Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Beijing Harps on US ‘containment’ Theory

[LETHALFORCE]

Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Beijing Harps on US ‘containment’ Theory

Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Beijing Harps on US ‘containment’ Theory

By D. S. Rajan

While the Party and State- controlled media in China have so far confined themselves to giving a factual account of the trust vote in New Delhi on the nuclear deal with the US, an authoritative and well-connected strategic affairs journal in Chinese language, has chosen to come out with a prompt independent comment on the subject. Appearing at a time when there are expectations of Beijing’s support to India’s case in the Nuclear suppliers Group (NSG), what has been said in the comment assumes significance.

The commentary, under the caption “ India extends hand, the US is to hold”, written by “Zhan Lue” (“Strategy” in English), ostensibly by a high level party cadre, has remarked (China Institute of International Strategic Studies, Beijing, Chinese language Online Edition, 23 July 2008) that the deal which was being considered almost dead due to the opposition coming from the ‘anti-American’ communist groups supporting the ‘Centrist government’, could be rescued by Prime Minister Singh through his act of ‘adventure and courage’; he could replace the erstwhile support of the communist groups with that of ‘regional small parties”. With the Prime Minister winning the trust vote in the Indian Parliament on 22 July 2008, a question, which remains, is whether the deal can now successfully go through the political process in the US. The write-up admitted that several legal questions may confront the deal in the US, but at the same time felt that the US Congress should be able to find time to express support for the deal, as overall it suits Washington’s interests.

“Zhan Lue” has further observed that New Delhi’s nuclear explosion in 1974 resulted in a stop to the Indo-US nuclear cooperation; but the time has changed now. The writer listed the following as constituents of the President Bush’s logic behind the US nuclear deal with India:

* The advantages of the US-India Strategic Partnership outweigh the risks which were perceived as per Washington’s old policy towards New Delhi,
* Availability of clean nuclear energy to India through the deal, can contribute to India’s capacity to reduce green house gas emissions.
* Unlike Pakistan, India’s nuclear weapon programme has not led to any proliferation
* Most important factor is that India is a democratic nation with common values and common interests with the US – contain china and resist Islamic terrorism.
* Worth paying attention is that India’s recycling of nuclear material will come under more and more international supervision as a result of the deal.

The Chinese strategist has nevertheless visualized worries to the US. Firstly, the deal can erode into the US aggressive open stand that if India is to carry out further nuclear tests, it will cut nuclear supplies to India. Next, Washington may have to worry about India’s economic relations and military contact with Iran. Lastly, New Delhi’s traditional habit of displaying a ‘non-alignment’ attitude towards American interests may also be of concern to Washington. On the other hand, the US could also feel ‘hopeful’, as to get closer to Washington, the Indian Prime Minister has successfully discarded the communists, triggering relaxation in the conditions concerning the deal. Zhan Lue has added that a refusal by the US Congress to endorse the deal, can not only lead to New Delhi’s dissatisfaction, but also to India’s approach to France and Russia for procuring 25000 MW of nuclear power, taking advantage of the permission to it accruing from the IAEA and NSG for buying nuclear material and technology. In the conclusion of the analyst, the ball will move into the court of the US Congress.
Implications

What looks significant is the reappearance, after some gap, of Chinese media criticisms on the US intentions to contain China through its nuclear deal with India. In the past, publications in China had accused the US of adopting a ‘double standard’ in signing the deal; a message was given on one occasion that Beijing might like to conclude similar pacts with friendly nations. An analysis (People’s Daily, 30 August 2007) criticized India by name with the remark that the desire of Washington is to enclose India into the camp of its global partners and that fits exactly with India’s wishes.

In contrast, Beijing’s apparent signals at diplomatic levels have been circumspect on the deal. The cautious statements of the PRC Foreign Ministry officials welcoming civil nuclear cooperation between nations keeping in view the non-proliferation interests, have given rise to Indian optimism on China supporting India’s case in the NSG. China’s offer to India for civil nuclear cooperation, made for the first time, has by implication been positively interpreted by Indian officials. During recent India-China leadership meetings, signs have been available to suggest Beijing’s stance favourable to India.

