NY Times Square bomb attempt

nitesh

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http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...escape-discrimination/articleshow/5907956.cms

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The comment has angered some Pakistanis. ''I'd rather be called a terrorist than an Indian,'' =xyone Pakistani blogger fumed, even as the American media was filled with self-lacerating laments from Pakistani-Americans about their future in the US.
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The Pakistani trail goes back even further to the early 1990s, well before the Osama bin Laden/Khalid Sheikh Mohammed inspired 9/11 tragedy, when World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and CIA shooter Mir Aimal Kansi emerged from the country's badlands to inflict the first terrorist attacks on mainland America.

Pakistanis in the US are now experiencing the blowback for their homeland's permissive track record of terrorism that has long been an Indian grievance.
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this one is really good, still trying to threaten

''Indian opportunism in terms of painting Pakistanis as the problem is un-Indian & self-defeating. When we get profiled, YOU get profiled,'' Mosharraf Zaidi, a US based political economist, warned.
 

nitesh

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Does any one else ever complained like this?
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/09/world/asia/09pstan.html

Since Mr. Shahzad's arrest in the Times Square attack, each country has, to some extent, blamed the other. Many Pakistanis insist that Mr. Shahzad is an American citizen who was radicalized in the United States by the difficulties he found living there as a Muslim. =omg=The Americans stress that Mr. Shahzad has traveled more than a dozen times back to Pakistan from the United States since 1999, and appeared to have received his military training in the epicenter of militancy, North Waziristan.

Mr. Shahzad's background as the son of a senior Pakistani military officer has embarrassed the Pakistani Army, the most powerful institution in the country, =hehehand which receives generous financing from the United States. Mr. Shahzad's father was a vice marshal in the Pakistani Air Force, and it appears that Mr. Shahzad grew up around senior military officers.:)
 

ajtr

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Many Pakistanis insist that Mr. Shahzad is an American citizen who was radicalized in the United States by the difficulties he found living there as a Muslim.
Pakistanis will blame anyone for their problem from jews to yankee to hindu to aliens but themselves.
 

Armand2REP

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Pakistanis will blame anyone for their problem from jews to yankee to hindu to aliens but themselves.
Didn't have anything to do with him being a Muslim, he was a lazy loser.
 

ajtr

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Would like to share this amazing research paper at BR

Pakistani Role in Terrorism Against the U.S.A


Narayanan Komerath

Abstract: Reports from diverse sources describe a Pakistani role in most foreign terrorist attacks directed against the United States in the past decade. Through the template of logic set out by British Prime Minister Anthony Blair, these reports show that the responsibility for the terrorist atrocities of Sep. 11, 2001 rests upon the Pakistani junta.

Introduction

Three thousand one hundred and fifteen people and nineteen terrorists are presumed dead in the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. [ABC010927] indicates substantial uncertainty about the true identities of several of the terrorists – including the alleged leader. Moroccan-born French citizen Zacarias Moussaoui, who has claimed that he knows all about the "9/11" plot, is on trial accused of being trained as a 20th hijacker and co-conspirator. French authorities [ABC020905] indicate that Moussaoui was to be in a second wave of attacks on embassies in early 2002, after an aborted 1994 plot to fly an airliner into the Eiffel Tower. The Moussaoui indictment [Chertoff020716] traces his alleged movements and contacts. The word "Pakistan" occurs with remarkable frequency.

The other person who is widely perceived to be knowledgeable about the conspiracy is Pakistan dictator Pervez Musharraf. He has recently commented [Hilton020808] that the sophistication of the 9/11 plot was far beyond the capabilities of Osama bin Laden as he knew him. Freudian slip or not, this agrees with several media reports regarding the involvement of Pakistani entities in most plots, attempts and actual terrorist attacks upon the United States in the last decade. This paper suggests that despite its impact, the 9/11 plot should be viewed as one of many contemporary plots. The number and diversity of the plots and the ties between the various entities involved, draw a picture quite different from that of a lone mad preacher inciting followers to suicide. The picture is rather one of a criminal enterprise which functions to enrich its principals through a well-diversified portfolio of sub-enterprises, powerful marketing, terror-for-hire contracts and a protection / cooperation racket.

There is no novelty in linking the 9/11 atrocities with other terrorist attacks around the world. British Prime Minister Anthony Blair's presentation to Parliament [Blair011007] of Her Majesty's evidence against Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda and the Taliban, was acclaimed for its articulation of the Western Allies' case for military action against Afghanistan. This document serves as a template for the logic used in pinning responsibility for terrorist atrocities. In this paper, this evidence is followed one level beyond where Mr. Blair stopped. The paper then discusses reports which fill some of the gaps in the puzzle regarding the motives, planning, logistics, funding, execution, cover-up and follow-up of the 9/11 atrocities – and the implications thereof.

The following generalities appear essential to the 9/11 crimes:

1. The attacks required funding beyond what the hijackers may have earned themselves.

2. The hijackers had trained to maneuver large, fast aircraft precisely at low altitudes.

3. Diverse in age, nationality and background, the perpetrators had trained as teams, with commonality in indoctrination and motives – but a large diversity in specialist training.

4. Extreme violence was part of their modus operandi to subdue and dominate planeloads of crew and passengers – some of whom must have realized the nature of the hijackers' intents. This indicates substantial training in tactics, weapons and procedures.

5. The symmetric, concentric collapse of the twin towers, though burned into our memories, was not imagined a priori, and is being investigated as a surprise to designers. Airliner impact might have been expected to topple the upper stories. In that event, the death toll would not have approached the threshold for weapons of mass destruction. Thus the conspirators may not have anticipated the global consensus for a military cleanup of Afghanistan. In other words, one should not assume that the 9/11 plot was intended as the grand finale of Al Qaeda. It may merely have been a plot chosen for media and fundraising effectiveness.

These observations are consistent with the model of a global terrorist enterprise carrying out attacks on a continuing basis, with a clientele of supporters, a portfolio of plots and a system of financial incentives maintaining a quasi-professional force. A part of this model fits "Al Qaeda", but only as an arm of the larger enterprise.

The Evidence Presented by British Prime Minister Blair

Let us follow Mr. Blair's line of reasoning, and apply his logic to other facts. We will use direct quotes where necessary, condensed without distorting their original meanings. Variations in spellings of names and organizations between authors, are left in tact. Quoting [Blair011007]: "The clear conclusions reached by the (UK) government are: Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaida .. planned and carried out the atrocities on 11 September 2001; (they) were able to commit these atrocities because of their close alliance with the Taleban régime, which allowed them to operate with impunity in pursuing their terrorist activity." Unlike this paper, Mr. Blair stopped short of asking: "Who made, trained and continues to support the Taliban?" Below, we examine the events and evidence cited by Mr. Blair.

Genesis of Al Qaeda

[Blair011007] pointed out that Al Qaeda and its global terror network had existed for over 10 years, founded and led by bin Laden. The network included "training camps, warehouses, communication facilities and commercial operations" and a trade in illegal drugs, raising significant sums of money. Blair also pointed to Laden's periods of stay in Afghanistan, as well as his "fatwas" against Americans.

On Al Qaeda's origin, the New York Times reports [NYT020609] that "the organization that eventually evolved into Al Qaeda ...began as the Makhtab al Khadimat, the Office of Services, in Peshawar, Pakistan,.." Osama Bin Laden has been sponsored and protected by Pakistan since the 1980s. According to [Raman990701], Laden led a savage tribal rampage in Gilgit/Baltistan areas of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, under the command of Pervez Musharraf, the protege of Islamist Pakistan dictator Zia ul Haq, crushing a popular agitation for rights. Later he accompanied Pakistan-equipped Islamist forces fighting the Soviets, and then against the more secular of the Afghan Mujaheddin Alliance forces who drove out the Soviet-backed regime. As the Soviet occupation ended, he turned his attention on the US. Between 1992 and '96, Taliban (meaning "student") forces led and equipped by the Pakistan Army routed the ragtag, exhausted, ill-equipped Afghan Alliance survivors of the war against the Soviets, and conquered 95% of Afghanistan, bringing it under mediaeval Islamic Law. Taliban-controlled Afghanistan was the "Strategic Depth" of Pakistan, a private backyard to conduct activities which would be hard to hide or protect in Pakistan. On the run from US-pressured Sudan, Yemen and Saudi Arabia, Osama bin Laden was brought in 1996 to Jalalabad, reportedly in a Pakistan Air Force C-130, with some of his wives and offspring. The Governor of Jalalabad province was a Pakistani-backed drug lord [Rashid2001], [Quadir2002]. (Note: this person was later appointed to the cabinet of Mr. Hamid Karzai, and assassinated in July 2002). Bin Laden issued his 1996 "fatwa" against the US from Jalalabad. The 1998 fatwa was issued from Peshawar, Pakistan. In censored, military-run Pakistan, where political activity requires military permission, bin Laden was able to preach, recruit and incite for the jehad – showing the complete acquiescence if not participation of Pakistani governments for over 10 years. The Afghan drug trade operates through Pakistan. From [DAWN991008]: "Afghanistan smuggling drugs via Pakistan..70 per cent of the world opium was being produced in Afghanistan, a major portion of which was supplied to the international market through Balochistan. " Presumably, the Pakistan Army got its cut.

The links between Al Qaeda and the Taliban

[Blair011007] cited Laden's ties to the Taliban, including a "close and mutually dependent" military alliance, and that the Taliban's "strength would be seriously weakened without .. Laden's military and financial support" including presence in the command structure.

The Taliban had a much closer and dependent, subordinate relationship with Pakistan's military leaders, having come to power on the strength of Pakistani firepower, air power and officer corps. In November 2001, it became obvious that up to 90 percent of the "foreigners" of the Taliban were experienced Pakistani military personnel. From [NYT011208]: "Pakistani military advisers were withdrawn from Afghanistan over the following weeks, a ..crucial factor in the surprisingly swift collapse of Taliban forces when confronted by the Northern Alliance"¦ "We did not fully understand the significance of Pakistan's role in propping up the Taliban until their guys withdrew and things went to hell fast for the Talibs." From [Etel010930]: "Twice he attended Taliban training camps .. run by Arabs as well as Pakistanis. The first one ..lasted 10 days in the Yellow Desert in Helmand province, a place where Saudi princes used to hunt, so it has its own airport. It was incredibly well guarded and there were many Pakistanis there, both students from religious schools and military instructors. The Taliban is full of Pakistanis."

The mechanisms for arming the Taliban are glimpsed in [VanNiekerk020130] for conventional weapons, and [Mintz020802] for advanced/ nuclear weapons. In both cases, the negotiators and technical people are identified as Pakistanis with official titles.

Attacks in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania and Yemen

[Blair011007] accused Laden of claiming credit for the deaths of 18 US soldiers in Somalia in October '93, the 224 deaths and over 5000 wounded in the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August '98, and the 17 dead and 40 wounded in the attack on USS Cole in October 2000. He accused Laden's lieutenant Atef of training the Somalis for the '93 attack.

It was to Pakistan that the principal suspects, including Ramzi Youssef, flew "home" after each of these attacks, regardless of their nominal nationalities. Some have been arrested under American pressure. As recently as July 2002, Sheikh Ahmed Salim, a 33-year-old Kenyan, who had a $25 million price tag on his head, was arrested in Karachi [Kenya020905]. Pakistani Mullah Masood Azhar, leader of the terrorist group Jaish-e-Muhammed [WN020225], is named as an organizer of the 1993 Somalia attacks on US peacekeepers [Mherald020226].

Acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction

[Blair011007]: " From the early 1990s Usama Bin Laden has sought to obtain nuclear and chemical materials for use as weapons of terror. "

Mr. Blair might have added: "With the active help of the Pakistani nuclear establishment." US investigators confirmed that six top-level officials of the Pakistani nuclear establishment were members of "Ummah Tameer Nau" (U.T.N.), a group affiliated with Al Qaeda, and were participating in planning nuclear terror attacks [NYT011209]. The Taliban's minister(s) were given tours of the Pakistani nuclear establishment, and the workings and requirements of nuclear weapons programs explained to them. From [NYT011209]: "According to the (CIA), (Dr. Bashiruddin) Mahmood (Former Chief of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission) and another nuclear scientist, Chaudry Abdul Majid, met with bin Laden in Kabul a few weeks before 9/11... U.S. pressure got the scientists detained in late October, and they admitted having provided bin Laden with detailed information about weapons of mass destruction"¦. General Hamid Gul — a former ISI director with pronounced anti-American, radically Islamist views — identified himself as U.T.N.'s "honorary patron" and said that he had seen Mahmood during his trip to brief bin Laden."

In 1998, the FBI foiled an arms purchase attempt in Florida [Wpost020801], [NBC0207], [Dherald020803], involving Pakistani intelligence service (ISI) personnel, diplomats and a consulting Pakistani nuclear scientist. The items sought included Stinger shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, and heavy water for use in nuclear reactors. A Canadian expert on radical Islam has claimed that Pakistanis smuggled "dirty nuclear bombs" into Canada [WN020320] and 3 of them across the border in the US, and are waiting for orders to set them off.

International Network

[Blair011007] cited Al Qaeda's network of terrorist organizations including "Egyptian Islamic Jihad and other north African Islamic extremist terrorist groups, and a number of other jihadi groups in other countries including the Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan and India", as well as cells in other countries. However, most activities are eventually traced to orders and training emanating and coordinated from Pakistan [See Table 1]. The UK hosted a large concentration of Al Qaeda forces and fund-raising and publicity resources [AK47UK]; [TOI011014]; invariably traced to Pakistani motivators. The international scope of the terror enterprise developed by Pakistan is described in [Weaver 9805]: "Even today you can sit at the Khyber Pass and see every color, every creed, every nationality, pass.. To make contacts with Islamists from North Africa!.."

[Blair011007] then listed Al Qaeda's business and financial transactions and camps in "Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Sudan, Somalia and Kenya for the use of"¦ terrorist groups", with at least 4 of 12 camps in Afghanistan used for training terrorists. While bin Laden may have made deals, it is clear that there are large and powerful streams of personnel, technical expertise, security and funding behind Al Qaeda. [IndUK020721], [Yomari990107] and [CNN980822] are examples of numerous reports of many more such camps located in Pakistan and Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, all run by the Pakistan Army and the ISI under Pak Lts. Gen. Aziz Khan, Javed Nasir, Mohammed Ziauddin and Mehmood Ahmed. Former US Ambassador Dennis Kux states [Kux2002] that "Instead of closing down the cross-border terrorist apparatus, Pakistan merely moved many of the Kashmir-bound terrorists to Afghanistan, changed the ISI chief and "privatised" the cross-border terrorism with continued ISI help". From [IA2002] "All recruits from Pakistan, Kashmir, POK and Afghanistan were sent to the battle front in Afghanistan for battle inoculation and also for advanced training in the camps run jointly by Pakistan's ISI and Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda, in Khost, Jalalabad and Kandahar"

Run-up to 9/11

[Blair011007]: "The modus operandi of 11 September was entirely consistent with previous attacks. Al Qaida's record of atrocities is characterised by meticulous long term planning, a desire to inflict mass casualties, suicide bombers, and multiple simultaneous attacks"¦ Laden insisted that the need to attack the United States excused the killing of other innocent civilians, Muslim and non-Muslim alike." This paper now examines events of which Her Majesty's investigators may have chosen to be ignorant.

