National Security and Intelligence Reforms
- Thread starter ejazr
- Start date
nrj
Ambassador
- Joined
- Nov 16, 2009
- Messages
- 9,658
- Likes
- 3,911
[h=2]Revisiting Intelligence Reform[/h]The Outlook informs that a report on intelligence reforms is in the offing. The review is being done by a government think-tank, taking cue from the speech of the Vice President, Hamid Ansari. It has been ten years since the Kargil Review Committee instigated the 'Gary' Saxena task force report to the Group of Ministers, and the new report is timely and welcome.
The Rajya Sabha chairman had said at the annual RN Kao Memorial Lecture a year ago that "there is no reason why a democratic system like ours should not have a Standing Committee of Parliament on intelligence." His speech then had come close on the heels of Mr. Chidambaram's talk, 'A New Architecture for India's Intelligence' at the Intelligence Bureau Centenary Endowment Lecture. Thus, political India made its intent clear that changes in both the internal and external dimensions of intelligence were impending. This was understandable since Mumbai 26/11 had indeed shaken up the security system. With reforms elsewhere in place, such as coastal security, it is the turn of intelligence agencies that seem to have failed yet again, after Kargil.
It is being authored by an intelligence 'insider', Rana Banerji. He made the news a few years ago as a leading contender for the top job in the external intelligence agency. The ideas he may have entertained and could not oversee may come up in the report, making it one worth looking forward to. Saikat Dutta ('Ghosts who walk', Outlook, 28 February 2011) writes that the whole gamut of intelligence function is being reviewed including recruitment, training, covert operations, the operations-analyses balance, financial accountability, ethics etc. Though no report can possibly recommend against opening up the intelligence domain to legislative oversight, the manner and extent of this recommendation would be its highlight, given the reservations about reform that may be in existence.
This article suggests the inclusion of a recommendation on ethnic, regional and community profile balancing within these organizations. The idea can be considered irrespective of whether the Equal Opportunity Bill under debate sees the light of day. Since no data exists on account of secrecy that understandably attends the intelligence function, that this aspect is less than optimal cannot be said outright. However, the possibility of certain subgroups not being represented adequately, such as Muslims and other groups from certain regions, cannot be discounted. The figures, albeit contested, provided by late Omar Khalidi, in his book Khaki and Ethnic Violence in India are representative. The remainder of this article argues why a greater representation of Muslims would be beneficial to the organizations in question and to national security.
There is a perception of Muslim under-representation to the extent of their numbers being negligible to minimal, particularly so in officer ranks, as revealed by Outlook in 2006. That there is no policy to this effect can be conceded, though the article had suggested that it was outcome of an 'unwritten code'. It possibly owes instead to a lack of qualification and dearth of volunteers. The latter is also due to the self-reinforcing cycle of Muslims not applying under the impression that they would not in any case make the grade. Given this, there is a case for remedial action. While positive discrimination is not the answer, an open recruiting policy may help. Targeting Muslims through an outreach to the community, through its leaders, may be useful. The figures for police and paramilitary have registered an upward trend since the Sachar committee made this suggestion. At officer level initially, Muslims can be asked for as deputationists from other organizations, such as police and the military. That deserving Muslims would likely seize the opportunity can be seen from a Muslim topping the IAS last year and the Indian Forest Service exam this year. The Vastanvi episode indicates the focus on education and jobs in the multiple communities that together form India and the world's largest minority.
Why is this necessary? Take for instance intelligence on the terror bombings which reveal the handiwork of majoritarian extremists. The refrain in intelligence input, magnified through the media, was that these were perpetrated by Muslims. However, the discourse in the Urdu press and in drawing rooms of Muslim households was to the contrary. It could thus have proved to be a timely line of investigation. At a higher level of abstraction, the domestication of the intelligence function is important for the plural, secular and democratic underpinnings of the republic. In case the character of the state is to be changed, it is the closed intelligence apparatus that would be the first target. Without checks and balances that pervade the system, these organizations lend themselves to such takeover. While democratic control of the military has witnessed much theorizing, the democracy-intelligence relationship has been neglected.
Firdaus Ahmed
Revisiting Intelligence Reform by Firdaus Ahmed
The Rajya Sabha chairman had said at the annual RN Kao Memorial Lecture a year ago that "there is no reason why a democratic system like ours should not have a Standing Committee of Parliament on intelligence." His speech then had come close on the heels of Mr. Chidambaram's talk, 'A New Architecture for India's Intelligence' at the Intelligence Bureau Centenary Endowment Lecture. Thus, political India made its intent clear that changes in both the internal and external dimensions of intelligence were impending. This was understandable since Mumbai 26/11 had indeed shaken up the security system. With reforms elsewhere in place, such as coastal security, it is the turn of intelligence agencies that seem to have failed yet again, after Kargil.
It is being authored by an intelligence 'insider', Rana Banerji. He made the news a few years ago as a leading contender for the top job in the external intelligence agency. The ideas he may have entertained and could not oversee may come up in the report, making it one worth looking forward to. Saikat Dutta ('Ghosts who walk', Outlook, 28 February 2011) writes that the whole gamut of intelligence function is being reviewed including recruitment, training, covert operations, the operations-analyses balance, financial accountability, ethics etc. Though no report can possibly recommend against opening up the intelligence domain to legislative oversight, the manner and extent of this recommendation would be its highlight, given the reservations about reform that may be in existence.
This article suggests the inclusion of a recommendation on ethnic, regional and community profile balancing within these organizations. The idea can be considered irrespective of whether the Equal Opportunity Bill under debate sees the light of day. Since no data exists on account of secrecy that understandably attends the intelligence function, that this aspect is less than optimal cannot be said outright. However, the possibility of certain subgroups not being represented adequately, such as Muslims and other groups from certain regions, cannot be discounted. The figures, albeit contested, provided by late Omar Khalidi, in his book Khaki and Ethnic Violence in India are representative. The remainder of this article argues why a greater representation of Muslims would be beneficial to the organizations in question and to national security.
There is a perception of Muslim under-representation to the extent of their numbers being negligible to minimal, particularly so in officer ranks, as revealed by Outlook in 2006. That there is no policy to this effect can be conceded, though the article had suggested that it was outcome of an 'unwritten code'. It possibly owes instead to a lack of qualification and dearth of volunteers. The latter is also due to the self-reinforcing cycle of Muslims not applying under the impression that they would not in any case make the grade. Given this, there is a case for remedial action. While positive discrimination is not the answer, an open recruiting policy may help. Targeting Muslims through an outreach to the community, through its leaders, may be useful. The figures for police and paramilitary have registered an upward trend since the Sachar committee made this suggestion. At officer level initially, Muslims can be asked for as deputationists from other organizations, such as police and the military. That deserving Muslims would likely seize the opportunity can be seen from a Muslim topping the IAS last year and the Indian Forest Service exam this year. The Vastanvi episode indicates the focus on education and jobs in the multiple communities that together form India and the world's largest minority.
Why is this necessary? Take for instance intelligence on the terror bombings which reveal the handiwork of majoritarian extremists. The refrain in intelligence input, magnified through the media, was that these were perpetrated by Muslims. However, the discourse in the Urdu press and in drawing rooms of Muslim households was to the contrary. It could thus have proved to be a timely line of investigation. At a higher level of abstraction, the domestication of the intelligence function is important for the plural, secular and democratic underpinnings of the republic. In case the character of the state is to be changed, it is the closed intelligence apparatus that would be the first target. Without checks and balances that pervade the system, these organizations lend themselves to such takeover. While democratic control of the military has witnessed much theorizing, the democracy-intelligence relationship has been neglected.
Firdaus Ahmed
Revisiting Intelligence Reform by Firdaus Ahmed
nrj
Ambassador
- Joined
- Nov 16, 2009
- Messages
- 9,658
- Likes
- 3,911
Regulating the Gentleman's Game: Intelligence Reform in India
Menaka Guruswamy
09/27/2010
A few months ago, as part of a panel that was discussing the need for regulating our intelligence agencies, I listened as a former head of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) looked at us civilians and explained patiently that intelligence was a "gentleman's profession" operating in a very "tough neighborhood." His neighbor, a former head of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), nodded in agreement, and concluded that only when these "honorable gentlemen" were ready, should regulation be contemplated.
The strands of the security net of independent India are its armed forces, para-military, police, independent courts, and its many intelligence agencies. Amongst those many agencies, are the court favorite Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the aforementioned external intelligence agency, RAW and internal security organization, IB. There are about fifteen such agencies including the three military branches, which have their own intelligence services.
Armed forces, like the Border Security Force, the Army, the Central Reserve Police Force or even the new National Investigation Agency are established and regulated by statutes. Indian intelligence agencies are not established, funded (or audited rigorously), or regulated by law. The exception to this norm is the CBI, which is perplexingly established by the Delhi Special Police Act, 1946. The Special Police Establishment was set up in 1941 by the colonial Government of India to investigate cases of bribery and corruption in transactions with the War and Supply Department of India during World War II.
The call for the regulation of our agencies includes demands for oversight, accountability, efficiency, and protection for officers from within the agencies (i.e. whistleblowers). It includes an accessible and transparent recruitment and appointment process, consistent training while in service, and hiring of those with special language and analysis skills. All these processes are lacking at the moment, as reflected in both a lack of operational and infiltration capabilities as well as in a fall in the number of suitable recruits.
This past January, Vice President Hamid Ansari delivered the fourth R.N Kao memorial lecture organized by the RAW, in remembrance of their founder. The Vice President argued that the present system of oversight of security and intelligence being limited to that by the Executive did not meet the requirements of good governance in an open society. He further declared that that there was no reason why a democratic society like India should not have a Parliamentary Standing Committee akin to other democracies, to ensure financial and performance accountability of the services.
The content of democratic accountability of intelligence services has manifested itself in different forms. Hans Born and Ian Leigh state in their book titled Making Intelligence Accountable that democratic accountability is comprised of executive control and parliamentary oversight, as well as inputs by civil society. The authors distil a consensus among the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the UN, and other international entities to explain that the objective is that security and intelligence agencies should be insulated from political abuse without being isolated from executive governance.
In the last twenty years, litigation at the European Court of Human Rights on issues of privacy and domestic cases against illegal wire-taps have resulted in the extensive regulation of intelligence services. For instance, in the case of Harman and Hewitt v U.K., decided by the European Court of Human Rights in 1986, the lack of a statutory basis for the U.K. Security Service (MI5) was held to be fatal to the claim that its actions were in "accordance with the law" for the purpose of surveillance and file-keeping, and thus, contrary to the right of privacy guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). As a consequence of the ruling, the U.K. passed the statutory charter for MI5 (the Security Service Act, 1989) and soon after, passed the Intelligence Services Act 1994 (for MI6 and the Government Communications Headquarters).
Similarly, to ensure compliance with Article 21 of the Constitution of India, that provides that "no person can be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law," legislation is warranted, otherwise, such deprivation is patently unconstitutional and illegitimate. The right to life jurisprudence has carved out a right to privacy in India. This right was implicated by recent reports highlighting large-scale and seemingly unwarranted surveillance of phone conversations by the agencies. The lack of any legal process by which intrusive activities need to be justified has also opened up the agencies to well-founded allegations of being used by governments against their political opponents.
Countries with comparable democratic structures like Australia and the United Kingdom have oversight mechanisms. Via the Intelligence Services Act, 1994, Parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) reviews the expenditure, administration, and policies of intelligence agencies in the UK. The Australian Security Intelligence Organization works closely with the Australian Protective Service, with both agencies falling under the Attorney General. A Parliamentary Oversight Committee, in addition to a separate intelligence officer in the Prime Minister's office, can initiate investigation of the agencies.
There are various oversight mechanisms used by other democracies as well. For instance, statutory bodies are comprised of independent experts appointed by the Executive (Canada), to more familiar parliamentary committees with finance, administrative, and policy oversight functions (U.K. and Norway), to all powerful congressional oversight mechanisms that include review of appointment processes (U.S.). Even countries that are relatively young in terms of their life spans as democracies, such as Argentina, Poland, and South Africa all have Parliamentary Oversight Committees.
In India, there is an absence of an established process of appointment for both potential officers and the head of the agency. It is imperative that legislation must establish the process of appointment, including minimum qualifications. Such processes must be subject to scrutiny by Parliament or at least the leader of the opposition. Further, like other positions of authority and responsibility-tenure and criterion for removal must be clearly specified by law. This not only assures quality of candidates, but also acts as insulation from pressure by the government, and places a premium on merit rather than connections and pliability.
At the present time, there is virtually no remedy in place for both citizens affected by actions of intelligence entities and for employees within the agencies, including whistleblower protection mechanisms. There are different approaches that have been adopted by various countries, including an independent ombudsman in New Zealand who has the power to address complaints against the agency, specialist tribunals in the United Kingdom, and parliamentary oversights committees that deal with complaints against the agency in countries like Germany and Norway.
Independent India, its Constitution and its people, warrant an accountable, efficient and well-trained intelligence community. Anything less impacts the rule of law and legitimizes zones of unaccountability, which further fuels a culture of impunity and unconstitutionality.
Menaka Guruswamy practices law at the Supreme Court of India.
Regulating the Gentleman's Game: Intelligence Reform in India | Center for the Advanced Study of India
Menaka Guruswamy
09/27/2010
A few months ago, as part of a panel that was discussing the need for regulating our intelligence agencies, I listened as a former head of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) looked at us civilians and explained patiently that intelligence was a "gentleman's profession" operating in a very "tough neighborhood." His neighbor, a former head of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), nodded in agreement, and concluded that only when these "honorable gentlemen" were ready, should regulation be contemplated.
The strands of the security net of independent India are its armed forces, para-military, police, independent courts, and its many intelligence agencies. Amongst those many agencies, are the court favorite Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the aforementioned external intelligence agency, RAW and internal security organization, IB. There are about fifteen such agencies including the three military branches, which have their own intelligence services.
Armed forces, like the Border Security Force, the Army, the Central Reserve Police Force or even the new National Investigation Agency are established and regulated by statutes. Indian intelligence agencies are not established, funded (or audited rigorously), or regulated by law. The exception to this norm is the CBI, which is perplexingly established by the Delhi Special Police Act, 1946. The Special Police Establishment was set up in 1941 by the colonial Government of India to investigate cases of bribery and corruption in transactions with the War and Supply Department of India during World War II.
The call for the regulation of our agencies includes demands for oversight, accountability, efficiency, and protection for officers from within the agencies (i.e. whistleblowers). It includes an accessible and transparent recruitment and appointment process, consistent training while in service, and hiring of those with special language and analysis skills. All these processes are lacking at the moment, as reflected in both a lack of operational and infiltration capabilities as well as in a fall in the number of suitable recruits.
This past January, Vice President Hamid Ansari delivered the fourth R.N Kao memorial lecture organized by the RAW, in remembrance of their founder. The Vice President argued that the present system of oversight of security and intelligence being limited to that by the Executive did not meet the requirements of good governance in an open society. He further declared that that there was no reason why a democratic society like India should not have a Parliamentary Standing Committee akin to other democracies, to ensure financial and performance accountability of the services.
The content of democratic accountability of intelligence services has manifested itself in different forms. Hans Born and Ian Leigh state in their book titled Making Intelligence Accountable that democratic accountability is comprised of executive control and parliamentary oversight, as well as inputs by civil society. The authors distil a consensus among the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the UN, and other international entities to explain that the objective is that security and intelligence agencies should be insulated from political abuse without being isolated from executive governance.
In the last twenty years, litigation at the European Court of Human Rights on issues of privacy and domestic cases against illegal wire-taps have resulted in the extensive regulation of intelligence services. For instance, in the case of Harman and Hewitt v U.K., decided by the European Court of Human Rights in 1986, the lack of a statutory basis for the U.K. Security Service (MI5) was held to be fatal to the claim that its actions were in "accordance with the law" for the purpose of surveillance and file-keeping, and thus, contrary to the right of privacy guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). As a consequence of the ruling, the U.K. passed the statutory charter for MI5 (the Security Service Act, 1989) and soon after, passed the Intelligence Services Act 1994 (for MI6 and the Government Communications Headquarters).
Similarly, to ensure compliance with Article 21 of the Constitution of India, that provides that "no person can be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law," legislation is warranted, otherwise, such deprivation is patently unconstitutional and illegitimate. The right to life jurisprudence has carved out a right to privacy in India. This right was implicated by recent reports highlighting large-scale and seemingly unwarranted surveillance of phone conversations by the agencies. The lack of any legal process by which intrusive activities need to be justified has also opened up the agencies to well-founded allegations of being used by governments against their political opponents.
Countries with comparable democratic structures like Australia and the United Kingdom have oversight mechanisms. Via the Intelligence Services Act, 1994, Parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) reviews the expenditure, administration, and policies of intelligence agencies in the UK. The Australian Security Intelligence Organization works closely with the Australian Protective Service, with both agencies falling under the Attorney General. A Parliamentary Oversight Committee, in addition to a separate intelligence officer in the Prime Minister's office, can initiate investigation of the agencies.
There are various oversight mechanisms used by other democracies as well. For instance, statutory bodies are comprised of independent experts appointed by the Executive (Canada), to more familiar parliamentary committees with finance, administrative, and policy oversight functions (U.K. and Norway), to all powerful congressional oversight mechanisms that include review of appointment processes (U.S.). Even countries that are relatively young in terms of their life spans as democracies, such as Argentina, Poland, and South Africa all have Parliamentary Oversight Committees.
In India, there is an absence of an established process of appointment for both potential officers and the head of the agency. It is imperative that legislation must establish the process of appointment, including minimum qualifications. Such processes must be subject to scrutiny by Parliament or at least the leader of the opposition. Further, like other positions of authority and responsibility-tenure and criterion for removal must be clearly specified by law. This not only assures quality of candidates, but also acts as insulation from pressure by the government, and places a premium on merit rather than connections and pliability.
At the present time, there is virtually no remedy in place for both citizens affected by actions of intelligence entities and for employees within the agencies, including whistleblower protection mechanisms. There are different approaches that have been adopted by various countries, including an independent ombudsman in New Zealand who has the power to address complaints against the agency, specialist tribunals in the United Kingdom, and parliamentary oversights committees that deal with complaints against the agency in countries like Germany and Norway.
Independent India, its Constitution and its people, warrant an accountable, efficient and well-trained intelligence community. Anything less impacts the rule of law and legitimizes zones of unaccountability, which further fuels a culture of impunity and unconstitutionality.
Menaka Guruswamy practices law at the Supreme Court of India.
Regulating the Gentleman's Game: Intelligence Reform in India | Center for the Advanced Study of India
nrj
Ambassador
- Joined
- Nov 16, 2009
- Messages
- 9,658
- Likes
- 3,911
Spywork For Dummies
Intelligence reforms in India have usually been an area that always sees a piecemeal approach, mostly crisis-driven and not based on a real assessment of need. Now, for the first time, a task force of the Delhi-based Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (idsa) has come up with a comprehensive set of recommendations by examining the processes that have plagued India's intelligence community.
Making a strong pitch for greater accountability via a parliamentary oversight board, the task force has suggested the government also look at strengthening financial accountability as a measure to prepare Indian intelligence agencies for the challenges of the 21st century.
"About a year ago, vice-president Hamid Ansari pointed out that there is a need for statutory oversight of our intelligence agencies. That was the spark needed...for us at idsa," director-general N.S. Sisodia told Outlook. In a first, the think-tank decided to look at preparing recommendations that examine the critical processes of national security "to promote a healthy debate and help the government take an informed decision", says Sisodia.
The task force examined the efficacy of the current operational structure, recruitment, ability to process raw inputs into actionable intelligence, technology upgrades and better intelligence coordination between the agencies (currently riven by turf wars). Led by R. Banerji, a well-regarded former special secretary in raw, with P.K. Upadhya and Brig Raj Shukla as its members, it held a series of consultations with the strategic community, including former nsa Brajesh Mishra, the recently deceased K. Subrahmanyam and a host of ex-IB and raw chiefs before preparing its report.
Some of the key problem areas identified by the task force are:
Lack of national intelligence coordination: Acknowledging that turf wars have proved to be a major impediment, the report notes that they have "taken a toll by slowing down or even completely blocking reform". The task force also felt that proposed organisations like the National Counter Terrorism Centre (nctc) have the "potential to intensify turf battles among existing agencies". Hence, it has recommended that the government appoint a national intelligence coordinator to end turf battles and assist the national security advisor in preventing a repeat of intelligence failures like Kargil and the terrorist attack on Mumbai in 2008.
No financial accountability: The task force felt that "to improve efficiency... there can be no getting away from introducing some sort of external supervision and control, including legislative oversight". It also examined critical lacunae in current procedures where there is no accountability of secret service funds. In fact, it observed that unlike other government budgetary allocations, funds here never lapse at the end of a financial year. "Ironically enough, the secret service funds portion has been steadily increasing and it is that portion which is never surrendered whereas other portions of funds allotted do lapse if schemes remain unimplemented." It feels these "aberrations need to be controlled and scrutinised".