One has to take a composite view of the seemingly contradictory perspectives of Chinese strategists and the government on the Indo-US nuclear deal. In reality, however, they are two components of the same Chinese policy – one to suit strategic interests and the other based on tactical factors. Under the former, the US is looked upon by China, as a potential threat and China would like to keep India outside the US influence. Tactically, China needs friendship with the US and India in the present stage to guarantee its “peaceful development’. Beijing’s support to New Delhi in the NSG, if it comes, needs to be seen in such tactical context. But China is expected to maintain a careful watch on whether the deal can lead to strengthening of India’s nuclear weapon programme at a level capable of competing with China or threatening its ally Pakistan. What stand Beijing will adopt to the reported objections of Pakistan on approval of the Indian nuclear safeguards agreement in the IAEA, particularly based on its perceived arms race in the region, is likely to generate great interest in India.

(The writer, Mr. D. S. Rajan, is the Director, Chennai Centre for China Studies, India. Email: [email protected])

 

[kuku]

Should have thought about that before 'containing' us with them missiles and warheads in pakistan.

Then again hypocrisy is a communist virtue.

 

[S.A.T.A]

All emerging powers(Chinese and India) betray this syndrome,called being full of themselves.The world far bigger and wider than the Chicom's Atlas.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

Indo-US nuclear deal and its implications

Indo-US nuclear deal and its implications

Col. (Retd) Riaz Jafri

Published on The Post

On August 1, 2008, the IAEA approved the safeguards agreement with
India, after which the United States approached the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) to grant a waiver to India to commence civilian nuclear
trade. The 45-nation NSG granted the waiver to India on September 6,
2008 allowing it to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel from
other countries. The implementation of this waiver makes India the
only known country with nuclear weapons which is not a party to the
Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but is still allowed to carry out
nuclear commerce with the rest of the world.

The US House of Representatives passed the bill on 28 September 2008.
Two days later, India and France inked a similar nuclear pact making
France the first country to have such an agreement with India. On
October 1, 2008 the US Senate also approved the civilian nuclear
agreement allowing India to purchase nuclear fuel and technology from
the United States. US President, George W. Bush, signed the
legislation on the Indo-US nuclear deal, approved by the U.S.
Congress, into law, now called the United States-India Nuclear
Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act, on October
8, 2008.

The agreement was signed after three years of negotiations, the deal
which provides India with nuclear fuel and technology without signing
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty is finally done. After eight
disastrous years abroad, is this finally a foreign-policy coup for the
Bush administration? That is how it is being sold in Washington, but
as a ‘neutral’ observer one would have serious doubts about its wisdom
and what it means for the stability of the region.

From the American point of view, they get to sell stuff to India (not

just nuclear reactors but, with luck, 126 fighter jets and lots of
other materials too) and cement strategic relations with India at a
time when China’s aggressive diplomacy in the region with Pakistan,
Sri Lanka and Burma is unnerving both India and the US. However, as
the torrid negotiations showed, America will never find it
straightforward to deal with India, since large parts of the India
political establishment deeply distrusts America and, notwithstanding
China’s regional ascendancy, do not want to give the US any more
leverage over Indian foreign policy than necessary. The basis for a
wider strategic Indo-US pact is not as strong as it might seem and as
India’s politics continues to regionalise and factionalise, the Indo-
US relationship may get harder to manage still.

For India, the deal looks like an unalloyed good, crowning the South
Asian leader as the world’s de-facto sixth nuclear power, opening the
floodgates to fuel and technology while freeing up capacity to enhance
their own bomb-making programmes — and all this without signing the
NPT. The deal does, however, put obligations on India. Whatever is
being said to soothe the anti-deal factions in India, the Indo-US deal
effectively prohibits India from testing a nuclear weapon since fuel
supplies and technology transfers would effectively stop if that
happened. By 2050, when 25pc of India’s electricity could be nuclear,
testing a bomb would effectively put the lights out in Bombay. India’s
senior diplomats accept this in private but continue to deny it in
public for the sake of the deal, just as they deny in public that the
deal is the outward expression of India’s incredibly rapid
rapprochement and growing strategic alliance with the US.

India will, however, not only seek to reduce its obligations to the US
but also try to be as free as possible of any dependence upon the US.
Hence dealing with France and Russia, as it is allowed, while at the
same time her internal difficulties in dealings with the US are not
going to go away. If this deal is about a strategic marriage to
counterbalance China, it got off to a rocky start, with both sides
having very different perceptions of what it meant for the other.
These differences persist, which is dangerous in itself. So what about
the neutrals, how should they view this deal? With considerable
trepidation, one would suggest, as a neutral, the criteria for judging
the deal should be whether it will make the region more or less
stable; more or less polarized. On that basis, one may not like what
one is likely to see.

