies could fail to clinch good contractsif China isn’t pushed into adhering to the European principles of transparency in public procurement, as well as environmental and social standards.

EU officials said China was trying to divide Europe to strengthen its hand in relations with individual member states. Countries such as Hungary and Greece, which both rely on Chinese investment, have in the past shown they’re susceptible to pressure from China.

Whenever European politicians travel to China nowadays they’re put under pressure by their hosts to sign agreements for the joint expansion of the Silk Road. “This bilateral structure leads to an unequal distribution of power which China exploits,” their report said.

The Silk Road isn’t the only issue between the EU and China right now. Like US President Donald Trump, the EU is also fed up with the obstacles China has put up for foreign investors, including the forced transfer of know-how to Chinese partners.

But the bloc isn’t resorting to one-sided tariffs to push China to open its markets. Instead, it’s working in an investment agreement with China. Progress has been painfully slow, but the EU hopes the looming global trade war may speed up the talks. Negotiators from the two sides plan to meet this week.

One EU diplomat said China was very good at exploiting grey areas in WTO law on the protection of intellectual property, for example, and didn’t shy away from breaking rules. “When we point that out to our Chinese negotiating partners they always show a lot of understanding but in reality hardly anything changes,” the diplomat said.

In a speech last week, President Xi Jinping said the Silk Road project “isn’t a Chinese conspiracy as some people abroad claim.” China, he insisted, has no intention of playing “self-serving geopolitical games.”

However, China has yet to provide exact information on which foreign firms have so far directly benefited from the Chinese development program. The $40 billion Silk Road Fund was set up in 2014 to invest in countries along the road but it’s unclear who is eligible for investment, and on what terms.

A German study released in February by the government’s GTAI foreign trade and investment marketing agency and the Association of German Chambers of Commerce and Industry concluded that the Silk Road project was often focused on politically unstable countries with uncertain legal frameworks. GTAI’s managing director said that around 80 percent of projects funded by Chinese state banks had gone to Chinese companies in the past.

German government papers seen by Handelsblatt indicate that China isn’t interested in transparency when it comes to procurement. Last May, when former Economics Minister Brigitte Zypries traveled to Beijing for the grand launch of the Silk Road initiative, she and other EU officials were meant to sign a joint declaration with the Chinese government. It didn’t happen.

The Europeans wanted to change much of the agreement’s wording, saying it should guarantee “equal opportunities for all investors in transport infrastructure” as well as international standards of transparency.

The Chinese refused to incorporate any amendments.

Dana Heide is a political correspondent for Handelsblatt in Berlin. Till Hoppe is Handelsblatt’s Brussels correspondent. Stephan Scheuer is the head of Handelsblatt’s features desk. Klaus Stratmann covers energy policy and politics for Handelsblatt in Berlin. To contact the authors:

Chincoms getting slapped left and right

 

[sorcerer]

China's white elephant: $1-bn Sri Lanka port shows what's wrong with BRI



Each year roughly 60,000 ships vital to the global economy sail through the Indian Ocean past a Chinese-operated port on the southern tip of Sri Lanka. Almost none of them stop to unload cargo.


The eight-year-old Hambantota port -- with almost no container traffic and trampled fences that elephants traverse with ease -- has become a prime example of what can go wrong for countries involved in President Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” trade and infrastructure initiative. Sri Lanka borrowed heavily to build the port, couldn’t repay the loans, and then gave China a 99-year lease for debt relief.


The experience has fueled fears that Xi’s plans to finance more than $500 billion in projects could see China take control of strategic infrastructure that also has military uses. But the massive state-owned Chinese conglomerate that took over the port in December wants to prove the sceptics wrong.

China Merchants Group -- whose 2017 revenues of $93 billion dwarf Sri Lanka’s gross domestic product -- is aiming to use its experience stretching from China to Europe to make the port profitable. During a rare look inside the grounds late last month, executive Tissa Wickramasinghe told Bloomberg News it had already nearly doubled the number of ships visiting the port.

"We are hell bent on making it work," said Wickramasinghe, the chief operating officer of Hambantota International Port Group, a joint venture led by China Merchants. "Whether the port should have been built, why it was built -- those are, to me, irrelevant now."

