Maoists vs Taliban who will win in a Fight?

[Blackwater]

Taliban and maoist are 2 different set of people with different goals and ideology

comparing them is not fair

 

[DivineHeretic]

Their methods to achieve their goals are somewhat similar.So a comparison might be done

 

[The Messiah]

Judging by the weapons in the op there's only one answer.

 

[Dovah]

Taliban wins, mid to low difficulty.

 

[Dovah]

Nice thread though. We should have more match ups. :thumb:

 

[Splurgenxs]

From the purely tactical Pov. They are essentially the same thing.
Only diffidence is the terrain.

From a strategic Pov . Maoists win hands down, Given the armaments and its judicious usage ,as well as the K/D ratio ..
the Taliban are not really all that ,if one offsets the balance by taking into account the massive funding and logistic support to all these jihadi extremist elements.

 

[Yusuf]

There cannot be a 5 vs 5 fight kind of scenario. If there is a say a fight for area dominance, Taliban will win because of thu weapons they have, the training & they are battle hardened both in Conventional & guerilla warfare. Taliban today is the deadliest mercenary force

 

[uvbar]

first the victory is based on terrain
second why do we need a comparison to pakistan ( even a indirect)
the greatest samurai in a war is the one who lets his sword rust

 

[Rage]

Interesting topic.

As one of the posters said, it really depends on the terrain. One the one hand, there are striking similarities between both: both are now ideological movements, not merely armed insurrections. Both are known to allude to traditional ideals such as 'justice' and to set themselves up as alternate poles of 'just, efficient government' as a source of their legitimacy. Both have standing cadres: a 'core cavalry' and political affiliates: with codes of conduct for both cadre and denizens. Both engage in public propaganda and have ideological sympathizers and financial contributants from within the civilian populace. Both have veritable 'war economies' : the Taliban made some 8,000 improvised explosive devices in 2008 alone, an astonishing rate of almost 22 a day; whereas, the Maoists are known to have established Technical Units/TRAM for the manufacture of weapons and mines in separate foundaries/industrial units across five states. Both indulge in economically malfeasant activities to finance their goals: extortion, kidnappings, targeted private/public infrastructure assaults; and draw, as their source of inspiration, from literature ideas, dialectic and justification: one religious; the other one, economic.

But there are also differences. The Maoists specialize in ambush situations, improvised explosive devices, sophisticated informant networks and bivouacking. Whereas the Taliban specialize in skirmishing, targeted explosions including IED's, hostage taking/sequestering, rapid multi-theatre advance, rapid dispersal and ensconcement, fear psychosis through suicide bombings, sustained hit-and-run attacks and defensive networks with robust lines of communication. Both groups' tactics and organizational strategies have been moulded to suit their environments. In hilly or mountainous terrain, I'd give the Taliban the battle; in jungle terrain, I'd give it to the Maoists; In neutral terrain that offers no particular advantages to either, I'd have to give it to the Taliban. The Pashtuns have a greater history of warfare and adaptive warfare against external enemies than the Gondi tribals. They have also had more experience in different terrains: from the arid mountains and base camps of Afghanistan, to the cities of Karachi and Quetta and now even the plains of the Punjab. They also have the ability to penetrate military institutions and use that to devastating effect by commanding the patronage of like-minded ideologues. The Maoists on the other hand have, again, almost exclusively been confined to the forests. They have no significant institutional penetration and their allure is limited to a certain substrata of society, and does not straddle social classes unlike the Taliban's.