PanAm73 Hijacking, Karachi 1986.

PanAm Flt.73 was hijacked at Karachi by a swarm of terrorists carrying AK47s, pistols, grenades and plastic explosives [PanAm9101]. The flight crew exited through the cockpit hatch, abandoning the flight attendants and passengers. The terrorists murdered two Indian-American passengers. Pakistani authorities, like the Taliban 14 years later, provided less than minimal support for hostage negotiation or help to the passengers but ensured that there would be no Indian or American hostage rescue mission. Eventually, a Pakistani "commando" team "stormed" the aircraft. Passengers cited them tossing grenades into a crowded cabin rather than shooting at the hijackers. An Indian flight attendant, cited for her heroism, was also killed, among several other casualties. The hijackers served various prison terms, but some obviously were allowed to escape. In August 2002, with their increased presence in Pakistan, the US reopened the case and got a Jordanian national extradited to stand trial for murder [WPost020727].

Mumbai coordinated bombings, 1993

The concept of simultaneous bombing attacks on several downtown buildings in a major city was tried out in the central business district of Mumbai, India [Sree001231], killing over 300 people and wounding thousands. Following Interpol "Red Corner" notices, the notorious smuggler/ gangsters Dawood Ibrahim and "Chota Shakeel" disappeared into Pakistan. In December 2001, Pakistan again refused Indian demands to extradite them, claiming ignorance of their whereabouts. A TIME correspondent reported that these fellows were living comfortably in the same exclusive neighborhood as General Musharraf. From [Anson0208]: "Ghulam Hasnain, the Karachi TIME stringer, had gone missing the day before"¦ the ISI had picked him up because of an expose he had written on Dawood Ibrahim for a Pakistani monthly. " From [SAT020803]: "His informative pieces on the ISI involvement in the Jihad mess got him in trouble. Husnain went in and out of several detention and interrogation sessions before he.." (escaped to the US).

World Trade Center 1993, US airliners 1995, Tunisian Synagogue 2002

A truck bomb exploded in the parking garage under the WTC, killing several people. Ramzi Youssef flew back to Pakistan the day of the bombing, but was arrested and brought to the US for trial. An Egyptian cleric is also in jail for the same plot. Youssef, and co-WTC bombing convicts Abdul Hakim Murad and Wali Khan were also implicated in a plot to bomb a dozen American airliners over the Pacific in 1995. This plot unraveled when a suspicious fire in an apartment exposed the bomb-making operation. [Laude010913] describes the intent of this plot, Project Bojinka, as being to hijack US-bound airliners over the Pacific and crash them into buildings. Ramzi Youssef's nationality is undetermined. However, in August 2002, citing the interrogation of Abu Zubeidah, an Al Qaeda coordinator arrested from Faisalabad, Pakistan, the FBI issued an "alert" for Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Pakistani "relative" of Ramzi Youssef, as organizer of the April 2002 suicide attack on a Tunisian synagogue. The suicide bomber, Nawar, was traced to training camps in Pakistan. Khalid Mohammed is said to be a link between the 1993 WTC bombings, the 9/11 WTC attack, and the Tunisian synagogue bombing.

The LAX Millennium Bombing Plot, 1999

This case came in for special mention by [Blair011007]. The case files [White010702]; [LAX010705]; [LAX010703] reveal the workings of the lowest levels of the terror establishment. Ahmed Ressam, a petty thief of Algerian origin, was recruited in Montreal and sent to Pakistan and then Afghanistan for training. Returning, he was arrested on arrival from Canada by ferry at Port Angeles near Seattle with a rental car containing a large bomb (over 100lb of explosives), intended for Los Angeles international airport on New Year's Day 2000. He was convicted in April 2001 – news reports cited a Pakistan International Airlines ticket stub as nailing the proof for the jury. In exchange for consideration of a sentence reduction from 130 to 27 years, he testified against co-conspirators including Abu Zubeidah, the coordinator in Pakistan whom he had met on arrival at Karachi from Montreal. From [LAX010703]: "Can you explain to the jury what Abu Zubeida really was in connection with the camps? A. He is the person in charge of the camps. He receives young men from all countries. He accepts you or rejects you. And he takes care of the expenses of the camps. He makes arrangements for you when you travel coming in or leaving." From Ressam's cross-examination [LAX010705]: "Q. The reason you were going to call Jaffar in Pakistan was so that you could take credit for blowing up the airport, correct? A. Yes, to claim the responsibility for the job." (Note: "Abu Jaffar" was the leader of the Algerian Cell in Pakistan). From the chilling testimony, it is clear that Ressam learned explosive chemistry, practised using guns, RPGs, making bombs, blowing up airports, killing dogs with poison gas (to simulate "Americans" and "Israel-supporters") and putting cyanide on doorknobs to kill "agents" and VIPs.

Portfolio of Terror

The LAX plot was by no means isolated. [Anson0208] describes Pakistani Sheikh Mubarak Ali Shah Gilani, as a leader of Jamaat ul-Fuqra ("The Impoverished") described by the State Department's 1995 report on terrorism as dedicated "to purifying Islam through violence". "Ul-Fuqra is said to have recruited devotees from as far away as the Netherlands and had sent jihadis into battle in Kashmir, Chechnya, Bosnia, and Israel. Since the early 1980s, ul-Fuqra had also operated in the U.S. as.. Muslims of America, in 19 states .. linked to.. money-laundering, arson, murder, and the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center. Gilani ..was, for a time, based himself in the States, but now .. is found in a walled compound in Lahore, Pakistan, where.. one of his visitors was (accused Shoe Bomber) Richard C. Reid." From [WStand9906]: "FUQRA terrorism in North America appears to have peaked in the early 1990s. In 1991, ..five men were arrested at the Niagara Falls border crossing after U.S. Customs agents.. found photographs, floor plans, and videotapes of the interiors of the targets, details of "recon team," "guard team," and "hit team" roles, and a description of how "time delay" bombs could be placed below the cinema floor. A Canadian jury convicted three American Fuqra members of 'conspiracy to commit mischief endangering life.' A fourth suspect, Max Lon Fongenie, who had arrived. .from Pakistan shortly before the plot was set in motion, fled back to Pakistan"¦ Gilani's close ties to Kashmir and the ISI.. in July 1983, Stephen Paul Paster, ..blew off most of one hand while planting a pipe bomb at a Portland hotel.. escaped from a hospital.. served 4 years of a 20-year prison sentence... suspected but not charged in.. bombings in Seattle in 1984.. Now lives in Lahore, where U.S. intelligence sources say he provides explosives training to visiting Fuqra members."

In presenting the following, it is noted that accusations are not proof of guilt – several post-911 horror stories have turned out to be the result of misunderstandings, xenophobia and outright perjury. A Pakistani-American businessman [Dawn020711] had his stores raided by law officers looking for evidence of money transfers involving the Al Qaeda. An employee in one of his stores pleaded guilty to having a false passport after a photo developing service told police that he had been extremely anxious and in a hurry to get 25 photos developed of the World Trade Center towers, 2 weeks before 9/11. A group of Pakistanis, under arrest on immigration / fraud charges [Newsday020715] were reportedly refusing to discuss why they purchased an industrial-size mixer and set up a production facility under a false corporate name in summer 2001, or how they disposed of the items. Another Pakistani immigrant is on trial. According to [CNN020808], "Imran has confessed in court that he plotted to blow up a bridge in Florida and Jewish synagogue". From [LVS020808]: "Pakistani immigrant pleaded guilty ..conspiring to bomb power stations, a National Guard armory and Jewish-owned businesses... Mandhai and Jokhan hoped the bombings would create chaos and they could make various demands.." [Wpost020801] discusses a Kuwaiti-born Canadian citizen in a plot to bomb the US embassy in Singapore: "Sometime in 2000, Mansour Jabarah (the father of the suspect) said, Mohammed left Kuwait for Pakistan 'without my permission.. He was looking for Islamic studies in English"¦ Police are looking for my other son, Abdulhassan and I don't know where he is..' "

As seen above, accused "Shoe Bomber" Richard C. Reid was traced to the "Fuqra" in Pakistan; associates arrested in France have been Pakistanis. On the alleged "Dirty Bomb Plot", [CNN020828] reports: "Jose Padilla,, researched how to build a "dirty bomb" at an al Qaeda facility in Pakistan and planned to use radioactive material stolen in the United States to construct the "uranium-enhanced" device". [CNN020616] reports the arrest of a Pakistani national in the US, associated with the same plot.

Rehearsal: Hijack-Murder on IC814

The terror schools obviously learned from the PanAm73 experience – the new genre of hijackers included trained pilots. At the end of December 1999, an Indian Airlines Airbus 300 en route from Kathmandu, Nepal to New Delhi was hijacked by a team of terrorists who were sitting in first class. They entered the cockpit by rushing a flight attendant as the door opened for her to serve beverages. They segregated the passengers and took several hostages to the forward cabin. They subdued the crew and forced them to take off from Amritsar where the crew had landed instead of Lahore, by slitting the throat of young Rupin Katyal – and threatening more murders. The aircraft was flown to Dubai and then to Kandahar, where the Taliban mounted anti-aircraft batteries and aimed tank guns at the aircraft to deter hostage-rescue attempts by India. After a week-long nightmare, India agreed to free 4 terrorists including Omar Shaikh Saeed, jailed for kidnap and murder after killing a police officer who was rescuing western hostages, Zagar, who murdered kidnap victims by tying hand grenades to them, and Jaish-e-Mohammed leader Masood Azhar, jailed for illegal entry and terrorist conspiracy. At the end of the standoff, the crew feigned equipment failure to prevent the terrorists from retrieving their checked baggage – and were surprised by the hijackers' familiarity with the cockpit controls and procedures. The Taliban allowed the hijackers and their freed associates to escape to Pakistan, which denied knowledge of their entry. In 2002, Saeed and one of the hijackers, Mansur Hasnain, were implicated in the kidnap-murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. Mr. Saeed had been living at his family home in Lahore with the full knowledge of the Pakistan government, and apparently "surrendered" to the ISI a week before they revealed his presence to police. [Ireact011108]: "Intelligence agencies are in possession of tape transcripts of the conversations between (Pakistan Army Lt. Gen) Aziz and the hijackers"¦ it was on Aziz's instructions that the hijackers demanded a ransom in addition to the release of jailed terrorists for freeing the 155 hijacked passengers." Proof of the planning of the hijacking was found in a Kabul house in November 2001 [Rohde011206].

Training

[Blair011007]: "The operatives involved in the 11 September atrocities attended flight schools, used flight simulators to study the controls of larger aircraft and placed potential airports and routes under surveillance." IC814 was obviously a dress rehearsal for 9/11, also achieving the release of Omar Shaikh Sayeed and Mullah Masood who would have further roles to play. Blair's grand declaration, "The modus operandi of 11 September was entirely consistent with previous attacks" looks ironic – the Western Allies were certainly given every opportunity to recognize that the Indian plane was hijacked by Pakistan-backed terrorists. The IC814 attack demonstrated how to get lethal weapons aboard an airliner in a nation where security searches including X-raying of all baggage have been routine for a long time – weapons were transferred in a diplomatic bag from a PIA flight on the tarmac – a clear indication of official complicity at the PIA flight's origin. The technique for rushing the cockpit was demonstrated, as was the subduing of passengers and crew by murdering an innocent in a most horrible manner – later replicated on 9/11 [WN020130].

Commercial Flight Simulators need expert instructors, with airline or Air Force experience. The 9/11 gang included one Saudi-licensed commercial pilot. The high-speed, high-precision maneuvers executed by the terrorists are far beyond the capabilities of armchair pilots. Amateur pilots with a few hours of flying Cessnas or PC-based flight simulators do not get such results on the first attempt – these were clearly people who had been trained for these precise maneuvers by experts who knew combat flying and airliner flying – Air Force veterans. It is known that PAF officers have been on deputation to Saudi and UAE Air Forces as pilots and instructors, and presumably had access to training on large aircraft. [NYT020824] quotes German investigators who place Atta and two accomplices at Afghan-based Al Qaeda training camps from late 2000 to early 2001. [Etel010930] confirms that the Afghan terror training camps had Pakistani military instructors and jet-handling airfields.

[Rediff020717] and [Mir020711] reported FBI requests to question PAF Squadron Leader Atif Ahmed bin Mansoor, and PAF refusal on the grounds that he is a "responsible officer". From [Mir020711] : (Between 1997 and '99) "Atif and Atta lived and studied together at ..Technical University of Hamburg-Harburg (TUHH), "¦ after Atif left for Pakistan, Mohamed Atta was frequently seen in the company of his first cousin, Marwan Al-Shehhi, who had arrived 'almost as a replacement'." Al-Shehhi, Atta and another Hamburg graduate were among the gang presumed dead on 9/11. In this connection, it is worthwhile to note that many of the 9/11 hijackers are reported to have attended or signed up for flight schools in the US and elsewhere – but none are reported to have actually demonstrated proficiency as pilots of large aircraft. In fact, most are pooh-poohed for incompetence. One hijacker is indeed reported to have had a Saudi commercial pilot license – but had gone around failing basic flying courses in the US!

It is useful to ask whether an organization known for "meticulous planning" would depend on such hit-or-miss training of their spearheads. Atta and his PAF classmate are reported to have won top honors at the technical school in Hamburg. During the 9/11 hijackings, the terrorist pilots showed high levels of proficiency in avoiding Air Traffic Control, finding targets accurately, and zeroing in on the WTC Tower using a high-G turn. In the Pentagon attack, the plane came in at 400 knots near-ground level. These skills went far beyond those implied by their scattered piloting lessons, and they worked in four teams with all the ruthless assurance of military squads. The flight school stories appear to be ways of establishing false identities and hiding the true piloting credentials of the terrorists and their military backgrounds.

[WSJ020701] reports on a Spanish investigation: "Mohammed Atta met with five other suspected Islamist terrorists in eastern Spain two months before Sept. 11"¦.Atta.. met with Ramzi Binalshibh .. in Tarragona on July 10, Spanish investigators said. .. Mr. Binalshibh, who is now believed to be in Pakistan, had been denied a visa to the U.S., where he had hoped to obtain a pilot's license. .. Said Bahaji, one of Mr. Atta's roommates in Hamburg, Germany, may have attended the meeting as well. Mr. Bahaji also is believed to be in Pakistan." The Mideast news channel Al Jazeera [AlJr020908] claims to corroborate this story and points out that "Binalshibh" is actually Ramzi bin Al-Shaibah, associated with Kuwaiti-born Pakistani passport-holder Khaled al-Sheikh Mohammad, whom they describe as the chief of Al Qaeda's military operations. Note conflict with earlier reports about Mohammed Atef holding that position. [Wp020911] follows up on these stories and indicates that the 9/11 plot was proposed by Atta and his classmates, and presented to the terror enterprise when Atta came to Pakistan in late 1999. However, the first funding, indicating selection of the plot from the portfolio, came in mid-2000, and this is where the first "smoking gun" piece of evidence appears to fit in.

