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Let's salute an unhonoured hero! - Rediff.com India News
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China attacked Ladakh and NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh) in strength on October 20, 1962.The People's Liberation Army plunged down the Bum La-Tawang stretch three dayslater to seize Tawang.
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The devastating artillery fire provided by Captain G S Gosalenabled the Delta Company of 1 Sikh regiment led by Lieutenant Haripal Kaushik based at Tongpeng La to repulse every Chinese foray.
Nursing a bloody nose, the PLA bypassed Tongpeng La and stormed the defences slightly southwest, but the Sikhs dug in there and CaptainGosal were equal to the task.
Meanwhile, Major General Niranjan Prasad, the beleaguered commander of 4 Infantry Division, inferred thatTawang was indefensible against a four-pronged attackby a PLA division. He also had a hunch that the PLA would skirt the Sikhs and head straight for Se La, blow up thebridge at Jang to trap the Indian troops on the Tawang side of the river.
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He ordered the army units in the Tawang sector to withdraw and muster at Se La to take on the Chinese there. The PLA occupied Tawang unchallenged.
Nothing like hindsight vision, yet one would like to inhale and wail: Given how gutsily themen of Lieutenant Kaushik andCaptain Gosal stuck to their guns, if senior field commanders had shown similarspine to fight it out instead of pressing the panic button, couldn't the Indian Army [ Images ] have avoided being disgraced in NEFA?
There was a pause in the warafter the loss of Tawang. The PLA badly needed respite to recoup, regroup, restock and reinforce, rebuild two blown-up bridges, re-lay the Bum La-Tawang track into a pucca road to smoothen the logisticsand to haul the artillery.
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To gain time, to pretend reasonable to the world, Chinaproposed a sham 'friendly settlement', which Pandit Nehru [ Images ] waved aside outright.
The Indian Army too utilised the interlude to beef up its defences. Since the contours made it a natural rampart, the 96-km-long Se La-Dirang Dzong-Bomdila barrier was the stronghold chosen by Major General A S Pathania, the new commander of 4 Infantry Division now headquartered at Dirang Dzong, to confront the Chinese again. He had three brigades -- 48, 62 and 65 -- under him for this task.
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Hello, 4 Rajput!
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With the war clouds glowering,troops from the rest of the country were rushed into NEFA. The Belgaum-based 4thRajput battalion was tagged to65, the brigade in-charge of the Dirang sector.
On arrival at Misamari, they were told about the dearth of transport, and the battalion under Major Trilok Nath, the officiating commanding officer, footed it to Dirang.
Lieutenant Colonel Brahmanand Avasthy (fondly called Brahma) was slated to take over the command of 2 Rajput, the battalion he was commissioned into, but before he could set course to Namkha Chu from Mhow, 2 Rajput had to bear the brunt of Chinese invasion.
That 282 men were killed and myriad wounded, stands testimony to how heroically they fought the pitched battle. He was reassigned to 4 Rajput.
~
A man of spartan traits, Brahma was a consummate professional and a soldier of the first water. He got cracking on the battalion's preparedness; he wrote to Major P L Kukrety (a company commander), among other things, where to site the machine-guns and mortars, and to the quartermaster on the logistical groundwork to keep the wheels oiled.
Brahma assumed command of 4 Rajput on October 29.
The Sappers Camp is located 10 km northwest of Dirang. The primary task of the Rajputs was to thwart Chineseinfiltration from the east of their area clustered around the Sappers Camp.
While the battalion headquarters was set up at the Sappers Camp, one company was detailed to protect the bridge nearby as well as the division headquarters at Dirang.
One company was located eastof the Nyukmadong ridge, another at Lubrang, and the fourth company at a place called Dangsikpu. Captain Gosal's battery emplaced mountain guns in the vicinity of Dangsikpu.
~
From November 14, the Indians carried out aggressive patrolling in the no man's land, but the PLA hit back with interest. The PLA had used the thaw to mass two divisions, each comprisingfour brigades, at Tawang.
In no time, one PLA division had the Indian 4th Infantry Division on the run.
Major K P P Nair, a company commander, led the Rajputs' combing operations, but his column and three reinforcement contingents were ambushed and suffered heavy casualties on November 15 and 16. The remnants had to beat a retreat to the base camp.
Chinese checkers
The survey of the Tibet-NEFAborder to draw the McMahon Line on the map was done by two British officers, LieutenantColonel F M Bailey and CaptainH T Morshead. The route the duo traversed during their exertions is called the Bailey Trail.
