Kargil - by a Pakistani General - review

[Virendra]

Why don't you give proper burials to those from your end first? That would bring much needed joy to families of soldiers died for Pak.

Don't worry about Generals here, worry about those who died from your side and not even a peep coming out to validate their sacrifices. Embarrassing and a disgrace.

Forget burials, even an official acknowledgment of Army's direct involvement by Pakistani Govt. took years to come about.

 

[Neo]

So was the Pakistani objective in Kargil to kill about 500 Indian soldiers? Albeit at the loss of double that number of lives?

The objective was to cut off the highway link to Siachin and Leh or to have the ability to destroy it. With point 5353 under Pakistan's control, the highway is now well within our reach and remains vulnerable.

 

[Ray]

It is not that Lt Gen shahid Aziz alone has criticised the Pak operation in Kargil, fancifully named as "Op Badr".

Here is what the ISI hero Hamid Gul has had to say

Pakistani general nails Musharraf's Kargil conflict lies
QASWAR ABBAS

The revelation by a former general of the Pakistan Army that the Kargil conflict was the brainchild of then army chief Pervez Musharraf, who had sent his regular troops to capture key Indian positions, has triggered varied reactions in both countries.

While Lt-Gen (retd) Hamid Gul, former chief of Pakistan's intelligence agency ISI, said Musharraf should have faced a court martial for his "hare-brained adventure", the Indian generals said there was nothing new about the so-called disclosure.

In a newspaper article, Lt-Gen (retd) Shahid Aziz, who was heading ISI's analysis wing during the conflict, wrote: "The Kargil war with India was an unsound military plan based on invalid assumptions, launched with little preparations and in total disregard of the regional and international environment."

The officer also denied the role of mujahideen in the 1999 war and accused Musharraf of cover-up.

"There were no mujahideen. Our soldiers were made to occupy barren ridges, with hand held weapons and ammunition," Aziz wrote in The Nation, a conservative English daily of Pakistan, on January 6.
Following the disclosure, Gul said: "I agree with Lt-Gen Aziz... A military operation without a clear political purpose is like a shot in the dark. Musharraf should have faced a court martial for his harebrained adventure."

But Defence analyst Ahmed Qureshi said Kargil was not an entirely wrong decision.

"Gen. Aziz is a professional soldier and his views on operational matters will always have merit. (But) Kargil was not an entirely wrong decision"¦ I would say, we couldn't have done better on military execution but our diplomatic and media operations were not in sync and thus the failure." (how more pathetic can one get?

The General headquarters in Rawalpindi, President Asif Ali Zardari's house and the PM's secretariat remained silent on the claim.

Reacting to the issue, the then Indian Army chief General V.P. Malik said the Pakistan establishment had spread this canard about militants occupying the Indian territory in Kargil. He said Musharraf was behind spreading this lie

Hamid Gul: Pakistani general nails Musharraf's Kargil conflict lies | Mail Online

 

[Virendra]

Read post #4 again.
http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=PVLd2g5cImA

If you tie one hand of your Army by completely restricting it southwest of LOC, you can't expect better.
But then these constraints are difficult to grasp for a military State like Pakistan as they don't restrict their Army, it is the other way round.

 

[Ray]

The objective was to cut off the highway link to Siachin and Leh or to have the ability to destroy it. With point 5353 under Pakistan's control, the highway is now well within our reach and remains vulnerable.

Flawed miliary application.

it may give succour and balm to the wounded Pak 'warrior' falsehood, and the Pakistanis can keep saying - Blessent mon cœur d'une langueur monotone ("wound my heart with a monotonous languor") - but the reality is as I have stated

In today's context, Arty OPs are but add ons. What they achieve, Drones do it better for observation and directing firepower, and interesting being nowhere near the area of operations and thus impossible to interdict/ deny/ neutralise.

And even if one Drone is downed, there will be others replicating and 'riding' the actions and command so that there is no time lag to take over and act in case the 'commanded' drone is down.

 

[ladder]

So, @Neo thinks keeping a previously UN-occupied peak (5353) that is just 2/300mts from LoC with one side having an easier access to POK is an achievement of OP Badr. Then that will give a new meaning to the proverb

'Khoda pahad nikla chuhiya' but this time they climbed the hill, rather than digging it so, 'chada pahad...................."

 

[Neo]

India already violated Simla agreement by occupying Siachin. Kargil was a direct result of what happened there.

 

[ladder]

India already violated Simla agreement by occupying Siachin. Kargil was a direct result of what happened there.

And can you quote me which clause of Shimla agreement was violated?