Smoking Gun #1: The Money Trail and Kidnap-Terror Links

[Blair011007]: "Since 1989, Usama Bin Laden has established a series of businesses to provide income for Al Qaida, and to provide cover for the procurement of explosives, weapons and chemicals, and for the travel of Al Qaida operatives. The businesses have included a holding company known as 'Wadi Al Aqiq', a construction business known as 'Al Hijra', an agricultural business known as 'Al Themar Al Mubaraka', and investment companies known as 'Ladin International' and 'Taba Investments'."

[Wpost020216] and [TOI0208] report on Pakistani conduits for Al Qaeda funding. The "smoking-gun" accusation in the 9/11 investigation, however, is a cell-phone call allegedly from Pakistan ISI Chief, Lt. Gen. Mehmood Ahmed to terrorist Omar Shaikh Saeed, who then transferred $100,000 from a UAE bank to Mohammed Atta in Germany before the 9/11 attacks. The call was caught by Indian RAW (Research & Analysis Wing) agents monitoring Ahmed's (or Saeed's) cell phone, and shadowing Saeed in a bookstore in Karachi. [Mir020711] gives the transfer date in summer 2000, which fits later American / German reports [CNN020710] of the terrorists' banking records, citing a $110K deposit as the earliest transaction – in 2000. On 9/10/2001, Atta and one of the other hijackers are reported to have wired the remainder of the money to the UAE (Atta reported to have wired $15,600), where Omar Shaikh is said to have collected it and returned to Pakistan immediately. From the American side of the transactions [LaTimes0110]: "The money trail to the Emirates just before the Sept. 11 attacks consisted of wire transfers to a man identified as Mustafa Ahmad, thought to be a financial officer in Al Qaeda. Al-Shehhi wired $5,400 to Ahmad, (Shaykh Saiid) shortly before noon on Sept. 10 from a Western Union office at the Greyhound bus terminal in Boston,...Separately, suspected hijacker Waleed M. Alshehri sent $5,215 to Ahmad from a currency booth at Boston's Logan Airport on the evening of Sept. 9. .. Atta wired money to Ahmad on Sept. 8 and 9. The document is unclear on the amounts, but Al Suweidi said it was like the others, about $5,000. Ahmad picked up the transfers on Sept. 11 from the Al Ansari exchange in Sharjah... The same day, Ahmad used a Saudi Arabian passport to fly from Dubai to Pakistan, Emirates officials have said." "Ahmad" was apparently identified with photos of Omar Shaikh Saeed by staff at the Ansari exchange. The source of these funds poses further interesting questions discussed below, but the accusation against Mehmood resulted in swift action to remove and protect him. Immediately following the publication of these reports, Mehmood Ahmed was moved out of the ISI chief post, but only to another post in the inner Corps Commanders' Council which helps Musharraf rule Pakistan. [TOI011009] reported that the US sought his removal after confirming the wiring of $100,000 to Mohammed Atta from Pakistan by "Ahmed Umar Sheikh" at his instance.

One might well ask why the original $100K payment would be made through traceable channels. The answer may be that (a) the source had to be authenticated for Atta to proceed and (a) the traceable party was Omar Shaikh Saeed, already a known terrorist with Al Qaeda links, and thus expendable (he is supposedly on Death Row now). Note that Saeed's pseudonym for the transactions was "M. Ahmad". The cell-phone intercept of Pakistan ISI Chief General Mehmood Ahmed was presumably secret until revealed to the FBI in late 2001 when its significance became clear.

A further link in the funding scheme came from arrests following the motorcycle drive-by murder of policemen guarding the American Center in Kolkata, India in January 2002. Even as India pointed to Pakistani links, Aftab Ansari, a kidnap-gang leader, was reported to have claimed credit for this from safety in Dubai, as "revenge". Indian police had shot his associate Asif Reza Khan, "trying to escape" after being arrested for holding jeweler Bhaskar Parekh to ransom in November 2000. This prompted US FBI Chief Robert Mueller, visiting India at the time, to declare that the shooting appeared to be gang-related, not a terrorist attack on the US. The fun ended when two of the motorcyclists were tracked down and surrounded. One died in a shootout, the other was captured alive and interrogated. Using evidence from Asif Reza Khan's interrogation, Interpol issued a "Red Corner Notice" against Ansari. Dubai acted quickly on this notice, arresting Aftab Ansari as he tried to catch a PIA flight to Karachi with his Pakistani passport. Dubai extradited him to India, where he confessed. From [TOI020123]: "CBI Director P C Sharma told visiting FBI Chief Robert S Mueller that Ansari, who claimed responsibility for Tuesday's attack, had taken a ransom of Rs 37.5 million to free (kidnap victim) shoe baron Parthapratim Roy Burman through hawala channels to Dubai.. . Out of this amount, Omar Sheikh ..had sent $100,000 to Atta through telegraphic transfer..".

There appears to be confusion in the media reports on the timing of the $100K wire transfer (if there was only one). We presume that "Al Ansari exchange" mentioned above in Sharjah, a half-hour's drive from Dubai, is owned by Mr. Ansari. The link between Aftab Ansari, Omar Shaikh and the Pakistan ISI is discussed in [Twk020322], and attributed to Ansari's gang-member Asif in [TRIN020126], and Ansari's confession in [Trib020513] and [IPCS2002]. [Rediff020123] describes how Ansari, Omar Shaikh Saeed and Masood Azhar met in prison. Mr. Burman was kidnapped in July 2001 and released on Aug. 2, 2001 [Blonnet010803]. However, Ansari's specialties were kidnapping and arms deals, and he had no shortage of wealth. [CNN020710] reports that "one of the first transfers was $110,000 in 2000 to an account held by Atta and Waleed Alshedri" – clearly this could not be from the ransom money obtained in November 2000 or July 2001. [Mir020711] also states that the Mehmood-Saeed wire of $100,000 to Atta occurred in "summer 2000", matching the above. Ansari's confession stated that Omar Shaikh Saeed introduced him at General Mehmood's suggestion in mid-2000 to "Professor" Hafeez Sayeed, leader of the Lashkar-e-Toiba terrorist organization, and they jointly developed plots where kidnapping would fund terror activities. Azim Cheema, an L-e-T terrorist, is said to have delivered the Pakistani passport and other documents for Ansari's use. Ansari confessed to several payments to Omar Shaikh Saeed, and to funding an arms cache including 14kg of RDX, which was seized in Patan, India.

The confusion regarding payments can be cleared by realizing that there were several payments, totaling well over $325,000 and perhaps over $500,000 [CNN020710]. The source may have been Al Ansari accounts, but the disbursements may have been routed through the Middle East, Europe or the Caymans, using banking and untraceable "hawala" channels. [CNN020710] reports how the 9/11 hijackers opened bank accounts, giving false data in cities in the southern US including SunTrust, a major Atlanta-based bank. A report from the Cayman Islands [Cayman010916] speaks of a strange group appearing there, claiming to be Afghans traveling on Pakistani passports – which could not be found. As the authorities tried to find out from Pakistan and Britain about these men (with no response from the Pak embassy), an anonymous writer sent a letter to a Cayman media editor declaring that the men were terrorists bent on launching an attack on the US – just before Sep. 11.

From the above accounts, the Pakistan ISI Chief and terrorists under his control appear to have been much closer to the funding and implementation of the 9/11 plot than Osama bin Laden was. The links between the kidnapping / hijacking ransoms and the 9/11 terrorists' funding shows a very different tactic from those attributed to bin Laden's funding mechanisms. Clearly, the spy agency of Pakistan would be in an excellent position to shake down international kidnappers who depended on Pakistani protection and passports – and the ISI Chief would have easy access to their accounts. The intercepted cell-phone call is the only direct published tie to Musharraf's junta – unless Omar Shaikh Saeed talks to US investigators. Pakistan appears bent on preventing this – supposedly having put Saeed on Death Row for the murder of Daniel Pearl. Hafeez Sayeed, the L-e-T chief, has also disappeared, his wife having filed a "habeas corpus" petition and the Pak authorities denying holding him.

On-site Executive Supervision

One feature of most Al Qaeda attacks is that the "project director", a senior terrorist officer, visits the target city – and leaves hours before the actual event. After the 9/11 attack, a senior mullah was arrested at Heathrow airport as he left a plane from the US – but nothing has been heard of that since. There was, however, another senior officer present – General Mehmood Ahmed, ISI Chief, was visiting the State Department when the attack on the Pentagon occurred – and he had practically a direct view of the event. From [Mateen010910]: "ISI Chief Lt-Gen. Mahmoud's week-long presence in Washington has triggered speculation about the agenda of his mysterious meetings at the Pentagon and National Security Council. .. most important meeting was with Marc Grossman, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. One can safely guess that the discussions must have centred around Afghanistan . . . and Osama bin Laden."

A final hint of ISI involvement in the 9/11 attack comes in the assassination of Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Masood on September 9 using a suicide bomb in a TV camera, and hints on bin Laden's whereabouts. According to [CBS0203], bin Laden was reported to be in Pakistan for "medical treatment". On the night of Sep. 9, General Musharraf was at a party at ISI Headquarters, where he met former ISI Chief, General Hamid Gul on his return from his weeks-long stay in Afghanistan [JLA020610]. A clear link between the Algerian suicide bomber, the TV-camera-bomb, and Pakistan has not yet been reported.

Another possible reason for the 9/09 "party" at ISI HQ has not been explored in the media. The first of the payments from the 9/11 hijackers, signaling that they had no further need for money in this world, was wired from Boston on 9/08 – and the recipient in Sharjah would have known immediately. It must have been the afternoon of the 9th in Pakistan. Why else were these payments, relatively negligible sums, wired at such risk of eventual discovery? And why by the same route by which the original $100K came? Which takes us to the most frightening piece of evidence: the timing when the airlift of strategic assets from Afghanistan was planned.

Smoking Gun #2: Transfer of assets from Afghanistan

On Sep. 12 (in Pakistan – late Sep. 11 in the US) all major Pakistani airports were closed for several hours [Rind010915], [Raman010917]. Heavy military traffic was reported. It was speculated that the senior officers from Afghanistan and critical equipment / weapons were being brought home before American bombing made travel impossible. The timing is extremely interesting when one considers the lead-time needed for a large-scale airlift involving both people and heavy equipment. The aircraft must have gone from Pakistan, and loaded men and equipment gathered from all over Afghanistan with its primitive roads and infrastructure, and returned to Pakistan. According to the Pakistani government [Hilton020808] General Musharraf was at some evening public meeting when he was informed of the attacks, and he dismissed them as something between the MidEast Arabs and the US – leaving less than 12 hours before the airlift arrived in Islamabad. When was this airlift planned? What does this imply about General Musharraf's foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks? The Sep. 8 and 9 money transfers from Boston [LATimes0110], conveying the "All Systems are Go!" signal, serve to explain much of this miracle – but since Gen. Mehmood was in the US at the time, this also implies a more direct information channel from Omar Shaikh Saeed a.k.a. "Mustafa Ahmad" to General Pervez Musharraf.

As the Americans made clear their strategy of a close and intrusive embrace of Pakistan as opposed to a standoff attack, there was a major fire at Pakistan Army Headquarters in Islamabad [Sharma011011]. The records of Pakistan Army officers who had or were now serving in Afghanistan were reported to have been conveniently lost. A similarly unfortunate fire hit ISI HQ after the Mehmood Ahmed links were published.

Post –911 attacks

There have been several attacks on US interests inside Pakistan before and since 9/11, including attacks on a prayer hall inside the diplomatic complex and blasts outside the Consulate in Karachi. We draw attention to attacks made outside Pakistan. On July 27, a US soldier was killed and 4 wounded near Jalalabad by remote-detonated explosives. US teams found "two electronic firing devices that could be set to a digital watch or a radio and activated by remote control. The circuit boards .. were made in Pakistan and similar devices had been used in other bombings and rocket attacks on U.S. personnel." [Mherald020828]

ISI – the link between the Pakistan Government and Global Terrorism

Reports abound on the primary role of the ISI in the Pakistani / Afghan terrorist enterprise. [TOI011009], [Sharma011011], [Mintz020802], [ADB020725], [NYT011208],[IndUK020721], [Kux2002], [Rashid010914], [UPI020129], [UPI020606] [ICG020729], all point to the clear links and indeed the identity between the religious fundamentalist groups, the terrorist groups, the Pakistan military and the ISI. What is left unstated is the proof that General Musharraf himself, and his immediate junta, control the ISI and give the orders. Fortunately, one needs to look no further than the statements made by the dictator himself, and his immediate friends and followers, to establish this link unambiguously. In [Lodhi020305] the Pakistani Ambassador to the US declares that the ISI is an arm of the Pakistan government, and does nothing without direct orders from the government. [Sehgal0112] explains the command structure of the ISI to emphasize the same point – the ISI does nothing except to carry out the orders of the Pakistan government. General Musharraf himself has vehemently repeated the same. Quoting the General [Hilton020808]: "Its unfortunate that the I.S.I. is targeted around the world. It's wrong and baseless. It does what the C.I.A. does, what RAW does, Mossad. It does what the government wants it do to. It is not a government within a government. The I.S.I. is manned by uniformed people. Especially when they answer to a commander-in-chief. I am the commander-in-chief." Thus the question of transferring responsibility for the terrorist attacks from the Al Qaeda to the Taliban and the other terror groups to the ISI to General Musharraf can be declared as "Q.E.D."

Discussion

Motives

[Blair011007]: " No other organisation has both the motivation and the capability to carry out attacks like those of the 11 September – only the Al Qaida network under Usama Bin Laden".

It is respectfully suggested that the PM should re-examine the logic of this statement, extending it one level higher. To quote General Musharraf [Hilton020808]: "I didn't think it possible that Osama sitting up there in the mountains could do it. He was perhaps the sponsor, the financier, the motivating force. But those who executed it were much more modern. They knew the US, they knew aviation. I don't think he has the intelligence or the minute planning. The planner was someone else."

Pakistan, on the other hand, is ruled by Musharraf's military dictatorship which has sent thousands of its people to death. The present junta used to be the junior officers of the Pak Army as it conducted the genocide of over 3 million of their own compatriots in East Pakistan in 1971 [Hrehman1971]. No other country in the world has a military dictatorship controlling a nuclear arsenal, protecting an enterprise of 10,000 "religious schools" which have produced 1.75 million brainwashed youths unemployable for anything other than rabid acts of violence. And Musharraf, most of all, has reason to hate the US. Rising through the ranks as a protégé of Islamist dictator Gen. Zia ul Haq, and as mentor of Osama bin Laden, Musharraf's bitterness at the military defeat of 1971 was multiplied by his failure in the battles of Siachen, and later in his grand plan to invade Kashmir under nuclear cover in 1999. He blames the US for that last defeat. President Clinton refused to back Pakistan, Musharraf's entire Northern Light Infantry Regiment got wiped out, and he escaped court martial only by conducting his coup d'etat. Musharraf's sidekick, Lt. Gen. Aziz, who was caught on tape telling Musharraf in 1999 that he controlled the occupiers of the Kargil heights ("we have the jehadis by the scruff of the neck"), is known as the "COAS" of the "Pakistan Army of Islam", a pseudonym for the Pakistan Armed forces deputed to run the Islamic jehad in Afghanistan and Kashmir. In 1998, President Clinton's cruise missiles retaliating for the Embassy attacks, hit the Harkat ul Mujaheddin camps inside Pakistan, as much as those inside Afghanistan [Yomari990107].

