India-Iran Relations

republic_roi97

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Iran overtakes Saudi Arabia as top oil supplier to India

After curbs on Tehran were lifted and partly due to less crude from the kingdom, which has increased its refining capacity.
Iran overtook political rival Saudi Arabia as India’s top oil supplier in October, shipping data showed, just ahead of a producers’ meeting this month to hammer out the details on output cuts aimed at reining in a global glut.

Iran used to be India’s second-biggest oil supplier, a position it ceded to Iraq after tough Western sanctions over its nuclear development programme limited Tehran's exports and access to finance.

But India’s oil imports from Iran have shot up this year after those sanctions were lifted in January. In October they surged more than threefold compared with the same month last year, rising to 7,89,000 barrels per day (bpd), according to ship tracking data and a report compiled by Thomson Reuters Oil Research and Forecasts. That compares to 6,97,000 bpd supplied last month by Saudi Arabia. Over the whole January to October period, though, Saudi Arabia still holds India’s top supply spot, at an average of 8,30,000 bpd versus Iraq’s 7,84,000 bpd and Iran’s 4,56,400 bpd.

But Saudi is more ‘refined’

Iran’s surge to the No.1 spot is due partly to less available crude from Saudi Arabia, which has increased its capacity to refine oil instead of just exporting more crude.

“Saudi Arabia’s refining capacity has increased over time and so it is not in a position to increase its exports further, whereas Iran is better placed to raise its output and sales to India,” said Ehsaan ul Haq of the United Kingdom-based consultancy KBC Energy.

The surge is also thanks to Iranian price discounts, which attracted purchases from India’s programme to build up its strategic petroleum reserves (SPR). Last month, India took in 2 million barrels of Iranian crude for the SPR stocks, and another 4 million barrels is expected to be shipped in November.

In the first seven months of its fiscal year, between April and October, India imported 5,23,200 bpd from Iran, compared to 2,49,100 bpd for the same period a year ago.

Returning buyers

Indian refiners including Reliance Industries Ltd, operator of the world’s biggest refinery complex at Jamnagar that had stopped imports from Iran during the sanctions period, have also returned as buyers of Iranian oil.

Iran produces almost 4 million bpd of oil and exports 2.4 million bpd. Tehran’s exports dropped to 1 million bpd during sanctions, down from a peak of almost 3 million bpd in 2011, before tougher Western sanctions were implemented.

Gaining the top position as oil supplier to the world’s third-biggest importer, even if only for one month, comes at a sensitive time.

The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is due to meet on November 30 to finalise a planned production cut aimed at propping up prices, which continue to languish below $50 per barrel due to oversupply.

Exemptions to the planned cuts were given to Libya and Nigeria, where output has suffered from conflict, and sanctions-hit Iran. Given Iran has now pipped de facto OPEC leader Saudi Arabia in India, those exemptions might be more difficult to defend during the upcoming meeting.
 

prohumanity

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Iranians are good human beings who have been wrongly victimized by west due to a mafia lobby pushing anti-iran propaganda in west.
Iran has emerged stronger due to these constant threats and bullying by some powers over the years,
Iranians are smart and generally trustworthy people ..proud of their ancient Persian culture.
Iran and INDIA should remain friends and business partners...this partnership has remained strong in spite of tough times.
 

India22

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It is very good for us that Iran-West nuclear problem has been solved. Now we can import oil from Iran, have Chabahar and import defence technology from Israel.
 

DingDong

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Iranians are good human beings who have been wrongly victimized by west due to a mafia lobby pushing anti-iran propaganda in west.
Iran has emerged stronger due to these constant threats and bullying by some powers over the years,
Iranians are smart and generally trustworthy people ..proud of their ancient Persian culture.
Iran and INDIA should remain friends and business partners...this partnership has remained strong in spite of tough times.
Iran was responsible for busting India's intel network in the Gulf, Indian intelligence agents were captured and tortured. Current Vice President of India, Hamid Ansari was India's ambassador to Iran back then.

Partnership between India and Iran is mostly about give-and-take. India imports oil from Iran to reduce her dependency on the Sunni Saudi Arabia.

Persian Culture no longer exists. They are the Shia version of Pakistan.
 

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Are India, Iran and Russia Parting Ways on Afghanistan?

With the entry of ISIS into the Afghanistan equation, Indian interests have diverged from those of Russia and Iran, who have said that ISIS is a much more dangerous threat than the Taliban.


Prime Minister Narendra Modi with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and President of Afghanistan Ashraf Ghani. Credit: PTI

Iran, Russia and India were the big three powers that acted in unison – in supporting the Northern Alliance – to prevent a complete takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban between 1996 and 2001. This experience of working together to resist the Taliban has largely shaped their actions in Afghanistan since then.