On the other hand, much has been also said about the Maoists organizational capability vis-à-vis the Talibans. The Maoists generally have a better organizational infrastructure because of the relative legitimacy of their competing ideology (but not means) in the democratic panoply. For example, in the manufacture of 12 bore weapons, spares and literature, the Maoists constituted a Central Technical Committee that oversaw the distribution of knocked-down kits- which were themselves crudely fabricated using lathe machines by Maoist techies working in nondescript workshops in industrial areas of various cities- through private road carriers/transporters to mobile assembly units located in the forests, especially in Bastar and Maad, in Chhattisgarh. The assembled weapons were then distributed either by the mobile assembling units themselves upon rendezvousing with regional Maoist platoons. Their financing channels are just as deliberately elusive, intricate and diversifiable. That said, it is important to remember that the Taliban in Pakistan have evolved too: they now have a sizable presence in Pakistani cities, where their funding comes from a host of urban gangland activities: including theft, drugs, target killings and 'bhatta'/hafta. Both have been alleged to have foreign sources of funding, and at least in the case of the Taliban, it may not be wise to discount these:

The United States squarely puts the blame for the failure of the War on Terror and anything related to the Taliban and the Al Qaeda on Pakistan. Unfortunately the bubble is blown by none other than a US congressman. Republican Congressman Dana Rohrabacher claimed "The Taliban was a construct of the CIA and was armed by the CIA" [1]. Let's explore how far this is true.


In a 1998 interview, Zbigniew Brezinski, Carter's national security adviser admitted that U.S. aid to the Mujahideen factions began before the December 1979 invasion and played a role in inviting the Russians into the region. The entire plan had been to trap the Russians in Afghanistan and use factions such as the Taliban to fight their war for them. According to Brezinski the first ruling for secret aid to the mujahideen came on July 3, 1979 under President Carter himself [2]. Soon after that an American delegation was sent to Pakistan to use it as a puppet to fight their war against the Soviets for them. Pakistan took almost all the losses for the war and the blame for arming the Taliban which could never have been possible without American financing and naturally when the war was over so was the assistance that Pakistan had been promised by the United States. Today Pakistan faces the fallout of what happened back then in the face of a raging insurgency fuelled further by the American presence in Afghanistan that has killed over 35000 Pakistanis with over 40000 Pakistanis grievously wounded [3].


Certain media outlets are telling the World that Pakistan is receiving 'huge amounts of aid' and may be supporting the militants to milk that aid. However they aren't telling the World about the losses Pakistan has suffered. According to Pakistan's Interior Ministry the damage caused to the Nation in the loss of infrastructure and life was $35 Billion up to July 2009. This was based on a conservative estimate but for lack of other figures we will use this. Since there has been no real let up in the violence from that period the current estimates put the damage to well over $42 Billion in return for a meagre and reluctant American compensation. The exact figure of aid is still unknown and various estimates put it from 4 Billion to 17 Billion. So from being in the War on Terror Pakistan is already at a loss financially without counting the loss in investment and the loss of developing markets for Pakistani exporters. Recent figures from 2011 have even more grim data: Pakistan has suffered losses of $68 Billion since the beginning of this war. [4]


In any case to have caused such much major damage the Tehreek E Taliban would need to be exceptionally well organized, very well armed and extremely well funded. The well funded and well armed bit specially stands surprisingly true since around 86% of the Taliban have never gone to a college or university before and 40% have only studied till Matric (About 9th grade) or even less [5] (This particular piece of statistic is still preliminary and its reliability is slightly in doubt due to the impossibility of finding the educational qualifications of every Taliban militant much less calculating a percentage but looking at the Pakistani scenario they are thought to be possibly somewhere around the truth). Most of the Taliban soldiers are completely illiterate and can barely sign their names on a piece of paper. The riddle of where the money may be coming from in a country where about 70% of the population lives below $2 a day or even how the major commanders seem to have evaded capture every time Pakistan launches an operation still remains unsolved.


To give the Taliban their due however they have indeed developed a source of funding in Pakistan over time. According to analysts the primary known sources of the Taliban's wealth are donations from its sympathizers, looting of supply convoys, kidnap for ransom and extortion of protection money. Recent reports indicate that Taliban are even involved in bank robberies in major Pakistani cities such as Karachi while it has also been speculated that a great deal of the poppy growth cultivation in Afghanistan directly benefits the Pakistani Taliban. According to the past governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa this reserve seems to be increasing by approximately $45 Million annually. This in itself is a large figure. In fact it is actually just about half of what the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government has been capable of spending on the war on terror. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government spent about $89.5 Million on law and order according to the 2009-10 National budget. [6]


