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"No-Go" Tribal Areas Became Basis for Afghan Insurgency Documents Show
Washington, D.C., September 13, 2010 - Pakistani tribal areas where Osama bin Laden found refuge were momentarily open to the Pakistani Army when "the tribes were overawed by U.S. firepower" after 9/11, but quickly again became "no-go areas" where the Taliban could reorganize and plan their resurgence in Afghanistan, according to previously secret U.S. documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act by the National Security Archive and posted today at The National Security Archive.
The declassified documents describe the consequences of these events. According to U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald E. Neumann, the 2005 Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan was a direct product of the "four years that the Taliban has had to reorganize and think about their approach in a sanctuary beyond the reach of either government." This had exponentially increased casualties as the Taliban adopted insurgency tactics successful in Iraq, including suicide bombings and the use of IEDs. Ambassador Neumann warned Washington that if the sanctuary in Pakistan were not addressed it would "lead to the re-emergence of the same strategic threat to the United States that prompted our OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom] intervention" in 2001.
As current U.S. strategy increasingly pursues policies to reconcile or "flip" the Taliban, the document collection released today reveals Washington's refusal to negotiate with Taliban leadership directly after 9/11. On September 13, 2001, U.S. Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin "bluntly" told Pakistani President Musharraf that there was "absolutely no inclination in Washington to enter into a dialogue with the Taliban. The time for dialog was finished as of September 11." Pakistan, as the Taliban's primary sponsor, disagreed. Pakistani Intelligence (ISI) Chief Mahmoud told the ambassador "not to act in anger. Real victory will come in negotiations"¦ If the Taliban are eliminated... Afghanistan will revert to warlordism."
Regarding the apprehension of Osama bin Laden, the ISI Chief said it was "better for the Afghans to do it. We could avoid the fallout." Mahmoud traveled to Afghanistan twice, on September 17, aboard an American plane, and again on September 24, 2001 to discuss the seriousness of the situation with Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Ambassador Chamberlin said that the negotiations were pointless since Mullah Omar "had so far refused to meet even one U.S. demand." Chamberlin told Mahmoud his meetings with Omar were fine, but they "could not delay military planning."
Despite the hesitancy of the U.S. to negotiate in the wake of 9/11, documents published here today indicate there has been some success in reconciling low-level Taliban figures into the U.S.-supported Kabul regime. One program, PTS (Program for Strengthening Peace) had "six regional offices and reported that over 800 former fighters had joined the program as of December 2005."
The new materials also illustrate the importance of the bilateral alliance to leaders in both Islamabad and Washington. One cable described seven demands delivered to Pakistani Intelligence (ISI) Director Mahmoud by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage two days after the attack, while another reported Pakistani President Musharraf's acceptance of those requests "without conditions" the next day. However, the documents also reveal fundamental disagreements and distrust. While Pakistan denied that it was a safe haven for anti-American forces, a State Department Issue Paper for the Vice President claimed "some Taliban leaders operate with relative impunity in some Pakistani cities, and may still enjoy support from the lower echelons of Pakistan's ISI."
Islamabad was concerned U.S. military activities in Afghanistan would produce a hostile regime in Kabul. Just weeks before the anti-Pakistan Northern Alliance took the capital city with U.S. assistance, in a signed memorandum Secretary of State Powell told President Bush, "Musharraf is pressing for a future government supportive of its interests and is concerned that the Northern Alliance will occupy Kabul."
The document collection published here today is part of a larger project at the National Security Archive to document the ongoing war in Afghanistan by obtaining U.S. government materials through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
Highlights of today's posting include:
* September 13, 2001 – U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage gives Pakistani Intelligence (ISI) Chief Mahmoud a list of seven demands:
o Stop al-Qaeda at the Border;
o Provide the U.S. with Blanket Landing Rights to Conduct Operations;
o Provide Territorial and Naval Access;
o Provide Intelligence;
o Publicly Condemn Terrorist Attacks;
o Cut off Recruits and Supplies to the Taliban;
o Break Diplomatic Relations with the Taliban and Help Us "Destroy Usama bin Ladin."
* September 14, 2001 – Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf accepts U.S. demands "without conditions."
* September 13 - 24, 2001 – Pakistan advocates negotiating with the Taliban to get Osama bin Laden. Wendy Chamberlin tells President Musharraf "There was absolutely no inclination in Washington to enter into a dialogue with the Taliban."
* September 14 – November 16, 2001 – Pakistan asks the U.S. to clarify if its counterterrorism mission is against the Taliban or just al-Qaeda and repeatedly asks the U.S. not to let the Northern Alliance take over Kabul. Throughout the 1990s the Northern Alliance was supported by foreign states opposed to the Taliban, including India.
* September 17 – September 24, 2001 – Pakistani Intelligence (ISI) Chief Mahmoud flies to Afghanistan twice to meet Taliban leader Mullah Omar and discuss U.S. demands, al-Qaeda, and the future of Afghanistan. It is unclear if anything comes of these talks. President Musharraf replaces Mahmoud as ISI Chief in October 2001 and Pakistan and the U.S. move forward with military action against the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
* Both Pakistani and American officials have doubts whether Pakistan has enough control over the Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA] to combat Taliban and al-Qaeda-allied forces active in the region. A Pakistani military official calls certain sections of FATA "no-go areas" for the Pakistani Army.
* Pakistan denies anti-American forces are active within its territory, while the U.S. is certain "some Taliban leaders operate with relative impunity in some Pakistani cities, and may still enjoy support from the lower echelons of Pakistan's ISI."