Cooperation between the three states, even in the overt domain, continued over the years and was evident recently as well. In November 2016, India completed the delivery of a batch of four Mi-25 Russian combat helicopters to Afghanistan. Earlier in March 2016, India and Iran signed a bilateral deal to develop the Chabahar port that would provide Afghanistan an alternate access to the sea, bypassing Pakistan. Such instances of collaboration involving Russia, Iran and India have given rise to a belief that these three powers have convergent interests regarding peace and stability in Afghanistan.

It is in light of this history of cooperation that Russia’s statements regarding the ISIS in Afghanistan have caused a stir in India. The Russian president’s special representative to Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, went on record saying that the ISIS — not the Taliban — is a bigger threat in the region.

Similarly, Iran continues to make overtures towards sections in the Taliban. Afghanistan’s former intelligence chief, Rahmatullah Nabil, in November accused Iran of supporting the Taliban in order to counter the Daesh threat.

In sharp contrast, India still regards the Taliban and its sponsors as bigger threats to Afghanistan. Earlier this month, the Ministry of External Aaffairs spokesperson said regarding the Taliban, “They have to respect the internationally agreed red lines, give up terrorism and violence, sever all ties with al Qaeda, agree to follow democratic norms and not do anything which will erode the gains of the last 15 years. Ultimately it is for the government of Afghanistan to decide whom to talk to and how.”

So, the question before India is: with the ISIS brought into the Afghanistan equation, have the interests of Russia, Iran and India now diverged in Afghanistan? And, if yes, what are the implications of this development for India’s strategy?

Is there a divergence?

The question of parting ways has two disparate elements: one that involves the Taliban and the other involves the ISIS. On the Taliban question, it is safe to say that there is no major divergence between Russia, India and Iran. All three would settle for any Afghan-owned arrangement that ends the cycle of violence in the country. There are differences, however, in the desired means to achieve this goal. India regards that it is the prerogative of the Afghan government to decide the pace of talks with the Taliban. But Russia and Iran differ. With the war against ISIS in Syria heading towards a denouement, there is a sense of urgency for Russia and Iran to act which has lead them to make their own suo motu overtures towards the Taliban.

On the second question regarding the ISIS, there is definitely a divergence. Russia sees ISIS in Afghanistan from the prism of its involvement in the ongoing Syrian war. While the Russian government has chosen to support the Shia dominated Bashar al-Assad government, this move is seen to be extremely unpopular in the eyes of the Sunni Russian Muslims.

Russia’s 20 million-strong Muslim minority has become a major recruitment centre for the ISIS. Russian Muslims have joined the ISIS in Syria and there have been reports indicating that the Russian authorities even encouraged some to go to Syria way back in 2011, with the hope that these ‘trouble-makers’ would never return. Today, there are an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 Russian citizens with the ISIS, putting it far ahead of other European countries. Another 2,000 are Russian-speaking, making Russian the second most common language in the ISIS, after Arabic.

This strategy of wishing away its problems seems to have failed, though. In October 2015, Putin’s chief of staff, Sergei Ivanov, acknowledged that many of the Russians who fought for ISIS have “returned home, presenting a direct threat.” This fear was also articulated by Putin in his speech at the UN General Assembly last September. Two months later, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev revealed that “many thousands of Russian citizens and individuals from other post-Soviet republics are fighting in Syria. These completely brainwashed people return home as professional murderers and terrorists. And we don’t want them to stage something similar in Russia after their Syrian stints expire.”

Now, this is where Afghanistan comes into the equation. Russia fears that these Russian-speaking ISIS members will set base in Afghanistan, particularly in the north, along the border with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It is also feared that the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which has much in common with the Russian Muslims in ISIS and is already present on Afghan soil, could gravitate towards ISIS and help them secure a foothold. Russia crucially sees any organisation under the ISIS flag as a global threat. Hence, its endeavour to portray the Taliban – a local, Afghanistan-based movement in Kabulov’s words – as a lesser threat.

Iran’s fears are somewhat similar. It is concerned that an influx of Sunni ISIS militants from Iraq and Syria will pose problems not only for the large Shia minority in Afghanistan but also for its own security. Another problem on its eastern borders would only add to its insecurities. And hence, Iran sees the ISIS as the irreconcilable enemy and Taliban as a secondary threat.

India sees the situation differently, and for good reasons. The Indian perception is based on an understanding that the ISIS in Afghanistan or Wilayat Khorasan is merely made up of rump factions of the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban and assorted drug and crime syndicates, all with a markedly anti-Pakistan orientation and with no global aspirations. Moreover, India is far more comfortably placed than Russia or Iran in this regard because of the buffer that is provided, paradoxically by Pakistan.

One view in India is that a singular focus on ISIS in Afghanistan will derail the fight against Taliban which has now killed over 6,000 Afghan soldiers and over 30,000 civilians in 2016 alone. Another reason for the Indian scepticism is that the focus on ISIS would bail out Pakistan, which today is internationally questioned for abetting terrorism. A ‘global’ threat would be used by Pakistan to create a new narrative, a new set of friends and to secure more funding. It would then be a sense of deja vu for India, with the ISI making overtures to elements within this group, providing sanctuaries in return for assurances that they would not be targeted and then manoeuvring to bring Kashmir into the equation.