Firstly, China is unhappy with this deal, as it made plain with its
foot-dragging at the Nuclear Supplier’s Group negotiations. China may
quite be ready to do a similar deal with its ally Pakistan, just to
not let this piece of US strategic manoeuvring go unanswered.
Secondly, the deal cuts an exception for India from the international
non-proliferation regime, (which however flawed, was the framework in
existence) in time will be used against the West. Iran, Pakistan,
North Korea, Egypt...take your pick! India has always refused to sign
the NPT because it is an ‘unequal treaty’, cooked up, says its
detractors, by the world’s self-appointed nuclear guardians. And yet
ironically, this deal reinforces the West’s notion that it can make
exceptions to its own rules. This is dangerous.

Thirdly, following on from the above, the deal threatens to fuel the
Asian arms race. Whatever India’s intentions Pakistan and others will
apprehend, and justifiably too, that the deal frees up capacity for
India to increase its warhead numbers. And since the deal keeps
India’s military nuclear program outside international inspection,
there will be no way of knowing either way. Historically speaking,
Pakistan will not give India the benefit of the doubt.

Fourthly, the deal is nakedly political. That might be stating the
obvious, but it is too often denied. This is not just about nuclear
technology. It is a big net with far-reaching implications that is
being thrown over India, by the US, for being ‘democratic’ and
‘friendly’. George Bush said as much when he signed the bill into the
law. “This agreement sends a signal to the world: Nations that follow
the path to democracy and responsible behaviour will find a friend in
the United States of America.” So, neo-conservatism is not dead yet.
That is the kind of divisive, “with-us-or-against-us” language that
daily replenishes the global well of anti-US resentment. And of
course, it is just this kind of language which so riles the parts of
the Indian political establishment that opposed the deal. India just
cannot afford to be subservient to any other nation.

Therefore, having signed a treaty with France, India is again set to
sign yet another one with Russia. Not only that, the stage is also set
for entering into an agreement for the production of the Russian
sophisticated state-of-the-art weaponry and weapon systems in India as
currently more than 70 percent of such weaponry used by India is of
Russian origin. Such close collaboration between the two, one, in the
nuclear field and the second, in the joint manufacture of advanced
defence materials, should be a matter of legitimate concern for the
US.

It was the US who was keen and more or less openly wooed India into
signing the nuclear deal with a view to bringing it into its (US)
fold. For that, the US legislation amended Section 123 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954. It let the US make a one-time exception for India
to keep its nuclear weapons without signing the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The amendment overturns a 30-year-old US
ban on supplying India with nuclear fuel and technology, implemented
after India’s first nuclear test in 1974. But the Indians seem to have
outsmarted the Americans on all counts.

The deal also undermines the NPT, which holds that only countries
which renounce nuclear weapons qualify for civilian nuclear
assistance. The accord also sends the wrong message: it could undercut
a US-led campaign to curtail Iran’s nuclear programme, and open the
way for a potential arms race in South Asia.

Under the amendment, India must separate its civilian and military
nuclear facilities, and submit civilian facilities to inspections by
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). India says 14 of its 22
nuclear facilities are civilian. It is feared that the pact could make
bomb making at the other eight easier as India could divert her all
nuclear resources and fuel towards them as the civilian nuclear fuel
needs will be met by the US. Not only that, how would US ensure that
the nuclear technology and information shared by it with India will
not be passed on to the Russians, who will soon have a similar nuclear
technology sharing agreement with India?

As the vogue phrase has it, we are living in a new, ‘multi-polar’
world, in which Western and US pre-eminence is being challenged
rapidly by a resurgent Asia and a newly bellicose Russian Federation.
The question is, Will this deal bring those poles together or set them
against each other? The answer seems to be the latter.

Pakistan had sought a similar civilian technology deal with the US but
was refused last in March. It is the only other confirmed nuclear
power not to have signed the NPT, saying it will join after India
does. A school of thought is of serious views that Pakistan’s own
expanding nuclear programme could fan rivalry between India and
Pakistan. What option does it have except to look towards East for
similar nuclear collaboration? China has supported Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons programme since the 1980s. Could the Indo-US deal spur a
similar deal between Pakistan and China in the very near future?

The writer is based in Rawalpindi
.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

U.S., India in defense pact | Articles | IndUS Business Journal

Issue Date: August 2009, Posted On: 7/30/2009

U.S., India in defense pact

WASHINGTON – The United States and India have achieved consensus on a key bilateral agreement that promises to bolster the two countries as reliable partners concerning defense and security matters.