Still, the port has a long way to go before it worries competitors in Singapore, Malaysia and the Middle East. Even with more traffic, Hambantota is only handling about one ship a day -- not enough to even register on China Merchants’ own data showing cargo handling volumes for February. It didn’t make a United Nations’ list of the world’s top 40 container terminals.

Major shipping lines now route cargo through Colombo, Sri Lanka’s capital, and see little reason to divert operations south. Maersk Line, the world’s largest container carrier, is waiting for Hambantota’s operator to offer a “firm value proposition” for clients, according to Steve Felder, the company’s managing director in South Asia.

“It’s too early to tell whether Hambantota will be of interest to us,” Felder said. “Much will be dependent on connectivity within the mainline network, the extent of domestic cargo, cost and productivity.”


The port’s weak performance has fueled impressions that it simply serves China’s broader strategic interests to secure crucial trade routes and international supply chains. It would take billions of dollars of investment to generate meaningful traffic, according to Rahul Kapoor, a Singapore-based shipping analyst with Bloomberg Intelligence.


“Hambantota is a great example of the Chinese quest for global maritime dominance,” Kapoor said. “For the foreseeable future, it remains a strategic push over commercial viability.”

From its earliest days, the port has spurred debate. Former Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa spearheaded the project, taking Chinese loans to shower goodies on his home district of Hambantota -- including a new international airport that still has just one daily scheduled flight.

The current administration led by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe told Bloomberg News the $1.1 billion debt-to-equity swap with China Merchants helped ease "the Chinese part of the debt burden." Still, the decision remains unpopular with many Sri Lankans. Ironically that’s boosted the political fortunes of Rajapaksa, who lost a 2015 election in part due to concerns he was too cosy with China.

On a recent afternoon at the port, vehicle traffic was nearly non-existent. A large monitor lizard meandered across the main road. A port executive shot a video with his iPhone of a Singaporean ship unloading cement into a smaller vessel, complaining that the process was taking too long.

Yet for Hambantota, it was busy: Two other ships were also docked -- a cruise ship whose passengers were on a jungle safari and a vessel full of vehicles.

"Today’s a good day," said Wickramasinghe, the COO.

To boost revenue, he plans to lure vehicle trans-shipments, refuelling and oil storage services away from Singapore, the U.A.E. Port of Fujairah and Malaysia’s Port Klang. The company could spend around $500 million on cranes to handle containers, and is speaking with "most of the oil majors" for oil bunkering and storage, he said.

Plans are also afoot to build a logistics and industrial zone next to the port. The 11.5 square-kilometre (4.4 square-mile) area -- more than three times the size of New York’s Central Park -- is now mostly jungle. Farmers nearby worry they could lose their ancestral land to proposed industrial zones.

"All the profits are going back to China," said Dharmasena Hettiarchchi, a 52-year-old farmer.

The abundance of space allows Japanese and Europeans automakers to store vehicles for trans-shipment to South Africa and the Middle East, Wickramasinghe said. China Merchants plans to more than double the number of vehicle trans-shipments to 250,000 this year, he said, with 10 percent annual growth expected the next few years. Singapore now handles 1 million vehicle trans-shipments annually.

“China Merchants doesn’t go and dump money if it’s not commercially viable,” Wickramasinghe said. “It’s definitely not political or military.”

China this week dismissed speculation that the Belt and Road Initiative had a military dimension, with foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying saying it was “open and transparent.” Hambantota was mutually beneficial and would aid Sri Lanka’s economy, she said.

“For others who speculate, I believe they have no reason to do so,” Hua said.

Still, Sri Lanka relocated its southern naval command to Hambantota in part to ease Indian and Japanese worries, state minister of defence Ruwan Wijewardene said in an interview.

“We’ve been speaking with them, and also with the Chinese,” he said. “We’ve made it very clear that it can’t be a military port.”

Wickramasinghe said it was normal for China Merchants to have a 99-year lease, citing a similar deal with the Port of Newcastle in Australia. Not everyone is convinced.

"The current Sri Lankan government has said that it will not permit the military use of the facility, but that could change," said Amit Bhandari, an analyst at Mumbai-based Gateway House. "Ninety-nine years is a long time after all."



http://www.business-standard.com/ar...ows-what-s-wrong-with-bri-118041800800_1.html