"No-Go" Tribal Areas Became Basis for Afghan Insurgency Documents Show
Washington, D.C., September 13, 2010 - Pakistani tribal areas where Osama bin Laden found refuge were momentarily open to the Pakistani Army when "the tribes were overawed by U.S. firepower" after 9/11, but quickly again became "no-go areas" where the Taliban could reorganize and plan their resurgence in Afghanistan, according to previously secret U.S. documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act by the National Security Archive and posted today at The National Security Archive.
The declassified documents describe the consequences of these events. According to U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald E. Neumann, the 2005 Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan was a direct product of the "four years that the Taliban has had to reorganize and think about their approach in a sanctuary beyond the reach of either government." This had exponentially increased casualties as the Taliban adopted insurgency tactics successful in Iraq, including suicide bombings and the use of IEDs. Ambassador Neumann warned Washington that if the sanctuary in Pakistan were not addressed it would "lead to the re-emergence of the same strategic threat to the United States that prompted our OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom] intervention" in 2001.
As current U.S. strategy increasingly pursues policies to reconcile or "flip" the Taliban, the document collection released today reveals Washington's refusal to negotiate with Taliban leadership directly after 9/11. On September 13, 2001, U.S. Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin "bluntly" told Pakistani President Musharraf that there was "absolutely no inclination in Washington to enter into a dialogue with the Taliban. The time for dialog was finished as of September 11." Pakistan, as the Taliban's primary sponsor, disagreed. Pakistani Intelligence (ISI) Chief Mahmoud told the ambassador "not to act in anger. Real victory will come in negotiations"¦ If the Taliban are eliminated... Afghanistan will revert to warlordism."
Regarding the apprehension of Osama bin Laden, the ISI Chief said it was "better for the Afghans to do it. We could avoid the fallout." Mahmoud traveled to Afghanistan twice, on September 17, aboard an American plane, and again on September 24, 2001 to discuss the seriousness of the situation with Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Ambassador Chamberlin said that the negotiations were pointless since Mullah Omar "had so far refused to meet even one U.S. demand." Chamberlin told Mahmoud his meetings with Omar were fine, but they "could not delay military planning."
Despite the hesitancy of the U.S. to negotiate in the wake of 9/11, documents published here today indicate there has been some success in reconciling low-level Taliban figures into the U.S.-supported Kabul regime. One program, PTS (Program for Strengthening Peace) had "six regional offices and reported that over 800 former fighters had joined the program as of December 2005."
The new materials also illustrate the importance of the bilateral alliance to leaders in both Islamabad and Washington. One cable described seven demands delivered to Pakistani Intelligence (ISI) Director Mahmoud by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage two days after the attack, while another reported Pakistani President Musharraf's acceptance of those requests "without conditions" the next day. However, the documents also reveal fundamental disagreements and distrust. While Pakistan denied that it was a safe haven for anti-American forces, a State Department Issue Paper for the Vice President claimed "some Taliban leaders operate with relative impunity in some Pakistani cities, and may still enjoy support from the lower echelons of Pakistan's ISI."
Islamabad was concerned U.S. military activities in Afghanistan would produce a hostile regime in Kabul. Just weeks before the anti-Pakistan Northern Alliance took the capital city with U.S. assistance, in a signed memorandum Secretary of State Powell told President Bush, "Musharraf is pressing for a future government supportive of its interests and is concerned that the Northern Alliance will occupy Kabul."
The document collection published here today is part of a larger project at the National Security Archive to document the ongoing war in Afghanistan by obtaining U.S. government materials through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
Highlights of today's posting include:
* September 13, 2001 – U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage gives Pakistani Intelligence (ISI) Chief Mahmoud a list of seven demands:
o Stop al-Qaeda at the Border;
o Provide the U.S. with Blanket Landing Rights to Conduct Operations;
o Provide Territorial and Naval Access;
o Provide Intelligence;
o Publicly Condemn Terrorist Attacks;
o Cut off Recruits and Supplies to the Taliban;
o Break Diplomatic Relations with the Taliban and Help Us "Destroy Usama bin Ladin."
* September 14, 2001 – Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf accepts U.S. demands "without conditions."
* September 13 - 24, 2001 – Pakistan advocates negotiating with the Taliban to get Osama bin Laden. Wendy Chamberlin tells President Musharraf "There was absolutely no inclination in Washington to enter into a dialogue with the Taliban."
* September 14 – November 16, 2001 – Pakistan asks the U.S. to clarify if its counterterrorism mission is against the Taliban or just al-Qaeda and repeatedly asks the U.S. not to let the Northern Alliance take over Kabul. Throughout the 1990s the Northern Alliance was supported by foreign states opposed to the Taliban, including India.
* September 17 – September 24, 2001 – Pakistani Intelligence (ISI) Chief Mahmoud flies to Afghanistan twice to meet Taliban leader Mullah Omar and discuss U.S. demands, al-Qaeda, and the future of Afghanistan. It is unclear if anything comes of these talks. President Musharraf replaces Mahmoud as ISI Chief in October 2001 and Pakistan and the U.S. move forward with military action against the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
* Both Pakistani and American officials have doubts whether Pakistan has enough control over the Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA] to combat Taliban and al-Qaeda-allied forces active in the region. A Pakistani military official calls certain sections of FATA "no-go areas" for the Pakistani Army.
* Pakistan denies anti-American forces are active within its territory, while the U.S. is certain "some Taliban leaders operate with relative impunity in some Pakistani cities, and may still enjoy support from the lower echelons of Pakistan's ISI."