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~
China attacked Ladakh and NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh) in strength on October 20, 1962.The People's Liberation Army plunged down the Bum La-Tawang stretch three dayslater to seize Tawang.
~
The devastating artillery fire provided by Captain G S Gosalenabled the Delta Company of 1 Sikh regiment led by Lieutenant Haripal Kaushik based at Tongpeng La to repulse every Chinese foray.
Nursing a bloody nose, the PLA bypassed Tongpeng La and stormed the defences slightly southwest, but the Sikhs dug in there and CaptainGosal were equal to the task.
Meanwhile, Major General Niranjan Prasad, the beleaguered commander of 4 Infantry Division, inferred thatTawang was indefensible against a four-pronged attackby a PLA division. He also had a hunch that the PLA would skirt the Sikhs and head straight for Se La, blow up thebridge at Jang to trap the Indian troops on the Tawang side of the river.
~
He ordered the army units in the Tawang sector to withdraw and muster at Se La to take on the Chinese there. The PLA occupied Tawang unchallenged.
Nothing like hindsight vision, yet one would like to inhale and wail: Given how gutsily themen of Lieutenant Kaushik andCaptain Gosal stuck to their guns, if senior field commanders had shown similarspine to fight it out instead of pressing the panic button, couldn't the Indian Army [ Images ] have avoided being disgraced in NEFA?
There was a pause in the warafter the loss of Tawang. The PLA badly needed respite to recoup, regroup, restock and reinforce, rebuild two blown-up bridges, re-lay the Bum La-Tawang track into a pucca road to smoothen the logisticsand to haul the artillery.
~
To gain time, to pretend reasonable to the world, Chinaproposed a sham 'friendly settlement', which Pandit Nehru [ Images ] waved aside outright.
The Indian Army too utilised the interlude to beef up its defences. Since the contours made it a natural rampart, the 96-km-long Se La-Dirang Dzong-Bomdila barrier was the stronghold chosen by Major General A S Pathania, the new commander of 4 Infantry Division now headquartered at Dirang Dzong, to confront the Chinese again. He had three brigades -- 48, 62 and 65 -- under him for this task.
~
Hello, 4 Rajput!
~
With the war clouds glowering,troops from the rest of the country were rushed into NEFA. The Belgaum-based 4thRajput battalion was tagged to65, the brigade in-charge of the Dirang sector.
On arrival at Misamari, they were told about the dearth of transport, and the battalion under Major Trilok Nath, the officiating commanding officer, footed it to Dirang.
Lieutenant Colonel Brahmanand Avasthy (fondly called Brahma) was slated to take over the command of 2 Rajput, the battalion he was commissioned into, but before he could set course to Namkha Chu from Mhow, 2 Rajput had to bear the brunt of Chinese invasion.
That 282 men were killed and myriad wounded, stands testimony to how heroically they fought the pitched battle. He was reassigned to 4 Rajput.
~
A man of spartan traits, Brahma was a consummate professional and a soldier of the first water. He got cracking on the battalion's preparedness; he wrote to Major P L Kukrety (a company commander), among other things, where to site the machine-guns and mortars, and to the quartermaster on the logistical groundwork to keep the wheels oiled.
Brahma assumed command of 4 Rajput on October 29.
The Sappers Camp is located 10 km northwest of Dirang. The primary task of the Rajputs was to thwart Chineseinfiltration from the east of their area clustered around the Sappers Camp.
While the battalion headquarters was set up at the Sappers Camp, one company was detailed to protect the bridge nearby as well as the division headquarters at Dirang.
One company was located eastof the Nyukmadong ridge, another at Lubrang, and the fourth company at a place called Dangsikpu. Captain Gosal's battery emplaced mountain guns in the vicinity of Dangsikpu.
~
From November 14, the Indians carried out aggressive patrolling in the no man's land, but the PLA hit back with interest. The PLA had used the thaw to mass two divisions, each comprisingfour brigades, at Tawang.
In no time, one PLA division had the Indian 4th Infantry Division on the run.
Major K P P Nair, a company commander, led the Rajputs' combing operations, but his column and three reinforcement contingents were ambushed and suffered heavy casualties on November 15 and 16. The remnants had to beat a retreat to the base camp.
Chinese checkers
The survey of the Tibet-NEFAborder to draw the McMahon Line on the map was done by two British officers, LieutenantColonel F M Bailey and CaptainH T Morshead. The route the duo traversed during their exertions is called the Bailey Trail.
~