Press reports passed off as secret intelligence: The task force did not mince words where "very common examples of misuse of operational practices" such as "artfully cloaking" news reports from "international publications such as the (International) Herald Tribune, Le Monde or foreign magazines such as Der Spiegel as source reports". Many intelligence operatives would then source these news reports to their "non-existent human source assets" and even claim secret service funds. As a result, Indian intelligence has been plagued by spectacular failures on several occasions.
Poor recruitment policies: The task force noted that raw suffered from the "tail-end syndrome" where the "bottom of the entrance lists" of those appearing for the upsc examinations were offered jobs. Even the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which used to have an excellent earmarking system, has now "diluted" its standards. Both agencies seem to have confined their "deputation quotas" to the Indian Police Service. As a result, specialised requirements such as science and technology or intake of defence service officers have suffered. The task force has strongly recommended open recruitment to ensure that the most talented professionals are recruited. It noted that this is the current practice in frontline intelligence agencies of countries like the US, the UK and Israel.
Archaic training: The "training curriculum in raw", the report notes, "remains archaic and too police-centric". Training methods have not even incorporated "modern technological advances in methods of communication" for running a source. In the IB, training schedules have been 'shortened" to meet operational needs, far short of the ideal two years needed to produce good intelligence operatives. The task force also points out that an earlier recommendation to establish a common training centre for all intelligence agencies "was not accepted".
Poor analysis and drift in operational work: "Many breaches of national security occurred in the past and continue to occur today, not for want of intelligence, but due to poor analysis and inadequate follow-up action." The task force analysed the problem and said operations is an area that needs urgent attention. It recommends that analysts be trained in modern prescriptive work which can then ensure better supervision in operations.
Lack of cover jobs: A major problem for raw operatives has been the inadequate cover they get when posted abroad. Sadly, the report says, "in India efforts were made earlier to experiment with non-official cover by setting up a travel agency or a security wing thereof with operations overseas. But these proposals did not get off the ground due to last-minute bureaucratic obstacles". The current diplomatic cover "limits access to spot real targets" and causes issues on handling "high-value assets". It also restricted gathering intelligence in specialised fields like economics and technology. "While working on the report, we noted that a balance must be maintained between operational efficiency and oversight mechanisms," Banerji told Outlook. "All major democracies have gone in for several tiers of accountability and oversight and it empowers intelligence agencies to produce sharper results."
The last major institutional and systemic reform in India's national security was undertaken in the aftermath of the Kargil war. But in 2008, when LeT terrorists attacked Mumbai, it revealed that much of the improvements envisaged had failed to materialise. Now, an attempt has been made to address the needs of India's intelligence community rather than take a crisis-driven approach. Hopefully, those responsible for India's security will approach the recommendations with an open mind.
www.outlookindia.com | Ghosts Who Walk
- Lack of coordination: Turf battles have slowed down or completely blocked reform No financial accountability: Secret service funds steadily increasing, without unused funds being surrendered
- Press reports as intelligence: Artfully cloaked news reports from international publications passed off as source reports
- Poor recruitment policies: RAW suffers from the "tail-end syndrome" where UPSC bottom-rungers are offered jobs
- Archaic training: The training curriculum in RAW remains archaic and too police-centric Drift in operational work: Breaches of national security due to poor analysis and inadequate follow-up action
- Lack of cover: RAW operatives suffer from inadequate cover when posted abroad
***
Intelligence reforms in India have usually been an area that always sees a piecemeal approach, mostly crisis-driven and not based on a real assessment of need. Now, for the first time, a task force of the Delhi-based Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (idsa) has come up with a comprehensive set of recommendations by examining the processes that have plagued India's intelligence community.
Making a strong pitch for greater accountability via a parliamentary oversight board, the task force has suggested the government also look at strengthening financial accountability as a measure to prepare Indian intelligence agencies for the challenges of the 21st century.
"About a year ago, vice-president Hamid Ansari pointed out that there is a need for statutory oversight of our intelligence agencies. That was the spark needed...for us at idsa," director-general N.S. Sisodia told Outlook. In a first, the think-tank decided to look at preparing recommendations that examine the critical processes of national security "to promote a healthy debate and help the government take an informed decision", says Sisodia.
The task force examined the efficacy of the current operational structure, recruitment, ability to process raw inputs into actionable intelligence, technology upgrades and better intelligence coordination between the agencies (currently riven by turf wars). Led by R. Banerji, a well-regarded former special secretary in raw, with P.K. Upadhya and Brig Raj Shukla as its members, it held a series of consultations with the strategic community, including former nsa Brajesh Mishra, the recently deceased K. Subrahmanyam and a host of ex-IB and raw chiefs before preparing its report.
Some of the key problem areas identified by the task force are:
Lack of national intelligence coordination: Acknowledging that turf wars have proved to be a major impediment, the report notes that they have "taken a toll by slowing down or even completely blocking reform". The task force also felt that proposed organisations like the National Counter Terrorism Centre (nctc) have the "potential to intensify turf battles among existing agencies". Hence, it has recommended that the government appoint a national intelligence coordinator to end turf battles and assist the national security advisor in preventing a repeat of intelligence failures like Kargil and the terrorist attack on Mumbai in 2008.
No financial accountability: The task force felt that "to improve efficiency... there can be no getting away from introducing some sort of external supervision and control, including legislative oversight". It also examined critical lacunae in current procedures where there is no accountability of secret service funds. In fact, it observed that unlike other government budgetary allocations, funds here never lapse at the end of a financial year. "Ironically enough, the secret service funds portion has been steadily increasing and it is that portion which is never surrendered whereas other portions of funds allotted do lapse if schemes remain unimplemented." It feels these "aberrations need to be controlled and scrutinised".
Press reports passed off as secret intelligence: The task force did not mince words where "very common examples of misuse of operational practices" such as "artfully cloaking" news reports from "international publications such as the (International) Herald Tribune, Le Monde or foreign magazines such as Der Spiegel as source reports". Many intelligence operatives would then source these news reports to their "non-existent human source assets" and even claim secret service funds. As a result, Indian intelligence has been plagued by spectacular failures on several occasions.
Poor recruitment policies: The task force noted that raw suffered from the "tail-end syndrome" where the "bottom of the entrance lists" of those appearing for the upsc examinations were offered jobs. Even the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which used to have an excellent earmarking system, has now "diluted" its standards. Both agencies seem to have confined their "deputation quotas" to the Indian Police Service. As a result, specialised requirements such as science and technology or intake of defence service officers have suffered. The task force has strongly recommended open recruitment to ensure that the most talented professionals are recruited. It noted that this is the current practice in frontline intelligence agencies of countries like the US, the UK and Israel.
Archaic training: The "training curriculum in raw", the report notes, "remains archaic and too police-centric". Training methods have not even incorporated "modern technological advances in methods of communication" for running a source. In the IB, training schedules have been 'shortened" to meet operational needs, far short of the ideal two years needed to produce good intelligence operatives. The task force also points out that an earlier recommendation to establish a common training centre for all intelligence agencies "was not accepted".
Poor analysis and drift in operational work: "Many breaches of national security occurred in the past and continue to occur today, not for want of intelligence, but due to poor analysis and inadequate follow-up action." The task force analysed the problem and said operations is an area that needs urgent attention. It recommends that analysts be trained in modern prescriptive work which can then ensure better supervision in operations.
Lack of cover jobs: A major problem for raw operatives has been the inadequate cover they get when posted abroad. Sadly, the report says, "in India efforts were made earlier to experiment with non-official cover by setting up a travel agency or a security wing thereof with operations overseas. But these proposals did not get off the ground due to last-minute bureaucratic obstacles". The current diplomatic cover "limits access to spot real targets" and causes issues on handling "high-value assets". It also restricted gathering intelligence in specialised fields like economics and technology. "While working on the report, we noted that a balance must be maintained between operational efficiency and oversight mechanisms," Banerji told Outlook. "All major democracies have gone in for several tiers of accountability and oversight and it empowers intelligence agencies to produce sharper results."
The last major institutional and systemic reform in India's national security was undertaken in the aftermath of the Kargil war. But in 2008, when LeT terrorists attacked Mumbai, it revealed that much of the improvements envisaged had failed to materialise. Now, an attempt has been made to address the needs of India's intelligence community rather than take a crisis-driven approach. Hopefully, those responsible for India's security will approach the recommendations with an open mind.
www.outlookindia.com | Ghosts Who Walk
nrj
Ambassador
- Joined
- Nov 16, 2009
- Messages
- 9,658
- Likes
- 3,911
An Indian Security Strategy
Leaders make statements on national security inside and outside the Parliament quite regularly, but the government has hesitated to spell out a national security strategy. Why?
There are two likely reasons.
First, there's no political consensus in the country on national security issues. For instance, there's no consensus on how to treat the challenges from Pakistan and China, and the government's policies on these issues have fluctuated.
In the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attacks there was intense debate over how India should have responded to the attacks. The government was restrained, but while many approved of this approach, many others saw the response as simply weak. Even today, there's no clarity on how the government will deal with such terror attacks in the future.
Second, the government hasn't been able to address the crucial issue of coordination over the formulation of national security. The NSC has been a useful invention, but it's anaemic in terms of resources. More important, it lacks powers to enforce anything. The departmental interests are extremely strong, and it has become difficult to synchronise them. There's no common understanding among various segments of the government of what national security constitutes.
Despite these complications, though, India urgently needs a national security strategy. The world is changing fast, and in the absence of a coherent strategy, the government's responses will remain ad hoc and partial. This could prove costly. It's clear that the government needs to formulate an official National Security Strategy document for the next 10 years. This will help address confusion over national security matters and consolidate the government's responses. More important, it will generate informed debate that may help build consensus.
A Suggested Outline
A National Security Strategy document should have, at the minimum, the following elements:
A draft document for the next 10 years could consist of:
Definition of National Security
The document must define national security in broad terms, including military and non-military dimensions of security. It must also clearly state the objectives of the strategy. These might be: protecting and defending the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the country; protecting the core values of the nation as enshrined in the Indian Constitution; and ensuring the socio-economic development of the country. India's goal should be to play a positive and effective role in global and regional affairs.
Appreciation of Geopolitical Environment
The document should describe the geopolitical environment and how it has affected India. This should include the transition in the international system to multipolarity; the rise of China and its intense drive for military modernisation, the growing dysfunctionality of Pakistani state; the impending withdrawal of US and ISAF troops from Afghanistan; the implications of the Arab spring; developments in the Indian ocean region; the growth of Africa and Latin America; the discovery of energy resources in the Arctic Ocean and the economic uncertainty in the United States and Europe.
In addition, there are non-territorial challenges that India will have to cope with. These include the increasing threat of piracy on the high seas; maritime security; increasing militarization of space; threats from cyber space and the intensification of competition for scarce resources like energy and strategic minerals. Also, the threat of WMD proliferation and issues concerning nuclear security must be highlighted as growing challenges. A broad counter-terrorism strategy should identified and implemented.
Challenges from the Neighbourhood
The document could pay special attention to neighbouring countries, the extended neighbourhood and the Indian Ocean. Instability in these regions will cause instability in India. India must therefore prepare itself for a backlash if some states in the region fail. At the same time, India should be prepared to contribute towards stability through bilateral and regional cooperation.
Coping With the Challenges
Having defined the challenges in a clear and unambiguous manner, the strategy document should focus attention on how India will cope with these challenges.
For a realistic National Security Strategy, there must be an appreciation of both the ends and means. The ultimate objective is to secure India's security, but the means must preserve the freedoms and rights of the individuals as enshrined in the Constitution. Thus, for example, a counter-terrorism strategy is needed, but it should have enough safeguards to protect individual rights and freedoms. Permanent membership of the UN Security Council should also be aspired to.
Internal Security
The document will need to give urgent attention to internal security issues, including left wing extremism, Jammu and Kashmir, the northeast of the country, communalism, corruption, religious fundamentalism and extremism, regional and socio-economic inequalities. These issues will have to be dealt with within the democratic framework of the Constitution.
An effective counter-terrorism strategy encompassing intelligence reforms, police reforms, legal reforms and involving clear rules of engagement with insurgents, militants and terrorists should be adopted. Similarly, a counter insurgency strategy aimed at firmly dealing with insurgents, while addressing the grievances of the alienated groups, should be put in place.
Border management, a neglected area, should be given high priority. An effectively regulated border that discourages illegal movement, but which facilitates people-to-people contacts is necessary. Modern border management practices should be adopted. Visa regime and immigration policies should be overhauled. The link between internal security issues and external factors, e.g. externally sponsored terrorism, fake Indian currency, drugs etc, may also be specified.
Resources and Capabilities
Making India secure will require building diverse capabilities – economic, diplomatic, military, human resources, governance reforms – and creating synergy between them.
A strong economy and inclusive growth should form the basis of the National Security Strategy as maintaining strong economic growth will give India huge strategic advantages, including allowing it to strengthen its hard and soft power.
Meanwhile, our diplomatic resources will need to be expanded and strengthened. More diplomats, more training, and more synergy with resources outside the government will be needed. Diplomacy will need to include diverse interests. Public diplomacy will be an integral component of diplomacy.
Technology will underpin many of our strengths. Thus, India will need to build capacities in research and development in diverse fields to help socio-economic economic development and self-reliance in strategic sectors including space, defence technologies, agriculture, manufacturing, information technology, clean and green technologies etc. The country's advances in science and technology should be utilized to create a highly skilled workforce. The education system will need to be overhauled. Young people must have the opportunity to pursue high quality education, if need be through state subsidies. Suitable policy measures must be adopted to take advantage of the country's demographic dividend.
While military modernisation is necessary, the need for military reform is even more acute. The institution of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) should be created, and necessary changes in defence structures should be implemented. Civil-military relations should be carried out in a harmonious way. Command and control systems for strategic systems must be made robust. Information warfare and cyber security issues will also need to be given due attention.
For effective implementation of a National Security Strategy, a wide range of governance reforms will be needed. Governance can be overhauled only through thorough reform of the electoral system, the criminal justice system, etc.
There's also a strong need to focus on the material and non-material needs of young people. Their needs in education, skill development, employment, family, mobility, etc should be addressed. This will make them feel proud to be Indian, while they retain and enjoy their multiple identities and freedoms.
Onefinal thought. The National Security Strategy document needs to be succinct, yet still flag all major issues concerning a security strategy, as well as provide guidelines to concerned departments to pre-frame suitable action plans. Since the global and regional situation is dynamic, the National Security Strategy document should be revised periodically.
Ultimately, the National Security Strategy document should be realistic and balanced. While recognizing the challenges, it should also underline the opportunities. After all, a successful national security strategy can give a fillip to our national consciousness, economy and socio-economic development, therefore creating a calmer environment conducive for national development.
Arvind Gupta holds the Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in)
Leaders make statements on national security inside and outside the Parliament quite regularly, but the government has hesitated to spell out a national security strategy. Why?
There are two likely reasons.
First, there's no political consensus in the country on national security issues. For instance, there's no consensus on how to treat the challenges from Pakistan and China, and the government's policies on these issues have fluctuated.
In the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attacks there was intense debate over how India should have responded to the attacks. The government was restrained, but while many approved of this approach, many others saw the response as simply weak. Even today, there's no clarity on how the government will deal with such terror attacks in the future.
Second, the government hasn't been able to address the crucial issue of coordination over the formulation of national security. The NSC has been a useful invention, but it's anaemic in terms of resources. More important, it lacks powers to enforce anything. The departmental interests are extremely strong, and it has become difficult to synchronise them. There's no common understanding among various segments of the government of what national security constitutes.
Despite these complications, though, India urgently needs a national security strategy. The world is changing fast, and in the absence of a coherent strategy, the government's responses will remain ad hoc and partial. This could prove costly. It's clear that the government needs to formulate an official National Security Strategy document for the next 10 years. This will help address confusion over national security matters and consolidate the government's responses. More important, it will generate informed debate that may help build consensus.
A Suggested Outline
A National Security Strategy document should have, at the minimum, the following elements:
- a working definition of national security and national security objectives;
- an appreciation of the emerging security environment taking into account the geopolitical changes in the world;
- an assessment of the national strengths and weaknesses of the country in dealing with the challenges;
- identification of the military, economic, diplomatic resources needed to meet the challenges.
A draft document for the next 10 years could consist of:
Definition of National Security
The document must define national security in broad terms, including military and non-military dimensions of security. It must also clearly state the objectives of the strategy. These might be: protecting and defending the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the country; protecting the core values of the nation as enshrined in the Indian Constitution; and ensuring the socio-economic development of the country. India's goal should be to play a positive and effective role in global and regional affairs.
Appreciation of Geopolitical Environment
The document should describe the geopolitical environment and how it has affected India. This should include the transition in the international system to multipolarity; the rise of China and its intense drive for military modernisation, the growing dysfunctionality of Pakistani state; the impending withdrawal of US and ISAF troops from Afghanistan; the implications of the Arab spring; developments in the Indian ocean region; the growth of Africa and Latin America; the discovery of energy resources in the Arctic Ocean and the economic uncertainty in the United States and Europe.
In addition, there are non-territorial challenges that India will have to cope with. These include the increasing threat of piracy on the high seas; maritime security; increasing militarization of space; threats from cyber space and the intensification of competition for scarce resources like energy and strategic minerals. Also, the threat of WMD proliferation and issues concerning nuclear security must be highlighted as growing challenges. A broad counter-terrorism strategy should identified and implemented.
Challenges from the Neighbourhood
The document could pay special attention to neighbouring countries, the extended neighbourhood and the Indian Ocean. Instability in these regions will cause instability in India. India must therefore prepare itself for a backlash if some states in the region fail. At the same time, India should be prepared to contribute towards stability through bilateral and regional cooperation.
Coping With the Challenges
Having defined the challenges in a clear and unambiguous manner, the strategy document should focus attention on how India will cope with these challenges.
For a realistic National Security Strategy, there must be an appreciation of both the ends and means. The ultimate objective is to secure India's security, but the means must preserve the freedoms and rights of the individuals as enshrined in the Constitution. Thus, for example, a counter-terrorism strategy is needed, but it should have enough safeguards to protect individual rights and freedoms. Permanent membership of the UN Security Council should also be aspired to.
Internal Security
The document will need to give urgent attention to internal security issues, including left wing extremism, Jammu and Kashmir, the northeast of the country, communalism, corruption, religious fundamentalism and extremism, regional and socio-economic inequalities. These issues will have to be dealt with within the democratic framework of the Constitution.
An effective counter-terrorism strategy encompassing intelligence reforms, police reforms, legal reforms and involving clear rules of engagement with insurgents, militants and terrorists should be adopted. Similarly, a counter insurgency strategy aimed at firmly dealing with insurgents, while addressing the grievances of the alienated groups, should be put in place.
Border management, a neglected area, should be given high priority. An effectively regulated border that discourages illegal movement, but which facilitates people-to-people contacts is necessary. Modern border management practices should be adopted. Visa regime and immigration policies should be overhauled. The link between internal security issues and external factors, e.g. externally sponsored terrorism, fake Indian currency, drugs etc, may also be specified.
Resources and Capabilities
Making India secure will require building diverse capabilities – economic, diplomatic, military, human resources, governance reforms – and creating synergy between them.
A strong economy and inclusive growth should form the basis of the National Security Strategy as maintaining strong economic growth will give India huge strategic advantages, including allowing it to strengthen its hard and soft power.
Meanwhile, our diplomatic resources will need to be expanded and strengthened. More diplomats, more training, and more synergy with resources outside the government will be needed. Diplomacy will need to include diverse interests. Public diplomacy will be an integral component of diplomacy.
Technology will underpin many of our strengths. Thus, India will need to build capacities in research and development in diverse fields to help socio-economic economic development and self-reliance in strategic sectors including space, defence technologies, agriculture, manufacturing, information technology, clean and green technologies etc. The country's advances in science and technology should be utilized to create a highly skilled workforce. The education system will need to be overhauled. Young people must have the opportunity to pursue high quality education, if need be through state subsidies. Suitable policy measures must be adopted to take advantage of the country's demographic dividend.
While military modernisation is necessary, the need for military reform is even more acute. The institution of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) should be created, and necessary changes in defence structures should be implemented. Civil-military relations should be carried out in a harmonious way. Command and control systems for strategic systems must be made robust. Information warfare and cyber security issues will also need to be given due attention.
For effective implementation of a National Security Strategy, a wide range of governance reforms will be needed. Governance can be overhauled only through thorough reform of the electoral system, the criminal justice system, etc.
There's also a strong need to focus on the material and non-material needs of young people. Their needs in education, skill development, employment, family, mobility, etc should be addressed. This will make them feel proud to be Indian, while they retain and enjoy their multiple identities and freedoms.
Onefinal thought. The National Security Strategy document needs to be succinct, yet still flag all major issues concerning a security strategy, as well as provide guidelines to concerned departments to pre-frame suitable action plans. Since the global and regional situation is dynamic, the National Security Strategy document should be revised periodically.
Ultimately, the National Security Strategy document should be realistic and balanced. While recognizing the challenges, it should also underline the opportunities. After all, a successful national security strategy can give a fillip to our national consciousness, economy and socio-economic development, therefore creating a calmer environment conducive for national development.