According to analysts the Taliban has also accumulated around $250-400 Million of wealth over time. Therefore the word that the Taliban is operating its own government with its own standing finances stands correct. [6]


If any further evidence of this is required, according to a report from Dawn a single Pakistani police constable makes about $80 a month while a Taliban foot soldier in Pakistan makes $170 per month. Even in death the government cannot match up to the Taliban. The heir of a dead policeman receives about $6000 while a suicide bombers family is often given sums of over $20000 [7]. The total number of Taliban troops and terrorists associated with other radical organizations operating under the umbrella of the Tehreek E Taliban Pakistan is 35,000. Using the figures and multiplying the yearly expenditure of the Taliban on salaries for its fighters and compensation for the families of suicide bombers the figures add to $72 Million. This is more than the $45 Million they are earning.


Given that the organization has spent approximately $72 Million of its wealth to pay their bombers and their foot soldiers it still leaves the question of acquisition of arms, weaponry and other expenses for its fighters. If that isn't enough to prove that the Taliban is a power to be reckoned with even bolder is the announcement of Hakeemullah Mahsud, the Taliban commander that the Taliban can give $20 Million in aid to the government to provide for the flood victims of Pakistan if the American aid for the floods is rejected.


It is certainly clear that the Taliban is earning more than $45 Million annually and that money is not enough to maintain the group's terrorist activities. It is also clear that to spend $72 Million yearly they would have to have another income source. This definitely means that either someone from outside is supporting the Taliban or the Taliban have even more sources of income that have not come under the scrutiny of Pakistani analysts and officials.


Pakistan becomes a punching bag: Blaming the ISI


The ISI has been the target of the blame for the monster we face today. Many writers and journalists even within Pakistan have begun taking a page from the American media and questioning whether it is certain Pakistani generals and the ISI secretly supplying the terrorists. The question is could this be true today and if so have these same generals or the ISI actually benefitted from the current situation of Pakistan?


Even if the claim that sympathetic generals within the army are supporting the insurgents holds true the question still remains how can the insurgent's have estimated wealth reserves of around $250-400 Million when it comprises of a group of ragtag and illiterate men, most of whom cannot read a single passage in any language. If the ISI is responsible, as the US and Indian media would have us believe, well then it's for sure that the agencies entire staff's salary is being handed over to the Taliban for the group's sustenance while the agencies own agents and operatives are going home without their salaries. Not to say they are perfectly happy with the murder of their own fellow countrymen by the Taliban. The funds available to the ISI are classified but for an impoverished country like Pakistan some analysts suggest it is $250 Million though it hasn't been confirmed yet.


Nonetheless 'rogue agents' from the ISI are the focus of the blame in today's World. However a look at how the ISI has taken losses and suffered might make those thinking along such lines reconsider. A small count of the attacks on the ISI in the country will reveal:


-The attack in Multan on the ISI building kills 8. [8]
-The attack in Peshawar on the ISI kills around 10. [9]
-ISI provincial headquarters in Lahore attacked on 28th May killing 35 and wounding over 300. [10]
-The brutal murder of 2 main ISI agents Khalid Khwaja and Colonel Imam by the Taliban, the two very same people often blamed for supporting the Taliban were killed by the very people the media alleged they were supporting. [11]
-The very recent bombing of the ISI building in Faisalabad. [12]


This proves that ISI has severely been targeted in the war and is losing both men and suffering severe financial losses in the War on Terror. These are some of the bomb attacks that are known but there are more deaths in the Tribal Areas that are going unaccounted for by the media.


According to an unnamed official many agents and operatives have been sent to the North and South Waziristan region to collect intelligence and have wound up dead. The ISI keeps mum about its losses officially which sometimes makes it hard for people to understand that it has also taken losses in this war.


If the losses are compared to other intelligence agencies the results are strikingly different. Well known CIA operations remain intact in Afghanistan and it's a surprise that the militants would so selectively attack the locations of the countries intelligence agencies and that also with absolute impunity. What is even more surprising is that many ordinary citizens of Pakistan do not know the locations of the ISI, yet the Taliban have attacked their headquarters in almost every major city.


