Nuclear mainstream

[Neo]

Nuclear mainstream​

Michael Krepon | Toby Dalton


PAKISTAN seeks to join the mainstream of the international nuclear order with Beijing’s support. Washington has offered words of qualified encouragement. A June 2015 US-Pakistan joint statement “emphasised the desirability of continued outreach to integrate Pakistan into the international nonproliferation regime.” But Pakistan’s path to the mainstream faces many obstacles.

The immediate objective of Pakistan’s mainstreaming diplomacy is to be accorded a civil nuclear deal like that given to India by the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2008. Islamabad also seeks to become an NSG member, alongside India. Or, failing this, to block India from becoming a member. The NSG operates by consensus, meaning if India became a member it could block Pakistani membership in the future.

India is pushing hard for admission in 2016, with support from the Obama administration and other NSG members, including Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Russia, and the UK. There is not yet consensus about Indian membership, but New Delhi’s case is advancing. The window for Pakistan’s mainstreaming into the global nuclear order is closing.
More N-arms will not deter India to a greater extent.

Since Pakistan is already receiving nuclear reactors from China — and since it cannot finance reactors elsewhere — why does it need or want to be an NSG member? Presumably, the answer has to do with standing in the nuclear order equivalent to India and not being frozen in an ‘inferior’ position.

India was able to secure a nuclear deal by leveraging international commercial interest in its nuclear market, and by offering improved strategic political relations to the US and others. Pakistan lacks these means of suasion, making a commercial N-power path to mainstreaming unlikely. For Pakistan, the path to success lies in n-weapon-related initiatives.

Pakistan has worked hard to build diverse nuclear capabilities, which it will retain as a necessary deterrent against perceived existential threats from India. At this juncture, Pakistan’s military leadership can choose to accept success in achieving a ‘strategic’ deterrent against India, sufficient to prevent nuclear exchanges and a major conventional war. Alternatively, it can choose to continue to compete with India in the pursuit of ‘full spectrum’ deterrence, which would entail open-ended nuclear requirements. These choices lead Pakistan to two starkly different nuclear futures and places in the global nuclear order.

Pakistani officials reiterate their intention not to enter an arms race with India, but the growth in Pakistan’s N-weapons complex suggests otherwise. More nuclear weapons and more fissile material will not deter India to a greater extent than is already the case. On the other hand, more nuclear weapons and more fissile material will not help Pakistan address its internal political, economic, and security challenges. Nor will these programmes help Pakistan join the nuclear mainstream.

By choosing to accept success in achieving the requirements of “strategic” deterrence, Pakistan is in a position to consider nuclear initiatives that would clarify its commitment to strengthening nuclear norms, regimes, and practices, and that would address widely held perceptions that its nuclear weapons are a major source of danger in South Asia. We propose that Pakistan consider five nuclear weapon-related initiatives that have previously been inconceivable: Shift declaratory policy from ‘full spectrum” to ‘strategic’ deterrence; commit to a recessed deterrence posture and limit production of short-range delivery vehicles and tactical nuclear weapons; lift Pakistan’s veto on FMCT negotiations and reduce or stop fissile material production; separate civilian and military nuclear facilities; sign the CTBT without waiting for India.

These initiatives are easy to dismiss — but none would impair Pakistan’s successful accomplishment of strategic deterrence against India. By rejecting them and continuing to compete with India, Pakistan is unlikely to be mainstreamed. By adopting them, Pakistan places India in a position of having to match Pakistan or risk losing entry into the NSG. Adopting these initiatives would, however, require difficult and fundamental adjustments to Pakistan’s thinking about nuclear weapons. Precisely because these initiatives would be so difficult and unusual for Pakistan, they would change perceptions about Pakistan and its place in the global nuclear order.

Taking even some of the five initiatives would clarify Pakistan’s commitment to adopt similar practices as other states with nuclear weapons. They would reduce risks of escalation that could lead to nuclear war. And they could facilitate Pakistan’s entrance into the nuclear mainstream, while strengthening nonproliferation norms, bolstering global disarmament hopes, and setting the bar higher for new entrants into the NSG.

The steps we propose lend themselves to mainstreaming. More importantly, these steps would advance Pakistan’s national, social, and economic security interests.

The writers have authored the report A Normal Nuclear Pakistan, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Stimson Centre.

http://www.dawn.com/news/1203017/nuclear-mainstream

 

[sorcerer]

A June 2015 US-Pakistan joint statement “emphasised the desirability of continued outreach to integrate Pakistan into the international nonproliferation regime.”

