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Lopsided Wars of Peace: America's Anemic Ability to Project Civilian Power
by Brian M. Michelson and Sean P. Walsh
One of the most painful, and expensive, lessons we have re-learned over the past decade was best articulated by T.E. Lawrence when he stated, "It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them." Yet, if we accept the premise that the long term strategic success of U.S./Coalition undertakings rides most heavily on the motivation, legitimacy, and effectiveness of host governments and their economies, then helping "them" - and thus ourselves – win, requires a significant capability on our part to rapidly promote the transition and development of foreign states to acceptable levels of political and economic stability. These transition and development efforts, whether occurring in permissive or conflict areas, are often grouped under the general terms of reconstruction and stabilization operations
Despite the additional cost in blood, treasure and international standing, the United States has still not adequately developed an interagency capability to project the full spectrum of national power in current, and future, reconstruction and stabilization scenarios. While several administrations have advocated a "Whole of Government" approach, the concept has not been fully conceptualized, institutionalized and resourced. The result is that America remains capable of only an anemic ability to project the full capabilities of the nation, to include non-military, or "civilian power" as the recent Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) calls it. This article will examine the background and scope of America's limited ability to project its full, non-military capabilities and present some possible solutions to address this issue. While the QDDR's recommendations are an excellent start, more ambitious change is needed to tackle the scale of the problem. This article's recommendations center on the need for a Congressional mandate on the scale of the 1947 National Security Act or the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act to fully develop America's whole of government reconstruction and stabilization capability........
Scope of the Problem
While the United States military has a critical role in reconstruction and stability operations, it is neither suited, nor resourced, to carry the full weight of national reconstruction and stabilization responsibilities. Unfortunately, the U.S. military is often forced to do so because its expeditionary capabilities allow it to arrive sooner, and with far greater capacity, than other U.S. organizations. As a result, the military is often comparatively better resourced to do so than anyone else.[vii] Recognizing this, the Army even states in its primary operations manual, FM 3-0, that stability operations are to be given the same attention and importance as offensive and defensive operations.[viii] However, many national and provincial level developmental tasks, to include justice system reform, monetary policy, and macroeconomic policy are beyond the typical scope and capability of the military. It is at this level, the operational level, that the civilian interagency contribution is most critically needed. The delay in achieving United States stability and reconstruction objectives has increased the price in blood and treasure and the long term probability of success.
As laid out in the QDDR, in order to effectively contribute to large scale reconstruction and stabilization operations such as a failed state, the U.S. civilian interagency community will need to develop an expeditionary capability marked by the following characteristics: 1) The ability to rapidly marshal, deploy, protect, and sustain personnel, equipment and funding (Capability Projection); 2) The ability to surge resources for both short and long term reconstruction and stabilization operations as required (Surge Capability); and 3) The ability to effectively plan, coordinate, and execute strategic, operational and tactical level tasks required to achieve national strategic and operational objectives (Planning and Execution). Comparing the expeditionary capabilities of the interagency community and the military provides a useful framework for these requirements.
The U.S. military is generally accepted as very capable in terms of projecting and sustaining power on foreign soil, as defined above. Since 2001, the Department of Defense has marshaled and deployed several hundred thousand Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines throughout the Middle East. The military has orchestrated their deployment, combat operations, stability operations, and logistics efforts by committing hundreds of trained personnel to the herculean effort of planning, coordinating, and executing a militarily integrated counterinsurgency campaign throughout the Middle East. Additionally, in order to meet the dramatically increased personnel demands required to execute these plans, the military has surged its capacity with the largest call-up of reserve forces since World War II, with many reservists serving on multiple tours of duty. Quite simply, this is what the U.S. military is designed to do: execute operations on an enormous scale under difficult circumstances and over long distances.
The military's structure and demonstrated capability contrast starkly with how the U.S. has designed and resourced the rest of the whole of government response to large scale reconstruction and stabilization operations. Despite good intentions and talented individuals, many civilian agencies have struggled to marshal and deploy sufficient personnel or adequately plan, coordinate, and execute strategic and operational level tasks. They have also displayed little ability to surge in support of current or future operational demands.