Another whipping boy? The Pakistani Military


The military has suffered even more financial loss than the ISI. No doubt much of the American aid and assistance is militaristic in nature and ends up in the hands of the Pakistan army however on the other hand this same institution is the primary loser in the violence that has gripped the country.


Asad Khalil a self styled analyst who is trying to get a hold on the real figure on army losses both in terms of finances and personnel claims that the army has suffered at least $7 Billion in losses in the war on terror. If so even the army is losing more financially than it is gaining.


Furthermore no matter how much the army is blamed for the mistakes of the past, including Pakistan's role in the Afghan civil war, it is clear that the Military could not have dreamed of facing the Soviets without US support, $4 Billion of US assistance was handed over to the militants [13]which have matured into the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Would it be sensible for Pakistan to face a superpower of that time such as the Soviets without support and would our leadership have taken the same decision if an American delegation had not come up and demanded help against the Soviets? So perhaps the United States is more to blame for the creation of terrorists.


Foreign Support to the Taliban?


When it comes to certain Right Wing media groups they have continuously stood up and taken every opportunity to say that terrorism is being sponsored by various intelligence agencies of certain countries that are against the ideal of Pakistan. However proof in this case counts. Our analysis reveals that the Taliban is gaining support from someone. Finding out who is the real issue.


The United States has sometimes been blamed for both directly or indirectly supporting terrorism in Pakistan but there has been no real official claim and nothing recorded from an official source. One thing frustrating the Pakistani Military today is its inability to monitor the activities of the CIA which has been blamed for sponsoring terrorism in Pakistan. Unfortunately for USA and fortunately for the Pakistanis the country woke up from its slumber when a man operating in Pakistan as Raymond Davis murdered two Pakistanis on the streets of Lahore in broad daylight. That's when reports of contacts on his cell phone came up, the gadgets in his car and photographs from his camera containing sensitive locations. There were 33 calls on his cell phone of which 27 were to known or suspected militants. This is confirmed knowledge from the police and is suspicious activity. [14]


According to Shakil Ahmed a journalist, Davis was only one of 1200 Blackwater agents spread out across the country [15]. Some police officials from Lahore further backed up these claims and even went further claiming he had close links to militants and was instrumental in recruiting youth for the terrorists. Furthermore the ISI which according to the agreement with USA, which allows agents on its territory, is to keep tabs on all CIA agents present in the country but does not have Davis in its records.


Many people believe it was unfortunate what happened that day but perhaps it was lucky as it allowed Pakistanis to understand that there is perhaps another angle to look at things from.


India has also been blamed and in this case rare politicians, or media channels supporting claims of Indian support to the terrorists have come up. An article in late 2009 appeared claiming India was supporting terrorism in Pakistan and had funnelled $650 Million to the Taliban insurgents in Pakistan, a fact which was revealed by three captured militants themselves. In October 2009 Rehman Malik claimed India was supporting the Taliban and Pakistan was ready to confront India with evidence. [16]


Another video appeared on the internet briefly where a militant commander admits to have been paid by India to fuel sectarianism in Pakistan on the television screen. Also after the Sri Lankan cricket team attack a report was made public that had been received by the local police in Lahore.

It is also imminent to mention here that India has four consulates in Afghanistan. This is more than the number of consulates a country would want to have in such an impoverished country. What is most alarming for Pakistan is that three of these consulates are right across the border. India has continuously been blamed for fomenting unrest in Baluchistan as well.


Nonetheless though the more patriotic men and women of Pakistan are prepared to believe these reports and are eager to find out just what exactly they are facing in the shape of an extremely powerful, never ending, well-financed insurgency Liberals are unlikely to give much attention to news of foreign aid to the Taliban unless confronted with some extraordinary proof which has so far not come.


Is the Taliban really thriving on foreign support?


The grim reality is that the Taliban is both earning and spending much more than was initially believed. It is difficult to make judgements about who is supporting them. However someone has to find out from where that money is coming. Pakistanis after all these years deserve to know how the Taliban have not just survived but thrived in Pakistan and are able to murder Pakistanis in weekly bombings.