Arvind Gupta holds the Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in)
- Joined
- Feb 23, 2009
- Messages
- 5,419
- Likes
- 1,001
The article by Maneka Goswami is very illuminative. Thank you nrj for opening this thread.
I'd like to chip in with my 2 cents. While I am all for executive reform and some kind of Constitutional oversight over the Intelligence agencies, I'd like to suggest that a Parliamentary Standing Committee might not be the ideal method. I remember reading a book about an unauthorized history of the MI6 by one of its former sub-directors, that created a huge furore and was subsequently banned in the UK, that alleged that Parliamentary Standing Committees or British Senate Committees were exactly some of the ways that the Soviet NKVD deflected suspicion of activities involving the interception of communications between high-ranking members of the British and American governments by the famous Cambridge Five, and in particular by one of its members, Donald Mclean. Reference: the VENONA project.. I'm trying to recall the name of the book, but can't seem to find it online through possible name searches.
I'd suggest that a separate tribunal, to deal with cases involving agency excesses on the polity or civilian populace and to protect whistleblowers from the ravages of career politics; and an Ombudsman to investigate charges or suspicions of administrative, fidelious, financial or operational delinquency is the way to go for a country such as ours susceptible to Parliamentary and agency penetration.
I'd like to chip in with my 2 cents. While I am all for executive reform and some kind of Constitutional oversight over the Intelligence agencies, I'd like to suggest that a Parliamentary Standing Committee might not be the ideal method. I remember reading a book about an unauthorized history of the MI6 by one of its former sub-directors, that created a huge furore and was subsequently banned in the UK, that alleged that Parliamentary Standing Committees or British Senate Committees were exactly some of the ways that the Soviet NKVD deflected suspicion of activities involving the interception of communications between high-ranking members of the British and American governments by the famous Cambridge Five, and in particular by one of its members, Donald Mclean. Reference: the VENONA project.. I'm trying to recall the name of the book, but can't seem to find it online through possible name searches.
I'd suggest that a separate tribunal, to deal with cases involving agency excesses on the polity or civilian populace and to protect whistleblowers from the ravages of career politics; and an Ombudsman to investigate charges or suspicions of administrative, fidelious, financial or operational delinquency is the way to go for a country such as ours susceptible to Parliamentary and agency penetration.
Last edited:
nrj
Ambassador
- Joined
- Nov 16, 2009
- Messages
- 9,658
- Likes
- 3,911
While many of higher priority tasks like NSS formulation, recruitment reforms & granting sufficient cover to overseas operatives are pending from years; Govt will most likely pass bill for parliament supervision over intelligence agencies in this December. I think its totally ridiculous.
Numerous expert recommendations demanded by govt bodies itself are due even today after kargil & parliament attack. These intelligence reforms should be utmost priority when internal/external security conflicts are only going to intensify.
Numerous expert recommendations demanded by govt bodies itself are due even today after kargil & parliament attack. These intelligence reforms should be utmost priority when internal/external security conflicts are only going to intensify.
Last edited:
nrj
Ambassador
- Joined
- Nov 16, 2009
- Messages
- 9,658
- Likes
- 3,911
This is Vikram Sood in 2006. A good read.
Intelligence reform or Perish
Unless someone has the wisdom of a sage, he cannot use spies; unless he is benevolent and righteous, he cannot employ spies; unless he is subtle and perspicacious, he cannot perceive the substance in intelligence reports. It is subtle, subtle, subtle. – Sun Tzu, The Art of War
This quotation has been cited by Philip Knightley in his book, "The Second Oldest Profession." The book is about spies and spying in the twentieth century and not necessarily something that is very complimentary to the trade although Knightley also quotes a former CIA counsel, Michael J Barrett who said "Espionage is the world's second oldest profession and just as honourable as the first." GC "Gary" Saxena, Chief of the Research and Analysis Wing in the 1980s quoting others used to say that intelligence was a game nations played and that it was a dirty game best played by men of honour.
Espionage is indeed as old as history. Chandragupta ran his espionage service for his Emperor, Ashoka, so did Emperor Akbar where he had his 4000 spies some of who reported to his National Security Council every evening. Delilah, the original honey trap, was a spy for the Philistines but later Mata Hari was a failure; Moses ran his espionage service and, at the time of Queen Elizabeth I, Sir Francis Walsingham ran a security service free of cost to Her Majesty. Yet later in history, major powers went to war without an intelligence service. When the French went to war with Germany in 1870 it had no secret service because it had no money for this sort of activity. Two days after the war started, the French allocated 1 million francs to start an espionage service but Colonel Rollin, the man asked to start this remarked, "It was too late. Such a service cannot be improvised. It must be built up in the leisure of time."
This is a fundamental truth very often forgotten by political masters. Intelligence is something vague and intangible for a politician to pay too much attention. It is neither a vote catcher, nor can it exhibit success in a way that a politician's fortunes could soar. It is not like building a bund or a road that every can see. Only those who have a strategic vision and security consciousness understand this game.
The United States went through the Second World War without a formal human intelligence service. In fact it was the last major power to have a formal and proper intelligence service. And when it did have a formal intelligence service it missed out vital clues and could not predict the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union or even Pokhran II or the September 11 attacks. After the War, in pursuit of its global interests, the intelligence set-ups in the US and the Soviet Union expanded phenomenally as they fought their Cold War. US intelligence became known more for its covert actions across the globe and by the end of the 1970s more than 200,000 persons were employed in the business of collection of intelligence US.
The process of intelligence collection and its targets have changed with the revolution in technology, communications and the changing nature of threats. The covert action option is more readily exercised by major powers in protecting or enhancing its state interests. The traditional spy was in Graham Greene's novels or in those much earlier by John Buchan, where the spy was either a "static" or "stationary" in a foreign country or was an "itinerant" who moved in and out of the target area. The task of such a spy usually was to cover docks, bridges, telegraph lines or whatever, pinch a document if possible and prepare reports with an essentially military objective.
Today, with communications and transport revolution the handler no longer has to be in the same place as the agent being run by him. Internet, satellite phones and cell phones have ensured that. Satellite imagery and satellite communication monitoring has meant that all activity in target areas is totally covered - twenty-four hours, seven days a week. Technical espionage with the more glamorous gizmo has burgeoned to overtake human intelligence (HUMINT). Consequently, over time HUMINT considered to be a stodgy poor relation and old fashioned and definitely more difficult, took a back seat creating a vast gap not only in the collection of vital information but also in assessment and analysis.
External and internal intelligence are two essential ingredients of statecraft of any government. The former is the sword and the latter is the shield. Their effectiveness depends on how they are used not just by the government of the day but over a sustained period of time. This in turn depends on whether or not a country and its government have a strategic security concept or is interested merely in keeping crime off the streets, has no regional or other goals and really has no secrets to hide. In such cases all a country needs is a local criminal investigation department to hunt criminals and solve crime. The US did not have a formal internal intelligence service when Sep 11, 2001 happened but that was under the belief that the US was so secure and so immensely popular in the world that it had no internal threat. What it had was an investigation agency in the FBI and the gigantic and super-secret National Security Agency for technological snooping along with a host of other agencies – 19 in all.
In India, intelligence at the time of independence symbolised ultimate and secret imperial power that helped its masters hunt Indian nationalists or kept a watch on Indian dissidents. It was a government agency that had been run by the British with Indian employees to serve imperial interests and was therefore viewed as a successor to imperial power. It was something nasty and hateful. Soon after independence and for many years after that, there was suspicion, fear or contempt about intelligence activities.
The main charter in the early days for Indian intelligence was the Communist threat as it was in the British system and Pakistan became the new add-on. The Telengana uprising and the Pakistani misadventures into Kashmir immediately after independence bolstered these two threats. The 1962 and 1965 wars with China and Pakistan eventually led to the creation of the R&AW, just as years later, the Kargil war led to the creation of the Defence Intelligence Agency, the National Technical Facilities (renamed Research) Organisation and several other organisations meant to smoothen intelligence coordination and assessment.
Since the R&AW was born of the IB, in the initial years officers from the IB who were, almost without exception, from the Indian Police, manned it. Like in every service some made superb and successful external intelligence officers and some did not. It was Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the R&AW's founding fathers, Rameshwar Nath Kao and Sankaran Nair, who repeatedly stressed that the R&AW should not become just another police organisation, and should have talent from wherever they could find, including other services of the Government of India. Recruitment to what would be a new service began in 1971 and many other lateral entrants later got absorbed in a service that became their new life. The R&AW went through its roller coaster fortunes with Morarji Desai the impractical moralist who single handedly went about denigrating and curtailing an agency barely six years old and a successful one at that. It set back the agency by several years and a restive staff added to their problems. It began to get back into recognition from the mid-80s because the good fortune of both – an able organisational leadership and a political leadership that had a strategic mindset that felt the need for a sharp external service.
Inevitably, as it happens in India, success brings envy and suspicion. We are particularly adept at damaging our own instruments of power and governance. The R&AW was subjected to reviews and committees periodically and the attempt has been to progressively exercise external control. The professionals in the organisation would accept controls and supervision if other professionals exercise it. Instead, the consistent attempt has been to tinker in the name of reform and exercise control. The result has been increasing bureaucratisation of a profession, which, by nature has to be unconventional, and needs imaginative handling far removed from stodgy bureaucrats who feel comfortable working in carefully structured and rigid systems. On the other hand, the head of an intelligence organisation must have the freedom to deploy and re-deploy men and material according to perceived threats. Such agencies must have what they call a "surge capacity"; that is an ability, flexibility and freedom to surge the forces in one direction if need be. Of course, there have to be some checks and balances as it cannot have an intelligence agency out of control like in Pakistan.
Quite often the role of India's two agencies, the IB and R&AW are considered as having common objectives and methods and therefore assumed that personnel are interchangeable. This is not so. The IB is the internal service, operating within the country also called the Security Service while the R&AW is the external service operating outside the country and often referred to as the Secret Intelligence Service. The former operates within and armed with the law of the country while the latter operates outside the realm of law of the country to which assigned. The Internal service makes patriots out of ordinary and sometimes extraordinary persons; the latter suborns and makes traitors out of ordinary citizens. The former has the protection of law, the latter does not. The former may not need to learn a new language or adjust to alien customs, the latter is useless without this ability. The two professions are similar in that they are secret and relate to security and espionage. But the talent required and the environment is totally different.
The biggest dangers to intelligence services in India are subversion by external forces and the politicisation of the agencies where the internal agency assumes that security of the state is the same thing as the security of the government while the external agency gets policised. The Security Service of the UK (better known as MI 5) and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI 6) are what their names signify. The former has more police functions, provides security to the State and not to a Government against its domestic political rivals and the latter has no police functions and provides intelligence about the external enemies of the State. Sourcing for recruitment is different.
If there is one lesson from September 11, 2001 – and there are many – and that is that one may have innumerable intelligence agencies including the behemoth called the NSA, the world's largest, most secret, and most advanced spy organisation, no technical input will be enough without humint and interpretation of this technical intelligence. James Bamford describes it best in his book ("The Body of Secrets") when he says that in Crypto City, scientists work on the largest collection of hyperpowerful computers, there are advanced mathematicians and language experts covering all parts of the globe. Time in Crypto City is measured in femtoseconds – one million billionth of a second. Scientists work in secret to develop computers that will perform more than one septillion operations every second. A septillion is the figure 1 with 24 zeros. Mercifully India does not need such an expensive arrangement as our interests are nowhere near as global as the US. But did all this elaborate arrangement prevent 9/11? Will it in the future? The answer to both is a definite no in the first case and a probable no in the second. The only thing that can be said with certainty is that the chances of detection would improve with a better humint capability.
This brings us to the subject of recruitment and in house maintenance of the intelligence cadres. Recruitment will have to depend on the nature of evolving and existing threats. The technological revolution that the world has witnessed since the 1990s, and there is no knowing where it will lead us in the future, means that the threat has altered considerably from what existed in the 1990s. Cheap and advanced technology is now available virtually on the streets. The threats ahead are technology and nano-technology based; catastrophic terrorism, cyber terrorism, remote control missile attacks and virtual wars are the new threats. International trade and commercial transactions have become faster and more intricate; banking transactions move at the speed of lightning. IT-driven globalisation also covers the criminal world. Interaction between narcotics smugglers, arms merchants, human traffickers and terrorists is much easier, faster and safer. They all have access to sophisticated denial and deception techniques. One is not even talking about radical religious terrorists.
The age of the generalist and the bird of passage is surely over. An officer on deputation comes without area expertise, language skills and does not necessarily have the attitude, time or incentive to acquire these skills during his tenure long or short. The chief motive of such an officer on deputation is to hope for a comfortable foreign assignment without adding much to the experience basket of the organisation. Officers on deputation these days come with additional baggage – most are politicised or unwanted in the states. It is, therefore, a fallacy to assume that salvation of intelligence organisations lies through greater induction from existing services.
An intelligence agency can be effective in its national effort only if it is manned by men and women of talent, ability, commitment and expertise. Unfortunately this talent and expertise or commitment is no longer available in the civil service. The R&AW and the IB need more and more professional intelligence officers who are home grown, who are assisted by a never ending supply of qualified economists, scientists, computer whiz kids, mathematicians, and experts in international banking and finance. Area and subject expertise gets built in-house over a period of time. Such talents do not come cheap; nor do security or preservation and enhancement of the country's interest. Recruitment has to be from the open market offering competitive remunerations, fast tracks for the efficient and an exit for others. The need is for a thoroughly professional intelligence corps and not one that functions on the basis of its origins, which is normally a recruitment examination passed several years ago or served by those who consider the R&AW to be a temporary safe haven from uncomfortable state cadres.
Recruitment to the civil services is not a selection process but merely an elimination process and not an assessment of merit or aptitude. Besides the wages are not attractive enough nor is career advancement any better. The civil service is no longer the career of first choice for most. The civil service age limit is high, by the time a probationer becomes an officer he is quite often in his late 20s. If he joins the R&AW after three years' service elsewhere, he is nearly thirty or more; besides being married and father/mother of at least one child. Such a person is just too distracted, too old to be molded into anything new and it is not his/her fault. The esprit de corps required in a secret organisation just does not get cultivated with people who are already set in their ways and lives. In secret organisations, honour and élan are the two most important motivations, especially because there is no public recognition of achievements and there is general public skepticism about such organisations. There is usually envy for the external and fear of the internal service, which is why bashing the external boys is so much easier and appears self-justified.
Speaking of honour, Rabinder Singh and Ujjwal Dasgupta fell because they were not men of honour. They fell because they were weak. One cannot say that men and women disgrace themselves merely because they are in touch with foreigners; external intelligence cannot be collected without access to foreigners. External liaison is legitimate if officially authorised and need not lead to a person being suborned; it is when intelligence liaison is unauthorised that it becomes illicit and dangerous.
We are going to make a grave mistake by adhering to archaic practices just because that has always been the case. There is need to change all this given the new and other enhanced threats. If we do not, we will ultimately have a non-functioning agency that will fail the government and the people every time. We simply must professionalise or perish.
Vikram Sood
VIKRAM SOOD'S PERSPECTIVES...: Intelligence reform or Perish
Intelligence reform or Perish
Unless someone has the wisdom of a sage, he cannot use spies; unless he is benevolent and righteous, he cannot employ spies; unless he is subtle and perspicacious, he cannot perceive the substance in intelligence reports. It is subtle, subtle, subtle. – Sun Tzu, The Art of War
This quotation has been cited by Philip Knightley in his book, "The Second Oldest Profession." The book is about spies and spying in the twentieth century and not necessarily something that is very complimentary to the trade although Knightley also quotes a former CIA counsel, Michael J Barrett who said "Espionage is the world's second oldest profession and just as honourable as the first." GC "Gary" Saxena, Chief of the Research and Analysis Wing in the 1980s quoting others used to say that intelligence was a game nations played and that it was a dirty game best played by men of honour.
Espionage is indeed as old as history. Chandragupta ran his espionage service for his Emperor, Ashoka, so did Emperor Akbar where he had his 4000 spies some of who reported to his National Security Council every evening. Delilah, the original honey trap, was a spy for the Philistines but later Mata Hari was a failure; Moses ran his espionage service and, at the time of Queen Elizabeth I, Sir Francis Walsingham ran a security service free of cost to Her Majesty. Yet later in history, major powers went to war without an intelligence service. When the French went to war with Germany in 1870 it had no secret service because it had no money for this sort of activity. Two days after the war started, the French allocated 1 million francs to start an espionage service but Colonel Rollin, the man asked to start this remarked, "It was too late. Such a service cannot be improvised. It must be built up in the leisure of time."
This is a fundamental truth very often forgotten by political masters. Intelligence is something vague and intangible for a politician to pay too much attention. It is neither a vote catcher, nor can it exhibit success in a way that a politician's fortunes could soar. It is not like building a bund or a road that every can see. Only those who have a strategic vision and security consciousness understand this game.
The United States went through the Second World War without a formal human intelligence service. In fact it was the last major power to have a formal and proper intelligence service. And when it did have a formal intelligence service it missed out vital clues and could not predict the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union or even Pokhran II or the September 11 attacks. After the War, in pursuit of its global interests, the intelligence set-ups in the US and the Soviet Union expanded phenomenally as they fought their Cold War. US intelligence became known more for its covert actions across the globe and by the end of the 1970s more than 200,000 persons were employed in the business of collection of intelligence US.
The process of intelligence collection and its targets have changed with the revolution in technology, communications and the changing nature of threats. The covert action option is more readily exercised by major powers in protecting or enhancing its state interests. The traditional spy was in Graham Greene's novels or in those much earlier by John Buchan, where the spy was either a "static" or "stationary" in a foreign country or was an "itinerant" who moved in and out of the target area. The task of such a spy usually was to cover docks, bridges, telegraph lines or whatever, pinch a document if possible and prepare reports with an essentially military objective.
Today, with communications and transport revolution the handler no longer has to be in the same place as the agent being run by him. Internet, satellite phones and cell phones have ensured that. Satellite imagery and satellite communication monitoring has meant that all activity in target areas is totally covered - twenty-four hours, seven days a week. Technical espionage with the more glamorous gizmo has burgeoned to overtake human intelligence (HUMINT). Consequently, over time HUMINT considered to be a stodgy poor relation and old fashioned and definitely more difficult, took a back seat creating a vast gap not only in the collection of vital information but also in assessment and analysis.
External and internal intelligence are two essential ingredients of statecraft of any government. The former is the sword and the latter is the shield. Their effectiveness depends on how they are used not just by the government of the day but over a sustained period of time. This in turn depends on whether or not a country and its government have a strategic security concept or is interested merely in keeping crime off the streets, has no regional or other goals and really has no secrets to hide. In such cases all a country needs is a local criminal investigation department to hunt criminals and solve crime. The US did not have a formal internal intelligence service when Sep 11, 2001 happened but that was under the belief that the US was so secure and so immensely popular in the world that it had no internal threat. What it had was an investigation agency in the FBI and the gigantic and super-secret National Security Agency for technological snooping along with a host of other agencies – 19 in all.
In India, intelligence at the time of independence symbolised ultimate and secret imperial power that helped its masters hunt Indian nationalists or kept a watch on Indian dissidents. It was a government agency that had been run by the British with Indian employees to serve imperial interests and was therefore viewed as a successor to imperial power. It was something nasty and hateful. Soon after independence and for many years after that, there was suspicion, fear or contempt about intelligence activities.
The main charter in the early days for Indian intelligence was the Communist threat as it was in the British system and Pakistan became the new add-on. The Telengana uprising and the Pakistani misadventures into Kashmir immediately after independence bolstered these two threats. The 1962 and 1965 wars with China and Pakistan eventually led to the creation of the R&AW, just as years later, the Kargil war led to the creation of the Defence Intelligence Agency, the National Technical Facilities (renamed Research) Organisation and several other organisations meant to smoothen intelligence coordination and assessment.
Since the R&AW was born of the IB, in the initial years officers from the IB who were, almost without exception, from the Indian Police, manned it. Like in every service some made superb and successful external intelligence officers and some did not. It was Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the R&AW's founding fathers, Rameshwar Nath Kao and Sankaran Nair, who repeatedly stressed that the R&AW should not become just another police organisation, and should have talent from wherever they could find, including other services of the Government of India. Recruitment to what would be a new service began in 1971 and many other lateral entrants later got absorbed in a service that became their new life. The R&AW went through its roller coaster fortunes with Morarji Desai the impractical moralist who single handedly went about denigrating and curtailing an agency barely six years old and a successful one at that. It set back the agency by several years and a restive staff added to their problems. It began to get back into recognition from the mid-80s because the good fortune of both – an able organisational leadership and a political leadership that had a strategic mindset that felt the need for a sharp external service.
Inevitably, as it happens in India, success brings envy and suspicion. We are particularly adept at damaging our own instruments of power and governance. The R&AW was subjected to reviews and committees periodically and the attempt has been to progressively exercise external control. The professionals in the organisation would accept controls and supervision if other professionals exercise it. Instead, the consistent attempt has been to tinker in the name of reform and exercise control. The result has been increasing bureaucratisation of a profession, which, by nature has to be unconventional, and needs imaginative handling far removed from stodgy bureaucrats who feel comfortable working in carefully structured and rigid systems. On the other hand, the head of an intelligence organisation must have the freedom to deploy and re-deploy men and material according to perceived threats. Such agencies must have what they call a "surge capacity"; that is an ability, flexibility and freedom to surge the forces in one direction if need be. Of course, there have to be some checks and balances as it cannot have an intelligence agency out of control like in Pakistan.