Coupled with this bitterness is the prime motivation of the terror enterprise, which must be financial. Pakistan appears to be controlled by two or three huge financial organizations which operate for the benefit of the senior military and their interests. Viewed as such, the various components of the terror enterprise come together. The madarssas and the preachings of religious leaders such as Masood Azhar and bin Laden generate the popular support and grassroots fundraising. Rich businessmen, Mideast potentates and oil tycoons contribute to the Cause, and successful terror attacks on the seemingly impregnable western establishment impress these tycoons as much as they impress the recruit base of Islamic youth from all over the world. Training camps and indoctrination centers are essential to this enterprise, turning impressionable youngsters into suicide terrorists. The "secular" military establishment focuses on organizing, training and equipping these diverse components. An in-depth look at this enterprise, and the identity of cause and command between the Al Qaeda, ISI, the Pakistan Army of Islam and the Pakistan Armed Forces, is beyond the scope of this article.

One might also consider General Musharraf's notion of honesty. When he declares that "there is no cross-border terrorism" the General's argument is that the Line of Control is not an International Border – and the Indian State of Jammu-Kashmir belongs to him anyway – and killing Indians is not terrorism to him. Likewise, when he defends the ISI, his argument may be that the power behind Al Qaeda is not the ISI – it is the Pakistan Army of Islam, an umbrella group of senior officers encompassing the Armed Forces, the ISI, the terror groups, the Taliban, Al Qaeda and the madarssas.

Claims of Pakistani government enthusiasm in terrorist arrests should be viewed against this snippet from [Dtimes020724]: "The man who turned in Ramzi Ahmed Yousef to the Americans was a Pakistani codenamed 'Hamid,' who now lives in the United States with his wife and one child under the Witness Protection Programme, richer by the two million dollars he received as his "finder's fee." This perhaps accurately captures the motivation method which the US uses on the top officers of the Pakistan junta – they have so far "found" the Pakistan Northern Light Infantry Regiment which invaded Kargil and never returned, the Taliban, the ten thousand Pakistani youths who went to Afghanistan, and the thousands of Pakistani military men who perished in General Rashid Dostum's alleged "Container Express". The madarssas and terror groups are perhaps in line for similar "findings" by the Generals.

Timing

Why on 9/11/2001? Was it just the end of the long preparations? The early report of Atta extending his house lease in Florida by a month at the end of August, suggests an unexpected delay – or an order to not renew for a longer lease (why, given that the lessor could do nothing about an early termination?) Sep. 11 has been associated with the anniversary of the US Congress accepting Jewish settlers' claims to Palestine in the 1920s – but what if the flying and media weather were not perfect and the WTC / Pentagon were not clearly visible? Another explanation is that the US administration had decided, a week before Sep. 11, to proceed with a comprehensive counter-terrorism plan prepared under the previous (Clinton) administration. This plan would have included tighter coordination between federal agencies in tracing financial links and terrorist movements. Did this imminent threat trigger several plans from the portfolio on a "use it or lose it" basis? See the incompetent Shoe Bomber, Dirty Bomber, Bridge Bombers, Industrial Mixers, etc. discussed above. This of course would imply that Al Qaeda was warned of the impending action by leaks from the US – which brings us to General Mehmood Ahmed's visit to the US in the week before 9/11.

We cannot know the intent of Gen. Ahmed's visit – and of USA Lt. Gen. T. Franks' trip to Pakistan from which he is reported to have turned back on 9/11. In retrospect, it is likely that the discussions included the US plan to implement the new counter-terrorism plan – and demanding Pakistani cooperation. We can only speculate on the transmission of those discussions to the terrorist enterprise. We can however observe General Ahmed's achievements. On Sep. 11, he managed to deflect the rising American anger off Pakistan and on to Afghanistan. At the same time, he managed to sell the US Administration on Pakistan's indispensable role as the "Frontline Ally" for the US to have any hope of preventing further attacks with weapons of mass destruction, keeping the ISI very much in the middle [WN020227] – and get paid handsomely for their efforts. The General and his boss Gen. Musharraf must congratulate themselves on the success of this grand extortion scheme.

An alternative explanation of the timing may be glimpsed from a snapshot of the Pakistan junta's predicament in the summer of 2001. The Taliban were under tight UN sanctions, which were being violated only by Pakistan (Note: arms convoys to the Taliban from Pakistan continued even during the US air strikes!) Pakistan's economy was in a downward spiral, with its foreign exchange reserves down below $400M or one month's reserve. Musharraf was scheduled to visit the US in the 3rd week of September. As that date approached, it was clear that the US administration, Congress, the World Bank, the Commonwealth and the G-8 were in no mood to oblige him with debt-rescheduling, F-16s, relaxation of sanctions, or increased economic aid. The lease extension takes on new significance when viewed in the context of Musharraf's declining prospects for a productive visit to the US – which was critical to his coup-free survival in Islamabad. With Saudi interest in bin Laden waning, and the Chinese becoming wary with Uighur terrorists being trained in Pakistan, the junta had to find a rich payer of protection money for "cooperation in fighting terrorism". Within 6 months after 9/11, Pakistan's foreign exchange reserves were reported up over $6 Billion, though their exports had plummeted and imports risen as the economy stayed depressed and businesspeople and tourists were scared away. This windfall was explained in the Pakistani press and by former PM Benazir Bhutto as an operation where Pakistan sent "couriers with suitcases" to the MidEast to buy dollars for 240 billion Pakistani rupees – a patently absurd explanation.

Table 1 summarizes the reports on Pakistani involvement in terror attacks on the USA. The list is obviously long, and the Pakistani role is pervasive. It is obvious that Pakistan has been deeply and inseparably involved in the Taliban and the Al Qaeda – and as such bears responsibility for the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Indirect evidence comes from the plethora of reports. Nearly every terror plot directed against the US and its interests has a strong link to Pakistani training, equipment, and personnel. If 9/11 was not Pakistan-organized, it must have been a rare exception.

Table 1: Summary of Pakistan links to terrorist attacks on America

Perpetrators and conspirators:

1. Jaish-e-Muhammed mullah Masood Azhar linked to attacks on Americans in Somalia.

2. 1993 WTC bomber Ramzi Youssef traced to Pakistan; tied to 1995 plot to bomb 12 US airliners. Pakistani arrested in Phillippines with explosives in apartment, tied to airline bombing plot.

3. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Pakistani, on FBI Wanted alert, related to 9/11, Razmi Youssef and Tunisian synagogue bombing.

4. Tunisian suicide bomber Nawar traced to Pakistan training camp in 2000/2001. Receives $20K from Pakistani sources.

5. Would-be LAX bomber (Algerian native) reveals Pak coordination and reporting locations.

6. Abu Zubeidah, Al Qaeda coordinator of LAX bomb plot, lived in Faisalabad, Pakistan.

7. 1993 Bombay commercial district bombings (over 300 dead) – Dawood Ibrahim sheltered from Interpol in house near Musharraf's residence. TIME journalist harassed for reporting his location.

8. East Africa embassy bombing coordinator flew home to Pakistan, 1998; Kenyan suspect Sheikh Ahmed Salim found in Karachi, July 2002.

9. Terror training camps found related to embassy bombings –Harkat-ul-Ansar camps hit by US cruise missiles in 1998 were inside Pakistan.

10. Fatal hijacking – PanAm 73, Karachi, 1986. Hijacker(s) allowed to escape; caught in 2002 and put on trial.

11. Fatal hijacking IC814, Dec.99– hijackers now in Pakistan, sought as part of Daniel Pearl murder gang. Dress rehearsal for 9/11 – modus operandi included slitting throats of passengers, and commercial-pilot-trained hijackers expert in hand-to-hand combat.

12. Mohammed Atta's classmate at Hamburg engg. School, 97-2000 was PAF Sqn. Ldr.

13. PAF Sqn Ldr replaced by Atta's cousin – 9/11 hijacker when PAF officer's brother died.

14. Omar Shaikh traced to ISI / Gen. Mehmood Ahmed links. Wired first $100K to Atta in summer 2000 on Ahmed's orders: cell phone call intercept.

15. Atta's pilot-trainee Pak classmate denied entry to US; meets with Atta and another Pak terrorist in Spain, July 10, 2001.

16. Zacarias Moussaoui trained in Pakistan.

17. Moussaoui came from Pakistan to London & US with $35K in 2001; sought B747 training.

18. Bin Laden's personal pilot reported to be former PAF officer.

19. Pak terror cells arrested in France, Miami.

20. Pakistani in a hurry to get 25 photos of WTC developed, 2 weeks before 9/11.

21. Pakistanis arrested on fraud; bogus company that bought industrial chemical mixer.

22. Richard Reid (accused Shoe Bomber) trained and received final instructions from Pakistan; related Pak cell arrested in France.

23. Jose Padilla (accused Dirty Bomber) trained and came to US from Pakistan; Pak associates arrested in US.

24. John Walker Lindh (American Taliban) trained in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir.

25. Singapore US embassy bomb plot: Kuwaiti-Canadian suspect indoctrinated in Pakistan.

26. Previous bombing plots had Pak coordinators; Afghan camps had Pak military instructors.

Official Pakistani Government Links to Terrorist Organizations

27. Dominant Pakistani role in Taliban Afghanistan

28. Pak sponsorship of Osama bin Laden's return to Afghanistan, 1996 via drug lord

29. Pak govt sponsorship of terror camps on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border.

30. Pak acquiesence in Osama's Fatwas against the US – 1996 and '98; Bin Laden proclamation in '98 of "God's Order to Kill Americans" in Peshawar, Pakistan.

31. Pak Lt. Gen. Aziz reported head of "Pakistan Army of Islam" running terror camps.

32. Pak military instructors for terror trainees in A'stan - FlightSim and training manuals found in A'Stan; IC814 hijack plot material found in Kabul house; hijackers and Omar Shaikh found living in Pakistan.

33. Kolkatta US Consulate attack organizer Aftab Ansari put kidnap ransom money in account which paid $100K to Atta.

34. ISI Chief Mehmood Ahmed reported to have ordered Omar Shaikh to send money to Atta

35. Omar Shaikh reportedly receives balance of funds wired by Atta & gang on 9/11 from Ansari Bank; flies back to Pakistan.

36. Pakistan Lt.Gen. Hamid Gul – fired ISI chief – virulently anti-American terror camp organizer – in Afghanistan for weeks; returns to party at ISI HQ, meeting Musharraf on 9/09 after Northern Alliance leader Masood was assassinated.

37. 9/12 emergency military evacuation from Afghanistan to Pakistan completed within far too little time to have been thought up after 9/11 attacks.

38. Timing – Atta extends lease for 30 days as Musharraf visit to US looks headed for disaster.

39. Pak envoy M. Lodhi asserts that the ISI does not act without government authorization.

40. General Musharraf takes full responsibility for ISI actions – repeatedly and vehemently.

The direct pointers suggest that there was no exception. The timeline of the 9/11 plot as seen from the media reports is laid out in Table 2. This shows some interesting aspects. It appears that the plot began to hatch at the same time as the Musharraf junta took over Pakistan. The link to the funding sources from kidnapping and arms smuggling appear to be strong. The most important pieces of evidence so far, directly related to the 9/11 attacks are:

1. Pak Army / ISI Taliban nexus, making Pakistan directly responsible for Taliban actions.

2. Aftab Ansari's declaration of how kidnap ransom/ arms profits were deposited in the account from where payments were transferred to Mohammed Atta, along with clear links between Ansari and Omar Saeed Shaikh.

3. The intercepted cell-phone call from General Mehmood Ahmed, director of the ISI, to Omar Shaikh Saeed to start the money transfers to the hijackers.

4. The transfers of balances from the hijackers to the Al Ansari exchange in Sharjah on 9/9-9/11.

5. Omar Shaikh Saeed's movements traced from Pakistan to the Al Ansari institution in Sharjah, withdrawal of funds received from the hijackers, and return to Pakistan on 9/11.

6. The "substitution" of Marwan Al Shehhi (Atta's cousin) for PAF Sqn Ldr. Bin Mansoor when the latter had only gone home to attend his brother's military funeral. This makes sense for a military organization which replaces a suicide mission trainee when his last sibling dies (as explained in the movie "Saving Private Ryan"), and cannot tell him why technical school is suicidal compared to flying PAF fighters on the Indian border. It also indicates that the Saudi hijackers and the PAF officer received funds and orders from the same source. The reported FBI "interest" in talking to the PAF suggests that the FBI have not dropped that angle – including the real identity of "Atta".

7. The curious behavior of the alleged terrorists at various "flight schools" –contrasted with the "professional" skill exhibited on 9/11.

8. Pakistani start of Zacarias Moussauoi's journey to the UK and then US – with terrorist training and $35K in cash – to join the other 9/11 hijackers, after Binalsbih (bin Al-Shaibah) failed to get a visa to America.

9. ISI complicity in assassinating Ahmed Shah Masood. Party at ISI HQ same night –9/09 with Musharraf and Hamid Gul attending. The coincidence (?) that the first "All Systems Are Go" payment from the hijackers in Boston came in to Shaikh Saeed in Dubai on Sep.9.

10. The impossibly short lead-time for the airlift of military personnel / equipment from Afghanistan to Pakistan on 9/12. This is a critical piece of evidence. It appears that the orders to conduct the evacuation must have been triggered by the final return of money, by the various hijackers, on Sep. 9 through 11th, Pakistan time. US retaliation of some sort against Afghanistan was expected, making the airlift essential. The airlift had to be timed well because of the danger in leaving the northern frontlines exposed to the Northern Alliance Forces, despite the murder of their leader Masood on September 9.

11. The flight of "Binalsbih" (Ramzi bin Al-Shaibah) and Said Bahaji to Pakistan on Sep. 5.

Table 2: Timeline Related to the 9/11 attacks

'97- '99

Atta and PAF Sqn Ldr classmates at Hamburg.

Aug. 99

PAF Sqn Ldr. returns to Pak; replaced by Marwan Al Shehhi.

Oct. 99

Musharraf coup. Gen. Mehmood Ahmed appointed ISI chief.

Dec.99-Jan.00

Atta and 2 classmates train in Afghanistan.

IC814 hijacked to Kandahar using 9/11 modus operandi.

Omar Shaikh & Masood Azhar freed.

Terrorist meeting at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Summer 2000

Shaikh Saeed introduces Aftab Ansari to L-e-T chief Hafeez Sayeed - kidnap scheme developed to fund terror.

Mehmood Ahmed phone call– orders Shaikh to wire $100K to Atta from Ansari account.