The natural suspicion is going to fall on the ISI Internationally unless and until Pakistan can find proper proof about foreign support to the Taliban, proof that can be presented to the United Nations. Furthermore it is necessary to cut the militants funding more than anything else. Capturing top Militant Commanders can also reveal the terrorists finances and their support structure which is crucial to ensure their defeat. There may be many hidden hands supporting the militants. Not to say these hidden hands have to be foreign intelligence services. They can also be powerful businessmen with militant links. Only the top management of the Taliban can explain where their finances come from. Capturing them is vital.

Both movements employ a rigorous training style that is suited to their climes.

Their lifestyles and nutritional sources are however instructive. Because the Taliban are well entrenched within Pakistani cities, they can avail themselves of a wider array of supplies. The Maoists however are restricted to rural fare, farm produce or what they can forage from the trees. In terms of nutritional stability, the Taliban wins out.

In terms of organizational sagacity, capability and discipline, I'd rate the Maoists slightly ahead. In terms of ferociousness, ideological motivation and crude (barehand) fighting ability, I'd rate the Taliban slightly ahead; in terms of sources, scale and state of funding, I'd again rate the Taliban ahead; and in terms of adaptability, which is the most crucial element of any guerrilla outfit, I'd rate the Taliban significantly ahead. Overall, given a neutral venue (non-urban, non-jungle, non-mountainous) given their greater experience, ferocity and demonstrated adaptability, I think the Taliban'd win.

- - -

In some ways, the Indian Army can be said to be more successful in countering its nemesis than its Pakistani counterpart, because it has adopted the exact same strategies that the Maoists employ. Cobra Commandos and troops of the CRPF trained at the CIJWS at Mizoram move, eat, fight and sleep like the Maoists. The results have been quite potent. The following is a translated article, originally in French, that details how this strategic-mimickry has evolved:

In The Indian Jungle, Fighting Maoist Rebels With Their Own Guerrilla Tactics -


The Pakistani Army, on the other hand, has relied largely on conventional tactics to counter its Taliban nemesis. Artillery pounding, helicopter gunships and traditional clear-and-hold tactics, that after employed, see the area handed over to designated civilian authorities, are the order of the day. This gamut of conventional strategies could work given large parallel troop concentrations and a secure border, but the Taliban in Pakistan can simply melt away and resurface on both sides along the porous Af-Pak border at will. The closest the PA comes to mimicking the Taliban's guerrilla strategy is the co-opting of tribal lashkars, in much the same manner that the IA has co-opted the Salwa Judum. But this is a strategy with limited employ because tribal lashkar tactics are themselves inchoate, diffused and not concerted. With the result that the gains the PA makes against the Taliban, either itself or through its confederates, cannot be consolidated post-withdrawal.

 

[spikey360]

After what Rage has posted, there isn't really much more to be said.

The taliban have a vast experience of executing all sorts of missions. From plane hijacks to suicide bombings, they've done it all. Furthermore, they've fought against the blunt force of the US war machine for more than a decade now. All the while the Maoists have only faced the restrained force of Indian State power. Both are our enemies, but the Taliban is a bigger threat and the Maoists are yet to face the full force of the Indian Armed Forces.

 

[pmaitra]

Leadership

Maoists have an excellent leadership, which includes quite a handful of university educated people. The Taliban leadership on the other hand are educated in Madrassas. This gives a the Maoists an edge over planning and execution of their missions, especially the ambushes and diversionary tactics, as well as managing the media. The Maoists have a clear edge here.

Training

The Maoists are well trained. Portions of the Taliban, especially those associated with and passed out from the Jihadi camps, are also well trained. However, it is difficult to compare which training is better. Foreign forces (USSR, NATO) have had very good successes against the Taliban on their home turf, while in India, even domestic forces have often struggled. While it is true that most of the operations against the Maoists were done by police and CRPF, one must consider that the Maoists themselves were never as well equipped as the Taliban. Considering all these, the Maoists have a clear edge.