This development – achieving consensus on language regarding end-use monitoring, a pact aimed at aimed at clearing the way for the sale of U.S.-made weapons to India – was finalized during Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's recent official visit to New Delhi.

Such an agreement will enable defense and security trade between the United States and India as never before, and will facilitate the participation of U.S. companies in supporting India in transforming its military and homeland security apparatus, according to the U.S.- India Business Council.

India has budgeted as much as $40 billion through 2012 to procure "best technologies" for the upgrade of its defense establishment. This figure does not include the millions budgeted to upgrade India's homeland security infrastructure.

"Agreement on EUM language signals that both the United States and India are looking to share the latest and best American technology and Systems," said Ron Somers, president of the USIBC.

 

[anoop_mig25]

Indo-US nuclear deal and its implications

Indo-US nuclear deal and its implications

Col. (Retd) Riaz Jafri

Published on The Post

On August 1, 2008, the IAEA approved the safeguards agreement with
India, after which the United States approached the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) to grant a waiver to India to commence civilian nuclear
trade. The 45-nation NSG granted the waiver to India on September 6,
2008 allowing it to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel from
other countries. The implementation of this waiver makes India the
only known country with nuclear weapons which is not a party to the
Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but is still allowed to carry out
nuclear commerce with the rest of the world.

The US House of Representatives passed the bill on 28 September 2008.
Two days later, India and France inked a similar nuclear pact making
France the first country to have such an agreement with India. On
October 1, 2008 the US Senate also approved the civilian nuclear
agreement allowing India to purchase nuclear fuel and technology from
the United States. US President, George W. Bush, signed the
legislation on the Indo-US nuclear deal, approved by the U.S.
Congress, into law, now called the United States-India Nuclear
Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act, on October
8, 2008.

The agreement was signed after three years of negotiations, the deal
which provides India with nuclear fuel and technology without signing
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty is finally done. After eight
disastrous years abroad, is this finally a foreign-policy coup for the
Bush administration? That is how it is being sold in Washington, but
as a ‘neutral’ observer one would have serious doubts about its wisdom
and what it means for the stability of the region.

From the American point of view, they get to sell stuff to India (not

just nuclear reactors but, with luck, 126 fighter jets and lots of
other materials too) and cement strategic relations with India at a
time when China’s aggressive diplomacy in the region with Pakistan,
Sri Lanka and Burma is unnerving both India and the US. However, as
the torrid negotiations showed, America will never find it
straightforward to deal with India, since large parts of the India
political establishment deeply distrusts America and, notwithstanding
China’s regional ascendancy, do not want to give the US any more
leverage over Indian foreign policy than necessary. The basis for a
wider strategic Indo-US pact is not as strong as it might seem and as
India’s politics continues to regionalise and factionalise, the Indo-
US relationship may get harder to manage still.

For India, the deal looks like an unalloyed good, crowning the South
Asian leader as the world’s de-facto sixth nuclear power, opening the
floodgates to fuel and technology while freeing up capacity to enhance
their own bomb-making programmes — and all this without signing the
NPT. The deal does, however, put obligations on India. Whatever is
being said to soothe the anti-deal factions in India, the Indo-US deal
effectively prohibits India from testing a nuclear weapon since fuel
supplies and technology transfers would effectively stop if that
happened. By 2050, when 25pc of India’s electricity could be nuclear,
testing a bomb would effectively put the lights out in Bombay. India’s
senior diplomats accept this in private but continue to deny it in
public for the sake of the deal, just as they deny in public that the
deal is the outward expression of India’s incredibly rapid
rapprochement and growing strategic alliance with the US.

India will, however, not only seek to reduce its obligations to the US
but also try to be as free as possible of any dependence upon the US.
Hence dealing with France and Russia, as it is allowed, while at the
same time her internal difficulties in dealings with the US are not
going to go away. If this deal is about a strategic marriage to
counterbalance China, it got off to a rocky start, with both sides
having very different perceptions of what it meant for the other.
These differences persist, which is dangerous in itself. So what about
the neutrals, how should they view this deal? With considerable
trepidation, one would suggest, as a neutral, the criteria for judging
the deal should be whether it will make the region more or less
stable; more or less polarized. On that basis, one may not like what
one is likely to see.

