http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703373404576147770085095438.html It makes no sense for India now to return to the table with Pakistan, especially without preconditions. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has long wanted to leave his stamp on foreign policy by achieving a lasting peace between India and Pakistan. Since he came to power in 2004, he has resolutely carried forward the process of bilateral dialogue that was initiated by Atal Behari Vajpayee, his predecessor. He was compelled to suspend those talks in November 2008 after Pakistani terrorists carried out an attack on Mumbai. Now, more than two years later, the memory of those attacks has faded sufficiently for him to resume that process. The two countries agreed to a new timetable for the dialogue last week. However, returning to the diplomatic table with Pakistan is a mistake. Increasingly compelling evidence has emerged that the Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistan-based terrorist group, carried out the Mumbai attacks with the connivance of the Pakistani military establishment. Despite being confronted with evidence by both India and the United States, Islamabad is playing a delaying game to avoid having to take any action against militant groups. Mr. Singh does not appear to see dialogue as an instrument to achieve desired outcomes. The earlier joint mechanism he and Mr. Musharraf initiated in 2006 to investigate and counter cross-border terrorism failed to prevent a string of attacks across Indian cities, not least the one on Mumbai. The Indian prime minister pressed on nevertheless, yielding to demands made by Pakistani Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani at successive summits. At a July 2009 summit at Sharm-el-Sheikh, Egypt, Mr. Singh allowed Mr. Gilani to phrase the joint statement in a manner that suggested Indian involvement in the insurgency in Pakistan's western Baluchistan province. The Pakistani media consequently portrayed this as an admission of guilt on India's part. Mr. Singh also effectively dropped India's insistence that talks could only resume after Pakistan acted against the terrorists accused of the Mumbai attacks, even reaffirming this position at a summit in Bhutan last April. All this, in spite of considerable political costs to himself and his political party. The Indian government's fecklessness is clear from whom it chooses to diplomatically engage with. Mr. Singh doesn't care that Pakistan's post-Musharraf civilian leaders are powerless to deliver on anything substantial. And that it is the military that matters Here, General Ashfaq Kayani, the army chief, is pursuing an anti-India agenda. Under his leadership, the Pakistani military has distanced itself from the overtures made by his predecessor, Mr. Musharraf. A former Afghan official has stated publicly that the 2008 bombing of India's embassy in Kabul was perpetrated by Lashkar-e-Taiba with cooperation from Pakistan's Interservices Intelligence (ISI) agency at a time when Gen. Kayani, as army leader, had ultimate responsibility for the ISI. During his tenure, there has been a resurgence of terrorists infiltrating into the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir; both Mr. Musharraf and Pakistani president Asif Ali Zardari have admitted that the ISI has been broadly responsible for these infiltrations in the past. A WikiLeaks cable, part of last year's dump, shows that even the U.S. has started to question Mr. Kayani's role. One diplomat wrote in 2009 that "the Pakistani establishment will dramatically increase support for Taliban groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, which they see as . . . an important counterweight" to India. Mr. Kayani is seen to be against a pro-Indian government in Kabul. As long as India officially remains the chief threat to Pakistan, the military establishment can reorder Islamabad's resources whichever way it wants; this power vanishes if India is no longer deemed that kind of threat. Perhaps that's why even Mr. Musharraf couldn't persuade his military colleagues on the merits of settling with India. If a military dictator couldn't deliver on a deal at the height of his power, agreements with Pakistan's civilians are unlikely to be worth the paper they are printed on. Yet Mr. Singh soldiers on. Talks might even have worked if New Delhi had ratcheted up the engagement step by step, in response to small, tangible acts of good faith by Islamabad. Now, though, India's decision will be interpreted as a victory by the Pakistani military-jihadi complex. Much like the Kim Jong Il regime in North Korea, Pakistan's military leaders reckon they can use their possession of nuclear weapons to get away with acts of aggression against their neighbor. This lets them use provocative attacks as a low-cost option to achieve their geopolitical objectives. Rewarding aggression with unconditional talks only encourages an encore. Mr. Singh and others in India's foreign policy establishment say they have no alternative. They point to the lack of credible military optionsâ€”because these options carry the risk of nuclear escalation. But talks with Pakistan versus punitive military strikes is a false dichotomy. There are other solutions within the sphere of diplomacy. These solutions involve understanding what truly enables the military-jihadi complex. The principal reason this complex can afford to export terrorism to India, Afghanistan and elsewhere is because, at a fundamental level, it is bankrolled and bailed out by the United States, China and Saudi Arabia. These powers support a state that has been on the brink perhaps since the 1950sâ€”so long that its elites have mastered the art of playing from that position. The Americans are desperate to extricate themselves from Afghanistan, the Chinese wish to tie down the U.S. and contain India, and the Saudis are interested in using Pakistan to hedge against a nuclear Iran. India has not yet attempted to use its own burgeoning relationships with these states to shape the behavior of various state and non-state actors that operate from within Pakistan. The real talks New Delhi should be pursuing are with Washington, Beijing and Riyadh. Mr. Pai is founder of the Takshashila Institution and editor of Pragatiâ€”The Indian National Interest Review.