Current Department of State (DoS) and US Agency for International Development (USAID) personnel policy provides manning to the U.S. Embassies in Iraq and Afghanistan on a volunteer basis with contractor augmentation.[ix] A 2005 staff trip report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations stated, "The Iraqi reconstruction mission has, from the General Garner days, been challenged to recruit and retain qualified civilians to serve lengthy tours of duty." There is no evidence that this challenge has abated.[x] The personnel system is slow to respond to changes and demands, with frequent underlaps occurring with replacements. The result is that we do not always get the right people, with the right skills, in the right place, at the right time. This situation has been especially acute in regards to attracting highly specialized personnel from agencies that do not traditionally have a foreign focus but are nonetheless crucial in reconstruction and stabilization operations. Time magazine noted that a report by the Special Inspector General for Iraq, "criticize[d] the Bush Administration for failing to attract government employees from outside the State and Defense departments to work in Iraq. Result: Scores of unqualified people parachuting in simply to build their resumes and rack up overtime."[xi] This has not always been the case. As recently as the Vietnam Conflict, the State Department assigned several hundred FSOs [Foreign Service Officers] to serve on the CORDS [Civil Operations and Rural Development Program] Provincial and District Advisory Teams.[xii] One can imagine the personnel and manning chaos that would ensue if military members could elect which conflicts to participate in on a case-by-case basis akin to the way the U.S. civilian agencies do. If reconstruction and stabilization operations are as important to national security as the both the Bush and Obama administrations have stated,[xiii] then it is not consistent to allow half of the governmental team (the civilian agencies) to participate on a voluntary basis. Describing the early days of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, former Coalition Provisional Authority budget director Rear Adm. David Oliver, lamented that "the coalition nations have millions of the most talented individuals in the world . . . We needed, and did not have, several thousand of them."[xiv] When we consider these factors, combined with the interagency community's relative inability to operate in less than permissive threat environments, the limited or delayed operational and strategic successes are not surprising.
The interagency community has neither adequate depth nor breadth of reserves from which to draw upon during times of crisis. Patrick Garvey's report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee lays out this issue quite clearly when he states that "there is no surge capacity in the civilian agencies. USAID, whose expertise is essential, has had trouble filling the seats it has in Baghdad."[xv] If operational demands require interagency officers and support personnel for a period of several years (as in Iraq and Afghanistan), there is no ready source of personnel or mechanism to marshal, train and deploy them. Lacking a system similar to the military reserve system to fill these demands, the personnel gap in reconstruction and stabilization operations has tended to be left unresourced or hastily filled by contractors.
Finally, few civilian interagency organizations place as significant an emphasis on preparing individuals for leadership positions and operational/managerial responsibilities through a formal educational process as does the military. The art of diplomacy, policy development and diplomatic reporting is a key role filled admirably by our FSOs. However, planning and executing large, complicated programs, especially in post conflict environments, is not a function for which FSOs generally have significant training or experience. "Reconstruction and stabilization missions," notes Patrick Garvey in a report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "demand program management skills and hands on field experience, rather than policy management and analytical skills needed in traditional embassy positions."[xvi] Based on a 2004 trip to Iraq, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff reported that "several people who had or were serving in Iraq expressed astonishment at the responsibilities they were given for which they were unprepared. For example, personnel with no budget or program management experience were overseeing enormous budgets and developing technical assistance programs."[xvii] Many interagency leaders were not provided the tools and skills to succeed at operational level decision making, planning, and execution. According to Max Boot, unless we change the U.S. paradigm, "The Foreign Service [will remain] trapped in a framework straight out of the 19th century, producing diplomats whose primary skill is liaison work with other diplomats."[xviii]
Lopsided Wars of Peace: America's Anemic Ability to Project Civilian Power | Small Wars Journal
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