Quite often the role of India's two agencies, the IB and R&AW are considered as having common objectives and methods and therefore assumed that personnel are interchangeable. This is not so. The IB is the internal service, operating within the country also called the Security Service while the R&AW is the external service operating outside the country and often referred to as the Secret Intelligence Service. The former operates within and armed with the law of the country while the latter operates outside the realm of law of the country to which assigned. The Internal service makes patriots out of ordinary and sometimes extraordinary persons; the latter suborns and makes traitors out of ordinary citizens. The former has the protection of law, the latter does not. The former may not need to learn a new language or adjust to alien customs, the latter is useless without this ability. The two professions are similar in that they are secret and relate to security and espionage. But the talent required and the environment is totally different.
The biggest dangers to intelligence services in India are subversion by external forces and the politicisation of the agencies where the internal agency assumes that security of the state is the same thing as the security of the government while the external agency gets policised. The Security Service of the UK (better known as MI 5) and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI 6) are what their names signify. The former has more police functions, provides security to the State and not to a Government against its domestic political rivals and the latter has no police functions and provides intelligence about the external enemies of the State. Sourcing for recruitment is different.
If there is one lesson from September 11, 2001 – and there are many – and that is that one may have innumerable intelligence agencies including the behemoth called the NSA, the world's largest, most secret, and most advanced spy organisation, no technical input will be enough without humint and interpretation of this technical intelligence. James Bamford describes it best in his book ("The Body of Secrets") when he says that in Crypto City, scientists work on the largest collection of hyperpowerful computers, there are advanced mathematicians and language experts covering all parts of the globe. Time in Crypto City is measured in femtoseconds – one million billionth of a second. Scientists work in secret to develop computers that will perform more than one septillion operations every second. A septillion is the figure 1 with 24 zeros. Mercifully India does not need such an expensive arrangement as our interests are nowhere near as global as the US. But did all this elaborate arrangement prevent 9/11? Will it in the future? The answer to both is a definite no in the first case and a probable no in the second. The only thing that can be said with certainty is that the chances of detection would improve with a better humint capability.
This brings us to the subject of recruitment and in house maintenance of the intelligence cadres. Recruitment will have to depend on the nature of evolving and existing threats. The technological revolution that the world has witnessed since the 1990s, and there is no knowing where it will lead us in the future, means that the threat has altered considerably from what existed in the 1990s. Cheap and advanced technology is now available virtually on the streets. The threats ahead are technology and nano-technology based; catastrophic terrorism, cyber terrorism, remote control missile attacks and virtual wars are the new threats. International trade and commercial transactions have become faster and more intricate; banking transactions move at the speed of lightning. IT-driven globalisation also covers the criminal world. Interaction between narcotics smugglers, arms merchants, human traffickers and terrorists is much easier, faster and safer. They all have access to sophisticated denial and deception techniques. One is not even talking about radical religious terrorists.
The age of the generalist and the bird of passage is surely over. An officer on deputation comes without area expertise, language skills and does not necessarily have the attitude, time or incentive to acquire these skills during his tenure long or short. The chief motive of such an officer on deputation is to hope for a comfortable foreign assignment without adding much to the experience basket of the organisation. Officers on deputation these days come with additional baggage – most are politicised or unwanted in the states. It is, therefore, a fallacy to assume that salvation of intelligence organisations lies through greater induction from existing services.
An intelligence agency can be effective in its national effort only if it is manned by men and women of talent, ability, commitment and expertise. Unfortunately this talent and expertise or commitment is no longer available in the civil service. The R&AW and the IB need more and more professional intelligence officers who are home grown, who are assisted by a never ending supply of qualified economists, scientists, computer whiz kids, mathematicians, and experts in international banking and finance. Area and subject expertise gets built in-house over a period of time. Such talents do not come cheap; nor do security or preservation and enhancement of the country's interest. Recruitment has to be from the open market offering competitive remunerations, fast tracks for the efficient and an exit for others. The need is for a thoroughly professional intelligence corps and not one that functions on the basis of its origins, which is normally a recruitment examination passed several years ago or served by those who consider the R&AW to be a temporary safe haven from uncomfortable state cadres.
Recruitment to the civil services is not a selection process but merely an elimination process and not an assessment of merit or aptitude. Besides the wages are not attractive enough nor is career advancement any better. The civil service is no longer the career of first choice for most. The civil service age limit is high, by the time a probationer becomes an officer he is quite often in his late 20s. If he joins the R&AW after three years' service elsewhere, he is nearly thirty or more; besides being married and father/mother of at least one child. Such a person is just too distracted, too old to be molded into anything new and it is not his/her fault. The esprit de corps required in a secret organisation just does not get cultivated with people who are already set in their ways and lives. In secret organisations, honour and élan are the two most important motivations, especially because there is no public recognition of achievements and there is general public skepticism about such organisations. There is usually envy for the external and fear of the internal service, which is why bashing the external boys is so much easier and appears self-justified.
Speaking of honour, Rabinder Singh and Ujjwal Dasgupta fell because they were not men of honour. They fell because they were weak. One cannot say that men and women disgrace themselves merely because they are in touch with foreigners; external intelligence cannot be collected without access to foreigners. External liaison is legitimate if officially authorised and need not lead to a person being suborned; it is when intelligence liaison is unauthorised that it becomes illicit and dangerous.
We are going to make a grave mistake by adhering to archaic practices just because that has always been the case. There is need to change all this given the new and other enhanced threats. If we do not, we will ultimately have a non-functioning agency that will fail the government and the people every time. We simply must professionalise or perish.
Vikram Sood
VIKRAM SOOD'S PERSPECTIVES...: Intelligence reform or Perish
nrj
Ambassador
- Joined
- Nov 16, 2009
- Messages
- 9,658
- Likes
- 3,911
RAT-TRAP INTELLIGENCE
Traditionally, intelligence reforms in India have had two main characteristics. They have been episodic and have been carried out by the government, either through appointed committees or in-house. The 1962 conflict with China was followed by the creation of new organisations like the Aviation Research Centre (ARC), the Sasashtra Seema Bal (SSB) and so on. The 1965 war with Pakistan and the Mizo insurgency led to the creation of the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW). The Kargil conflict in 1999 led to the creation of the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) and Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) as recommended by the Intelligence Review Committee, which was headed by former governor and R&AW head GC Saxena. Post Mumbai 2008, we have the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) and the National Intelligence Grid on the anvil.
In-house reviews have had limited mandates and were really cadre reviews. There has never been any reform that takes a long-term security perspective and then work-out what kind of an intelligence system would be required to meet such needs.
It is, therefore, refreshing to see that think-tanks based in New Delhi have begun to examine this important matter and, presumably, their recommendations will reach the government. This, however, is a limited way of the outside looking in. The danger is that these exercises can become academic. For instance, a comparison with the intelligence supervision practices in Australia, New Zealand or Canada, to seek role models for what India should adopt, would be misplaced. The security risks in these countries, the size of their population and its demographic mix, and their neighbourhoods are totally different. We have to evolve our own systems and not copy systems that have worked elsewhere.
The current discourse on intelligence reform gives the impression that while the subject is intelligence reform, all the examples cited relate to R&AW. On the contrary, intelligence reforms have to be examined in their totality, including all the intelligence services like the Intelligence Bureau (IB), DIA, Military Intelligence (MI) and NTRO (which remained headless for over five months, a reflection of the government's attitude towards intelligence organisations), and not restricting the review to just one organisation. This needs to be corrected.
Intelligence is not available at the flick of a button. We all know that intelligence networks are built in the fullness of time and not when the crisis is upon us. Developing an intelligence report is a painstaking effort requiring multiple expertise, including 'humint' and 'techint' of different kinds. This has to be backed by area, language and subject expertise built over a long time.
Recruitment has to be at a young age so that the recruits can be moulded before attitudes and mindsets firm up, or they get too old to take chances in the field - the only way an intelligence officer develops the ability to analyse and assess. It takes five to ten years to inculcate expertise in a young recruit at the junior level; there is no overnight expertise. Operational intelligence requires different expertise and aptitudes. An intelligence agency must continue to have covert and 'psy-war' capabilities which have long gestations; these cannot be empirically measured but have to be consistently pursued and continuously honed.
Any reform must examine the kind of human capabilities that will be required in the future, and whether the existing pattern of recruitment and compensation is adequate today and will remain so in the times ahead. There has to be a system that ensures the organisation continues to get the appropriate kind of human material that forms the core of the organisation, and also that the agency has access to external expertise from time to time. The reforms must look at the system of control and management, and whether the secretariat system has been good for the organisations where careers are linked to prospects outside the organisation and not within. Since intelligence agencies are specialised agencies and do not compete with general appointments, they should have their own stream of career progression, independent of the career paths in the rest of the civil service.
We live in a world that is seeing rapidly changing threat perceptions. Intelligence agencies have to be flexible to meet any evolving threat. At present, there is hardly any surge capability where the agency can, on its own, shift manpower and resources to meet the new threat. The process that exists today is far too cumbersome and slow to allow any rapid redeployment. By the time any new system is put into place the quarry would have moved on, either morphed into something different, or grown so big that the changes originally proposed become inadequate.
The head of an intelligence organisation must have the flexibility and authority to move men and material around. One cannot think of annual reviews of performance if the process of obtaining sanctions for even relocating manpower and acquiring additional equipment has to be sought from structures governed by persons removed from the scene of action.
There cannot be accountability without a charter for the intelligence organisations and the empowerment of their heads. Only when there is a legal charter - accompanied by powers vested in the man leading the organisation to deliver the results - can one think of accountability.
Empowerment, trust and charter go hand in hand. Otherwise, we would end up creating new power centres and vested interests that would act as a deterrent to the organisation and not serve any purpose. In our zeal to control and supervise, we run the danger of creating multiple controls and stifling intelligence organisations.
It would somewhat be like the Russian Babushka dolls - symbolic and decorative, but of little practical use. At least, the dolls have some purpose; in the context of security, multiplicity of organisations under multiple scrutiny would only hamstring the agencies. They will continue to be unable to deliver to the degree required, or even worse, fail.
Merely stressing on accountability and oversight would be misplaced. This is perhaps based on the impression that intelligence is generally considered evil because it is secret, therefore it must be controlled. This leads to the bizarre expectation among some wise people that intelligence agencies and their collection methods should be made transparent. In this context, intelligence agencies have to be protected against disclosures of locations of facilities, names of officers and other personnel, and other sensitive details that would help the adversary and harm the conduct of operations as well as the security of the country.
So, while oversight and co-ordination are good catchphrases, the point is by whom and to what extent? We thus have to be careful and not follow the western example where the experience has been different. Out there, too many multiple controls have not been an unmitigated success and coordination among multiple agencies remains a problem despite the best of intentions. Intelligence agencies work best under a single chain of command, and multiplicity of controls and supervisory agencies leads to confusion. They work even better when the chief executive of a country takes an active interest in their output and well-being.
There is a suggestion that operational details or secret service funds be subjected to external scrutiny. This means that there has to be scrutiny of intelligence operations and sources by external agencies/bodies. This is absolutely unthinkable.
While trying to improve the inner working of intelligence agencies it would be dangerous to adopt the human rights approach. Intelligence agencies in an autocratic regime act to preserve that autocracy. In a democracy they act to preserve democracy and the nation. But intelligence agencies cannot themselves practise democracy or human rights. It is not in the nature of their working ethos. The ideal for some is to have an intelligence agency that is as hard as nails on the outside and soft as chocolate from the inside. RTIs and PILs are best discouraged unless we are determined to expose all our working methods to those against whom these resources are used. This cannot be.
There are other misconceptions too. Intelligence agencies do not conduct rescue operations of hostages or do make policies in democratic countries, nor should they. They only provide inputs, but the ultimate decision to negotiate and the mandate of the negotiators are determined by political considerations. Intelligence agencies become all powerful in autocratic and military regimes, for instance, in the erstwhile Soviet Union, Egypt, Pakistan etc. In situations where the 'civil society' is concerned with the functioning of intelligence agencies, surely, there has to be a quid pro quo.
It would be unrealistic to state that intelligence agencies do not have their shortcomings, but they are not all of their own making. The rest of us have contributed by either being indiscreet, indifferent or even hostile. It is true that sometimes intelligence agencies have failed to deliver and that, unfortunately, is what they are known for - their failures. Their successes are left untold except to those who need to know.
Reform is essential in society and its instruments of governance. To deny this would be to live in bigotry. But there have to be some yardsticks to judge whether or not the reforms would indeed accomplish what they set out to do. The reform process must begin with empathy that seeks to improve, and not suspicion that seeks to control.
A full and comprehensive review must, therefore, look ahead and assess the perceived threats to the country, and then recommend what kind of an intelligence agency would best serve the security and national interests of the country in the next 15-20 years. Simultaneously, the head of the organisation should be empowered to act to fulfil that charter. This means he must have the authority to hire and fire experts, fast-track or discard, and the capacity to surge his deployment according to security needs and not be dependent on the wisdom or lack of it in some other corner of the government. The review should ideally address the needs of an organisation in terms of personnel, materials and resources for the future. It should address the specialised needs of an organisation with different skill sets. If it merely concentrates on chopping and controlling, it is destined to fail.
The writer is former secretary, Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW)
RAT-TRAP INTELLIGENCE | Hard News
Traditionally, intelligence reforms in India have had two main characteristics. They have been episodic and have been carried out by the government, either through appointed committees or in-house. The 1962 conflict with China was followed by the creation of new organisations like the Aviation Research Centre (ARC), the Sasashtra Seema Bal (SSB) and so on. The 1965 war with Pakistan and the Mizo insurgency led to the creation of the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW). The Kargil conflict in 1999 led to the creation of the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) and Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) as recommended by the Intelligence Review Committee, which was headed by former governor and R&AW head GC Saxena. Post Mumbai 2008, we have the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) and the National Intelligence Grid on the anvil.
In-house reviews have had limited mandates and were really cadre reviews. There has never been any reform that takes a long-term security perspective and then work-out what kind of an intelligence system would be required to meet such needs.
It is, therefore, refreshing to see that think-tanks based in New Delhi have begun to examine this important matter and, presumably, their recommendations will reach the government. This, however, is a limited way of the outside looking in. The danger is that these exercises can become academic. For instance, a comparison with the intelligence supervision practices in Australia, New Zealand or Canada, to seek role models for what India should adopt, would be misplaced. The security risks in these countries, the size of their population and its demographic mix, and their neighbourhoods are totally different. We have to evolve our own systems and not copy systems that have worked elsewhere.
The current discourse on intelligence reform gives the impression that while the subject is intelligence reform, all the examples cited relate to R&AW. On the contrary, intelligence reforms have to be examined in their totality, including all the intelligence services like the Intelligence Bureau (IB), DIA, Military Intelligence (MI) and NTRO (which remained headless for over five months, a reflection of the government's attitude towards intelligence organisations), and not restricting the review to just one organisation. This needs to be corrected.
Intelligence is not available at the flick of a button. We all know that intelligence networks are built in the fullness of time and not when the crisis is upon us. Developing an intelligence report is a painstaking effort requiring multiple expertise, including 'humint' and 'techint' of different kinds. This has to be backed by area, language and subject expertise built over a long time.
Recruitment has to be at a young age so that the recruits can be moulded before attitudes and mindsets firm up, or they get too old to take chances in the field - the only way an intelligence officer develops the ability to analyse and assess. It takes five to ten years to inculcate expertise in a young recruit at the junior level; there is no overnight expertise. Operational intelligence requires different expertise and aptitudes. An intelligence agency must continue to have covert and 'psy-war' capabilities which have long gestations; these cannot be empirically measured but have to be consistently pursued and continuously honed.
Any reform must examine the kind of human capabilities that will be required in the future, and whether the existing pattern of recruitment and compensation is adequate today and will remain so in the times ahead. There has to be a system that ensures the organisation continues to get the appropriate kind of human material that forms the core of the organisation, and also that the agency has access to external expertise from time to time. The reforms must look at the system of control and management, and whether the secretariat system has been good for the organisations where careers are linked to prospects outside the organisation and not within. Since intelligence agencies are specialised agencies and do not compete with general appointments, they should have their own stream of career progression, independent of the career paths in the rest of the civil service.
We live in a world that is seeing rapidly changing threat perceptions. Intelligence agencies have to be flexible to meet any evolving threat. At present, there is hardly any surge capability where the agency can, on its own, shift manpower and resources to meet the new threat. The process that exists today is far too cumbersome and slow to allow any rapid redeployment. By the time any new system is put into place the quarry would have moved on, either morphed into something different, or grown so big that the changes originally proposed become inadequate.
The head of an intelligence organisation must have the flexibility and authority to move men and material around. One cannot think of annual reviews of performance if the process of obtaining sanctions for even relocating manpower and acquiring additional equipment has to be sought from structures governed by persons removed from the scene of action.
There cannot be accountability without a charter for the intelligence organisations and the empowerment of their heads. Only when there is a legal charter - accompanied by powers vested in the man leading the organisation to deliver the results - can one think of accountability.
Empowerment, trust and charter go hand in hand. Otherwise, we would end up creating new power centres and vested interests that would act as a deterrent to the organisation and not serve any purpose. In our zeal to control and supervise, we run the danger of creating multiple controls and stifling intelligence organisations.
It would somewhat be like the Russian Babushka dolls - symbolic and decorative, but of little practical use. At least, the dolls have some purpose; in the context of security, multiplicity of organisations under multiple scrutiny would only hamstring the agencies. They will continue to be unable to deliver to the degree required, or even worse, fail.
Merely stressing on accountability and oversight would be misplaced. This is perhaps based on the impression that intelligence is generally considered evil because it is secret, therefore it must be controlled. This leads to the bizarre expectation among some wise people that intelligence agencies and their collection methods should be made transparent. In this context, intelligence agencies have to be protected against disclosures of locations of facilities, names of officers and other personnel, and other sensitive details that would help the adversary and harm the conduct of operations as well as the security of the country.
So, while oversight and co-ordination are good catchphrases, the point is by whom and to what extent? We thus have to be careful and not follow the western example where the experience has been different. Out there, too many multiple controls have not been an unmitigated success and coordination among multiple agencies remains a problem despite the best of intentions. Intelligence agencies work best under a single chain of command, and multiplicity of controls and supervisory agencies leads to confusion. They work even better when the chief executive of a country takes an active interest in their output and well-being.
There is a suggestion that operational details or secret service funds be subjected to external scrutiny. This means that there has to be scrutiny of intelligence operations and sources by external agencies/bodies. This is absolutely unthinkable.
While trying to improve the inner working of intelligence agencies it would be dangerous to adopt the human rights approach. Intelligence agencies in an autocratic regime act to preserve that autocracy. In a democracy they act to preserve democracy and the nation. But intelligence agencies cannot themselves practise democracy or human rights. It is not in the nature of their working ethos. The ideal for some is to have an intelligence agency that is as hard as nails on the outside and soft as chocolate from the inside. RTIs and PILs are best discouraged unless we are determined to expose all our working methods to those against whom these resources are used. This cannot be.
There are other misconceptions too. Intelligence agencies do not conduct rescue operations of hostages or do make policies in democratic countries, nor should they. They only provide inputs, but the ultimate decision to negotiate and the mandate of the negotiators are determined by political considerations. Intelligence agencies become all powerful in autocratic and military regimes, for instance, in the erstwhile Soviet Union, Egypt, Pakistan etc. In situations where the 'civil society' is concerned with the functioning of intelligence agencies, surely, there has to be a quid pro quo.
It would be unrealistic to state that intelligence agencies do not have their shortcomings, but they are not all of their own making. The rest of us have contributed by either being indiscreet, indifferent or even hostile. It is true that sometimes intelligence agencies have failed to deliver and that, unfortunately, is what they are known for - their failures. Their successes are left untold except to those who need to know.
Reform is essential in society and its instruments of governance. To deny this would be to live in bigotry. But there have to be some yardsticks to judge whether or not the reforms would indeed accomplish what they set out to do. The reform process must begin with empathy that seeks to improve, and not suspicion that seeks to control.
A full and comprehensive review must, therefore, look ahead and assess the perceived threats to the country, and then recommend what kind of an intelligence agency would best serve the security and national interests of the country in the next 15-20 years. Simultaneously, the head of the organisation should be empowered to act to fulfil that charter. This means he must have the authority to hire and fire experts, fast-track or discard, and the capacity to surge his deployment according to security needs and not be dependent on the wisdom or lack of it in some other corner of the government. The review should ideally address the needs of an organisation in terms of personnel, materials and resources for the future. It should address the specialised needs of an organisation with different skill sets. If it merely concentrates on chopping and controlling, it is destined to fail.
The writer is former secretary, Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW)
RAT-TRAP INTELLIGENCE | Hard News
thakur_ritesh
Ambassador
- Joined
- Feb 19, 2009
- Messages
- 4,435
- Likes
- 1,733
NRJ,
Thanks for all the articles, some excellent articles in there.