 

[Neo]

Flawed miliary application.

it may give succour and balm to the wounded Pak 'warrior' falsehood, but the reality is as I have stated

Flawed and outdated now but back then neither of us did have drone technology or a credible missile arsenal.

 

[Virendra]

The objective was to cut off the highway link to Siachin and Leh or to have the ability to destroy it. With point 5353 under Pakistan's control, the highway is now well within our reach and remains vulnerable.

The lone post may surprise by 1st attack but being surrounded from three sides, cannot maintain a pro-longed assault on the highway.
Dislodging established enemy or making fresh advances is not new for IA, as they've done it in Siachen and Turtuk region.
Any further changes to the actual LOC are unlikely in peace times.

 

[Neo]

And can you quote me which clause of Shimla agreement was violated?

Siachen: ten questions
-
-
Dr Maleeha Lodhi
Tuesday, April 17, 2012

The writer is special adviser to the Jang Group/Geo and a former envoy to the US and the UK.

It was in April twenty-eight years ago that the seeds of the Siachen conflict were sown. This April nature struck a cruel blow when an avalanche hit the area, burying 139 Pakistani soldiers and civilian workers. The tragedy is a poignant reminder of the need to settle a long-standing, costly dispute.

Because facts have been sparse in recent TV discussions of Siachen it would be useful to recall the dispute's military, political and diplomatic history. One way to do this is to ask ten key questions even if they are not exhaustive.



1. What is the source of the dispute?

Agreements between Pakistan and India that followed the wars of 1948 and 1971 did not demarcate or determine a dividing line in Kashmir's northeastern reaches – one of the world's most inhospitable and desolate regions. The July 1949 Karachi agreement established a ceasefire line, which after minor modification became the Line of Control under the 1972 Simla Agreement. This went as far as a point known by its grid reference NJ9842, south of the Siachen Glacier. From here on, the agreement said, the line continues "thence north to the glacier". The area beyond NJ9842 was not delineated because it was deemed too harsh and inaccessible for habitation. Neither side at that time thought the region had any military or strategic importance. It was not anticipated that the glacier would later become a contentious issue and that modern mountain warfare or shifting strategic calculations would make it disputed.

In the mid 1970s Pakistan began to allow international mountaineers and expedition teams to visit the glacier's peaks. Pakistan's administrative control of the area also received cartographic backing. International map publishers started showing the Line of Control proceeding north-eastward towards the Karakorum Pass and the Siachen area in Pakistani territory. Because of the treacherous terrain Pakistan established no permanent posts. Only scouting missions periodically went there.

How did the conflict start?

With India occupying key peaks in April 1984 in a major airborne operation named 'Meghdoot'. A failure of intelligence meant that Pakistan discovered this and dispatched troops only to find Indian forces occupying almost all the high ground positions along the Saltoro range. Pakistan's efforts to dislodge the Indians did not succeed. Both sides gradually came to deploy more soldiers and create more posts.



2. When did diplomatic efforts start to resolve the conflict?

Soon after the first clashes. But it wasn't until the December 1985 meeting in Delhi between General Ziaul Haq and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi that a serious effort was made to pursue a settlement. Since then twelve rounds of talks have taken place, the last in May 2011.



3. Was agreement for military disengagement ever reached?

Yes, in the fifth round held in June 1989 after the advent of Benazir Bhutto's government and an upswing in relations with India. The joint statement issued after talks on June 17, 1989 outlined the core elements of a settlement: "There was agreement by both sides to work towards a comprehensive settlement, based on redeployment of forces to reduce the chance of conflict, avoidance of the use of force and the determination of future positions on the ground so as to conform with the Simla Agreement and to ensure durable peace in the Siachen area". It added: "the army authorities of both sides will determine these positions".



4. How significant was the June 1989 breakthrough?

It produced the outlines of a solution. For the first time the Indians agreed to relocate forces away from the disputed heights although in subsequent talks between military officials in 1989 differences emerged over where they would pull back. The language 'redeployment of forces' rather than 'withdrawal' was a Pakistani concession aimed at enabling Rajiv Gandhi to sell the agreement to his military and to political opponents in an election year. The agreement was endorsed by Prime Ministers Bhutto and Gandhi during the latter's July 1989 visit to Islamabad.

5. Was Pakistan keen to turn this understanding into an agreement?

Absolutely. Pakistan's defence secretary was mandated for the sixth round of talks in November 1992 to discuss modalities for implementation of the 1989 agreement.