$110K appears in accounts of Atta and Marwan Al Shehhi.

Nov. 2000



Ansari gang holds Indian jeweler to $850K ransom.

Jan/Feb.01

Moussaoui leaves Pakistan, goes to London and then US w/ $35,000 cash.

July 01

Meeting between Atta, Bin Al Shabai, Said Bahaji and others in Spain. Bin Al Shabai unable to go to USA due to repeated visa refusal.

Hijack gang arrives in US.

Ansari gang holds Indian Shoe merchant to ransom.

Summer 01

$375K passes through hijacker's bank accounts in US.

August:01

Atta extends house lease by 1 month.

Sep. 3

ISI Chief Gen. Mehmood Ahmed arrives in Washington for "discussions".

Sep. 5

Bin Al Shabai and Said Bahaji flee to Pakistan.

Sep. 8

(Boston: Sep.9, Pakistan time). Atta wires money to Sharjah.

Sep. 9:
Masood assassinated in Afghanistan; Musharraf at ISI HQ party; meets Hamid Gul on return from Afghanistan. Waleed AlShehri wires $5215 from Boston to Sharjah (Ansari bank). Atta also sends money.

Musharraf orders airlift from Taliban?

Sep. 10

Al-Shehhi wires $5400 to "Ahmad" (Omar Shaikh)

Sep. 11

"Ahmad" (Omar Shaikh) picks up transfers at Al Ansari exchange, Sharjah; flies back to Karachi

Sep. 11

(evening, Pak time) 911 attacks occur. Musharraf at party; informed.



Sep. 12

(Morning, Pak time):Islamabad & other Pak airports closed – heavy military traffic – airlift from Afghanistan arrives.

The question remains: "If the US knows all this, why are they not attacking Pakistan or arresting the junta leaders?" Theories abound on this. The most sanguine is that the US administration has some people near the top whose deep knowledge of Pakistan and Afghanistan permits them to implement sophisticated policies, where they essentially force or pay the leaders of the terror gang to sell out all their accomplices, and thus systematically dismantle the terror apparatus from the bottom up. It would be remarkable if such a policy survived the emotions and pressures of 9/11/2001. Theories exploring other scenarios may be found in [Choss0111A]. It is noted that General Mehmood Ahmed, far from being a "rogue Islamist General" is a trusted associate of General Musharraf, his loyalty established through his support in the coup of 1999, and given the top spot in the ISI to replace Gen. Ziauddin, whom Musharraf had arrested. As of early September 11, 2002, no top leaders of Al Qaeda are under arrest – Abu Zubeidah the middle manager in terror recruiting, and Muttawakil, the Taliban minister, are the topmost captives to-date. Table 3 lists various names associated with the 9/11 plot as a primer for the reader.

Table3: Names related to the 9/11 terrorist plot

· Abadin, Zein al. See "Abu Zubeidah"

· Ahmed, Mehmood: Lt. General, Pakistan Army. Appointed chief of ISI by General Musharraf after 1999 coup. Transferred in 2001 to the Corps Commanders' Council.

· Ahmad, Mustafa Muhammad: Pseudonym of person who wired $100K to and received balance from Mohammed Atta near 9/11. See "Omar Shaikh Saeed"

· Ansari, Aftab: Alleged kidnapper/ arms smuggler. Organized terror attack at American Center, Kolkotta, Dec.2001. Pak passport; extradited to India by Dubai. Alleged to have funded account where O. Saeed wired $100K to the 9/11 hijackers. Linked to Al Ansari Exchange, Sharjah, where Atta and Al Shehhi wired money on Sep.9&10, 2001.

· Atef, Mohammed: Alleged military chief of Al Qaeda. Believed killed in US air raid.

· Atta, Mohammed: Alleged leader of 9/11 hijackers.

Bahaji, Said: Alleged associate whom Atta met in Tarrogonna, Spain, July 10, 2001. Flew to Pakistan Sep.5, 2001 and believed hiding there. Wanted.

Bin Al-Shaibah, Ramzi. Alleged Yemeni classmate of M. Atta, denied entry into US.

· Binalshibh, Ramzi. See "bin Al-Shaibah, Ramzi". Believed to be in Pakistan. Wanted.

· Bin Laden, Osama: Saudi billionaire turned preacher; organizer of Al Qaeda.

· Bin Mansoor, Atif Ahmed: Sqn Ldr., Pakistan Air Force. Reportedly classmate of Mohammed Atta at Hamburg Technische Hochschule, 1997-2000 before arrival of Marwan Al Shehhi

· Gul, Hamid: Former chief of ISI. Fired in 1989 after US concerns about terrorist links.

· Hasnain, Mansur: An alleged hijacker of IC814. Sought in Pakistan for murder of Daniel Pearl.

· Husnain, Ghulam: Karachi TIME stringer who reported story on Dawood Ibrahim living in Pakistan near Musharraf's residence. Harassed by ISI; escaped to the West.

· Khan,Aziz: Lt. General, Pak. Army; Musharraf's assistant in Kargil debacle; caught on tape telling Musharraf about control of " mujaheddin"; Said to be chief of "Pak Army of Islam".

· Masood, Ahmed Shah: Leader of Afghan Resistance to Soviet invasion. After Soviets left, led Northern Alliance. Assasinated Sep. 9, 2001 by suicide bomber.

· Mohammed, Khaled al-Sheikh.Pakistan-born, Kuwaiti resident. Wanted related to 9-11 attacks. Believed to be uncle of Ramzi Youssef.

· Moussaoui, Zacarias: Tried by US as "20th hijacker" in 9/11 plot. Algerian-French.

· Omar (Mullah): Taliban leader. Absconding after October 7, 2001.

· Saeed, Omar Shaikh: Member, Harkat-ul-Mujaheddin; also associated with Jaish-e-Mohammed and ISI Chief General Mehmood Ahmed. British citizen, arrested for kidnap & murder in India, 1994, freed as ransom for IC814, Jan. 2000, Alleged conveyor for funds to and from 9/11 hijackers. Sentenced to death for murder of Daniel Pearl.

· Saleem, Sheikh Ahmed: "bin Laden's financial advisor". Sudan national; arrested July 12, 2002 in Karachi, suspected in attack on US Consulate.

· Sayeed, "Professor" Haffez: Pakistani leader of "Lashkar-e-Toiba", renamed "Lashkar-e-Jhangvi" after US named L-e-T as a foreign terrorist organization. Allegedly conspired with Ansari to use kidnappings to fund terrorism.

· Siddiqui, Imtiaz: See "Mansur Hasnain"

· Youssef, Ramzi: In US jail, convicted of roles in 1993 WTC bombing, and planning 1995 plot to blow up US airliners over the Pacific.

· Zubeidah, Abu, a.k.a. Zein al Abadin: Pakistan based, accused Al Qaeda coordinator of 1999 LAX bomb plot & East African embassy bombings. Arrested by US in Faisalabad.



Conclusion

In this paper, we have used the statement of "evidence" presented by the Western Allies as rationale for their attacks on Afghanistan. From the logic and evidence presented by Prime Minister Blair, supplemented with other information which became available before and after September 2001, we can see that bin Laden and Al Qaeda are specific players inside a larger organization – and that organization is the same as that which runs the Pakistan government. The accumulated mass of reports from all over the world present a picture of a global menace from Pakistan–trained, equipped and ordered terrorists. This menace is far from being over. Added to the weight of these indirect pointers, specific evidence on money transfers and the timing of the emergency evacuation from Afghanistan, exposes several links of a chain tying the top levels of the Pakistan government to the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001.
 
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ajtr

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TERROR IN NY: A JEM LINK? INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.645


B.RAMAN


Najibullah Zazi , a 25-year-old Afghan citizen with permanent resident status in the US, was arrested by the USA's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in September 2009 on a charge of belonging to an Al Qaeda motivated and trained cell, which was allegedly planning suicide bombings in the New York City subway system. He pleaded guilty along with one of two other co-conspirators. The third co-conspirator did not plead guilty. The case is reserved for judgement in June.

2.According to the prosecution, the three had planned to attack the subway system at the instance of Saleh al-Somali, Al-Qaeda's head of external operations, and Rashid Rauf, who was described by the prosecution as an Al-Qaeda operative. Rashid Rauf, who was reportedly killed in a US Drone (pilotless plane) strike in North Waziristan in November,2008, belonged to the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) of Pakistan and was related by marriage to Maulana Masood Azhar, the Amir of the JEM.

3. Zarein Ahmedzay, a 25-year-old former New York taxi driver, one of the three co-conspirators, who pleaded guilty to charges including conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, claimed the three had bought ingredients to make explosives similar to those used in the July 7 2005 bombings in London which killed 52 people on three tube trains and a bus. Ahmedzay told the court that he travelled to Pakistan with Najibullah Zazi and Adis Medunjanin in the summer of 2008. They went to a training camp in North Waziristan and volunteered to join the Taliban and fight the US forces in Afghanistan, but were told they would be "more useful if we returned to New York City... to conduct operations."Asked by the judge what kind of operations, he said: "Suicide-bombing operations." Zazi told the court:"During the training, al Qaeda leaders asked us to return to the United States and conduct a martyrdom operation. We agreed to this plan." It was reported on April 13,2010, that a fourth suspect in the case----not yet named as a co-conspirator---had been arrested in Pakistan and that the US authorities were trying to get him to the US for interrogation.

4.Rashid Rauf, who motivated them, was from a Mirpuri family of Birmingham. The Mirpuris are the Punjabi-speaking residents of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK). He disappeared from the UK in 2002 after the British Police suspected him in connection with the murder of one of his relatives in Birmingham. On August 9, 2006, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) claimed to have picked him up from a house in Bhawalpur, southern Punjab, which he had bought after coming to Pakistan in 2002. The Pakistani authorities claimed that he was in close touch with Al Qaeda and that it was his arrest that gave them an inkling regarding the imminence of the plot of a group of jihadi extremists based in the UK to blow up a number of US-bound planes. The discovery of the conspiracy and the arrest of many UK-based suspects of Pakistani origin were then announced by the British Police.

5.Despite his alleged involvement in the August 2006 plot to blow up a number of US-bound planes with liquid explosives, the Pakistani authorities avoided handing him over to the British Police for interrogation. The Government of Pakistan told a court on October 30, 2006, that Rashid Rauf had been detained under the Security of Pakistan Act. A Rawalpindi Anti-Terrorism Judge, Justice Safdar Hussain Malik, passed orders on November 21, 2006, approving his judicial custody in the Adiala jail. This ruled out his early transfer to the British Police for interrogation. He escaped from custody under mysterious circumstances on December, 16,2007, while being taken back to jail from the court. Many alleged that the ISI had allowed him to escape to avoid pressure from the British Police to hand him over for interrogation.

6. Quoting an unnamed senior Pakistani security official, an Islamabad datelined report of the Agence France Press (AFP) stated as follows on November 22, 2008: "The alleged mastermind of a 2006 transatlantic airplane bombing plot was killed in a US missile attack in northwest Pakistan early Saturday (November 15, 2008) .The transatlantic bombing plot alleged mastermind Rashid Rauf was killed along with an Egyptian Al-Qaeda operative in the US missile strike in North Waziristan early Saturday," a senior security official told AFP. The Al-Qaeda operative killed in the strike was identified as Abu Zubair al-Misri, the official added. He and the Egyptian Al-Qaeda operative were killed along with at least two other militants in a US drone attack on the house of a local tribesman in the village of Alikhel, part of a district known as a stronghold for Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, officials said. The missile strike came days after another US drone attack which killed six rebels, including an Arab Al-Qaeda operative. That attack prompted Taliban militants based in the rugged tribal territory bordering Afghanistan to warn of reprisal attacks across Pakistan if there were more strikes by the US. "

7.According to the "Daily Telegraph",Rauf had been suspected of involvement in almost every significant terrorist plot in Britain since his escape to Pakistan in 2002, including the explosions of July 7, 2005 in London, the failed attacks of July 21, 2005 in London and the plot to blow up airliners over the Atlantic.He was also behind an alleged plan to attack shopping centres in Manchester during Easter 2008.

8.Maulana Masood Azhar used to be a leader of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), a founding member of Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front For Jihad against the Crusaders and the Jewish People formed in 1998. Its then Amir, Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil, was a signatory of bin Laden's first fatwa calling for attacks against the US. Azhar had fought as a member of bin Laden's group in Somalia in the early 1990s. In 1994, he entered India and was arrested by the Police and kept in custody in Jammu & Kashmir. He was one of those released by the Government of India in December,1999, to secure the release of the passengers of a plane of the Indian Airlines hijacked by the HUM to Kandahar to demand the release of Azhar and others. After his return to Pakistan from Kandahar, Azhar developed differences with Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil, left the HUM and formed his own organization in January 2000 called the JEM. bin Laden failed in his efforts to patch up the differences between the two. He then switched his support from the HUM to the JEM.

9. The JEM was very active in J&K and was suspected of involvement in the attempted attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi on December 13,2001. Unlike the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), which never indulges in an act of terrorism in Pakistani territory and against Pakistani targets, the JEM has been involved in acts of terrorism in Pakistani territory. It was suspected of involvement, along with Al Qaeda, in the two unsuccessful attempts to kill Pervez Musharraf in Rawalpindi in December,2003.It supported the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in its operations against the Pakistan Army in the Swat Valley and then in South Waziristan. It is now believed to have its training camps in North Waziristan along with those of Ilyas Kashmiri of the 313 Brigade.

10. Since Rashid Rauf joined it in 2002, the JEM has been training members of the Pakistani diaspora in the UK. The Zazi's case was the first indication that it may be training jihadi volunteers from the US too. As part of the investigation into the attempted incendiary attack in Times Square of New York by Faisal Shahzad, a US citizen of Pakistani origin, on May 1,2010, four suspected members of the JEM in Pakistan are reported to have been detained by the Pakistani authorities. Among those detained is one Muhammed Rehan, a suspected associate of Shahzad who allegedly has links to the JEM. According to a senior Pakistani official, Rehan made possible a meeting between Shahzad and at least one senior Taliban official. He alleged that Rehan drove Shahzad on July 7, 2009, to Peshawar. They also went to the Waziristan region, where they met with one or more senior Taliban leaders.