@Topic
One really didn't need to read all those articles to get a sense of what all has happened in those reforms till date.
When manish tiwary introduced the bill on reforming the intelligence agencies, it immediately came across, what could be the hidden motive of the politicians? It is how our politicians are perceived as, and if they are suggesting they have the best interest, it ought to be their own best interest.
As Vikram Sood wrote, reforms have primarily meant more bureaucracy, more control of the politicians and babus, precisely what I pointed out to in that thread where the discussion was on manish tiwary's introduction of such a bill, and now there is another angle coming across, what happens to all that money that gets sanctioned and the real worry is where does it end up and why is no money returned at the end of the financial year.
I have at least, least expectations of anything good coming out of these reforms being talked about, and if past is anything to go by, we can be pretty sure, if at all, there will be halfhearted measures, or nothing will be implemented which helps the agencies in real time.
One of the more important message that needs to be understood well, and as put across by Vikarm Sood:
Hope our politicians are reading and understanding all this.
Thanks for all the articles, some excellent articles in there.
@Topic
One really didn't need to read all those articles to get a sense of what all has happened in those reforms till date.
When manish tiwary introduced the bill on reforming the intelligence agencies, it immediately came across, what could be the hidden motive of the politicians? It is how our politicians are perceived as, and if they are suggesting they have the best interest, it ought to be their own best interest.
As Vikram Sood wrote, reforms have primarily meant more bureaucracy, more control of the politicians and babus, precisely what I pointed out to in that thread where the discussion was on manish tiwary's introduction of such a bill, and now there is another angle coming across, what happens to all that money that gets sanctioned and the real worry is where does it end up and why is no money returned at the end of the financial year.
I have at least, least expectations of anything good coming out of these reforms being talked about, and if past is anything to go by, we can be pretty sure, if at all, there will be halfhearted measures, or nothing will be implemented which helps the agencies in real time.
One of the more important message that needs to be understood well, and as put across by Vikarm Sood:
Another of his suggestions, where it was suggested we don't try to follow too much of other countries' examples of reforming because what they face, the environment they work under, the threat perceptions they work under and the population they cater to are completely contrast to what one comes across in India, so it is best we device our own methods of working and checks and balances.
Hope our politicians are reading and understanding all this.
nrj
Ambassador
- Joined
- Nov 16, 2009
- Messages
- 9,658
- Likes
- 3,911
This Tiwari bill will be passed next month without opposition.
Parliamentary control over agencies is first step of reforms but its also disturbing since there is possibility of efficiency degradation. Other thing what I've understood from this bill is that, NSA will become key person with marginal decision power over these agencies.
Lot of things depend on how reforms are followed after this point. There shouldn't be hesitation to present draft of next overhaul stage when this bill is passed.
Here is another brilliant article by Mr.Sood. He is heavily influenced by Sun Tzu's thinking.
Parliamentary control over agencies is first step of reforms but its also disturbing since there is possibility of efficiency degradation. Other thing what I've understood from this bill is that, NSA will become key person with marginal decision power over these agencies.
Lot of things depend on how reforms are followed after this point. There shouldn't be hesitation to present draft of next overhaul stage when this bill is passed.
Here is another brilliant article by Mr.Sood. He is heavily influenced by Sun Tzu's thinking.
Intelligence Reform
nrj
The bill is a private member bill by Manish Tiwari and without UPA support I doubt it would pass. The UPA, left parties and the BJP should all back this bill so that we can clean out corruption and incompetence from our intelligence agencies. Its high time that this bill is passed.
It's time to pass Tiwari's bill on intelligence reforms
The late US Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan wrote in Secrecy: The American Experience (Yale, 1998) that the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco, which brought personal embarrassment to Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, could have been avoided if the CIA had studied a 1960 public opinion poll by Princeton's Institute for International Social Research. The poll clearly showed that there was no possibility of any shift in the Cuban public's allegiance to Fidel Castro. Ignoring this, the CIA mounted an ambitious operation to train and launch Cuban exiles for an "internal uprising" (17-19 April 1961), spending millions of dollars and ending up with 118 American deaths.
This national shame and subsequent Watergate abuses led to assertive Congressional oversight even on clandestine operations by scrutinizing intelligence budget. Their British "cousins" were slow to catch up till a series of intelligence controversies forced them to enact the 1989 Security Service Act and 1994 Intelligence Service Act codifying oversight on MI-5 (Internal), MI-6 (Foreign) and GCHQ (Technical). Christopher Andrew, chronicler of MI-5's official history, quotes military historian Sir Michael Howard on traditional British attitude: "In Britain the activities of the intelligence and security services have always been regarded in much the same light as intra-marital sex. Everyone knows that it goes on and is quite content that it should, but to speak, write or ask questions about it is regarded as bad form." It was no wonder that our own British modelled security bureaucracy took a dim view of my piece in a national daily on 27 April 1998, recommending institutional oversight on our intelligence agencies.
The bill by Manish Tiwari is trying to codify oversight on our three major intelligence agencies much on the same lines as the British laws.
Fortunately, there are signs of change. While our government continues with its negative attitude, Manish Tiwari, Congress spokesperson and MP, has introduced a private bill (The Intelligence Services — Powers & Regulation — Bill 2011) trying to codify oversight on our three major intelligence agencies (RAW, IB and NTRO) much on the same lines as the British laws. The draft bill provides fairly clear charter for each agency to prevent poaching on each other's turf. For example, IB is strictly to do "collection and management of intelligence within the country", restricting its creeping foreign presence. All agencies are forbidden to "take any action that furthers the interests of any political party or coalition of political parties or other such interest groups". They should send bi-annual reports with accounts to the Prime Minister. No intelligence chief can now hope to get gubernatorial appointments after retirement, being not "eligible for reappointment to any post under the State except as an Advisor to the Government of India". Like the UK's Intelligence & Security Committee, whose reports are available publicly, there will be a "National Intelligence and Security Oversight Committee" headed by the chairman of the Rajya Sabha. The proposed members are the Speaker, Prime Minister, Home Minister and Opposition leaders. Their annual reports are to be tabled in Parliament. There will also be an "Intelligence Ombudsman" to address departmental grievances and a "National Intelligence Tribunal" chaired by a retired Supreme Court judge to investigate public complaints. Then there are strict rules on electronic interception.
Surprisingly, the bill does not mention the National Security Adviser even once, appearing to make his office redundant. The most puzzling is the role of the Home Minister, whose only function is as member of the "National Intelligence and Security Oversight Committee".
In the UK, the concerned ministers (Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary for MI-6/GCHQ and Home Secretary for MI-5) are given lead roles in oversight functions, besides the PM. In the Indian version, too much responsibility is on the Prime Minister, as all activities are directly under him. However, an overburdened PM will surely delegate his responsibilities to his PMO, whose roles in the past were less than encouraging if we analyse how they failed on sensitive issues like the Coomer Narain spy case, intelligence integration on Kargil and 26/11, as well as the current 2G scam. Since the NSA has already managed to create a sizable bureaucracy, will it not be better to codify his role in intelligence integration without his being able to prevent direct access of intelligence chiefs to PM?
It might be also a good idea to expand the Ombudsman's charter to include the inspector general's powers provided under the US law of immediate internal scrutiny to prevent abuses.
The bill is a private member bill by Manish Tiwari and without UPA support I doubt it would pass. The UPA, left parties and the BJP should all back this bill so that we can clean out corruption and incompetence from our intelligence agencies. Its high time that this bill is passed.
It's time to pass Tiwari's bill on intelligence reforms
The late US Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan wrote in Secrecy: The American Experience (Yale, 1998) that the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco, which brought personal embarrassment to Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, could have been avoided if the CIA had studied a 1960 public opinion poll by Princeton's Institute for International Social Research. The poll clearly showed that there was no possibility of any shift in the Cuban public's allegiance to Fidel Castro. Ignoring this, the CIA mounted an ambitious operation to train and launch Cuban exiles for an "internal uprising" (17-19 April 1961), spending millions of dollars and ending up with 118 American deaths.
This national shame and subsequent Watergate abuses led to assertive Congressional oversight even on clandestine operations by scrutinizing intelligence budget. Their British "cousins" were slow to catch up till a series of intelligence controversies forced them to enact the 1989 Security Service Act and 1994 Intelligence Service Act codifying oversight on MI-5 (Internal), MI-6 (Foreign) and GCHQ (Technical). Christopher Andrew, chronicler of MI-5's official history, quotes military historian Sir Michael Howard on traditional British attitude: "In Britain the activities of the intelligence and security services have always been regarded in much the same light as intra-marital sex. Everyone knows that it goes on and is quite content that it should, but to speak, write or ask questions about it is regarded as bad form." It was no wonder that our own British modelled security bureaucracy took a dim view of my piece in a national daily on 27 April 1998, recommending institutional oversight on our intelligence agencies.
The bill by Manish Tiwari is trying to codify oversight on our three major intelligence agencies much on the same lines as the British laws.
Fortunately, there are signs of change. While our government continues with its negative attitude, Manish Tiwari, Congress spokesperson and MP, has introduced a private bill (The Intelligence Services — Powers & Regulation — Bill 2011) trying to codify oversight on our three major intelligence agencies (RAW, IB and NTRO) much on the same lines as the British laws. The draft bill provides fairly clear charter for each agency to prevent poaching on each other's turf. For example, IB is strictly to do "collection and management of intelligence within the country", restricting its creeping foreign presence. All agencies are forbidden to "take any action that furthers the interests of any political party or coalition of political parties or other such interest groups". They should send bi-annual reports with accounts to the Prime Minister. No intelligence chief can now hope to get gubernatorial appointments after retirement, being not "eligible for reappointment to any post under the State except as an Advisor to the Government of India". Like the UK's Intelligence & Security Committee, whose reports are available publicly, there will be a "National Intelligence and Security Oversight Committee" headed by the chairman of the Rajya Sabha. The proposed members are the Speaker, Prime Minister, Home Minister and Opposition leaders. Their annual reports are to be tabled in Parliament. There will also be an "Intelligence Ombudsman" to address departmental grievances and a "National Intelligence Tribunal" chaired by a retired Supreme Court judge to investigate public complaints. Then there are strict rules on electronic interception.
Surprisingly, the bill does not mention the National Security Adviser even once, appearing to make his office redundant. The most puzzling is the role of the Home Minister, whose only function is as member of the "National Intelligence and Security Oversight Committee".
In the UK, the concerned ministers (Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary for MI-6/GCHQ and Home Secretary for MI-5) are given lead roles in oversight functions, besides the PM. In the Indian version, too much responsibility is on the Prime Minister, as all activities are directly under him. However, an overburdened PM will surely delegate his responsibilities to his PMO, whose roles in the past were less than encouraging if we analyse how they failed on sensitive issues like the Coomer Narain spy case, intelligence integration on Kargil and 26/11, as well as the current 2G scam. Since the NSA has already managed to create a sizable bureaucracy, will it not be better to codify his role in intelligence integration without his being able to prevent direct access of intelligence chiefs to PM?
It might be also a good idea to expand the Ombudsman's charter to include the inspector general's powers provided under the US law of immediate internal scrutiny to prevent abuses.
- Joined
- Feb 23, 2009
- Messages
- 5,419
- Likes
- 1,001
It is, indeed, 'Spycatcher'! Thank you Syd. I was just told the name of the book by another friend, and was about to update the thread. But thank you, for putting this up.
I've not read 'Their Trade is Treachery' yet, which I think was released recently. What is your view of the proposed reforms of the intelligence services and in particular, of the Manish Tiwari bill?
Not a Very Intelligent Attempt at Intelligence Reform
Intelligence agencies like the Research and Analysis Wing, Intelligence Bureau and National Technical Research Organisation are notorious for their abuse of civil liberties and also have a pathetic record of effectiveness. A private member's bill, the Intelligence Services (Powers and Regulation) Bill, 2011 which is meant to set things right, however contains ambiguous provisions that hold immense possibilities for abuse of powers. It also hands out near total control over the agencies and their accountability bodies to the prime minister and the executive.
SAHRDC is the South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, New Delhi.
India's intelligence agencies are as notorious for their civil liberties abuses as they are for their intelligence failures.1 In a lecture sponsored by the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) in 2010, Vice-President Hamid Ansari expressed the need for parliamentary oversight over intelligence agencies because of concerns related to the concentration of power over intelligence agencies in the executive, the executive's misuse and abuse of intelligence powers, the absence of accountability for such abuse, the lack of inter-agency coordination and the need for transparency and public debate.2 Manish Tewari, Member of Parliament (MP) and spokesperson for the Congress Party, the main partner in the ruling United Progressive Alliance, advanced a private member's bill that seemingly targets these issues.3 I need to read the rules.Unfortunately, the Intelligence Services (Powers and Regulation) Bill, 2011 (hereI need to read the rules.after the bill) does little to address its stated goals of increasing intelligence coordination, regulation, oversight and accountability. The bill uses vague terms and broad provisions to give the agencies free rein; it concentrates power in the executive; and creates toothless oversight and accountability mechanisms that lack independence from the executive. The failings of the bill are so great that it is hard to avoid concluding that it is little more than a cosmetic effort to appear to be reforming the intelligence community while actually doing nothing.
Background
The bill focuses on the existing Intelligence Bureau (IB), the domestic intelligence agency, the RAW, the external intelligence agency, and the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), which is responsible for intelligence technologies.4 All three agencies were established by executive order. The IB is a colonial hangover that for years was responsible for procuring all Indian intelligence.5 After its failure to predict the 1962 Chinese invasion, it was stripped of its external intelligence gathering powers (ibid). In 1968, Indira Gandhi created the RAW to take on that role. After the RAW committed its own serious intelligence blunder by failing to read the signs of impending Pakistani incursions into Kargil in 1999, the executive ordered the creation of the NTRO.6
Added to their poor intelligence record, India's intelligence community has faced numerous civil liberties scandals. The IB is regularly accused of using its considerable resources to monitor political opposition in hopes of giving the government of the day an advantage.7 Many blame this diversion of resources for the agencies' inability to prevent so many terrorist attacks.8 The IB further has come under fire for naming some of India's most respectable human rights organisations as Maoist supporters to stifle their criticism of the government in the decades-old insurgency.9 The NTRO, as the agency responsible for phone tapping, is implicated in accusations that the intelligence agencies are abusing their powers by monitoring more than one million mobile phones (government officials admit to, and officially claim, only the tapping of 6,000 phones).10 Moreover, Indian intelligence agents have been accused of kidnapping, extrajudicial killings,11 and torture, the latter of which allegedly is often inflicted on suspected terrorists held in secret detention centres.12 So poor is their reputation that Canada initially refused visas to several former intelligence agents.13
The Bill
The Intelligence Services (Powers and Regulation) Bill, 2011 is trying to shine the tarnished images of India's most powerful intelligence agencies – the IB, RAW and NTRO. First, it attempts to give them new legitimacy by turning them into statutory bodies consistent with their counterparts in other democratic countries. It also estaI need to read the rules.blishes a parliamentary oversight committee and two accountability bodies to address staff and public complaints. A thorough analysis shows, however, that the bill is likely to do little to create democratic legitimacy of the agencies and the oversight and accountability bodies are farcical at best.
Insufficient Regulation
One of the primary purposes of the bill is "to regulate the manner of the functioning and exercise of powers" of these agencies, yet little in the document does this. The sparse provisions fail to specifically describe or limit the actual functions and mandate of the agencies, leaving open the possibility of widespread abuses. The bill's vague terms and overly broad provisions ensure that there is no real limit to the agencies' powers beyond the designation of the IB as the domestic intelligence agency, the RAW as the external agency, and the NTRO as responsible for technical intelligence gathering. The provisions governing the RAW are the most ridiculous. Nowhere does the bill state that the RAW's primary function is to gather intelligence, a point we can infer but should not be left to our imaginations. Furthermore, nothing in the bill states that the RAW has law enforcement capabilities, again powers we can infer from later provisions that allow it to search property and interfere in communications.14 Indeed, the bill does not specify the functions of the RAW at all. How can it regulate the RAW when it is unclear what functions it is authorised to undertake?
The RAW's mandate is equally broad and vague. It is required to act "(a) in the interests of National security, with partiI need to read the rules.cular reference to the defence, security strategic, economic and foreign policies of the Union of India; or (b) in aid of the neutralisation of threats from external sources" (Article 3(2)). Under the bill's definition, "sovereignty, territorial integrity, economic stability and upholding of the Constitution" are facets of national security (Article 2(7)). It is hard to imagine any cross-border criminal activity or even potentially wholly internal activity that would not qualify as a threat to any of these interests and therefore within the RAW's jurisdiction. Given its past activities and abuses, it is easy to imagine the RAW taking advantage of the ambiguity of its mandate to grant itself the broadest possible jurisdiction.
The two provisions governing the IB are better for their specificity on the agency's mandate and functions but still grant the IB nearly unlimited powers. The bill mandates the IB to protect national security in the context of internal conflict, terrorism aided or conducted by Indians, espionage, and violent subversion of the Constitution (Article 4). While its mandate initially seems narrow, it is expanded exponentially through the list of functions. The IB is tasked with gathering and managing intelligence, "safeguarding the economic well-being of"¦India" and aiding law enforcement agencies (Article 4(3)(i-iii)). The IB could all too easily interpret these latter two functions as all-encompassing as there is no definition of "economic well-being" and there is no requirement that it aid Indian law enforcement only on serious crimes or within its national security mandate. The IB is not restricted to an intelligence-gathering role and nothing in the bill limits it from adopting law enforcement functions.
The NTRO's mandate and functions are also exceptionally broad. It is tasked with monitoring and interfering in any type of communication, collecting information on behalf of intelligence, defence and law enforcement agencies, and assisting these organisations in understanding technical languages and cryptology (Article 6(2)). It is to carry out its functions "in the interests of" India's "national security"¦, economic well being"¦or" to support law enforcement in the "prevention, detection, interdiction or investigations of"¦crimes" as assigned by the prime minister (Article 6(3)(a-c)).Allowing the NTRO to gather technical intelligence to support law enforcement potentially removes all restrictions on the types of information it can seek or the persons who can be monitored (beyond the prohibition against gathering intelligence solely for political use),15 as long as the prime minister justifies the action as related to law enforcement. Furthermore, the NTRO is given full discretion to determine the type of technology it will use to monitor communications without any safeguards that it be least invasive or most protective of privacy rights guaranteed by India's Constitution (Article 6(2)(a)).
The only real regulation of the functions of the intelligence agencies comes from the procedure for attaining warrants and authorisations to search property or interfere with communications. Yet even these provisions contain weak standards for regulating these invasions of privacy. A designated authority, who is a member of the executive at the level of secretary, can authorise the issuance of a domestic warrant only if: (1) the proposed action by a requesting agency is necessary because it is "likely to be of substantial value in assisting [the relevant agency]"¦ in carrying out their functions;" and (2) there are no other "reasonable" means for achieving the objective of the proposed action.16 The standard assumes that gathering information of "substantial value" to "assisting" the agencies justifies any limitation of constitutional rights as long as "reasonable means" are used. The language was adopted from repealed provisions of the British Intelligence Services Act 1994.17 The British parliament replaced the unfair assumption with a requirement that a warrant be issued only if it is "necessary" for assisting the intelligence agencies and the action is "proportionate" to its goals.18 It requires more than a simple statement of necessity based on the hope that the warrant will gain information that will assist it and contains a proportionality requirement to measure the importance of the information sought against the level of intrusion into a person's life, which offers much greater civil liberties protection.19 Either the bill's drafters were ignorant of this important reform or they purposely adopted a weaker standard to permit greater civil liberties violations.
The provisions governing applications for warrants and authorisations contain two massive potential loopholes that may allow the agencies to escape this regulation. First, the IB, RAW and unspecified law enforcement agencies can request the NTRO to "monitor" communications (Article 16(2)), yet no warrant or authorisation is required for this activity (Article 8(1)). This loophole has potentially enormous consequences on civil liberties as the bill could be interpreted to grant blanket approval for interception of communications, as differentiated from interference, which implies disruption or alteration of communications, without any consideration of privacy rights. The second potential loophole is that while information gained illegally by the IB, RAW or the NTRO cannot be used against the person to whom it relates (Article 11(1)), it may be used to support applications for new warrants or authorisations.20 This provision effectively condones illegal intelligence behaviour and seemingly permits the agencies to go on fishing expeditions through illegal searches and interference in communications knowing they can always get approval later if they discover important information.
Consolidating Prime Minister's Power
The five provisions governing the IB, RAW and NTRO make it very clear that the prime minister will administer and determine the functions and mandate of the intelligence agencies. Each agency reports directly to the prime minister; each director is chosen and can freely be fired by him/her; and the prime minister decides intelligence spending, as nothing in the bill assigns that power elsewhere.21 A government secretary, a member of the executive under the prime minister, or, in urgent cases, the prime minister issues warrants and authorisations (Article 8(1) and Article 9(1)). This consolidation of intelligence power in the prime minister is made complete through executive domination over the oversight and accountability bodies.