6. What prevented an accord?

Indian backtracking on the 1989 understanding and subsequently changing the terms for a settlement largely on the urging of its military, which continues to oppose a pullout. The 1992 talks ended in deadlock when Delhi insisted on 'complete' authentication of 'current' positions prior to redeployment and sought to reopen previously settled issues. Pakistan saw this as resiling from the 1989 agreement that obliged both sides to stand down to pre-1972 positions. Pakistan held that India violated the Simla agreement by occupying an area that may have been undemarcated, but was under Pakistan's administrative control. The Simla Agreement prohibited unilateral alteration of the status quo whatever the differing legal interpretations.



7. Has 'authentication' been the main sticking point?

Yes. The 1989 joint statement made no mention of marking 'current positions', referring only to determining 'future positions.' Pakistan rejected authentication because a) it meant legitimising an illegal act and b) provided India the basis for a legal claim in negotiations later to delineate the area beyond NJ 9842.

India's demand for authentication of an Agreed Ground Position Line (AGPL) on the map and on the ground rested on the argument that this would provide a legal or diplomatic safeguard if Pakistan later went back on commitments and captured the Saltoro ridge. Other than being a vehicle to formalise 'current positions', authentication has, over the years, served as an alibi for the Indian army to resist military disengagement. Former Indian officials have argued that withdrawal from Siachen will facilitate Pakistan's access across Saltoro to the Karakoram Pass on the Chinese border. In what reflects the defence establishment's thinking, they have also presented a strategic rationale for the LOC's delineation beyond NJ9842 that provides India both a key location on the Chinese border and permanent control of heights overlooking Gilgit and Baltistan.



8. Were there other missed opportunities in the 1990s?

Possibly. In the November 1992 talks Pakistan showed readiness to record 'present' positions on an annexure to the agreement provided the main text contained the proviso that this would not constitute the basis for a legal claim or justify any political or moral right to the area. But the Indians insisted on 'complete' authentication and exchange of maps. Pakistan refused. Thereafter the January 1994 talks explored ideas about a Zone of Complete Disengagement based on an Indian non-paper. Delhi continued to press for acceptance of the AGPL before demilitarisation. The dialogue began to run out of steam. The mid 1990s saw BJP leaders calling to retain Siachen for 'strategic and security reasons' while Pakistan started to link Siachen to resolving Kashmir.



9. Did the 1999 Kargil episode have implications for talks on Siachen?

Inescapably. Any escalation of tensions or confrontation inevitably sets back diplomatic efforts, but Kargil did more. It gave Delhi an added how-can-we-trust-Pakistan justification to toughen terms for a Siachen settlement and put Islamabad in the dock for violating the Simla accord. It helped the Indian army argue that disengagement would risk Pakistan seizing the posts it vacated.



10. Did the last round in May 2011 make progress?

No. Pakistani officials detected a hardening in the Indian position. Delhi insisted that the line beyond NJ 9842 be delineated before any disengagement or withdrawal. This reversed the sequence proposed by Pakistan and earlier agreed by India: disengagement and moving outside the zone of conflict followed by talks on demarcation. A package proposal was conveyed in a Pakistani non-paper handed during the twelfth round. This reiterated redeployment and joint monitoring of the disengagement process. It also reiterated that once withdrawal schedules were prepared, 'present' and 'future' positions could be incorporated, subject to the earlier proviso. The talks ended in an impasse.



This unedifying diplomatic history should not however dampen efforts for a settlement but instead intensify the search for imaginative ways to untie the Siachen knot. Not only will this end a confrontation that exacts such a high price but it will also set a powerful precedent to solve other more vexed disputes.


Siachen: ten questions - Dr Maleeha Lodhi

 

[Ray]

Flawed and outdated now but back then neither of us did have drone technology or a credible missile arsenal.

The issue then is not worth the thought now!

 

[Neo]

The clause was not written clearly but militarisation was an offensive move initiated by India.

 

[Ray]

Siachen: ten questions
-
-
Dr Maleeha Lodhi
Tuesday, April 17, 2012

The writer is special adviser to the Jang Group/Geo and a former envoy to the US and the UK.

It was in April twenty-eight years ago that the seeds of the Siachen conflict were sown. This April nature struck a cruel blow when an avalanche hit the area, burying 139 Pakistani soldiers and civilian workers. The tragedy is a poignant reminder of the need to settle a long-standing, costly dispute.

Because facts have been sparse in recent TV discussions of Siachen it would be useful to recall the dispute's military, political and diplomatic history. One way to do this is to ask ten key questions even if they are not exhaustive.