Funding

The Taliban is well funded by the al-Wahhab and al-Saud alliance. They have, or currently do, receive funding from US and Pakistan. They also have opium as a major source of income. The Maoists on the other hand do not have a secure source of funding. While funding is being channeled to Maoists by PRC, PRC could and would never match the funding that the Taliban receive, because all PRC wants is to keep India bogged down while it marches ahead in development. The Taliban have an edge here.

Efficiency

The Maoists have, despite lack of funds and superior weapons in comparison with the Taliban, have been extremely lethal. They are quick, flexible, and can melt away into the darkness very well. The Taliban, on the other hand, have had much less success in battles. For example, the Taliban, or whatever it was called then, lost every single battle against the Soviet forces. The Maoists however, have won quite a few. The Maoists have an edge here.

Motivation

The Taliban are not ideologically motivated. While Islam might be their excuse, they often end up killing fellow Muslims of different denominations. They are also extremely vulnerable to bribes, and will defect given the first opportunity. Switching sides has been the hallmark of the several factions than make the Taliban today, during the post-1989 years in Afghanistan. The Maoists, on the other hand, keep their political differences academic. Maoists, even after splitting, have collaborated and joined forces and carried out operations against security forces. Bribing is less likely to work with the Maoists. The Maoists have an edge here.

Man Power

Taliban's manpower is between 30,000 and 40,000, while the Maoists' (wo)man power is 20,000. Maoists also employ women in full fledged warfare, while the Taliban is restricted to men. The Taliban, nonetheless, has the edge here.

Territorial Impact

While the Maoists probably have an impact on a larger territory, their impact is limited to sporadic attacks, while the Taliban, despite controlling relatively smaller regions, have consolidated their grip on those regions. Focusing on the quality of territorial impact, the Taliban have an edge here.

Verdict

Considering the above points on a scale of 0 and 1 for each, Maoists win.

Taliban 3 - 4 Maoists

 

[KS]

Leadership

Maoists have an excellent leadership, which includes quite a handful of university educated people. The Taliban leadership on the other hand are educated in Madrassas. This gives a the Maoists an edge over planning and execution of their missions, especially the ambushes and diversionary tactics, as well as managing the media. The Maoists have a clear edge here.

While the Maoists do have some univ grads that does not automatically make them winners. The Talibs also do have some battle hardened leaders who cut their teeth against the Soviets - one of the best out there and they do have shown some good tactical planning like Mehran base attack and devastating use of suicide bombings to take out the traditional pasthan leadership - the maliks and their jirgas thus entrenching themselves. Moreover they have the advanatages of rogue planners among the PA and ISI.On the Maoists side, their cutting trees to block roads, blowing up communication lines etc point to a good leadership. Essentially a draw.

Training

The Maoists are well trained. Portions of the Taliban, especially those associated with and passed out from the Jihadi camps, are also well trained. However, it is difficult to compare which training is better. Foreign forces (USSR, NATO) have had very good successes against the Taliban on their home turf, while in India, even domestic forces have often struggled. While it is true that most of the operations against the Maoists were done by police and CRPF, one must consider that the Maoists themselves were never as well equipped as the Taliban. Considering all these, the Maoists have a clear edge.

Taliban all the way - the Maoists are just village tribals who after 20 or so years take up a .303 to fight against the state. The Pathans (who make the Talibs) on the other hand are literally born to the sound of AK firing. Fighting against someone be it the Pakistani state, some other tribe, some other clan within the same tribe is in their blood, refined over centuries of raiding, pillaging and invading.They have seen firings, killings right from their childhood. Guns are second nature to them and add to this the overall average training they receive at the hands of AQ...A slight edge to Taliban

Funding

The Taliban is well funded by the al-Wahhab and al-Saud alliance. They have, or currently do, receive funding from US and Pakistan. They also have opium as a major source of income. The Maoists on the other hand do not have a secure source of funding. While funding is being channeled to Maoists by PRC, PRC could and would never match the funding that the Taliban receive, because all PRC wants is to keep India bogged down while it marches ahead in development. The Taliban have an edge here.

Agreed.