The National Intelligence and Security Oversight Committee: The National Intelligence and Security Oversight Committee (NISOC) is an executive committee masquerading as a parliamentary body (Article 12(1)). The prime minister and the minister of home affairs constitute a quarter of the NISOC membership.22 The NISOC reports directly to the prime minister and must submit an annual report to him/her (Article 12(5)). The prime minister presents the annual report to Parliament only after s/he removes information deemed "prejudicial to the discharge of the functions of" the intelligence agencies.23 It is impossible for the NISOC to act independently of the prime minister while s/he is a member and has the power to monitor and censor its work.
In addition to its lack of independence, the NISOC has no power. The NISOC is tasked with "examin[ing] the administration and compliance of policy laid down" by the bill.24 Meaningful oversight to protect democratic principles and the rule of law requires an examination of the intelligence policy that determines agency priorities, agency financing, administration, and, as much as possible, operations.25 The NISOC's mandate, thus, is anaemic at best.
Even if it had a broader mandate, the NISOC is likely to have little access to information. It is prohibited from reviewing operations and intelligence sources except as necessary for fulfilling its feeble mandate (Article 12(2)). Information cannot be disclosed to it until agency directors first remove "sensitive information";26 after that, the prime minister can refuse disI need to read the rules.closure at whim.27 Furthermore, the only thing the NISOC can do should it discover any concerns is submit a report to the prime minister who then submits it to Parliament after removing any information s/he considers prejudicial to the intelligence agencies. As an oversight body, the NISOC is grossly inadequate.
The Intelligence Ombudsman: The Intelligence Ombudsman fares little better despite being able to give binding orders to redress internal complaints against the intelligence agencies.28 The Intelligence Ombudsman is tasked with investigating staff complaints against the IB, RAW and NTRO. The bill establishes the ombudsman as a political appointee of the executive branch (Article 16(1)) who reports to the prime minister (Article 16(5)). It further grants "administrative control" to the cabinet secretary, a member of the prime minister's office.29 These provisions give the prime minister enormous power over the ombudsman and unimpeded access to his/her workings. The ombudsman is further restricted from giving reasons for his/her decisions because of secrecy requirements (Article 17(3)), making it impossible to monitor decisions for bias. Executive control within the ombudsman's office can be too easily abused to deprive intelligence staff of appropriate remedies for their complaints.
The National Intelligence Tribunal: The bill also creates the National Intelligence Tribunal (hereafter tribunal) to address civil liberties violations and other complaints by the public against the agencies (Article 23). As with the NISOC and ombudsman, it seeks to appear to be creating an independent oversight/accountability body when in reality, the tribunal is yet another weak institution subject to near total control by the prime minister and the executive. Most notably, the tribunal cannot be established until the executive places a notification in the official gazette (ibid). What happens if the executive refuses to take this action?30
Additionally, the procedural aspects of the tribunal appear strong only if one ignores its utter lack of independence from the executive. The tribunal can review authoriI need to read the rules.sations and warrants (Article 27(1); Article 32(5)) interpret the act (Article 31(6)), and order redress for civil liberties violations based on whether the relevant intelligence agency had "reasonable grounds for its actions or inactions" (Article 34). It is prohibited from giving reasons for its decisions, but the decisions can be appealed before the Supreme Court. Although these powers could achieve accountability and oversight, the executive's correspondingly strong powers to influence the tribunal's decisions undermine its independence and thus its power. The tribunal reports to the prime minister and must submit biannual reports of its workings to him/her alone. The prime minister decides whether to grant the tribunal the staff and infrastructure requested by its chairperson (Article 27(5)); and, the executive branch determines what types of officers and employees the tribunal needs and provides such staff "as it may think fit" (Article 30(1)). These powers permit the prime minster (and the executive branch generally) to deprive the tribunal of staff and facilities at will, making the tribunal wholly beholden to him/her to function.31 Furthermore, the administrative staff functions only under "the general superintendence of the ChairI need to read the rules.person", rather than under his/her full control. These provisions could allow the executive to freely monitor and interfere in the tribunal's work.
The lack of independence also raises a serious separation of powers issue. Two of the three tribunal members are current or former judges.32 At a minimum, these judges will appear not only to be beholden to the executive branch for their appointment and remuneration but also for getting their work done. Separation of powers between the executive and judicial branches of government is elemental to a democracy and must be fiercely guarded.
The provisions of the tribunal appear to be modelled on repealed provisions of the British Intelligence Services Act,33 which granted the secretary of state nearly identical control over its intelligence tribunal.34 Either the bill's drafters are inept for not knowing the provisions were repealed or they preferred to maintain full executive power over the accountability of the intelligence agencies while publicly claiming otherwise.
Read as a whole, the bill grants the executive all-encompassing power to determine the policy, operations, administration, budget and accountability of the agencies to the nearly total exclusion of the judiciary and Parliament.
Conclusions
The ineffectiveness of India's intelligence agencies coupled with their ongoing civil liberties violations has forced Parliament to consider legislation that would allow for oversight and accountability of India's intelligence community. The bill, however, does little to protect against intelligence failures or guarantee independent oversight and accountability of the agencies. Instead, it seemingly grants the agencies the broadest possible jurisdiction, potentially unlimited functions, and consolidates the executive's power over them in blatant disregard of the vice-president's concerns and democratic principles.
Intelligence agencies like the Research and Analysis Wing, Intelligence Bureau and National Technical Research Organisation are notorious for their abuse of civil liberties and also have a pathetic record of effectiveness. A private member's bill, the Intelligence Services (Powers and Regulation) Bill, 2011 which is meant to set things right, however contains ambiguous provisions that hold immense possibilities for abuse of powers. It also hands out near total control over the agencies and their accountability bodies to the prime minister and the executive.
SAHRDC is the South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, New Delhi.
India's intelligence agencies are as notorious for their civil liberties abuses as they are for their intelligence failures.1 In a lecture sponsored by the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) in 2010, Vice-President Hamid Ansari expressed the need for parliamentary oversight over intelligence agencies because of concerns related to the concentration of power over intelligence agencies in the executive, the executive's misuse and abuse of intelligence powers, the absence of accountability for such abuse, the lack of inter-agency coordination and the need for transparency and public debate.2 Manish Tewari, Member of Parliament (MP) and spokesperson for the Congress Party, the main partner in the ruling United Progressive Alliance, advanced a private member's bill that seemingly targets these issues.3 I need to read the rules.Unfortunately, the Intelligence Services (Powers and Regulation) Bill, 2011 (hereI need to read the rules.after the bill) does little to address its stated goals of increasing intelligence coordination, regulation, oversight and accountability. The bill uses vague terms and broad provisions to give the agencies free rein; it concentrates power in the executive; and creates toothless oversight and accountability mechanisms that lack independence from the executive. The failings of the bill are so great that it is hard to avoid concluding that it is little more than a cosmetic effort to appear to be reforming the intelligence community while actually doing nothing.
Background
The bill focuses on the existing Intelligence Bureau (IB), the domestic intelligence agency, the RAW, the external intelligence agency, and the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), which is responsible for intelligence technologies.4 All three agencies were established by executive order. The IB is a colonial hangover that for years was responsible for procuring all Indian intelligence.5 After its failure to predict the 1962 Chinese invasion, it was stripped of its external intelligence gathering powers (ibid). In 1968, Indira Gandhi created the RAW to take on that role. After the RAW committed its own serious intelligence blunder by failing to read the signs of impending Pakistani incursions into Kargil in 1999, the executive ordered the creation of the NTRO.6
Added to their poor intelligence record, India's intelligence community has faced numerous civil liberties scandals. The IB is regularly accused of using its considerable resources to monitor political opposition in hopes of giving the government of the day an advantage.7 Many blame this diversion of resources for the agencies' inability to prevent so many terrorist attacks.8 The IB further has come under fire for naming some of India's most respectable human rights organisations as Maoist supporters to stifle their criticism of the government in the decades-old insurgency.9 The NTRO, as the agency responsible for phone tapping, is implicated in accusations that the intelligence agencies are abusing their powers by monitoring more than one million mobile phones (government officials admit to, and officially claim, only the tapping of 6,000 phones).10 Moreover, Indian intelligence agents have been accused of kidnapping, extrajudicial killings,11 and torture, the latter of which allegedly is often inflicted on suspected terrorists held in secret detention centres.12 So poor is their reputation that Canada initially refused visas to several former intelligence agents.13
The Bill
The Intelligence Services (Powers and Regulation) Bill, 2011 is trying to shine the tarnished images of India's most powerful intelligence agencies – the IB, RAW and NTRO. First, it attempts to give them new legitimacy by turning them into statutory bodies consistent with their counterparts in other democratic countries. It also estaI need to read the rules.blishes a parliamentary oversight committee and two accountability bodies to address staff and public complaints. A thorough analysis shows, however, that the bill is likely to do little to create democratic legitimacy of the agencies and the oversight and accountability bodies are farcical at best.
Insufficient Regulation
One of the primary purposes of the bill is "to regulate the manner of the functioning and exercise of powers" of these agencies, yet little in the document does this. The sparse provisions fail to specifically describe or limit the actual functions and mandate of the agencies, leaving open the possibility of widespread abuses. The bill's vague terms and overly broad provisions ensure that there is no real limit to the agencies' powers beyond the designation of the IB as the domestic intelligence agency, the RAW as the external agency, and the NTRO as responsible for technical intelligence gathering. The provisions governing the RAW are the most ridiculous. Nowhere does the bill state that the RAW's primary function is to gather intelligence, a point we can infer but should not be left to our imaginations. Furthermore, nothing in the bill states that the RAW has law enforcement capabilities, again powers we can infer from later provisions that allow it to search property and interfere in communications.14 Indeed, the bill does not specify the functions of the RAW at all. How can it regulate the RAW when it is unclear what functions it is authorised to undertake?
The RAW's mandate is equally broad and vague. It is required to act "(a) in the interests of National security, with partiI need to read the rules.cular reference to the defence, security strategic, economic and foreign policies of the Union of India; or (b) in aid of the neutralisation of threats from external sources" (Article 3(2)). Under the bill's definition, "sovereignty, territorial integrity, economic stability and upholding of the Constitution" are facets of national security (Article 2(7)). It is hard to imagine any cross-border criminal activity or even potentially wholly internal activity that would not qualify as a threat to any of these interests and therefore within the RAW's jurisdiction. Given its past activities and abuses, it is easy to imagine the RAW taking advantage of the ambiguity of its mandate to grant itself the broadest possible jurisdiction.
The two provisions governing the IB are better for their specificity on the agency's mandate and functions but still grant the IB nearly unlimited powers. The bill mandates the IB to protect national security in the context of internal conflict, terrorism aided or conducted by Indians, espionage, and violent subversion of the Constitution (Article 4). While its mandate initially seems narrow, it is expanded exponentially through the list of functions. The IB is tasked with gathering and managing intelligence, "safeguarding the economic well-being of"¦India" and aiding law enforcement agencies (Article 4(3)(i-iii)). The IB could all too easily interpret these latter two functions as all-encompassing as there is no definition of "economic well-being" and there is no requirement that it aid Indian law enforcement only on serious crimes or within its national security mandate. The IB is not restricted to an intelligence-gathering role and nothing in the bill limits it from adopting law enforcement functions.
The NTRO's mandate and functions are also exceptionally broad. It is tasked with monitoring and interfering in any type of communication, collecting information on behalf of intelligence, defence and law enforcement agencies, and assisting these organisations in understanding technical languages and cryptology (Article 6(2)). It is to carry out its functions "in the interests of" India's "national security"¦, economic well being"¦or" to support law enforcement in the "prevention, detection, interdiction or investigations of"¦crimes" as assigned by the prime minister (Article 6(3)(a-c)).Allowing the NTRO to gather technical intelligence to support law enforcement potentially removes all restrictions on the types of information it can seek or the persons who can be monitored (beyond the prohibition against gathering intelligence solely for political use),15 as long as the prime minister justifies the action as related to law enforcement. Furthermore, the NTRO is given full discretion to determine the type of technology it will use to monitor communications without any safeguards that it be least invasive or most protective of privacy rights guaranteed by India's Constitution (Article 6(2)(a)).
The only real regulation of the functions of the intelligence agencies comes from the procedure for attaining warrants and authorisations to search property or interfere with communications. Yet even these provisions contain weak standards for regulating these invasions of privacy. A designated authority, who is a member of the executive at the level of secretary, can authorise the issuance of a domestic warrant only if: (1) the proposed action by a requesting agency is necessary because it is "likely to be of substantial value in assisting [the relevant agency]"¦ in carrying out their functions;" and (2) there are no other "reasonable" means for achieving the objective of the proposed action.16 The standard assumes that gathering information of "substantial value" to "assisting" the agencies justifies any limitation of constitutional rights as long as "reasonable means" are used. The language was adopted from repealed provisions of the British Intelligence Services Act 1994.17 The British parliament replaced the unfair assumption with a requirement that a warrant be issued only if it is "necessary" for assisting the intelligence agencies and the action is "proportionate" to its goals.18 It requires more than a simple statement of necessity based on the hope that the warrant will gain information that will assist it and contains a proportionality requirement to measure the importance of the information sought against the level of intrusion into a person's life, which offers much greater civil liberties protection.19 Either the bill's drafters were ignorant of this important reform or they purposely adopted a weaker standard to permit greater civil liberties violations.
The provisions governing applications for warrants and authorisations contain two massive potential loopholes that may allow the agencies to escape this regulation. First, the IB, RAW and unspecified law enforcement agencies can request the NTRO to "monitor" communications (Article 16(2)), yet no warrant or authorisation is required for this activity (Article 8(1)). This loophole has potentially enormous consequences on civil liberties as the bill could be interpreted to grant blanket approval for interception of communications, as differentiated from interference, which implies disruption or alteration of communications, without any consideration of privacy rights. The second potential loophole is that while information gained illegally by the IB, RAW or the NTRO cannot be used against the person to whom it relates (Article 11(1)), it may be used to support applications for new warrants or authorisations.20 This provision effectively condones illegal intelligence behaviour and seemingly permits the agencies to go on fishing expeditions through illegal searches and interference in communications knowing they can always get approval later if they discover important information.
Consolidating Prime Minister's Power
The five provisions governing the IB, RAW and NTRO make it very clear that the prime minister will administer and determine the functions and mandate of the intelligence agencies. Each agency reports directly to the prime minister; each director is chosen and can freely be fired by him/her; and the prime minister decides intelligence spending, as nothing in the bill assigns that power elsewhere.21 A government secretary, a member of the executive under the prime minister, or, in urgent cases, the prime minister issues warrants and authorisations (Article 8(1) and Article 9(1)). This consolidation of intelligence power in the prime minister is made complete through executive domination over the oversight and accountability bodies.
The National Intelligence and Security Oversight Committee: The National Intelligence and Security Oversight Committee (NISOC) is an executive committee masquerading as a parliamentary body (Article 12(1)). The prime minister and the minister of home affairs constitute a quarter of the NISOC membership.22 The NISOC reports directly to the prime minister and must submit an annual report to him/her (Article 12(5)). The prime minister presents the annual report to Parliament only after s/he removes information deemed "prejudicial to the discharge of the functions of" the intelligence agencies.23 It is impossible for the NISOC to act independently of the prime minister while s/he is a member and has the power to monitor and censor its work.
In addition to its lack of independence, the NISOC has no power. The NISOC is tasked with "examin[ing] the administration and compliance of policy laid down" by the bill.24 Meaningful oversight to protect democratic principles and the rule of law requires an examination of the intelligence policy that determines agency priorities, agency financing, administration, and, as much as possible, operations.25 The NISOC's mandate, thus, is anaemic at best.
Even if it had a broader mandate, the NISOC is likely to have little access to information. It is prohibited from reviewing operations and intelligence sources except as necessary for fulfilling its feeble mandate (Article 12(2)). Information cannot be disclosed to it until agency directors first remove "sensitive information";26 after that, the prime minister can refuse disI need to read the rules.closure at whim.27 Furthermore, the only thing the NISOC can do should it discover any concerns is submit a report to the prime minister who then submits it to Parliament after removing any information s/he considers prejudicial to the intelligence agencies. As an oversight body, the NISOC is grossly inadequate.
The Intelligence Ombudsman: The Intelligence Ombudsman fares little better despite being able to give binding orders to redress internal complaints against the intelligence agencies.28 The Intelligence Ombudsman is tasked with investigating staff complaints against the IB, RAW and NTRO. The bill establishes the ombudsman as a political appointee of the executive branch (Article 16(1)) who reports to the prime minister (Article 16(5)). It further grants "administrative control" to the cabinet secretary, a member of the prime minister's office.29 These provisions give the prime minister enormous power over the ombudsman and unimpeded access to his/her workings. The ombudsman is further restricted from giving reasons for his/her decisions because of secrecy requirements (Article 17(3)), making it impossible to monitor decisions for bias. Executive control within the ombudsman's office can be too easily abused to deprive intelligence staff of appropriate remedies for their complaints.
The National Intelligence Tribunal: The bill also creates the National Intelligence Tribunal (hereafter tribunal) to address civil liberties violations and other complaints by the public against the agencies (Article 23). As with the NISOC and ombudsman, it seeks to appear to be creating an independent oversight/accountability body when in reality, the tribunal is yet another weak institution subject to near total control by the prime minister and the executive. Most notably, the tribunal cannot be established until the executive places a notification in the official gazette (ibid). What happens if the executive refuses to take this action?30
Additionally, the procedural aspects of the tribunal appear strong only if one ignores its utter lack of independence from the executive. The tribunal can review authoriI need to read the rules.sations and warrants (Article 27(1); Article 32(5)) interpret the act (Article 31(6)), and order redress for civil liberties violations based on whether the relevant intelligence agency had "reasonable grounds for its actions or inactions" (Article 34). It is prohibited from giving reasons for its decisions, but the decisions can be appealed before the Supreme Court. Although these powers could achieve accountability and oversight, the executive's correspondingly strong powers to influence the tribunal's decisions undermine its independence and thus its power. The tribunal reports to the prime minister and must submit biannual reports of its workings to him/her alone. The prime minister decides whether to grant the tribunal the staff and infrastructure requested by its chairperson (Article 27(5)); and, the executive branch determines what types of officers and employees the tribunal needs and provides such staff "as it may think fit" (Article 30(1)). These powers permit the prime minster (and the executive branch generally) to deprive the tribunal of staff and facilities at will, making the tribunal wholly beholden to him/her to function.31 Furthermore, the administrative staff functions only under "the general superintendence of the ChairI need to read the rules.person", rather than under his/her full control. These provisions could allow the executive to freely monitor and interfere in the tribunal's work.
The lack of independence also raises a serious separation of powers issue. Two of the three tribunal members are current or former judges.32 At a minimum, these judges will appear not only to be beholden to the executive branch for their appointment and remuneration but also for getting their work done. Separation of powers between the executive and judicial branches of government is elemental to a democracy and must be fiercely guarded.
The provisions of the tribunal appear to be modelled on repealed provisions of the British Intelligence Services Act,33 which granted the secretary of state nearly identical control over its intelligence tribunal.34 Either the bill's drafters are inept for not knowing the provisions were repealed or they preferred to maintain full executive power over the accountability of the intelligence agencies while publicly claiming otherwise.
Read as a whole, the bill grants the executive all-encompassing power to determine the policy, operations, administration, budget and accountability of the agencies to the nearly total exclusion of the judiciary and Parliament.
Conclusions
The ineffectiveness of India's intelligence agencies coupled with their ongoing civil liberties violations has forced Parliament to consider legislation that would allow for oversight and accountability of India's intelligence community. The bill, however, does little to protect against intelligence failures or guarantee independent oversight and accountability of the agencies. Instead, it seemingly grants the agencies the broadest possible jurisdiction, potentially unlimited functions, and consolidates the executive's power over them in blatant disregard of the vice-president's concerns and democratic principles.
nrj
Ambassador
- Joined
- Nov 16, 2009
- Messages
- 9,658
- Likes
- 3,911
National Security: Decision Making
The Indian State as it exists today is a consequence of the British presence in India. Prior to that, throughout history, the sub continental land mass was hardly ever a State in geographical terms. Culturally, there was a vast web of unity but it was not enough to make the people and the large numbers of rulers of the land mass feel that they all had an identity of interests in security also.
The three most important among these were the tribal incursions in J &K, establishing a foreign policy and determining the approach towards China.
In fact the concept of security in those days was confined only to the ruling elite and it only encompassed territorial integrity and pacification of the populations. Each ruler thought of his interests alone. The raiders from the North West found it easy to make forays into this land mass and eventually to establish footholds. Subsequently, the British and other Europeans came in with equal ease and an empire was created.Thanks to various battles and wars in Europe, the British had a highly developed sense of national interests. Applied to the Indian subcontinent, it meant protection of the new acquisitions from other empire builders or expansionist powers. Much of their involvement in national security terms meant mainly keeping Czarist Russia and China at bay.
Policies with this end in view were made in London by the British Government which now had a Secretary of State for India. This official depended for his inputs on the Governor General of India. The latter's authority was principally concerned with the consolidation of British power in India. His prime interests were, therefore, of a military nature and his own advisers were, therefore, mainly the British military establishment in India, headed in the final stages, by a Commander-in-Chief, placed second in the Executive Council of the Viceroy.