1. What is the source of the dispute?

Agreements between Pakistan and India that followed the wars of 1948 and 1971 did not demarcate or determine a dividing line in Kashmir's northeastern reaches – one of the world's most inhospitable and desolate regions. The July 1949 Karachi agreement established a ceasefire line, which after minor modification became the Line of Control under the 1972 Simla Agreement. This went as far as a point known by its grid reference NJ9842, south of the Siachen Glacier. From here on, the agreement said, the line continues "thence north to the glacier". The area beyond NJ9842 was not delineated because it was deemed too harsh and inaccessible for habitation. Neither side at that time thought the region had any military or strategic importance. It was not anticipated that the glacier would later become a contentious issue and that modern mountain warfare or shifting strategic calculations would make it disputed.

In the mid 1970s Pakistan began to allow international mountaineers and expedition teams to visit the glacier's peaks. Pakistan's administrative control of the area also received cartographic backing. International map publishers started showing the Line of Control proceeding north-eastward towards the Karakorum Pass and the Siachen area in Pakistani territory. Because of the treacherous terrain Pakistan established no permanent posts. Only scouting missions periodically went there.

How did the conflict start?

With India occupying key peaks in April 1984 in a major airborne operation named 'Meghdoot'. A failure of intelligence meant that Pakistan discovered this and dispatched troops only to find Indian forces occupying almost all the high ground positions along the Saltoro range. Pakistan's efforts to dislodge the Indians did not succeed. Both sides gradually came to deploy more soldiers and create more posts.



2. When did diplomatic efforts start to resolve the conflict?

Soon after the first clashes. But it wasn't until the December 1985 meeting in Delhi between General Ziaul Haq and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi that a serious effort was made to pursue a settlement. Since then twelve rounds of talks have taken place, the last in May 2011.



3. Was agreement for military disengagement ever reached?

Yes, in the fifth round held in June 1989 after the advent of Benazir Bhutto's government and an upswing in relations with India. The joint statement issued after talks on June 17, 1989 outlined the core elements of a settlement: "There was agreement by both sides to work towards a comprehensive settlement, based on redeployment of forces to reduce the chance of conflict, avoidance of the use of force and the determination of future positions on the ground so as to conform with the Simla Agreement and to ensure durable peace in the Siachen area". It added: "the army authorities of both sides will determine these positions".



4. How significant was the June 1989 breakthrough?

It produced the outlines of a solution. For the first time the Indians agreed to relocate forces away from the disputed heights although in subsequent talks between military officials in 1989 differences emerged over where they would pull back. The language 'redeployment of forces' rather than 'withdrawal' was a Pakistani concession aimed at enabling Rajiv Gandhi to sell the agreement to his military and to political opponents in an election year. The agreement was endorsed by Prime Ministers Bhutto and Gandhi during the latter's July 1989 visit to Islamabad.

5. Was Pakistan keen to turn this understanding into an agreement?

Absolutely. Pakistan's defence secretary was mandated for the sixth round of talks in November 1992 to discuss modalities for implementation of the 1989 agreement.



6. What prevented an accord?

Indian backtracking on the 1989 understanding and subsequently changing the terms for a settlement largely on the urging of its military, which continues to oppose a pullout. The 1992 talks ended in deadlock when Delhi insisted on 'complete' authentication of 'current' positions prior to redeployment and sought to reopen previously settled issues. Pakistan saw this as resiling from the 1989 agreement that obliged both sides to stand down to pre-1972 positions. Pakistan held that India violated the Simla agreement by occupying an area that may have been undemarcated, but was under Pakistan's administrative control. The Simla Agreement prohibited unilateral alteration of the status quo whatever the differing legal interpretations.



7. Has 'authentication' been the main sticking point?

Yes. The 1989 joint statement made no mention of marking 'current positions', referring only to determining 'future positions.' Pakistan rejected authentication because a) it meant legitimising an illegal act and b) provided India the basis for a legal claim in negotiations later to delineate the area beyond NJ 9842.

India's demand for authentication of an Agreed Ground Position Line (AGPL) on the map and on the ground rested on the argument that this would provide a legal or diplomatic safeguard if Pakistan later went back on commitments and captured the Saltoro ridge. Other than being a vehicle to formalise 'current positions', authentication has, over the years, served as an alibi for the Indian army to resist military disengagement. Former Indian officials have argued that withdrawal from Siachen will facilitate Pakistan's access across Saltoro to the Karakoram Pass on the Chinese border. In what reflects the defence establishment's thinking, they have also presented a strategic rationale for the LOC's delineation beyond NJ9842 that provides India both a key location on the Chinese border and permanent control of heights overlooking Gilgit and Baltistan.