Firstly, China is unhappy with this deal, as it made plain with its
foot-dragging at the Nuclear Supplier’s Group negotiations. China may
quite be ready to do a similar deal with its ally Pakistan, just to
not let this piece of US strategic manoeuvring go unanswered.
Secondly, the deal cuts an exception for India from the international
non-proliferation regime, (which however flawed, was the framework in
existence) in time will be used against the West. Iran, Pakistan,
North Korea, Egypt...take your pick! India has always refused to sign
the NPT because it is an ‘unequal treaty’, cooked up, says its
detractors, by the world’s self-appointed nuclear guardians. And yet
ironically, this deal reinforces the West’s notion that it can make
exceptions to its own rules. This is dangerous.

Thirdly, following on from the above, the deal threatens to fuel the
Asian arms race. Whatever India’s intentions Pakistan and others will
apprehend, and justifiably too, that the deal frees up capacity for
India to increase its warhead numbers. And since the deal keeps
India’s military nuclear program outside international inspection,
there will be no way of knowing either way. Historically speaking,
Pakistan will not give India the benefit of the doubt.

Fourthly, the deal is nakedly political. That might be stating the
obvious, but it is too often denied. This is not just about nuclear
technology. It is a big net with far-reaching implications that is
being thrown over India, by the US, for being ‘democratic’ and
‘friendly’. George Bush said as much when he signed the bill into the
law. “This agreement sends a signal to the world: Nations that follow
the path to democracy and responsible behaviour will find a friend in
the United States of America.” So, neo-conservatism is not dead yet.
That is the kind of divisive, “with-us-or-against-us” language that
daily replenishes the global well of anti-US resentment. And of
course, it is just this kind of language which so riles the parts of
the Indian political establishment that opposed the deal. India just
cannot afford to be subservient to any other nation.

Therefore, having signed a treaty with France, India is again set to
sign yet another one with Russia. Not only that, the stage is also set
for entering into an agreement for the production of the Russian
sophisticated state-of-the-art weaponry and weapon systems in India as
currently more than 70 percent of such weaponry used by India is of
Russian origin. Such close collaboration between the two, one, in the
nuclear field and the second, in the joint manufacture of advanced
defence materials, should be a matter of legitimate concern for the
US.

It was the US who was keen and more or less openly wooed India into
signing the nuclear deal with a view to bringing it into its (US)
fold. For that, the US legislation amended Section 123 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954. It let the US make a one-time exception for India
to keep its nuclear weapons without signing the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The amendment overturns a 30-year-old US
ban on supplying India with nuclear fuel and technology, implemented
after India’s first nuclear test in 1974. But the Indians seem to have
outsmarted the Americans on all counts.

The deal also undermines the NPT, which holds that only countries
which renounce nuclear weapons qualify for civilian nuclear
assistance. The accord also sends the wrong message: it could undercut
a US-led campaign to curtail Iran’s nuclear programme, and open the
way for a potential arms race in South Asia.

Under the amendment, India must separate its civilian and military
nuclear facilities, and submit civilian facilities to inspections by
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). India says 14 of its 22
nuclear facilities are civilian. It is feared that the pact could make
bomb making at the other eight easier as India could divert her all
nuclear resources and fuel towards them as the civilian nuclear fuel
needs will be met by the US. Not only that, how would US ensure that
the nuclear technology and information shared by it with India will
not be passed on to the Russians, who will soon have a similar nuclear
technology sharing agreement with India?

As the vogue phrase has it, we are living in a new, ‘multi-polar’
world, in which Western and US pre-eminence is being challenged
rapidly by a resurgent Asia and a newly bellicose Russian Federation.
The question is, Will this deal bring those poles together or set them
against each other? The answer seems to be the latter.

Pakistan had sought a similar civilian technology deal with the US but
was refused last in March. It is the only other confirmed nuclear
power not to have signed the NPT, saying it will join after India
does. A school of thought is of serious views that Pakistan’s own
expanding nuclear programme could fan rivalry between India and
Pakistan. What option does it have except to look towards East for
similar nuclear collaboration? China has supported Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons programme since the 1980s. Could the Indo-US deal spur a
similar deal between Pakistan and China in the very near future?

The writer is based in Rawalpindi
.

wrietr must be happy becaue according to him if india teat dael will be off but he forgatts one thing that there is clause in a deal in which if india test then there is 1 year time frame where india had to explian why did she tested and what where background cinditions.the deal wont be automatically off:bye:

 

[LETHALFORCE]

the deal would be too costly to call off for both sides.