The decision to refer the J&K issue to the UN, instead of driving the incursionists out of J&K which was militarily feasible at that time, has embroiled us in an unending stand off with Pakistan.
When the Empire was converted into a nation in 1947, the institutions and outlook inherited by the Indian successors were all colonial in nature. Very few had the vision that with introduction of Parliamentary democracy radical changes had to be effected and new thinking evolved. To be fair to the leaders of the day, their preoccupations were with matters which they considered to be of immediate importance such as making the state viable, establishing a respectable place for it in the community of nations and awakening the people to their new status and responsibilities.
Strategic thinking was not a part of this matrix and, therefore, no questions arose as to what mechanism should take care of it, even though there were issues of national security which came up almost immediately after independence.The three most important among these were the tribal incursions in J &K, establishing a foreign policy and determining the approach towards China. Though the decisions were to be made in the name of the Indian Cabinet, the actual policy maker was the Prime Minister who depended primarily on his insights and experience of dealing with a colonial power, the British. His stature was such that hardly anybody could question him. The bureaucracy, as it was constituted then, did not have the expertise to advise in the arena which was by and large a new area for them.The decisions in each of these cases were, thus, adhoc and entirely individualistic. They did not follow structured long term or midterm assessments. They gave no indication that they emanated from an awareness of strategic imperatives for the country. What is certain, however, is that real-politic was not a consideration.
After 1955, with the rechristening of the C-in-Cs as Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs no longer served as principal advisers for defence decision making. The field was left entirely to the civilians who themselves were ill equipped to take a holistic view of National Security.
Those decisions have had in subsequent years, traumatic effect on the body politic of the country. The decision to refer the J&K issue to the UN, instead of driving the incursionists out of J&K which was militarily feasible at that time, has embroiled us in an unending stand off with Pakistan. The policy on China saw the loss of Tibet as a buffer state. Only, establishing nonalignment at the core of our foreign policy, can be said to have the continuing approval of the country.
The correct adoption of this policy was an outcome from the experience of the long freedom struggle against colonialism in India.These early encounters with national security decision making brought no changes to the decision making institutions except that there was now a Defence Minister in the Cabinet in place of the C-in-C. The service Chiefs functioned with the title of C-in-Cs till 1955, providing inputs to the Government for decision making on defence matters through Chiefs of Staff Committees and Defence Minister's Committee. The Defence Committee of the Cabinet considered their recommendations. After 1955, with the rechristening of the C-in-Cs as Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs no longer served as principal advisers for defence decision making. The field was left entirely to the civilians who themselves were ill equipped to take a holistic view of National Security.
Their organisations such as they existed were still to be Indianised in spirit.This was evident in the episodes which led to the war with China in 1962 and which ended with the war with Pakistan in 1965. Misgivings about China had always been present and were on the rise after the discovery of the road built by them in Aksai Chin. The Indian response was the forward policy which just amounted to establishing checkposts on the Sino Indian border as far forward as possible. The checkposts represented no strength, just a symbolic presence. Their concept evolved part from wishful thinking, part from an acknowledgement that nothing more substantive was possible in the near future. The policy was not the result of brainstorming sessions because no mechanism for such brainstorming existed. The disaster of 1962 then followed.
The debacle in 1962 did lead to soul stirring within the country and it was realised that something was amiss.
The Tashkent agreement of 1966 which ended the 1965 war with Pakistan again saw India loose out. The Hajipir Pass, captured with considerable sacrifice, and which controlled infiltration routes into J &K was returned to Pakistan against no tangible gain.In both situations, decisions were of individuals. More wide ranging coordinated institutional assessments preceded the decisions. There was no prior articulation of India's national interests.
"Security means development into a modernising society; security is not just military hardware, though it may include it; security is not military though it may involve it; security is not traditional activity though it may encompass it".
The debacle in 1962 did lead to soul stirring within the country and it was realised that something was amiss. Among many steps taken, JIC which was a subcommittee under the Chiefs of Staff, was given an independent status and the role of being a single point referral agency for the preparation of assessments. The Defence Committee of Cabinet was converted into the Cabinet Committee for Political Affair. A separate organisation, the R&AW, was created to deal with foreign intelligence. Most of these however, amounted ultimately to cosmetic changes, because defence and foreign policycensoredmaking continued to remain with key individuals who were not necessarily professionals themselves.
The assessments of the JIC were not taken seriously. In fact these assessments were prepared routinely and superficially, with Ministry of External Affairs keeping most of its information to itself. The same was the situation with regard to technical source information obtained by the Armed Forces.The real cause of this state of affairs was the presence of a frigid mindset and absence of a security culture. These accounted for the irony that the essence of what constituted national interests or security was not still understood by most players in the bureaucratic or political class. Nobody had seen the wisdom of clearly identifying India's interests or values, much less articulating them.One of the best definitions of security is from Robert McNamara "Security means development into a modernising society; security is not just military hardware, though it may include it; security is not military though it may involve it; security is not traditional activity though it may encompass it".
...a mechanism was brought into existence in 1970-71 in relation to Bangladesh operations. Highest level representatives from the MEA, Ministry of Defence, Army HQs and R&AW met to plan, coordinate and execute. A brilliant strategy was thus produced with equally brilliant results.
This definition underscores why there should always be a National Security Management mechanism present in the country. Such a mechanism was brought into existence in 1970-71 in relation to Bangladesh operations. Highest level representatives from the MEA, Ministry of Defence, Army HQs and R&AW met to plan, coordinate and execute. A brilliant strategy was thus produced with equally brilliant results. However, the mechanism did not last beyond 1971. It, therefore left no permanent imprint. Furthermore, this is what caused the political dialogue at Simla in 1972 to fail in taking full advantage of the military victory in the 1971 war. At the end of the Simla agreement, the J&K issue returned back to square one. Pakistan has since repeatedly demonstrated that LOC is not sacrosanct.The years following have seen no basic changes in the national security decision making systems though some new ideas were tried. Following examples will illustrate:
A feeble effort was made in 1990 to give a new direction to decision making by setting up a National Security Council but a change of government at Delhi reduced this effort to naught. Status quo continued in the rest of the decade but in its last year the concept of NSC has been revived.This NSC exists merely in form. To be effective it has to be fully and properly structured. The handling of the highjack of IAC 814 in December 1999 would indicate that national security management in the country is still in an embryonic stage.
Non state actors like the media, academics and thinktanks have taken upon themselves to direct national issues and recommend for adoption policies and postures.
The highjack posed two perspectives before the policy maker. One was humanitarian, saving 160 lives. The other was of capitulation to the State behind the overt face of the highjackers and to the ideology which has been the inspiration of this State and which we recognise as having no validity. Most people in the country, including some leaders in the ruling Parivar saw the final decision in the case to be contrary to the supreme national interests. Sentimentality played a big role when national security decision making needs to be entirely objective and coldcensoredblooded.However there is reason to believe that in the new millennium wind of change would be blowing, improving decision making. Non state actors like the media, academics and thinktanks have taken upon themselves to direct national issues and recommend for adoption policies and postures.
Public interest litigations are compelling the judiciary also to be involved in decision making. Such activity is being noticed at the centre of power, creating an impact. CTBT is a good example of how such pressures are operating.These pressures will ultimately hopefully result in the enunciation of a national strategic doctrine and creation of a proper national security management mechanism. The vacuum that exists in public consciousness about national security thinking may then start disappearing, compelling the policy makers to remain always on their toes.
-- Anand K Verma, former Chief of R&AW and author of Reassessing Pakistan
National Security: Decision Making
The Indian State as it exists today is a consequence of the British presence in India. Prior to that, throughout history, the sub continental land mass was hardly ever a State in geographical terms. Culturally, there was a vast web of unity but it was not enough to make the people and the large numbers of rulers of the land mass feel that they all had an identity of interests in security also.
The three most important among these were the tribal incursions in J &K, establishing a foreign policy and determining the approach towards China.
Policies with this end in view were made in London by the British Government which now had a Secretary of State for India. This official depended for his inputs on the Governor General of India. The latter's authority was principally concerned with the consolidation of British power in India. His prime interests were, therefore, of a military nature and his own advisers were, therefore, mainly the British military establishment in India, headed in the final stages, by a Commander-in-Chief, placed second in the Executive Council of the Viceroy.
The decision to refer the J&K issue to the UN, instead of driving the incursionists out of J&K which was militarily feasible at that time, has embroiled us in an unending stand off with Pakistan.
Strategic thinking was not a part of this matrix and, therefore, no questions arose as to what mechanism should take care of it, even though there were issues of national security which came up almost immediately after independence.The three most important among these were the tribal incursions in J &K, establishing a foreign policy and determining the approach towards China. Though the decisions were to be made in the name of the Indian Cabinet, the actual policy maker was the Prime Minister who depended primarily on his insights and experience of dealing with a colonial power, the British. His stature was such that hardly anybody could question him. The bureaucracy, as it was constituted then, did not have the expertise to advise in the arena which was by and large a new area for them.The decisions in each of these cases were, thus, adhoc and entirely individualistic. They did not follow structured long term or midterm assessments. They gave no indication that they emanated from an awareness of strategic imperatives for the country. What is certain, however, is that real-politic was not a consideration.
After 1955, with the rechristening of the C-in-Cs as Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs no longer served as principal advisers for defence decision making. The field was left entirely to the civilians who themselves were ill equipped to take a holistic view of National Security.
The correct adoption of this policy was an outcome from the experience of the long freedom struggle against colonialism in India.These early encounters with national security decision making brought no changes to the decision making institutions except that there was now a Defence Minister in the Cabinet in place of the C-in-C. The service Chiefs functioned with the title of C-in-Cs till 1955, providing inputs to the Government for decision making on defence matters through Chiefs of Staff Committees and Defence Minister's Committee. The Defence Committee of the Cabinet considered their recommendations. After 1955, with the rechristening of the C-in-Cs as Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs no longer served as principal advisers for defence decision making. The field was left entirely to the civilians who themselves were ill equipped to take a holistic view of National Security.
Their organisations such as they existed were still to be Indianised in spirit.This was evident in the episodes which led to the war with China in 1962 and which ended with the war with Pakistan in 1965. Misgivings about China had always been present and were on the rise after the discovery of the road built by them in Aksai Chin. The Indian response was the forward policy which just amounted to establishing checkposts on the Sino Indian border as far forward as possible. The checkposts represented no strength, just a symbolic presence. Their concept evolved part from wishful thinking, part from an acknowledgement that nothing more substantive was possible in the near future. The policy was not the result of brainstorming sessions because no mechanism for such brainstorming existed. The disaster of 1962 then followed.
The debacle in 1962 did lead to soul stirring within the country and it was realised that something was amiss.
"Security means development into a modernising society; security is not just military hardware, though it may include it; security is not military though it may involve it; security is not traditional activity though it may encompass it".
The assessments of the JIC were not taken seriously. In fact these assessments were prepared routinely and superficially, with Ministry of External Affairs keeping most of its information to itself. The same was the situation with regard to technical source information obtained by the Armed Forces.The real cause of this state of affairs was the presence of a frigid mindset and absence of a security culture. These accounted for the irony that the essence of what constituted national interests or security was not still understood by most players in the bureaucratic or political class. Nobody had seen the wisdom of clearly identifying India's interests or values, much less articulating them.One of the best definitions of security is from Robert McNamara "Security means development into a modernising society; security is not just military hardware, though it may include it; security is not military though it may involve it; security is not traditional activity though it may encompass it".
...a mechanism was brought into existence in 1970-71 in relation to Bangladesh operations. Highest level representatives from the MEA, Ministry of Defence, Army HQs and R&AW met to plan, coordinate and execute. A brilliant strategy was thus produced with equally brilliant results.
- The decision to go in for the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion in 1974, because China was now considered to be a larger threat than Pakistan, was not a decision based on institutional recommendations.
- The policy relating to support to Sri Lankan Tamils grew out of fears that unless such support was forthcoming, the party in power at Delhi will be a loser in Tamil Nadu. This underlying thought governed this policy throughout the period such support was given. The validity of such a thesis was rarely examined independently by competent observers.
- The decision to impose emergency in 1975 was again taken without reference to ground realities or credible disinterested assessments thereof.
- The decision to have early national polls in 1977 was based on unrealistic studies.
- Operation Blue Star was undertaken despite strong dissenting voices.
A feeble effort was made in 1990 to give a new direction to decision making by setting up a National Security Council but a change of government at Delhi reduced this effort to naught. Status quo continued in the rest of the decade but in its last year the concept of NSC has been revived.This NSC exists merely in form. To be effective it has to be fully and properly structured. The handling of the highjack of IAC 814 in December 1999 would indicate that national security management in the country is still in an embryonic stage.
Non state actors like the media, academics and thinktanks have taken upon themselves to direct national issues and recommend for adoption policies and postures.
Public interest litigations are compelling the judiciary also to be involved in decision making. Such activity is being noticed at the centre of power, creating an impact. CTBT is a good example of how such pressures are operating.These pressures will ultimately hopefully result in the enunciation of a national strategic doctrine and creation of a proper national security management mechanism. The vacuum that exists in public consciousness about national security thinking may then start disappearing, compelling the policy makers to remain always on their toes.
-- Anand K Verma, former Chief of R&AW and author of Reassessing Pakistan
National Security: Decision Making
nrj
Ambassador
- Joined
- Nov 16, 2009
- Messages
- 9,658
- Likes
- 3,911
Why India needs the National Counter Terrorism Centre
The prime minister should perhaps drop the police role of the NCTC, leaving it free to focus its energies on intelligence gathering, coordination and operations, says Anil Chowdhry, former secretary, internal security, ministry of home affairs.
Anyone who has dealt with or understands internal security issues will tell you that the National Counter Terrorism Centre is an imperative. Such a body is required to meet the growing threat of terrorist violence which recognises neither national nor international boundaries, especially for a country like ours, which faces a high level of threat.
Under our Constitution, law and order and policing are undoubtedly the responsibility of the state governments. But at the time our Constitution was framed there were no organised terrorist groups of the kind operating globally today.
Post Independence, communal and political ideology driven violence was the worst that the police forces were called upon to tackle.
The current scenario is vastly different.
Realising the seriousness of the threat from trans-national terrorism, almost all major democracies including the US, UK, and other European countries have been able to enact and create central agencies to tackle the menace, within the framework of their respective federal structures, placing national security concerns above partisan politics.
Unfortunately, in our country a similar initiative has got caught in controversies -- mostly political, and partially by the manner in which the NCTC was sought to be created by the Cabinet Committee on Security via a proposal mooted by the nodal ministry for internal security, the ministry of home affairs.
The outcry is about the Centre treading on the state governments' toes
I was posted in our embassy in Washington, DC when that country was shaken to its roots by the 9/11 attacks. Before 9/11 it had surprised me no end that the world's oldest and most powerful democracy did not have an internal or counterterrorism agency.
Intelligence and counterterrorism was left entirely to the Central Intelligence Agency which was basically their external intelligence agency. The Federal Bureau of Investigation too had an intelligence unit whose primary focus was on drug trafficking and other forms of organised crimes. And they did pay the price for this lack of infrastructural support to protect their homeland!
The US responded very swiftly by enacting the rather draconian Patriot Act, and later by creating the mammoth body in the form of the department of homeland security and the National Counterterrorism Centre, all reporting directly to the President.
Although a few eyebrows were raised and one could hear murmurs of dissent, there was no outcry like being witnessed now in our country.
Whenever a serious terrorist incident takes place the state governments have been observed taking the plea that there was no advance intelligence from the central agencies and occasionally one also comes across comments to the effect that the state police forces are neither equipped nor geared to counter threats of such magnitude, specially those driven by external entities.
But now that the Centre has come up with a proposal to constitute a central agency to combat terrorist threat head on, there is a growing outcry that the Centre is treading on the state governments' toes, in violation of the letter and spirit of our Constitution.
The objections are being voiced in the form of letters written by several chief ministers to the prime minister which have also been leaked to the media. This should generate a debate among the intelligentia, but barring a couple of editorials in the national dailies, I have not seen much of this happening.
Political parties push their narrow agenda, brushing aside national security interests
Quite lamentably, our political parties, even those who repeatedly tom-tom their national credentials, choose to push their narrow political agenda brushing aside national security interests.
Also, at times like this one sadly feels the absence of apolitical think-tanks comprising experts on national and internal security matters in our country. The few that are in existence are neither consulted nor called upon to assess the impact of proposed infrastructural changes to meet emerging challenges.
Unlike the US where such think-tanks abound and actually aid the government to take the requisite measures to tackle national security issues, in our country, it is invariably 'babus' aided political decisions which hold sway.
Having been involved in the fight against terrorism for many years, I am very convinced that there is a need for an agency to coordinate and focus intelligence driven counterterrorism operations, nationally.
Following a visit to the US to study the counterterrorism apparatus devised post 9/11 which has so far stood the test of time, the present home minister, I understand, came back quite impressed by their NCTC and took it upon himself to launch one here.
He announced his plan to do so almost one year ago. Where he seems to have gone wrong is that he failed to bring the state governments on board through prior consultations.
Chidambaram must be the captain of the team
The home minister in the context of our Constitutional framework must be the captain of a team. It is a game of cricket, hockey or football that he is playing, not tennis.
Judging from media reports, it appears that a few chief ministers have expressed their misgivings over police powers being given to the NCTC. In my view, the situation can be salvaged by holding consultations and discussions with the chief ministers to remove such apprehensions.
Instead of making it a prestige issue, our prime minister should stand up to his image of being a serious and mature politician to accommodate dissenting views and perhaps drop the police role of the NCTC, leaving it free to focus its latent energies on intelligence gathering, coordination and operations.
As far as the issue raised in a section of our political leadership about the NCTC functioning under the Intelligence Bureau is concerned, I am firmly opposed to creating a multiplicity of intelligence agencies. That, in my view, is part of the problem due to which our counterterrorism efforts have so far not been as successful as they should have been.
Anil Chowdhry is a former secretary, internal security, ministry of home affairs.
Why India needs the National Counter Terrorism Centre - Rediff.com News
The prime minister should perhaps drop the police role of the NCTC, leaving it free to focus its energies on intelligence gathering, coordination and operations, says Anil Chowdhry, former secretary, internal security, ministry of home affairs.
Anyone who has dealt with or understands internal security issues will tell you that the National Counter Terrorism Centre is an imperative. Such a body is required to meet the growing threat of terrorist violence which recognises neither national nor international boundaries, especially for a country like ours, which faces a high level of threat.
Under our Constitution, law and order and policing are undoubtedly the responsibility of the state governments. But at the time our Constitution was framed there were no organised terrorist groups of the kind operating globally today.
Post Independence, communal and political ideology driven violence was the worst that the police forces were called upon to tackle.
The current scenario is vastly different.
Realising the seriousness of the threat from trans-national terrorism, almost all major democracies including the US, UK, and other European countries have been able to enact and create central agencies to tackle the menace, within the framework of their respective federal structures, placing national security concerns above partisan politics.
Unfortunately, in our country a similar initiative has got caught in controversies -- mostly political, and partially by the manner in which the NCTC was sought to be created by the Cabinet Committee on Security via a proposal mooted by the nodal ministry for internal security, the ministry of home affairs.
The outcry is about the Centre treading on the state governments' toes
I was posted in our embassy in Washington, DC when that country was shaken to its roots by the 9/11 attacks. Before 9/11 it had surprised me no end that the world's oldest and most powerful democracy did not have an internal or counterterrorism agency.
Intelligence and counterterrorism was left entirely to the Central Intelligence Agency which was basically their external intelligence agency. The Federal Bureau of Investigation too had an intelligence unit whose primary focus was on drug trafficking and other forms of organised crimes. And they did pay the price for this lack of infrastructural support to protect their homeland!
The US responded very swiftly by enacting the rather draconian Patriot Act, and later by creating the mammoth body in the form of the department of homeland security and the National Counterterrorism Centre, all reporting directly to the President.
Although a few eyebrows were raised and one could hear murmurs of dissent, there was no outcry like being witnessed now in our country.
Whenever a serious terrorist incident takes place the state governments have been observed taking the plea that there was no advance intelligence from the central agencies and occasionally one also comes across comments to the effect that the state police forces are neither equipped nor geared to counter threats of such magnitude, specially those driven by external entities.
But now that the Centre has come up with a proposal to constitute a central agency to combat terrorist threat head on, there is a growing outcry that the Centre is treading on the state governments' toes, in violation of the letter and spirit of our Constitution.
The objections are being voiced in the form of letters written by several chief ministers to the prime minister which have also been leaked to the media. This should generate a debate among the intelligentia, but barring a couple of editorials in the national dailies, I have not seen much of this happening.
Political parties push their narrow agenda, brushing aside national security interests
Quite lamentably, our political parties, even those who repeatedly tom-tom their national credentials, choose to push their narrow political agenda brushing aside national security interests.
Also, at times like this one sadly feels the absence of apolitical think-tanks comprising experts on national and internal security matters in our country. The few that are in existence are neither consulted nor called upon to assess the impact of proposed infrastructural changes to meet emerging challenges.