Pakistani generals 'helped sell nuclear secrets'
The source of the documents is AQ Khan, who confessed in 2004 to selling parts and instructions for the use of high-speed centrifuges in enriching uranium to Libya, Iran and North Korea. Extracts were published by the Washington Post, including a letter in English purportedly from a senior North Korean official to Khan in 1998 detailing payment of $3m to Pakistan's former army chief, General Jehangir Karamat, and another half-million to Lieutenant General Zulfiqar Khan, who was involved in Pakistan's nuclear bomb tests.


A.Q. Khan’s Revelations: Did Pakistan’s Army Sell Nukes to North Korea?

The letter, written purportedly by Jon Byong-Ho, then a top-ranking North Korean official, details bribes given to other Pakistani military officers in return for “missile components.” It states:

The 3 million dollars have already been paid to Army Chief Gen. J Karamat and half a million dollars and 3 diamond and ruby sets have been given to Gen. Zulfiqar Khan.

Pakistani government officials immediately rubbished the letter, calling it a “fabrication.” The now retired Gen. Jehangir Karamat dismissed it as “totally false.” When confronted by reporters, Gen. Zulfiqar Khan, later the head of a powerful state utility company, said, “I have not read the story, but of course it is wrong.” The North Korean government has not commented on the letter.

Pakistani officials reiterate their intention not to enter an arms race with India,

http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/...uns-india-in-nuclear-weapons-race-ican.69430/

Shift declaratory policy from ‘full spectrum” to ‘strategic’ deterrence;

The Pentagon's Secret Plans to Secure Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal
But instead of moving nuclear material in armored, well-defended convoys, the SPD prefers to use civilian-style vans, without noticeable defenses, in the regular flow of traffic. And, according to a senior U.S. intelligence official, the Pakistanis have begun using this low-security method to transfer not merely the “de‑mated” component nuclear parts, but also “mated” nuclear weapons. Western nuclear experts have feared that Pakistan is building small, tactical nuclear weapons for quick deployment on the battlefield. In fact, not only is Islamabad building these devices, it is also now driving them around the streets of Pakistan. Experts further worry about the accidental launch of a nuclear warhead during a period of high tension between Pakistan and India, or the possibility that rogue elements inside the Pakistani military might take it upon themselves to launch a nuclear attack.
http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/the-pentagons-secret-plans-to-secure-pakistans-nuclear-arsenal/

. There is not yet consensus about Indian membership, but New Delhi’s case is advancing. The window for Pakistan’s mainstreaming into the global nuclear order is closing.

This article in DAWN is based on Just this worry by Pakistan...Rest of the article is :bs: given the credibility of Pakistan.
That sums up the article and Pakistani Insecurity.

 

[sorcerer]

If Pakistan Wants a 'Normal' Nuclear Status, It Must Give Up Terrorism
A throwback to simplistic US rationalizations still won’t bring Pakistan into the non-proliferation mainstream.

By Seema Sirohi
September 05, 2015

Ever since India and the United States concluded their 2005 civil nuclear agreement, which essentially recognized India as the sixth nuclear weapons power in the global order, Pakistan has argued for a similar agreement with the U.S., despite its dubious record of proliferation.

Pakistan seeks parity with India in every realm, even if its size and history make that a questionable project. Undeterred, it has mounted a massive diplomatic campaign in Western capitals over the last several years to block India from reaching the next stage of legitimacy for its nuclear program, i.e. entry into the four international technology-control regimes starting with the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Islamabad’s anti-India campaign can be considered somewhat successful, since it has managed to chip away at the resistance against its own proliferation record while raising questions about accepting India as a de facto nuclear power. Conventional wisdom in Washington, which once considered Pakistan as a nuclear pariah because of A.Q. Khan’s enterprise of selling nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea, has shifted to finding ways of rationalizing its behavior.


The reasons are two-fold: Pakistan is apparently making 20 nuclear weapons a year and in a decade could amass the world’s third largest arsenal. Some U.S. experts believe that something must be done to treat this suicidal/homicidal behavior.
** Pakis!! Told you so!!!

The second reason is the residual desire among many American non-proliferation experts – encouraged by the curtailment of Iran’s nuclear program – to have a second go at India and impose conditions on its nuclear program by way of Pakistan. They say India got away too easily in 2005 – despite their considerable efforts to scuttle the nuclear deal – and that its subsequent actions to implement the terms of the agreement have “fallen short of expectations.”

It is against this background that a new report by two premier think tanks — the Carnegie Endowment and the Stimson Center — must be considered. “A Normal Nuclear Pakistan,” released last week, reads like an endorsement of Pakistan’s position and an apology for its army nurturing anti-India terrorists. Incidentally, the report prefers the word “extremists.”