11. The suspected involvement of the JEM in the training of Faisal, if proved correct, would indicate, in the wake of its involvement in the motivation and training of the Zazi cell, a possible link between the members of the Zazi cell and Faisal. It would also indicate the possibility that like Zazi, Faisal was not acting alone. The JEM is becoming as worrisome as the LET as a surrogate of Al Qaeda using angry elements in the Pakistani diaspora for acts of terrorism not only in the UK as it had done in the past, but also in the US now. ( 7-5-10)
 

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Irresistible lure of Pakistan as nursery of global jihad

By Lehaz Ali (AFP) – 3 hours ago
PESHAWAR, Pakistan — When Faisal Shahzad was arrested over the New York car bomb attempt, he joined a growing list of Western terror suspects inspired, trained or sponsored by extremists in Pakistan.
The son of an affluent air force commander, Shahzad was brought up in Pakistan but educated in the United States, where he got a job, settled his young family into suburbia and acquired citizenship.
But the American dream appeared to go badly wrong. Returning from a visit to Pakistan, he told US immigration officials he went to see his parents.
After his arrest on last Monday over the attempt to set off a car bomb in Times Square, he allegedly confessed to being trained in Pakistan to make bombs.
Pakistan is yet to confirm a link between Shahzad and a specific militant faction, but investigators are poring over who exactly he visited and where he went during a months-long stay in his homeland.
While the details are opaque, radicalised youth have long felt an irresistible pull to Pakistan as a nursery of modern jihad. The country's borderlands with Afghanistan have been branded the headquarters of Al-Qaeda.
Osama bin Laden's ideology of global jihad against the United States and its allies, rooted in the mountains of the Afghan-Pakistani border, has inspired myriad offshoot groups and galvanised alienated youth.
"Jihadi elements are coming here from all over the world because they can cross the border and can enter Afghanistan," Malik Naveed Khan, police chief of Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa northwestern province, told AFP.
"The mountains along the Afghan border are best shelter for them."
Accidents of history and geography have made the 27,200 square kilometres (10,500 square miles) of Pakistan's tribal belt, which lies beyond any government control, a hotbed of Pakistani, Afghan and foreign militants.
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United States sowed the seeds by sponsoring Afghans to fight against the Soviets in the 1980s. The war put huge pressure on the Soviet Union but spawned jihadist groups and Al-Qaeda.
"Pakistan allowed every Tom, **** and Harry from all over the world to settle down in Peshawar, in the tribal areas," said Imtiaz Gul, whose book on the tribal belt, "The Most Dangerous Place", is to be published next month.
"They found a place where nobody questioned what they were doing and this continued all through these three decades," he added.
The 1980s ushered in a major state-sponsored Islamisation of Pakistani society. The military and intelligence agencies supported hardline groups as an instrument of domestic and foreign policy towards Afghanistan and Kashmir.
After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the US-led invasion of Afghanistan pushed the Taliban and Al-Qaeda into the tribal belt, where mountains, thick forest and lawlessness provided the perfect haven.
Although much of the radical Islamic backlash against US policies is rooted in the Middle East, analysts say Pakistan, with its free media and political system, is a more fertile breeding ground than Arab police states.
"It is a country where you can find the purpose of your life.... The message, unfortunately, going out is that you can come and survive and thrive here," said Gul, who heads the Centre for Research and Security Studies think tank.
Five Americans are currently on trial in Pakistan for allegedly plotting to carry out a terrorist attack.
David Headley, the American son of a former Pakistani diplomat, has pleaded guilty before a court in the United States to surveying targets for the Pakistani militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba ahead of the 2008 attacks in Mumbai.
Britain says the majority of its terror plots originate in Pakistan.
The mastermind of the 2005 bombings in London, and two of the four Britons who blew themselves up on the city's transport system, visited Pakistan.
Sophisticated transport links make it easy to travel to Karachi, Lahore or Peshawar, where young people can meet political leaders or clerics who can put them in touch with militants.
A police investigator in Karachi, where Shahzad is believed to have spent time, said there were "many" madrassas and mosques in the city where educated people were being indoctrinated and manipulated.
"In Karachi, in Lahore, in Peshawar, you have Islamic clergy that preaches radicalism. So it is easy access that makes Pakistan an attractive place," said security and political analyst Hasan Askari.
"Out of those youths, only a very small number, maybe one or two percent would adopt violence," said Askari.
 

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Pakistan a breeding ground for Islamism



The portrait of the naturalized U.S. citizen of Pakistani origin arrested for last weekend's failed car bombing in Times Square exposes once again the specious argument made by liberal-left ideologues that alone or in some combination, poverty, the sins of western colonialism-imperialism and the wickedness of Zionism are the cause of Islamist terrorism.

Instead, in Faisal Shahzad — a 30-year-old graduate of computer science with an MBA from the University of Bridgeport, Conn., and married with two young children — we have the profile of an alleged Islamist terrorist coming from a middle class, or even privileged, background.

The cause of Islamist terror is Islamism. It is an ideology like bolshevism devised to legitimize making war (jihad), seize power and establish a Shariah-based totalitarian rule. And as it was once with bolshevism in old Russia, Islamism attracts primarily young Muslim men of middle-class backgrounds with intellectual pretensions to become the vanguard "martyrs" of jihad against the West for being the enemy of Islam and Muslims.

Acute resentment

Islamism flourishes in an environment of acute resentment born from a sense of general failure of society compared to past greatness or glory nostalgically idealized. The greater the sense of present failure of Muslim societies, the more pressing the Islamist fervour to redeem an idealized past, and in this effort all means become justifiable for an end that is given religious sanction.

Islamism is the Muslim ideology of counter-revolution against the modern world and modernity. And while this ideology keeps the elders engaged through long idle hours of endless chatter, it is the opium readily inhaled by the young that sets so many of them on the path of jihad against infidels.

Pakistan is the fertile breeding ground of Islamism for reasons that are intrinsic to its history and politics. It is the only country forcefully established with Islam as a nationalist ideology that a majority of Muslims in undivided India — including Muslims of what constitutes present-day Pakistan — rejected.

Since Britain conceded to the demand for Pakistan in the face of religious frenzy pushed by middle- and lower-class Muslim activists, the country's history has been a series of failures of its own making. These failures have deeply embittered the thinking of that class of Pakistanis from whose rank the ruling elite comes, and whose regular pastime is to parcel blame to others for their part in making Pakistan a terrorist-exporting rogue and failed state.

I have traveled in Pakistan. I have visited the homes of the privileged in society and there among the wealthy and the powerful, I have often heard the case made that if Pakistan is faced with destruction it will destroy the other as it goes down. In Urdu this sounds terribly ominous.

Young Pakistani men like Faisal Shahzad, whose father is a retired air force general, hear such discussions and are invariably influenced by them.

The list of Pakistani terrorists is long and getting longer. It has long been urgent for the West to respond effectively to Islamist terrorism.

One response might well be to consider a moratorium on migration to the West from Pakistan and adjoining areas producing hordes of men such as Faisal Shahzad.
 

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Terrorism's Supermarket


Faisal Shahzad, the would-be terrorist of Times Square, seems to have followed a familiar path. Like many earlier recruits to jihad, he was middle-class, educated, seemingly assimilated—and then something happened that radicalized him. We may never be sure what made him want to kill innocent men, women, and children. But his story shares another important detail with many of his predecessors: a connection to Pakistan.

The British government has estimated that 70 percent of the terror plots it has uncovered in the past decade can be traced back to Pakistan. Pakistan remains a terrorist hothouse even as jihadism is losing favor elsewhere in the Muslim world. From Egypt to Jordan to Malaysia to Indonesia, radical Islamic groups have been weakened militarily and have lost much of the support they had politically. Why not in Pakistan? The answer is simple: from its founding, the Pakistani government has supported and encouraged jihadi groups, creating an atmosphere that has allowed them to flourish. It appears to have partially reversed course in recent years, but the rot is deep.


For a wannabe terrorist shopping for help, Pakistan is a supermarket. There are dozens of jihadi organizations: Jaish-e-Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Al Qaeda, Jalaluddin and Siraj Haqqani's network, Tehrik-e-Taliban, and the list goes on. Some of the major ones, like the Kashmiri separatist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, operate openly via front groups throughout the country. But none seem to have any difficulty getting money and weapons.

The Pakistani scholar-politician Husain Haqqani tells in his brilliant history, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, how the government's jihadist connections go back to the country's creation as an ideological, Islamic state and the decision by successive governments to use jihad both to gain domestic support and to hurt its perennial rival, India. Describing the military's distinction between terrorists and "freedom fighters," he notes that the problem is systemic. "This duality ... is a structural problem, rooted in history and a consistent policy of the state. It is not just the inadvertent outcome of decisions by some governments." That Haqqani is now Pakistan's ambassador to Washington adds an ironic twist to the story. (And a sad one, because the elected government he represents appears to have little power. The military has actually gained strength over the past year.)


In recent months Pakistan's government and military have taken tougher actions than ever before against terrorists on their soil—and Pakistani troops have suffered grievously. And yet the generals continue to make a dubious distinction among terrorists. Those that threaten and attack the people of Pakistan have suffered the wrath of the Pakistani Army. But then there are groups that threaten and attack only Afghans, Indians, and Westerners—and those groups have largely been left alone.

Consider the tribal area where Faisal Shahzad is said to have trained on his visits to Pakistan: North Waziristan, where the deadliest groups that attack Afghans, Indians, and Westerners hole up. Although last year the Pakistani military took the fight to South Waziristan, a haven for groups that have launched attacks inside Pakistan, the generals have refused to go into the North, despite repeated entreaties from the United States and NATO. As far as the Pakistani military is concerned, there's always a compelling reason why now isn't the right time to go there. And the respected Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, an expert on the Afghan insurgency, recently reported that Pakistan continues to have influence with the Afghan Taliban and is using that leverage to force the Kabul government do its bidding rather than to broker a peace between the Taliban and the Afghan government.

Until the Pakistani military truly takes on a more holistic view of the country's national interests—one that sees economic development, not strategic gamesmanship against Afghanistan and India, as the key to Pakistan's security—terrorists will continue to find Pakistan an ideal place to go shopping.

Over the past four decades, much Islamic terrorism has been traced back to two countries: Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Both countries were founded as ideological, Islamic states; over the years the governments sought legitimacy by reinforcing that religious ideology, and that made the countries hothouses of militancy, fundamentalism, and jihad. That trend is slowly being reversed in Saudi Arabia, perhaps because King Abdullah could make it happen as the enlightened ruler of an absolute monarchy. It may not be so easy for Pakistan to overcome its jihadist past.
 

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Faisal Shahzad, Subprime Terrorist?​


The story of the Times Square bomber reads like some Urdu dinner-theater production of Mel Brooks's The Producers that got lost in translation between here and Peshawar: A man sets out to produce the biggest bomb on Broadway since Dance a Little Closer closed on its opening night in 1983. Everything goes right: He gets a parking space right next to Viacom, owners of the hated Comedy Central! But then he gets careless: He buys the wrong fertilizer. He fails to open the valve on the propane tank. And next thing you know, his ingenious plot is the non-stop laugh riot of the Great White Way. Ha-ha! What a loser! Why, the whole thing's totally — what's the word? — "amateurish," according to multiple officials. It "looked amateurish," scoffed New York's Mayor Bloomberg. "Amateurish," agreed Janet Napolitano, the White House amateurishness czar. Ha-ha-ha! How many jihadists does it take to change a light bulb? Answer: Twenty-seven. Twenty-six terrorist masterminds to supervise six months of rigorous training at a camp in Waziristan, after which the 27th flies back to Newark, goes to Home Depot, and buys a quart of lamp oil and a wick.

Is it so unreasonable to foresee that one day one of these guys will buy the wrong lamp oil and a defective wick and drop the Camp Osama book of matches in a puddle as he's trying to light the bomb, and yet, this time, amazingly, it actually goes off? Not really. Last year, not one but two "terrorism task forces" discovered that U.S. Army psychiatrisat Nidal Hasan was in regular e-mail contact with the American-born, Yemeni-based cleric Ayman al-Awlaki but concluded that this was consistent with the major's "research interests," so there was nothing to worry about. A few months later, Major Hasan gunned down dozens of his comrades while standing on a table shouting "Allahu Akbar!" That was also consistent with his "research interests," by the way. A policy of relying on stupid jihadists to screw it up every time will inevitably allow one or two to wiggle through. Hopefully not on a nuclear scale.

Faisal Shahzad's curriculum vitae rang a vague bell with me. A couple of years back, I read a bestselling novel by Mohsin Hamid called The Reluctant Fundamentalist. His protagonist, Changez, is not so very different from young Faisal: They're both young, educated, Westernized Muslims from prominent Pakistani families. Changez went to Princeton; Faisal went to the non-Ivy University of Bridgeport, but he nevertheless emerged with an MBA. Both men graduate to the high-flying sector of Wall Street analysts. On returning to New York from overseas, both men get singled out and questioned by Immigration officials. Both men sour on America, and grow beards. Previously "moderate," they are now "radicalized."

The difference is that Faisal tries to blow up midtown Manhattan while Changez becomes the amused, detached narrator of a critically acclaimed novel genially mocking America's parochialism and paranoia. Mohsin Hamed's book was hailed as "elegant" (the Observer), "charming" (the Village Voice), "playful" (the Financial Times), "rich in irony" (the Sydney Morning Herald), and "finely tuned to the ironies of mutual — but especially American – prejudice" (the Guardian). If only life were like an elegantly playful novel rich in irony. Instead, the real-life counterpart to the elegant charmer holes up in a jihadist training camp for months, flies back "home," and parks a fully loaded SUV in Times Square.

He's not an exception, he's the rule. The Pantybomber is a wealthy Nigerian who lived in a London flat worth £2 million. Kafeel Ahmed, who died driving a flaming SUV into the concourse of Glasgow Airport, was president of the Islamic Society of Queen's University, Belfast. Omar Sheikh, the man who beheaded Daniel Pearl, was a graduate of the London School of Economics. Mohammed Atta was a Hamburg University engineering student. Osama bin Laden went to summer school at Oxford. Educated men. Westernized men. Men who could be pulling down big six-figure salaries anywhere on the planet — were it not that their Islamic identity trumps everything else: elite education, high-paying job, Western passport. As for the idea that America has become fanatically "Islamophobic" since 9/11, au contraire: Were America even mildly "Islamophobic," it would have curtailed Muslim immigration, or at least subjected immigrants from Pakistan, Yemen, and a handful of other hotbeds to an additional level of screening. Instead, Muslim immigration to the West has accelerated in the last nine years, and, as the case of Faisal Shahzad demonstrates, being investigated by terrorism task forces is no obstacle to breezing through your U.S. citizenship application. An "Islamophobic" America might have pondered whether the more extreme elements of self-segregation were compatible with participation in a pluralist society: Instead, President Obama makes fawning speeches boasting that he supports the rights of women to be "covered" — rather than the rights of the ever lengthening numbers of European and North American Muslim women beaten, brutalized, and murdered for not wanting to be covered. America is so un-Islamophobic that at Ground Zero they're building a 13-story mosque — on the site of an old Burlington Coat Factory damaged by airplane debris that Tuesday morning. So, in the ruins of a building reduced to rubble in the name of Islam, a temple to Islam will arise.

And, whenever the marshmallow illusions are momentarily discombobulated, the entire political-media class rushes forward to tell us that the thwarted killer was a "lone wolf," an "isolated extremist." According to Mayor Bloomberg a day or two before Shahzad's arrest, the most likely culprit was "someone who doesn't like the health-care bill" (that would be me, if your SWAT team's at a loose end this weekend). Even after Shahzad's arrest, the Associated Press, CNN, and the Washington Post attached huge significance to the problems the young jihadist had had keeping up his mortgage payments. Just as, after Major Hasan, the "experts" effortlessly redefined "post-traumatic stress disorder" to apply to a psychiatrist who'd never been anywhere near a war zone, so now the housing market is the root cause of terrorism: Subprime terrorism is a far greater threat to America than anything to do with certain words beginning with I- and ending in -slam.