8. Were there other missed opportunities in the 1990s?

Possibly. In the November 1992 talks Pakistan showed readiness to record 'present' positions on an annexure to the agreement provided the main text contained the proviso that this would not constitute the basis for a legal claim or justify any political or moral right to the area. But the Indians insisted on 'complete' authentication and exchange of maps. Pakistan refused. Thereafter the January 1994 talks explored ideas about a Zone of Complete Disengagement based on an Indian non-paper. Delhi continued to press for acceptance of the AGPL before demilitarisation. The dialogue began to run out of steam. The mid 1990s saw BJP leaders calling to retain Siachen for 'strategic and security reasons' while Pakistan started to link Siachen to resolving Kashmir.



9. Did the 1999 Kargil episode have implications for talks on Siachen?

Inescapably. Any escalation of tensions or confrontation inevitably sets back diplomatic efforts, but Kargil did more. It gave Delhi an added how-can-we-trust-Pakistan justification to toughen terms for a Siachen settlement and put Islamabad in the dock for violating the Simla accord. It helped the Indian army argue that disengagement would risk Pakistan seizing the posts it vacated.



10. Did the last round in May 2011 make progress?

No. Pakistani officials detected a hardening in the Indian position. Delhi insisted that the line beyond NJ 9842 be delineated before any disengagement or withdrawal. This reversed the sequence proposed by Pakistan and earlier agreed by India: disengagement and moving outside the zone of conflict followed by talks on demarcation. A package proposal was conveyed in a Pakistani non-paper handed during the twelfth round. This reiterated redeployment and joint monitoring of the disengagement process. It also reiterated that once withdrawal schedules were prepared, 'present' and 'future' positions could be incorporated, subject to the earlier proviso. The talks ended in an impasse.



This unedifying diplomatic history should not however dampen efforts for a settlement but instead intensify the search for imaginative ways to untie the Siachen knot. Not only will this end a confrontation that exacts such a high price but it will also set a powerful precedent to solve other more vexed disputes.


Siachen: ten questions - Dr Maleeha Lodhi

Lodhi is a hawk in any case.

She would be stupid to believe that India would deny itself the ascendancy she has just to placate Pakistan when they are perpetually are sly, deceitful and immoral in their dealings as was shown in Kargil.

She represents the pathetic whine that permeates the hawkish Pakistan establishment.

What a gas that Siachen is Pak territory!

 

[Virendra]

India already violated Simla agreement by occupying Siachin. Kargil was a direct result of what happened there.

Siachen never belonged to Pakistan. Both armies sprinted towards it.
Pakistan's nuclear tests post date the Indian ones by a month. Does it mean that Pakistan never toyed with nuclear energy and suddenly embarked on the path due to Indian tests, finished everything in a month and came up with its own nuclear device?
The fact that both India and Pakistan scaled Siachen at the same time, shows that even Pakistan was preparing to militarily occupy Siachen and India only thinly outran them.
Even then India had to dislodge Pakistan from some of the Siachen posts to gain upper hand there. Shimla argument is only to deflect guilt on the other side.

Regards,
Virendra

 

[Neo]

The lone post may surprise by 1st attack but being surrounded from three sides, cannot maintain a pro-longed assault on the highway.
Dislodging established enemy or making fresh advances is not new for IA, as they've done it in Siachen and Turtuk region.
Any further changes to the actual LOC are unlikely in peace times.

One single attack is what it takes to destroy the highway, doesn't it?
IA tried to regain controll of point 5353 till 2003. If it wasn't
Important, she would not have spent money or risked more lives after the ceasefire.

 

[thethinker]

What more can you expect of an army which rejects it's Shia dead while give proper burials to Sunni dead.

Lies, more lies, some acceptance of truth and obsucation followed by more lies.

It would be interesting to see how many top brass of Paki army are Sunni and how many are Shia.

 

[Neo]

The issue then is not worth the thought now!

It can not be ignored while discussing history. Our objective was to control the landlink hence we conquered and defended point 5353.

 

[Virendra]

The clause was not written clearly but militarisation was an offensive move initiated by India.

Militarisation of place like Siachen doesn't happen overnight that one side dodges the other in it.
It happened because Pakistani Army is always in the need of a ruckus to justify its King status in the country and India had sniffed in time the Pakistani Military's orders given for special suits & inventory of High Altitude warfare.

 

[Virendra]

One single attack is what it takes to destroy the highway, doesn't it?
IA tried to regain controll of point 5353 till 2003. If it wasn't
Important, she would not have spent money or risked more lives after the ceasefire.

In that case you would agree that the Pak Army did an extremely poor job sitting on all those peaks for weeks in 99