Equally importantly, the report hyphenates India and Pakistan, a tendency declared outdated and pointless some time ago that should no longer find favor anymore with people in the know. But it does. The report hyphenates India and Pakistan to such an extent, it seems aimed more at making Indian entry into the NSG tougher while it pushes Pakistan’s case.

It begins by plaintively asking: “Will Pakistan be forever penalized because of the illicit activities of A.Q. Khan and his proliferation network? Will Pakistan remain outside the nonproliferation ‘mainstream’ despite its concerted efforts to quash the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) Pakistan and other extremist groups, because it is viewed as an accomplice to still others that carry out acts of violence against India – acts that could escalate to the use of nuclear weapons?”

The short answer should be “yes,” unless Pakistan firmly shuts down its terrorist enterprise.

The report then asks: “Or can Pakistan break from its past, change negative perceptions and become a “normal” nuclear state – or at least as “normal as India…?”

The short answer should be “no,” unless it abandons its revisionist stance and proves it over years.

But the report’s authors, Michael Krepon and Toby Dalton, take a journey of justification on Pakistan’s behalf, treating the terrorism it sponsors with half-shut eyes. They almost give the Pakistani army a free pass for sending jihadis into India, and appear to treat the venture as hearsay. Their narrow focus on Pakistan and how it can enter the nuclear mainstream to the exclusion of the wider problem of state sponsorship of terrorism is problematic.

The authors don’t ask that all terrorist groups be dismantled, leading one to presume that they agree with the Pakistani view that terrorists (LeT and others) attacking India will somehow have the good sense not to steal the country’s nuclear secrets.

They seem to approve Pakistan’s position that the TTP must be curbed first because it acts against the state and is more likely to endanger the country’s expanding nuclear arsenal. Yet, they write that a battle could be triggered by an attack by groups such as the LeT, without demanding action against it.

They offer five conditions that Pakistan must meet to become a “normal” nuclear state: shift from “full spectrum” to “strategic” deterrence, limit production of short-range missiles and tactical nuclear weapons, allow negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, separate civilian and military nuclear programs, and, finally, sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty without waiting for India.

The accommodative stance is unlikely to go anywhere with Pakistani generals who have understood that keeping the West scared is one way to keep the money flowing and the attention from waning. It is best exemplified by Brig. Gen. Zahir Kazmi, who is quoted in the report saying, “It is the nonproliferation regime that must be normalized, not Pakistan.”

The message is clear: Pakistan will continue its dangerous and destabilizing behavior unless the world community gives in to its demands. This report goes a long distance toward showing how.

What’s distressing is that Krepon and Dalton maintain a parallel track of criticism against India where they claim that India’s “net contributions to stabilizing the global nuclear order have been modest, at best.” They further claim that the steps India needed to take after the nuclear deal have “fallen short of expectations.”

What is more noteworthy is that the Obama administration supports integration of Pakistan “into the international nonproliferation regime,” according to a U.S.-Pakistan joint statement issued on June 2, 2015. There is no doubt that the State Department has a set of people entrenched in the nonproliferation bureau who are didactic and strongly oppose any favors to India. At the very least they may want the same for Pakistan.

There is little appetite in the international community for legitimizing Pakistan’s nuclear program, which while running at full steam, has added dangerous new elements (tactical nuclear weapons and short-range delivery missiles).

Unsurprisingly, the country that most closely mirrors Pakistan’s position is China. But and now it seems the U.S. position may also be moving in that direction.

Seema Sirohi is a Washington-based analyst and a frequent contributor to Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. Seema is also on Twitter, and her handle is @seemasirohi.

This article was originally published at Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations, a foreign policy think tank in Mumbai, India, established to engage India’s leading corporations and individuals in debate and scholarship on India’s foreign policy and the nation’s role in global affairs.

http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/if-pakistan-wants-a-normal-nuclear-status-it-must-give-up-terrorism/

 

[sorcerer]

[pdf]http://carnegieendowment.org/files/NormalNuclearPakistan.pdf[/pdf]


Normal Porkistan

 

[sorcerer]

Stopping a Dirty Bomb

• VIENNA – Nuclear terrorism is, in the words of US President Barack Obama, “the gravest danger we face.” But while few would dispute this characterization, the world has unfinished business in minimizing the threat. Ten years after world leaders agreed to amend the landmark 1987 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) to make it harder for terrorists to obtain nuclear material, the new measures have yet to enter into force. The resulting vulnerability needs to be addressed urgently.
  