Efficiency

The Maoists have, despite lack of funds and superior weapons in comparison with the Taliban, have been extremely lethal. They are quick, flexible, and can melt away into the darkness very well. The Taliban, on the other hand, have had much less success in battles. For example, the Taliban, or whatever it was called then, lost every single battle against the Soviet forces. The Maoists however, have won quite a few. The Maoists have an edge here.

Though the Mujaheddin did not loose every single battle against the Soviets with some commanders like Ahmad Massoud having quite some victories, yeah the Maoists are more efficient than the Talibs.

Motivation

The Taliban are not ideologically motivated. While Islam might be their excuse, they often end up killing fellow Muslims of different denominations. They are also extremely vulnerable to bribes, and will defect given the first opportunity. Switching sides has been the hallmark of the several factions than make the Taliban today, during the post-1989 years in Afghanistan. The Maoists, on the other hand, keep their political differences academic. Maoists, even after splitting, have collaborated and joined forces and carried out operations against security forces. Bribing is less likely to work with the Maoists. The Maoists have an edge here.

Talibs through and through. When a man is prepared to go kaboom with earnest and there are thousands like him earning martyrdom, then that is enough said about their motivation. Their only aim in life is kill the kaffir and earn their place in jannat with their 72 hoors. While we have seen plenty Maoists surrendering arms, till now I have not heard much Taliban surrendering. They kill or get killed.

Maoists on the other hand except for the top leadership - the ground cadre - most of them joined this war because they lack some basic necessities that the Govt have failed to give them and can be countered by just giving them the same..Even if not all, atleast a good portion of them can be rehabilitated that way and actually it has been done. But in Taliban case, their demand is a 7th century Arabia which is just not possible in this age and hence their need to fight will always be there.

Man Power

Taliban's manpower is between 30,000 and 40,000, while the Maoists' (wo)man power is 20,000. Maoists also employ women in full fledged warfare, while the Taliban is restricted to men. The Taliban, nonetheless, has the edge here.

Agreed.

One more thing - while the Maoists recruit individually, the Talib on the other hand can actually recruit based on clan loyalities where entire clans can be recruited in one go if the elder in that clan pledges loyalty to them.

Territorial Impact

While the Maoists probably have an impact on a larger territory, their impact is limited to sporadic attacks, while the Taliban, despite controlling relatively smaller regions, have consolidated their grip on those regions. Focusing on the quality of territorial impact, the Taliban have an edge here.

As far as I know if we consider the Afghan Taliban too,then the Talibs control a larger territory than the Maoists.

Some more factors :

Weapons profile - Taliban all the way - AKs, PKMs, RPGs, AAA guns, NVG devices and COM equipments from NATO supplies.

Weapons availability - Centuries old training in making rifles in remote villages out of reach of authorities, smuggled NATO goods, thus having a veritable armoury of their own. Taliban again.

Psychological impact - Videos of beheadings, suicide bombings etc create an aura of fear in them, thus sometimes winning them half the fight.

 

[pmaitra]

@KS, the Soviets never lost a single battle against the Talibs. Not a single one. Not even against Masood's Mujahids. This has been confirmed even by historians from NATO countries. They just could not keep up. Don't rely too much on Taliban propaganda. They like to brag more than they can actually do. We had them scooting like scared rabbits from Kargil.

 

[KS]

@KS, the Soviets never lost a single battle against the Talibs. Not a single one. Not even against Masood's Mujahids. This has been confirmed even by historians from NATO countries. They just could not keep up. Don't rely too much on Taliban propaganda. They like to brag more than they can actually do. We had them scooting like scared rabbits from Kargil.

Even that being true - what matters is who won the war and not the battles. And the Soviets till the last could not get a toehold on Panjshir,

 

[pmaitra]

Even that being true - what matters is who won the war and not the battles.

That I agree.

I think the fear factor which you mentioned works in favour of Taliban, and putting Taliban and ISI together, they have an edge over the Maoists. Just comparing Taliban and Maoists, I'd give the Maoists an edge. You made some interesting and valid points though.

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Must be drunk thread ..

Unsubscribing now