Incidentally, one way of falling behind with your house payments is to take half a year off to go to Pakistan and train in a terrorist camp. Perhaps Congress could pass some sort of jihadist housing credit?

Given the demographic advance of Islam in Europe and the de jure advance of sharia in Europe (the Geert Wilders blasphemy trial) and de facto in America (Comedy Central's and Yale University Press's submission to Islamic proscriptions on representations of Mohammed), you wonder why excitable types like Faisal Shahzad are so eager to jump the gun. The Islamization of the West proceeds apace; why draw attention to it and risk a backlash?

Because the reactions of Bloomberg & Co. are a useful glimpse into the decayed and corroded heart of a civilization. One day the bomb will explode. Dozens dead? Hundreds? Thousands? Would we then restrict immigration from certain parts of the world? Or at least subject them to extra roadblocks on the fast-track to citizenship?

What do you think?

I see, as part of the new, culturally sensitive warmongering, that the NATO commander in Afghanistan is considering giving out awards to soldiers for "courageous restraint." Maybe we could hand them out at home, too. Hopefully not posthumously.
 

ajtr

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Pak sets free most terrorists held for failed NY plot
May 08, 2010 12:04 IST


Pakistani intelligence agencies have freed many suspected militants, including two Jaish-e-Muhammed operatives, who were arrested over alleged links with Faisal Shahzad, the American citizen of Pakistani origin who has confessed to plotting the bungled Times Square bombing.
Sources said intelligence agencies have released most of the 20 members of various banned terror outfits who were apprehended to probe their links with Shahzad.

They were sent back to their homes on Friday night after they were found innocent.

It is not clear whether Sheik Mohammed Rehan, a top JeM leader, who purportedly drove Shahzad from Karachi to Peshawar in July 2009, was arrested or not.

Pakistan had banned the JeM, the terror group which has close links with the Al Qaeda [ Images ] and primarily targets India [ Images ], in 2002, but analysts believe that it is receiving continuous help from the Inter-Services Intelligence. Some experts are also of the view that the ISI had actually facilitated the terror group's formation.
 

nitesh

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oouch this hurts: this is what we are saying from long time: cccccccccccccccccccc

http://www.torontosun.com/comment/columnists/salim_mansur/2010/05/07/13868181.html

..........................
Pakistan is the fertile breeding ground of Islamism for reasons that are intrinsic to its history and politics. It is the only country forcefully established with Islam as a nationalist ideology that a majority of Muslims in undivided India — including Muslims of what constitutes present-day Pakistan — rejected.

Since Britain conceded to the demand for Pakistan in the face of religious frenzy pushed by middle- and lower-class Muslim activists, the country's history has been a series of failures of its own making. These failures have deeply embittered the thinking of that class of Pakistanis from whose rank the ruling elite comes, and whose regular pastime is to parcel blame to others for their part in making Pakistan a terrorist-exporting rogue and failed state.
..................

Young Pakistani men like Faisal Shahzad, whose father is a retired air force general, hear such discussions and are invariably influenced by them.
.............
 

ajtr

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Imam's Path From Condemning Terror to Preaching Jihad​



"Jihad is becoming as American as apple pie and as British as afternoon tea." ANWAR AL-AWLAKI, a radical American-born Muslim cleric hiding in Yemen.

WASHINGTON — In the weeks after the Sept. 11 attacks, the eloquent 30-year-old imam of a mosque outside Washington became a go-to Muslim cleric for reporters scrambling to explain Islam. He condemned the mass murder, invited television crews to follow him around and patiently explained the rituals of his religion. "We came here to build, not to destroy," the cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki, said in a sermon. "We are the bridge between Americans and one billion Muslims worldwide."

At first glance, it seemed plausible that this lanky, ambitious man, with the scholarly wire-rims and equal command of English and Arabic, could indeed be such a bridge. CD sets of his engaging lectures on the Prophet Muhammad were in thousands of Muslim homes. American-born, he had a sense of humor, loved deep-sea fishing, had dabbled in get-rich-quick investment schemes and dropped references to "Joe Sixpack" into his sermons. A few weeks before the attacks he had preached in the United States Capitol.

Nine years later, from his hide-out in Yemen, Mr. Awlaki has declared war on the United States.

"America as a whole has turned into a nation of evil," he said in a statement posted on extremist Web sites in March. Though he had spent 21 of his 39 years in the United States, he added, "I eventually came to the conclusion that jihad against America is binding upon myself, just as it is binding on every other able Muslim."

His mix of scripture and vitriol has helped lure young Muslims into a dozen plots. He cheered on the Fort Hood gunman and had a role in prompting the attempted airliner bombing on Dec. 25, intelligence officials say. And last week, Faisal Shahzad, who is charged in the attempted bombing in Times Square, told investigators that Mr. Awlaki's prolific online lectures urging jihad as a religious duty helped inspire him to act.

At a time of new concern about the attraction of Western Muslims to violent extremism, there is no figure more central than Mr. Awlaki, who has harnessed the Internet for the goals of Al Qaeda. Counterterrorism officials are gravely concerned about his powerful appeal for many others who are following his path to radicalization.

"He's a magnetic character," said Philip Mudd, a veteran of the C.I.A.'s Counterterrorism Center who just stepped down after nearly five years as a top F.B.I. intelligence adviser. "He's a powerful orator in a revolutionary movement."

Convinced that he is a lethal threat, the United States government has responded in kind. This year Mr. Awlaki became the first American citizen on the C.I.A.'s list of terrorists approved as a target for killing, a designation that has only enhanced his status with admirers like Shahidur Rahman, 27, a British Muslim of Bangladeshi descent who studied with Mr. Awlaki in London in 2003.

Other clerics equivocated about whether terrorist violence could be reconciled with Islam, Mr. Rahman said, but even seven years ago Mr. Awlaki made clear that he had few such qualms.

"He said suicide is not allowed in Islam," Mr. Rahman said in an interview, "but self-sacrifice is different."

There are two conventional narratives of Mr. Awlaki's path to jihad. The first is his own: He was a nonviolent moderate until the United States attacked Muslims openly in Afghanistan and Iraq, covertly in Pakistan and Yemen, and even at home, by making targets of Muslims for raids and arrests. He merely followed the religious obligation to defend his faith, he said.

"What am I accused of?" he asks in a recent video bearing the imprint of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. "Of calling for the truth? Of calling for jihad for the sake of Allah? Of calling to defend the causes of the Islamic nation?"

A contrasting version of Mr. Awlaki's story, explored though never confirmed by the national Sept. 11 commission, maintains that he was a secret agent of Al Qaeda starting well before the attacks, when three of the hijackers turned up at his mosques. By this account, all that has changed since then is that Mr. Awlaki has stopped hiding his true views.

The tale that emerges from visits to his mosques, and interviews with two dozen people who knew him, is more complex and elusive. A product both of Yemen's deeply conservative religious culture and freewheeling American ways, he hesitated to shake hands with women but patronized prostitutes. He was first enthralled with jihad as a teenager — but the cause he embraced, the defeat of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, was then America's cause too. After a summer visit to the land of the victorious mujahedeen, he brought back an Afghan hat and wore it proudly around the Colorado State campus in Fort Collins where he studied engineering.

Later, Mr. Awlaki seems to have tried out multiple personas: the representative of a tolerant Islam in a multicultural United States (starring in a WashingtonPost.com video explaining Ramadan); the fiery American activist talking about Muslims' constitutional rights (and citing both Malcolm X and H. Rap Brown); the conspiracy theorist who publicly doubted the Muslim role in the Sept. 11 attacks. (The F.B.I., he wrote a few days afterward, simply blamed passengers with Muslim names.) All along he remained a conservative, fundamentalist preacher who invariably started with a scriptural story from the seventh century and drew its personal or political lessons for today, a tradition called salafism, for the Salafs, or ancestors, the leaders of the earliest generations of Islam. Finally, after the Yemeni authorities, under American pressure, imprisoned him in 2006 and 2007, Mr. Awlaki seems to have hardened into a fully committed ideologist of jihad, condemning non-Muslims and cheerleading for slaughter. His message has become indistinguishable from that of Osama bin Laden — except for his excellent English and his cultural familiarity with the United States and Britain. Those traits make him especially dangerous, counterterrorism officials fear, and he flaunts them.

"Jihad," Mr. Awlaki said in a March statement, "is becoming as American as apple pie and as British as afternoon tea."

'Skinny Teenager With Brains'

Twenty years ago, long before the Sept. 11 attacks and the wars that followed, a shy freshman named Anwar turned up at the little mosque in a converted church a short walk from the Colorado State campus. His American accent was misleading: born in New Mexico in 1971, when his father was studying agriculture there, he had lived in the United States until the age of 7.

But he had spent his adolescence in Yemen, where memorizing the Koran was a matter of course for an educated young man, and women were largely excluded from public life.

His father, Nasser, was a prominent figure who would serve as agriculture minister and chancellor of two universities and who was close to President Ali Abdullah Saleh, the country's authoritarian leader. Anwar was sent to Azal Modern School, among the country's most prestigious private schools.

"I recall Anwar as a skinny teenager with brains," said Walid al-Saqaf, a neighbor in the 1980s in Sana, the Yemeni capital. For boys of their generation, Afghanistan and its fight to oust the godless Soviet Army was the greatest cause.

"There was constant talk of the heroes who were leaving Yemen to join the fight and become martyrs and go to paradise," recalled Mr. Saqaf, now a doctoral student in Sweden. In the Awlakis' neighborhood, families would gather to watch the latest videotapes of the mujahedeen, he said.

But Nasser al-Awlaki had other ideas for his son, who studied civil engineering in Colorado in preparation for the kind of technocratic career his father had pursued. There was one odd note, given the family's relative wealth: just after arriving, Anwar applied for a Social Security number and claimed falsely he had been born in Yemen, evidently to qualify for scholarship money reserved for foreign citizens.

Yusuf Siddiqui, a fellow student who was active with Mr. Awlaki in the mosque and the Muslim Student Association, said there were regular reminders of his Yemeni upbringing.

"If you made some pop culture reference, he might not recognize it," Mr. Siddiqui said. Once, Anwar astonished his Americanized friends by climbing a nearby mountain barefoot. "He just said, 'That's how we do it in Yemen,'" Mr. Siddiqui recalled.

Accustomed to Yemeni mores, he was not comfortable interacting with women. Once, when a female American student stopped by the Muslim Student Association to ask for help with math homework, "He said to me in a low tone of voice, 'Why don't you do it?'" Mr. Siddiqui said.

Still, Mr. Awlaki was neither among the most conservative Muslim students nor among the libertines who tossed aside religious restrictions on drinking and sex. He ran successfully for president of the Muslim Student Association against a Saudi student who was far stricter.

"I remember Anwar saying, 'He would want your mom to cover her face. I'm not like that,'" Mr. Siddiqui said.

His vacation trip to Afghanistan, around the time the Soviet-backed Communist government fell from power, appears to have brought a new interest in the nexus of politics and religion. He wore an Eritrean T-shirt and the Afghan hat and quoted Abdullah Azzam, a prominent Palestinian scholar who provided theological justification for the Afghan jihad and was later known as a mentor to Osama bin Laden.

Meanwhile, at the Islamic Center of Fort Collins, the little mosque where volunteers took turns giving the Friday sermon, Mr. Awlaki discovered a knack for preaching. If he could boast of no deep scholarship, he knew the Koran and the sayings of the prophet, spoke fluent English and had a light touch.

"He was very knowledgeable," said Mumtaz Hussain, 71, a Pakistani immigrant active in the mosque for two decades. "He was an excellent person — very nice, dedicated to religion."

He expressed no anti-American sentiments, said Mr. Hussain, whose son served in the National Guard. "This is our motherland now. People would not tolerate sermons of that kind," he said. Years later, on his blog, Mr. Awlaki would compare Thomas Gradgrind, Charles ****ens's notoriously utilitarian headmaster in "Hard Times," "to some Muslim parents who are programmed to think that only medicine or engineering are worthy professions for their children." It sounds like a hint at his own experience, and some family acquaintances say there was tension between Anwar and his father over career choices. But in 1994, Mr. Awlaki married a cousin from Yemen — whom by custom he did not introduce to his male friends — left behind engineering, and took a part-time job as imam at the Denver Islamic Society.

'He Had a Beautiful Tongue'

Like many an evangelical Christian pastor, Mr. Awlaki preached against vice and sin, lauded family values and parsed the scripture, winning fans and rising to successively larger mosques.

In Denver, however, there was an episode that might have been an omen. A Saudi student at the University of Denver told an elder that he had decided, with Mr. Awlaki's encouragement, to travel to Chechnya to join the jihad against the Russians. The elder, a Palestinian American in his 60s, thought it ill advised and confronted Mr. Awlaki in a loud argument.

"He had a beautiful tongue," recalled the elder, who asked not to be named. "But I told him: 'Don't talk to my people about jihad.' He left two weeks later."

At 25, he landed for five years at Arribat al-Islami, a stucco building with blue-green tile under a towering palm tree at the edge of San Diego. "He lit up when he was with the youth," said Jamal Ali, 40, an airport driver. He played soccer with younger children and took teenagers paintballing. "I saw him evolving in trying to understand where he fit into Islam," Mr. Ali said.

Lincoln W. Higgie III, 71, an art dealer who lived across quiet Saranac Street from the mosque and the small adjoining house where Mr. Awlaki lived with his wife and two toddlers, recalls an engaging neighbor who apologized about parking problems that came with the flood of Friday worshipers.

On Thursdays, Mr. Higgie remembered, Mr. Awlaki liked to go fishing for albacore, and he would often bring over a sample of the catch, deliciously prepared by his wife. The Awlakis' son and daughter would play on Mr. Higgie's floor, chasing his pet macaw, while the men compared notes on their travels.

"I remember he was very partial to the Blue Mosque in Istanbul," Mr. Higgie said. He detected no hostility to non-Muslims, no simmering resentment against America.

In his private life, he was not always puritanical. Even as he preached about the sanctity of marriage amid the temptations of American life ("especially in Western societies, every haram is available," he said, using the Arabic word for the forbidden), he was picked up twice by the San Diego police for soliciting prostitutes; he was given probation.

He displayed a very American entrepreneurial streak, exploring a possible business importing Yemeni honey and attending seminars in Las Vegas focused on investing in gold and minerals (and once losing $20,000 lent by relatives). Eventually a regular at the mosque proposed a venture that would prove hugely successful: recording Mr. Awlaki's lectures on CD.

Starting in 2000, Mr. Awlaki would record a series of highly popular boxed sets — three, totaling 53 CDs, devoted to the "Life of Muhammad" alone; others covering the lesser prophets of Islam (including Moses and Jesus), the companions of the prophet and an account of the hereafter.

The recordings appear free of obvious radicalism. (IslamicBookstore.com has added a notice to its Web listings of Mr. Awlaki's work, saying the recording "has been reviewed and does not contain any extremist statements.")