  In July 2005, signatories to the CPPNM agreed to amend the Convention to address the risk of terrorism more effectively. The new measures that were introduced would make it more difficult for terrorists to cause a widespread release of radioactive material by attacking a nuclear power plant or detonating a radioactive dispersal device – commonly known as a dirty bomb.
  
  
  But before the amendment can enter into force, two-thirds of the 152 signatories to the original convention must ratify it. While significant progress has been made – in July, the US, Italy, and Turkey did so – at least 14 more countries are needed.
  
  The fact that there has never been a major terrorist attack involving nuclear or other radioactive material should not blind us to the severity of the threat. There is evidence that terrorist groups have tried to acquire the material needed to construct a crude nuclear explosive device, or a dirty bomb.
  
  In 2011, for example, Moldovan police seized highly enriched uranium from a group of smugglers who were trying to sell it. The smugglers, exhibiting a worrying level of technical knowledge, had tried to evade detection by building a shielded container. In this case, the story ended happily. Thanks to efforts by Moldova, with the assistance of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to boost its nuclear security capabilities, the material was identified and confiscated, and the smugglers were arrested.
  
  There is no way to know whether the smuggling effort uncovered in Moldova is an outlier or the tip of a very large iceberg. But one thing is certain: the amount of nuclear material in the world is increasing. Since 1999, the amount of such material being used for peaceful purposes has increased by 70% – a trend that will continue as the use of nuclear power grows. It is essential that effective measures are in place to ensure that these materials are not misused or misplaced, whether accidentally or intentionally.
  
  Since 1995, the IAEA’s member states have reported nearly 2,800 incidents involving radioactive material escaping regulatory control. Although only a handful of these incidents involved material that could be used to make a nuclear explosive device, a relatively small amount of radioactive material could be combined with conventional explosives to create a dirty bomb. Such a weapon could be capable of killing many people, contaminating large urban areas, and sparking mass panic.
  
  Much has been achieved in the secure management of nuclear material since the attacks on the United States in September 2001 prompted a renewed focus on the risks of terrorism. Many countries have instituted effective measures to prevent the theft, sabotage, or illegal transfer of nuclear or other radioactive material, and security at many nuclear facilities has been improved. But much more needs to be done.
  
  The original Convention focused only on the international transport of nuclear material, and did not cover the protection of nuclear facilities. The amendment adopted ten years ago would oblige countries to protect nuclear facilities and any nuclear material used, stored, or transported domestically. It would expand cooperation on locating and recovering stolen or smuggled nuclear material and coordinate the response to any attack on a nuclear facility. It would also make nuclear trafficking a criminal offense and require signatories to cooperate on improving national systems of physical protection and minimizing the consequences of sabotage.
  
  Protecting nuclear material is not just an issue for countries that use nuclear power. Terrorists and criminals will try to exploit any vulnerability in the global security system. Any country, in any part of the world, could find itself used as a transit point – just as any country could become the target of an attack.
  
  Effective international cooperation is critically important. The consequences of a major security failure could be a catastrophe that transcends borders. All countries must take the threat of nuclear terrorism seriously. The single most effective way to do so would be to ensure that the amendment to the CPPNM enters into force as soon as possible.
  http://www.project-syndicate.org/co...-terrorism-convention-by-yukiya-amano-2015-09

Pakis are gonna get their butt kicked big time soon!

 

[LETHALFORCE]

Chinese support is enough to go mainstream? I doubt it .

 

[sorcerer]

Chinese support is enough to go mainstream? I doubt it .

Chinese support is enough for AQ Khan to go mainstream!!

 

[sob]

what @Neo and dawn did not highlight from the report

The NSG pathway to nuclear normalcy will remain exceedingly difficult for Pakistan — unless ...national security managers are willing to take new initiatives that alter perceptions of Pakistan’s place in the nuclear order.

 

[blueblood]

what @Neo and dawn did not highlight from the report

The NSG pathway to nuclear normalcy will remain exceedingly difficult for Pakistan — unless ...national security managers are willing to take new initiatives that alter perceptions of Pakistan’s place in the nuclear order.

That's never gonna happen. This kind of feel good articles are good for local consumption but not for the international decision makers. When every tom, dick and harry from army to politicians to media keep threatening to nuke India, Afghanistan, Israel and the latest addition to the list UAE, world notices it.

OTOH nobody is worried about India's nukes not even Pakistan.

Fallacy of Pakistan's argument is and always have been that they hold equal importance in the international arena, something which was true from 1960s to 1980s but never after that and that ship has irreversibly sailed.