Unlike the US where such think-tanks abound and actually aid the government to take the requisite measures to tackle national security issues, in our country, it is invariably 'babus' aided political decisions which hold sway.
Having been involved in the fight against terrorism for many years, I am very convinced that there is a need for an agency to coordinate and focus intelligence driven counterterrorism operations, nationally.
Following a visit to the US to study the counterterrorism apparatus devised post 9/11 which has so far stood the test of time, the present home minister, I understand, came back quite impressed by their NCTC and took it upon himself to launch one here.
He announced his plan to do so almost one year ago. Where he seems to have gone wrong is that he failed to bring the state governments on board through prior consultations.
Chidambaram must be the captain of the team
The home minister in the context of our Constitutional framework must be the captain of a team. It is a game of cricket, hockey or football that he is playing, not tennis.
Judging from media reports, it appears that a few chief ministers have expressed their misgivings over police powers being given to the NCTC. In my view, the situation can be salvaged by holding consultations and discussions with the chief ministers to remove such apprehensions.
Instead of making it a prestige issue, our prime minister should stand up to his image of being a serious and mature politician to accommodate dissenting views and perhaps drop the police role of the NCTC, leaving it free to focus its latent energies on intelligence gathering, coordination and operations.
As far as the issue raised in a section of our political leadership about the NCTC functioning under the Intelligence Bureau is concerned, I am firmly opposed to creating a multiplicity of intelligence agencies. That, in my view, is part of the problem due to which our counterterrorism efforts have so far not been as successful as they should have been.
Anil Chowdhry is a former secretary, internal security, ministry of home affairs.
Why India needs the National Counter Terrorism Centre - Rediff.com News
nrj
Ambassador
- Joined
- Nov 16, 2009
- Messages
- 9,658
- Likes
- 3,911
DEFENCE REFORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY: MANAGING THREATS AND CHALLENGES TO INDIA
Gurmeet Kanwal
South Asia is the second most unstable region in the world and is closely following West Asia in the race to reach the number one spot. Among the world's major democracies India faces the most complex threats and challenges spanning the full spectrum of conflict from nuclear to sub-conventional. Unresolved territorial disputes with China and Pakistan, insurgencies in Jammu and Kashmir and the north-eastern states, the rising tide of left wing extremism (LWE) and the growing spectre of urban terrorism have vitiated India's security environment.
I - SEARCH FOR A STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW
Despite the prolonged exposure that the security establishment has had in dealing with multifarious challenges, India's national security continues to be poorly managed. In fact, no Indian government till today has undertaken a strategic defence review.
The only time a review was undertaken in the recent past was after the Kargil conflict of 1999 when the Kargil Review Committee headed by the doyenne of Indian strategic thinkers, the late Mr. K Subrahmanyam, was appointed. The committee was asked to ""¦review the events leading up to the Pakistani aggression in the Kargil District of Ladakh in Jammu & Kashmir; and, to recommend such measures as are considered necessary to safeguard national security against such armed intrusions."
Besides Mr. Subrahmanyam, who was appointed chairman, the Committee comprised three members: Lieutenant General (Retd.) K. K. Hazari, B. G. Verghese and Satish Chandra, Secretary, National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) who was also designated as Member-Secretary. Though it had been given a very narrow and limited charter, the committee looked holistically at the threats and challenges and examined the loopholes in the management of national security.
The committee was of the view that, "the political, bureaucratic, military and intelligence establishments appear to have developed a vested interest in the status quo.'' Consequently, it made far reaching recommendations on the development of India's nuclear deterrence, the management of national security, intelligence reforms, border management, the defence budget, the use of air power, counter-insurgency operations, integrated manpower policy, defence research and development, and media relations. The committee's report was tabled in Parliament on February 23, 2000.
The Cabinet Committee on Security then appointed a Group of Ministers (GoM) to study the Kargil Review Committee report and recommend measures for implementation. The GoM was headed by Home Minister L K Advani and comprised Defence Minister George Fernandes, External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha and National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra. In turn, the GoM set up four task forces on intelligence reforms, internal security, border management and defence management to undertake in-depth analysis of various facets of national security management. These were headed, respectively, by Jammu and Kashmir Governor Mr. G. C. Saxena, former defence and home secretary and principal secretary to the Prime Minister Mr. N. N. Vohra, former home secretary Mr. Madhav Godbole and Mr. Arun Singh, former Union minister who was then an advisor to the Ministry of External Affairs on security matters and who had himself headed the Committee on Defence Expenditure in the early 1990s.
The GoM recommended sweeping reforms to the existing national security management system and the CCS accepted all its recommendations, including one for the establishment of the post of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) – which still has not happened. As approved by the CDS, a tri-Service Andaman and Nicobar Command and a Strategic Forces Command were established. Other salient measures included the establishment of HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS); the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA); the establishment of a Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) headed by the defence Minister with two wings: the Defence Procurement Board and the Defence technology Board; management of borders with different countries by a single border management agency (e.g. the western border with Pakistan is managed by the BSF); and, the nomination of the CRPF as India's primary counter-insurgency operations force.
Despite the new measures approved for implementation by the CCS on May 11, 2001, many lacunae still remain in the management of national security. In order to review the progress of implementation of the proposals approved by the CCS in 2001 and to take stock of the new developments over the last 10 years, such as the threats emanating from the sea a la the Mumbai terror strikes and the rapid deterioration of the regional security environment due to the growing spread of radical extremism and creeping Talibanisation, the government appointed a Task Force on National Security in mid-June 2011.
The task force is led by Mr. Naresh Chandra, former Cabinet Secretary and ambassador to the US and comprises 13 other members. The members include Mr. G Parthasarathy, former High Commissioner to Pakistan, Air Chief Marshal S. Krishnaswamy (Retd), Admiral Arun Prakash (Retd), Lt Gen V. R. Raghavan (Retd), Dr. Anil Kakodkar, former chief of the Department of Atomic Energy, Mr. K. C. Verma, former Secretary R&AW and Mr. V. K. Duggal, former Union Home Secretary, among others. The task force has been given six months to submit its report.
II - MANAGING NATIONAL SECURITY
There is much needs to be done to improve the management of national security in India. The first and foremost requirement is for the government to formulate a comprehensive National Security Strategy (NSS), including internal security, so that all the stakeholders are aware of what is expected of them.
The NSS should be formulated after carrying out an inter-departmental, inter-agency, multi-disciplinary strategic defence review. Such a review must take the public into confidence and not be conducted behind closed doors. Like in most other democracies, the NSS should be signed by Prime Minister, who is the head of government, and must be placed on the table of Parliament and released as a public document. Only then will various stakeholders be compelled to take ownership of the strategy and work unitedly to achieve its aims and objectives.
It has clearly emerged that China poses the most potent military threat to India and, given the nuclear, missile and military hardware nexus between China and Pakistan, future conventional conflict in Southern Asia will be a two-front war. Therefore, India's military strategy of dissuasion against China must be gradually upgraded to deterrence. Genuine deterrence comes only from the capability to launch and sustain major offensive operations into the adversary's territory. India needs to raise new divisions to carry the next war deep into Tibet. Since manoeuvre is not possible due to the restrictions imposed by the difficult mountainous terrain, firepower capabilities need to be enhanced by an order of magnitude, especially in terms of precision-guided munitions. This will involve substantial upgradation of ground-based (artillery guns, rockets and missiles) and aerially-delivered (fighter-bomber aircraft and attack helicopter) firepower. Only then will it be possible to achieve future military objectives.
The armed forces are now in the fifth and final year of the 11th Defence Plan (2007-12) and it has not yet been formally approved by the government. The government has also not approved the long-term integrated perspective plan (LTIPP 2007-22) formulated by HQ Integrated Defence Staff. Without these essential approvals, defence procurement is being undertaken through ad hoc annual procurement plans, rather than being based on carefully prioritised long-term plans that are designed to systematically enhance India's combat potential. These are serious lacunae as effective defence planning cannot be undertaken in a policy void.
The government must commit itself to supporting long-term defence plans or else defence modernisation will continue to lag and the present quantitative military gap with China's People's Liberation Army will become a qualitative gap as well in 10 to 15 years. This can be done only by making the dormant National Security Council a pro-active policy formulation body for long term national security planning. (The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) deals with current and near term threats and challenges and reacts to emergent situations.)
The defence procurement decision making process must be speeded up. The army is still without towed and self-propelled 155mm howitzers for the plains and the mountains and urgently needs to acquire weapons and equipment for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations. The navy has been waiting for long for the INS Vikramaditya (Admiral Gorshkov) aircraft carrier, which is being refurbished in a Russian shipyard at exorbitant cost. Construction of the indigenous air defence ship is lagging behind schedule.
The plans of the air force to acquire 126 multi-mission, medium-range combat aircraft in order to maintain its edge over the regional air forces are also stuck in the procurement quagmire. All three Services need a large number of light helicopters. India's nuclear forces require the Agni-III missile and nuclear powered submarines with suitable ballistic missiles to acquire genuine deterrent capability. The armed forces do not have a truly integrated C4I2SR system suitable for modern network-centric warfare, which will allow them to optimise their individual capabilities.
All of these high-priority acquisitions will require extensive budgetary support. With the defence budget languishing at less than two per cent of India's GDP – compared with China's 3.5 per cent and Pakistan's 4.5 per cent plus US military aid – it will not be possible for the armed forces to undertake any meaningful modernisation in the foreseeable future. Leave aside genuine military modernisation that will substantially enhance combat capabilities, the funds available on the capital account at present are inadequate to suffice even for the replacement of obsolete weapons systems and equipment that are still in service well beyond their useful life cycles. The central police and para-military forces (CPMFs) also need to be modernised as they are facing increasingly more potent threats while being equipped with obsolescent weapons.
The government must also immediately appoint a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) or a permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to provide single-point advice to the CCS on military matters, along with the simultaneous establishment of theatre commands. Any further delay in these key structural reforms in higher defence management on the grounds of the lack of political consensus and the inability of the armed forces to agree on the issue will be extremely detrimental to India's interests in the light of the dangerous developments taking place in India's neighbourhood. The logical next step would be to constitute tri-Service integrated theatre commands to synergise the capabilities and the combat potential of individual Services. It is time to set up a tri-service Aerospace and Cyber Command as well as a Special Forces Command to meet emerging challenges in these fields and to better manage all available resources. A tri-Service Logistics and Maintenance command has also been long overdue. International experience shows that such reform has to be imposed from the top down and can never work if the government keeps waiting for it to come about from the bottom up.
III- CONCLUSIONS
The softer issues that do not impinge immediately on planning and preparation for meeting national security challenges must never be ignored as these can have adverse repercussions on the morale of the officers and men in uniform in the long term. The numerous anomalies created by the implementation of the Sixth Pay Commission report must be speedily resolved. In fact, the ham-handed handling of this issue has led to a dangerous "them versus us" civil-military divide and the government must make it a priority to bridge this gap quickly.
The ex-Servicemen too have had a raw deal and have been surrendering their medals and holding fasts for justice to get justice for their legitimate demand of "one rank-one pension". One rank-one pension is an idea whose time has come and it must be implemented without further delay and without appointing any more committees of bureaucrats to look into the issue. While a Department of Ex-servicemen's Welfare has been created in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in keeping with the UPA's Common Minimum Programme, till recently there wasn't a single ex-Serviceman in it. Such measures do not generate confidence among serving soldiers and retired veterans in the civilian leadership. Finally, rather unbelievably, India is still without a National War Memorial.
Issue brief - Defence Reforms and National Security: Managing Threats and Challenges to India
Gurmeet Kanwal
South Asia is the second most unstable region in the world and is closely following West Asia in the race to reach the number one spot. Among the world's major democracies India faces the most complex threats and challenges spanning the full spectrum of conflict from nuclear to sub-conventional. Unresolved territorial disputes with China and Pakistan, insurgencies in Jammu and Kashmir and the north-eastern states, the rising tide of left wing extremism (LWE) and the growing spectre of urban terrorism have vitiated India's security environment.
I - SEARCH FOR A STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW
Despite the prolonged exposure that the security establishment has had in dealing with multifarious challenges, India's national security continues to be poorly managed. In fact, no Indian government till today has undertaken a strategic defence review.
The only time a review was undertaken in the recent past was after the Kargil conflict of 1999 when the Kargil Review Committee headed by the doyenne of Indian strategic thinkers, the late Mr. K Subrahmanyam, was appointed. The committee was asked to ""¦review the events leading up to the Pakistani aggression in the Kargil District of Ladakh in Jammu & Kashmir; and, to recommend such measures as are considered necessary to safeguard national security against such armed intrusions."
Besides Mr. Subrahmanyam, who was appointed chairman, the Committee comprised three members: Lieutenant General (Retd.) K. K. Hazari, B. G. Verghese and Satish Chandra, Secretary, National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) who was also designated as Member-Secretary. Though it had been given a very narrow and limited charter, the committee looked holistically at the threats and challenges and examined the loopholes in the management of national security.
The committee was of the view that, "the political, bureaucratic, military and intelligence establishments appear to have developed a vested interest in the status quo.'' Consequently, it made far reaching recommendations on the development of India's nuclear deterrence, the management of national security, intelligence reforms, border management, the defence budget, the use of air power, counter-insurgency operations, integrated manpower policy, defence research and development, and media relations. The committee's report was tabled in Parliament on February 23, 2000.
The Cabinet Committee on Security then appointed a Group of Ministers (GoM) to study the Kargil Review Committee report and recommend measures for implementation. The GoM was headed by Home Minister L K Advani and comprised Defence Minister George Fernandes, External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha and National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra. In turn, the GoM set up four task forces on intelligence reforms, internal security, border management and defence management to undertake in-depth analysis of various facets of national security management. These were headed, respectively, by Jammu and Kashmir Governor Mr. G. C. Saxena, former defence and home secretary and principal secretary to the Prime Minister Mr. N. N. Vohra, former home secretary Mr. Madhav Godbole and Mr. Arun Singh, former Union minister who was then an advisor to the Ministry of External Affairs on security matters and who had himself headed the Committee on Defence Expenditure in the early 1990s.
The GoM recommended sweeping reforms to the existing national security management system and the CCS accepted all its recommendations, including one for the establishment of the post of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) – which still has not happened. As approved by the CDS, a tri-Service Andaman and Nicobar Command and a Strategic Forces Command were established. Other salient measures included the establishment of HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS); the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA); the establishment of a Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) headed by the defence Minister with two wings: the Defence Procurement Board and the Defence technology Board; management of borders with different countries by a single border management agency (e.g. the western border with Pakistan is managed by the BSF); and, the nomination of the CRPF as India's primary counter-insurgency operations force.
Despite the new measures approved for implementation by the CCS on May 11, 2001, many lacunae still remain in the management of national security. In order to review the progress of implementation of the proposals approved by the CCS in 2001 and to take stock of the new developments over the last 10 years, such as the threats emanating from the sea a la the Mumbai terror strikes and the rapid deterioration of the regional security environment due to the growing spread of radical extremism and creeping Talibanisation, the government appointed a Task Force on National Security in mid-June 2011.
The task force is led by Mr. Naresh Chandra, former Cabinet Secretary and ambassador to the US and comprises 13 other members. The members include Mr. G Parthasarathy, former High Commissioner to Pakistan, Air Chief Marshal S. Krishnaswamy (Retd), Admiral Arun Prakash (Retd), Lt Gen V. R. Raghavan (Retd), Dr. Anil Kakodkar, former chief of the Department of Atomic Energy, Mr. K. C. Verma, former Secretary R&AW and Mr. V. K. Duggal, former Union Home Secretary, among others. The task force has been given six months to submit its report.
II - MANAGING NATIONAL SECURITY
There is much needs to be done to improve the management of national security in India. The first and foremost requirement is for the government to formulate a comprehensive National Security Strategy (NSS), including internal security, so that all the stakeholders are aware of what is expected of them.
The NSS should be formulated after carrying out an inter-departmental, inter-agency, multi-disciplinary strategic defence review. Such a review must take the public into confidence and not be conducted behind closed doors. Like in most other democracies, the NSS should be signed by Prime Minister, who is the head of government, and must be placed on the table of Parliament and released as a public document. Only then will various stakeholders be compelled to take ownership of the strategy and work unitedly to achieve its aims and objectives.
It has clearly emerged that China poses the most potent military threat to India and, given the nuclear, missile and military hardware nexus between China and Pakistan, future conventional conflict in Southern Asia will be a two-front war. Therefore, India's military strategy of dissuasion against China must be gradually upgraded to deterrence. Genuine deterrence comes only from the capability to launch and sustain major offensive operations into the adversary's territory. India needs to raise new divisions to carry the next war deep into Tibet. Since manoeuvre is not possible due to the restrictions imposed by the difficult mountainous terrain, firepower capabilities need to be enhanced by an order of magnitude, especially in terms of precision-guided munitions. This will involve substantial upgradation of ground-based (artillery guns, rockets and missiles) and aerially-delivered (fighter-bomber aircraft and attack helicopter) firepower. Only then will it be possible to achieve future military objectives.
The armed forces are now in the fifth and final year of the 11th Defence Plan (2007-12) and it has not yet been formally approved by the government. The government has also not approved the long-term integrated perspective plan (LTIPP 2007-22) formulated by HQ Integrated Defence Staff. Without these essential approvals, defence procurement is being undertaken through ad hoc annual procurement plans, rather than being based on carefully prioritised long-term plans that are designed to systematically enhance India's combat potential. These are serious lacunae as effective defence planning cannot be undertaken in a policy void.
The government must commit itself to supporting long-term defence plans or else defence modernisation will continue to lag and the present quantitative military gap with China's People's Liberation Army will become a qualitative gap as well in 10 to 15 years. This can be done only by making the dormant National Security Council a pro-active policy formulation body for long term national security planning. (The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) deals with current and near term threats and challenges and reacts to emergent situations.)
The defence procurement decision making process must be speeded up. The army is still without towed and self-propelled 155mm howitzers for the plains and the mountains and urgently needs to acquire weapons and equipment for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations. The navy has been waiting for long for the INS Vikramaditya (Admiral Gorshkov) aircraft carrier, which is being refurbished in a Russian shipyard at exorbitant cost. Construction of the indigenous air defence ship is lagging behind schedule.
The plans of the air force to acquire 126 multi-mission, medium-range combat aircraft in order to maintain its edge over the regional air forces are also stuck in the procurement quagmire. All three Services need a large number of light helicopters. India's nuclear forces require the Agni-III missile and nuclear powered submarines with suitable ballistic missiles to acquire genuine deterrent capability. The armed forces do not have a truly integrated C4I2SR system suitable for modern network-centric warfare, which will allow them to optimise their individual capabilities.
All of these high-priority acquisitions will require extensive budgetary support. With the defence budget languishing at less than two per cent of India's GDP – compared with China's 3.5 per cent and Pakistan's 4.5 per cent plus US military aid – it will not be possible for the armed forces to undertake any meaningful modernisation in the foreseeable future. Leave aside genuine military modernisation that will substantially enhance combat capabilities, the funds available on the capital account at present are inadequate to suffice even for the replacement of obsolete weapons systems and equipment that are still in service well beyond their useful life cycles. The central police and para-military forces (CPMFs) also need to be modernised as they are facing increasingly more potent threats while being equipped with obsolescent weapons.
The government must also immediately appoint a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) or a permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to provide single-point advice to the CCS on military matters, along with the simultaneous establishment of theatre commands. Any further delay in these key structural reforms in higher defence management on the grounds of the lack of political consensus and the inability of the armed forces to agree on the issue will be extremely detrimental to India's interests in the light of the dangerous developments taking place in India's neighbourhood. The logical next step would be to constitute tri-Service integrated theatre commands to synergise the capabilities and the combat potential of individual Services. It is time to set up a tri-service Aerospace and Cyber Command as well as a Special Forces Command to meet emerging challenges in these fields and to better manage all available resources. A tri-Service Logistics and Maintenance command has also been long overdue. International experience shows that such reform has to be imposed from the top down and can never work if the government keeps waiting for it to come about from the bottom up.
III- CONCLUSIONS
The softer issues that do not impinge immediately on planning and preparation for meeting national security challenges must never be ignored as these can have adverse repercussions on the morale of the officers and men in uniform in the long term. The numerous anomalies created by the implementation of the Sixth Pay Commission report must be speedily resolved. In fact, the ham-handed handling of this issue has led to a dangerous "them versus us" civil-military divide and the government must make it a priority to bridge this gap quickly.
The ex-Servicemen too have had a raw deal and have been surrendering their medals and holding fasts for justice to get justice for their legitimate demand of "one rank-one pension". One rank-one pension is an idea whose time has come and it must be implemented without further delay and without appointing any more committees of bureaucrats to look into the issue. While a Department of Ex-servicemen's Welfare has been created in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in keeping with the UPA's Common Minimum Programme, till recently there wasn't a single ex-Serviceman in it. Such measures do not generate confidence among serving soldiers and retired veterans in the civilian leadership. Finally, rather unbelievably, India is still without a National War Memorial.
Issue brief - Defence Reforms and National Security: Managing Threats and Challenges to India