Shakir Muhammad, a Fort Collins engineer who is active in the mosque there, said he became a fan of the CD sets, finding them enthralling even on repeated listening. Only once did a passage give him pause; Mr. Awlaki discussed suicidal violence and did not quite condemn it.

"I thought, 'This guy may be for it,'" Mr. Muhammad said. "It bothered me." One day in August 2001, Mr. Awlaki knocked at the door of Mr. Higgie, his neighbor, to say goodbye. He had moved the previous year to Virginia, becoming imam at the far bigger Dar al-Hijrah mosque, and he had returned to pick up a few things he had left behind. As Mr. Higgie tells it, he told the imam to stop by if he was ever in the area — and got a strange response. "He said, 'I don't think you'll be seeing me. I won't be coming back to San Diego again. Later on you'll find out why,'" Mr. Higgie said.

The next month, when Al Qaeda attacked New York and Washington, Mr. Higgie remembered the exchange and was shaken, convinced that his friendly neighbor had some advance warning of the Sept. 11 attacks.

In fact, the F.B.I. had first taken an interest in Mr. Awlaki in 1999, concerned about brushes with militants that to this day remain difficult to interpret. In 1998 and 1999, he was a vice president of a small Islamic charity that an F.B.I. agent later testified was "a front organization to funnel money to terrorists." He had been visited by Ziyad Khaleel, a Qaeda operative who purchased a battery for Osama bin Laden's satellite phone, as well as by an associate of Omar Abdel Rahman, the so-called Blind Sheik, who was serving a life sentence for plotting to blow up New York landmarks.

Still more disturbing was Mr. Awlaki's links to two future Sept. 11 hijackers, Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaq Alhazmi. They prayed at his San Diego mosque and were seen in long conferences with the cleric. Mr. Alhazmi would follow the imam to his new mosque in Virginia, and 9/11 investigators would call Mr. Awlaki Mr. Alhazmi's "spiritual adviser."

The F.B.I., whose agents interviewed Mr. Awlaki four times in the days after the Sept. 11 attacks, concluded that his contacts with the hijackers and other radicals were random, the inevitable consequence of living in the small world of Islam in America. But records of the 9/11 commission at the National Archives make clear that not all investigators agreed.

One detective, whose name has been redacted, told the commission he believed Mr. Awlaki "was at the center of the 9/11 story." An F.B.I. agent, also unidentified, said that "if anyone had knowledge of the plot, it would have been" the cleric, since "someone had to be in the U.S. and keep the hijackers spiritually focused."

The 9/11 commission staff members themselves had sharp arguments about him. "Do I think he played a role in helping the hijackers here, knowing they were up to something?" said one staff member, who would speak only on condition of anonymity. "Yes. Do I think he was sent here for that purpose? I have no evidence for it."

The separate Congressional Joint Inquiry into the attacks suspected that Mr. Awlaki might have been part of a support network for the hijackers, said Eleanor Hill, its director. "There's no smoking gun. But we thought somebody ought to investigate him," Ms. Hill said.

Alarmed about Mr. Awlaki's possible Sept. 11 connections, a State Department investigator, Raymond Fournier, found a circuitous way to charge Mr. Awlaki with passport fraud, based on his false claim after entering the United States in 1990 that he had been born in Yemen.

A warrant was issued, but prosecutors in Colorado rescinded it, concluding that no criminal case could be made. Mr. Awlaki returned from a trip abroad in October 2002 — an act some colleagues say was evidence for his innocence of any 9/11 role — for what would prove to be his last stay in the United States.

During that trip, he visited Ali al-Timimi, a Virginia cleric later convicted for encouraging Muslims to join the fight against American troops in Afghanistan. Mr. Awlaki "attempted to get al-Timimi to discuss issues related to the recruitment of young Muslims," according to a motion filed in his criminal case. Mr. Timimi wondered if Mr. Awlaki might be trying to entrap him at the F.B.I.'s instigation, his friends say.

But if Mr. Awlaki was cooperating with the government, it would have astonished his associates. As the American authorities rounded up Muslim men after 9/11, he had grown furious.

After raids in March 2002 on Muslim institutions and community leaders in Virginia, Mr. Awlaki led a chorus of outrage, noting that some of the targets were widely viewed as moderates. "So this is not now a war on terrorism, we need to all be clear about this, this is a war on Muslims!" Mr. Awlaki declared, his voice shaking with anger. "Not only is it happening worldwide, but it's happening right here in America that is claiming to be fighting this war for the sake of freedom." Around that time, Johari Abdul-Malik, a former Howard University chaplain who was joining the staff at Mr. Awlaki's Virginia mosque, met him at a cafe. Mr. Awlaki said he planned to leave the United States.

"I tried to convince him that the atmosphere was not as bad as he thought, that it was a positive time for outreach," Mr. Abdul-Malik recalled. But Mr. Awlaki was shaken by what he saw as an anti-Muslim backlash. And always fond of the limelight, Mr. Abdul-Malik said, Mr. Awlaki was looking for a bigger platform.

"He said he might have a TV show for the gulf," Mr. Abdul-Malik said. "He might run for Parliament in Yemen. Or he might teach."

'Never Trust a Kuffar'

In a bare lecture room in London, where Mr. Awlaki moved after leaving the United States, he addressed his rapt, young followers, urging them never to believe a non-Muslim, or kuffar in Arabic.

"The important lesson to learn here is never, ever trust a kuffar," he said, chopping the air, his lecture caught on video. "Do not trust them!"

The unbelievers are "plotting to kill this religion," he declared. "They're plotting night and day."

If he had the same knowing tone and touches of humor as in earlier sermons, his message was more conspiratorial. You can't believe CNN, the United Nations, or Amnesty International, he told his students, because they, too, were part of the war on Islam.

"We need to wisen up and not be duped," Mr. Awlaki said. "Malcolm X said, 'We've been bamboozled.'"

Many of his young British Muslim listeners, accustomed to preachers with heavy accents and an otherworldly focus, were entranced by his mix of the ancient and the contemporary, his seamless transition from the 29 battles of the Prophet Muhammad to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. "He was the main man who translated the jihad into English," said Abu Yahiya, 27, a Bangladeshi-British student of Mr. Awlaki's lectures in 2003.

At a personal level, said Mr. Rahman, one of the students who studied with Mr. Awlaki in 2003, Mr. Awlaki made it clear that they could no longer pretend to be Muslims while going clubbing at night.

"I could not be Mohammed in the morning and 'Mo' in the evening," he said.

Mr. Awlaki's demand that they make a choice, devoting themselves to a harsh, fundamentalist strain of Islam, offered clarity, he said.

"It would hit the audience automatically in their hearts and minds," Mr. Rahman said. When others claimed the popular cleric was brainwashing them, Mr. Rahman said, "When you got a lot of dirt in your brain, you need a washing. I believe he did brainwash me."

Mr. Awlaki's fame grew, his CDs kept selling, and he traveled around Britain lecturing. But he had a hard time supporting himself, according to people who knew him, and in 2004 he had moved to Yemen to preach and study.

In mid-2006, after he intervened in a tribal dispute, Mr. Awlaki was imprisoned for 18 months by the Yemeni authorities. By his later account on his blog, he was in solitary confinement nearly the entire time and used it to study the Koran, to read literature (he enjoyed ****ens but disliked Shakespeare) and eventually, when it was permitted, to study Islamic scholarship.

Notably, he was enraptured by the works of Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian whose time in the United States helped make him the father of the modern anti-Western jihadist movement in Islam.

"Because of the flowing style of Sayyid I would read between 100 and 150 pages a day," Mr. Awlaki wrote. "I would be so immersed with the author I would feel Sayyid was with me in my cell speaking to me directly." Two F.B.I. agents questioned him in the Yemeni prison, and Mr. Awlaki blamed the United States for his prolonged incarceration. He was right; John D. Negroponte, then the director of national intelligence, told Yemeni officials that the United States did not object to his detention, according to American and Yemeni sources. But by the end of 2007, American officials, some of whom were disturbed at the imprisonment without charges of a United States citizen, signaled that they no longer insisted on Mr. Awlaki's incarceration, and he was released.

"He was different after that — harder," said a Yemeni man who knows Mr. Awlaki well.

Mr. Awlaki started his own Web site, reaching a larger audience than ever. But finding that he was constantly followed by Yemeni security in Sana, the capital, he moved to the house of an uncle in Shabwa, the rugged southern province and his tribe's traditional turf.

Last October, friends said, he heard the distant whine of a drone aircraft circling overhead. Worried that he was endangering his relatives, he fled to the mountains. While his role is unclear in Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the terrorist network's Yemeni affiliate, American officials believe he has become "operational," plotting, not just inspiring, terrorism against the West.

From his hide-out, Mr. Awlaki sends out the occasional video message. But his reported influence on the Times Square bombing suspect, Mr. Shahzad, suggests that no matter what happens to him, his electronic legacy is secure. His message will endure in hundreds of audio and video clips that his followers have posted to the Web, a mix of religious stories and incitement, awaiting the curious and the troubled.

Mr. Awlaki's transformation has left a trail of bewilderment, apprehension and fury among many people who knew and worshiped with him in the United States. Mr. Siddiqui, his college friend, said he was "surprised and disappointed."

"He's turning his back not only on the country where he was born but on his Muslim brothers and sisters in this country," he said.

Mr. Abdul-Malik said that his former fellow imam at the Virginia mosque "is a terrorist, in my book" and that Mr. Awlaki and his like-thinkers were trying to reduce Islam to a "medieval narrative. It's the Hatfields and the McCoys: you hit me, I hit you."

Some Muslim families have asked whether they should keep Mr. Awlaki's scriptural CDs, Mr. Abdul-Malik said. He tells them it is their decision, but he has advised shops not to carry even the earlier, benign Awlaki material.
 

AirforcePilot

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Pakistani Taliban Behind Times Square Bomb Plot, Officials Say

The Pakistani Taliban were behind the failed Times Square bomb attempt last weekend, top administration officials said Sunday.

Attorney General Eric Holder and White House counterterrorism adviser John Brennan said the investigation has led authorities to believe that suspect Faisal Shahzad trained with the Taliban in Pakistan and was funded by them.

Brennan told "Fox News Sunday" that Shahzad had "extensive interaction" with the group, which he described as virtually "indistinguishable" from Al Qaeda.

"It looks as though he was operating on behalf of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan," he said. "This is a group that is closely aligned with Al Qaeda. It has a murderous agenda similar to Al Qaeda, they train together, they plan together, they plot together. They're almost indistinguishable."

New York law enforcement officials initially said they did not have evidence to support claims made by the Pakistani Taliban that they were responsible for the attempted attack. The Taliban later reversed their claim.

But Holder reportedly said Sunday that investigators know the Taliban "helped facilitate it" and probably helped fund it.

"We've now developed evidence that shows that the Pakistani Taliban was behind the attack," Holder told "This Week," according to ABC News.

Shahzad, a U.S. citizen of Pakistani descent, was arrested Monday in connection with the plot.

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/05/09/pakistani-taliban-times-square-bomb-plot-holder-says/
 

Vinod2070

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http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...escape-discrimination/articleshow/5907956.cms

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The comment has angered some Pakistanis. ''I'd rather be called a terrorist than an Indian,'' =xyone Pakistani blogger fumed, even as the American media was filled with self-lacerating laments from Pakistani-Americans about their future in the US.
..............
He is surely being called that! He has as much right to be called Indian as a Chinese. Why even bring it up!

this one is really good, still trying to threaten

''Indian opportunism in terms of painting Pakistanis as the problem is un-Indian & self-defeating. When we get profiled, YOU get profiled,'' Mosharraf Zaidi, a US based political economist, warned.
He should buzz off. He is no one to tell us what is Indian. He is definitely not one.

India and Indians have nothing to do with Pakistan and Pakistanis. Move on and don't pester us!
 

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More firmly and publicly than before, senior officials of the Obama administration on Sunday blamed the failed attempt to blow up a bomb in Times Square on the Pakistani Taliban, an accusation that should increase pressure on the Pakistan military to attack the organization in its bastions in the lawless tribal region of North Waziristan.
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Seems another busy year for Pakistani Army.... ///////
 

ajtr

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Some Pak officials know where Bin Laden is: Hillary Clinton

Washington, DC: US has said that there are elements in Pakistan's administration who were more informed about al-Qaeda and Taliban than they let on, as Washington for the first time accused Taliban for being behind the botched Times Square bombing plot. "Some Pakistani officials were more informed about al-Qaeda and Taliban than they let on", secretary of state Hillary Clinton has said.

"I'm not saying that they're at the highest levels but I believe that somewhere in this government are people who know where Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda is, where Mullah Omar and the leadership of the Afghan Taliban is and we expect more cooperation to help us bring to justice, capture or kill, those who attacked us on 9/11," Clinton told CBS in an interview.
 

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Will Kayani move his men into North Waziristan?

Are Americans losing patience with Pakistan? Looks like. But how far can they go to discipline a slippery ally in fighting terrorism that announced its arrival in Times Square the other day?

Bomb-maker Faisal Shahzad, the Pakistani American son of a retired Air Vice Marshal of Pakistan Air Force, has since come to be known as a Tehrik-e-Taliban recruit. He visited his instructors or handlers in the tribal North Waziristan (bordering Afghanistan) where the Pak Army hasn't yet moved its troops to flush them out.

The Americans want Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani to go after the Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements in that part of Waziristan bordering Afghanistan. But will he? It was rumored in the initial phase of the Pak Army offensive in tribal areas that the strategy wasn't as much to take the Taliban (Al Qaeda) out as to let them escape to the North.

This brings one to the options available to the Obama Administration to make Kayani fall in line. Will the President consider boots-on-the-ground? In other words that means deploying American foot soldiers in a country where US-bashing is a thriving political industry.

Reports hint at the possibility. But that'll be extreme action with no surety of success and serious possibilities of co-lateral damage in body-bag terms. If that happens, Obama's image within the US will be as pathetic as the US's in Pakistan.

A senior British diplomat once justified to me the use of Drones to fight the Taliban and Al Qaeda on Pak territory. He admitted to massive loss of innocent local lives and resultant growth in popular support for so-called jehadis who were killed but in ones and twos.

The strategy was to avoid arrival of body bags in the US and NATO countries where support for the war on terror has dwindled beyond recognition. "We couldn't risk physical combat on a terrain suited to the adversary," he argued.

We all now know that the strategy to fight a war without laying down lives has bred rather than eliminate terrorism. What then can Obama realistically do to make Kayani fall in line? Cut or curtail the $7.5 billion promised over five years but predicated — on paper at least — on Islamabad's delivery on counter-terrorism?

Tame and of limited value, such a squeeze would hardly address the threat posed to American homeland by Pak-based terrorists. It wouldn't also be sustainable unless, of course, Washington alters radically its strategy to hand over baton to Pakistan in the post-surge-and-withdrawal phase.

So, Obama's caught in a cleft. He can count only on his luck. And the hope that another car bomber or airborne killer gang doesn't make it to the American shores. Good Pakistanis can help him. But is Gen. Kayani one among them? India has no experience of that goodness. Not yet.

Source
 

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