An Afghan National Army soldier stands guard after the inauguration of the reconstruction project to restore the ruins of historic Darul Aman palace, in Kabul, Afghanistan May 30, 2016. Credit: Reuters/Omar Sobhani

Where does this leave India?

With Russia and Iran moving towards an overly anti-ISIS focus in Afghanistan, India is broadly left with three options.

One, continue to back the Afghan National Unity Government’s (NUG) peace efforts and anti-terrorism resistance. This would mean urgent and sustained collaboration with the US under the Afghanistan-India-US trilateral to strengthen the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces and rebuild the Afghan economy.

Two, become a part of Russia and Iran’s efforts in talking to the Taliban. As a part of one such effort, Russia, China and Pakistan are meeting in Moscow on December 27 to discuss the ISIS threat in Afghanistan, crucially without any representation from the NUG. Future meetings of this working group are expected to involve Iran as well.

Three, open direct channels with elements in the Afghan Taliban that are not under Pakistan’s influence.

The first option is highly dependent on the NUG’s own successes. It has been a disappointment thus far – mired in allegations of misgovernance, corruption and disunity. An Asia Foundation survey indicated that 66% of the Afghan population is now pessimistic about the direction the country is heading in, with insecurity indicated as the major factor. This strategy is also dependent on how the Donald Trump administration views Afghanistan. If the US were to reduce focus on Afghanistan, India would find supporting this option on its own untenable.

The second and third options would mean that India will have to look beyond the NUG. Apart from establishing contacts with sections within the Taliban, it would mean reviving contacts with provincial leaders, an enterprise which may lead to problems with the NUG.

The three options are not mutually exclusive. For the moment, India would do well to keep abreast of developments in both camps – the Russia, Iran overtures to the Taliban and the Trump administration’s future plans for Afghanistan. There are dangers, no matter what, in both sets. The Russia, Iran initiative in talking to the Taliban would, inevitably, mean giving Pakistan a larger than merited role shaping the future of the region.

The future of the US in Afghanistan is also uncertain. Afghanistan has been a bad experience for the Americans and they too may choose to view the Taliban menace as a localised insurgency and not one which is a global terrorist threat. If it feels that the US is seeking an exit, Pakistan can hasten it by sacrificing the Haqqani network at an appropriate time, thereby making a re-entry into the good books of the US.

There are no easy choices in the Afghanistan war. Unless the NUG, or the government succeeding it, backed by well-wishing international actors, can regain control of important districts in Afghanistan, other countries are likely to take the cue from Russia and Iran. It will effectively lead to a return of the nineties – only the aftershocks will travel further this time around.

https://thewire.in/89722/india-iran-russia-afghanistan/
 

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Iran 'not concerned' by Indian threat to cut oil imports
Reuters | London Apr 05, 2017 03:37 PM IST

Iran's oil minister dismissed India's decision to cut oil imports from Tehran in 2017/18 by a fifth as a threat on Wednesday, in an escalation of a dispute over a giant gas field contract.

Sources familiar with the matter told Reuters last week that Indian state refiners were going to cut oil imports from Iran, as New Delhi seeks to put pressure on Tehran to award the Farzad B gas field to an Indian consortium.

"India is one of our good costumers, but we cannot sign (a) contract under threat," Bijan Zanganeh was quoted as saying by Iran's ISNA news agency.

"India's cut of oil imports from Iran will not cause any trouble to us as we have other buyers," he added.

Zanganeh said despite an extension of deadlines, India has not offered an acceptable proposal for the development of the gas field.

"Their proposal was not profitable to Iran ... We sent (the) Indians a letter and told them we are keen to continue negotiations, but under sensible conditions, not under threats."

India, Iran's biggest oil buyer after China, was among a handful of countries that continued to deal with the Tehran despite Western sanctions over its nuclear programme.

A consortium headed by ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL), the overseas investment arm of Indian explorer Oil and Natural Gas Corp, discovered Farzad B in the Farsi offshore block in 2008.

The consortium, which also includes Oil India and Indian Oil Corp, could not obtain permission to develop the field due to Western sanctions, but those sanctions were removed last year.

India and Iran had both been hopeful of wrapping up the Farzad B deal by March, although Zanganeh said Iran has asked other countries to submit their proposals for its development.
 
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Cutting Edge 2

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Russia may replace India in Farzad-B gas field project — Iran’s minister
May 25, 13:51UTC+3
Russia may enter the Farzad-B gas field project replacing India

VIENNA, May 25. /TASS/. Russia may enter the Farzad-B gas field project replacing India, Iran’s petroleum minister Bijan Namdar Zanganeh said Thursday.


"Russians," he said when asked who may enter the project if the deal with Indian partners fails.

According to the minister, the Iranian side has failed to make an appropriate offer.

Earlier it was reported that India and Iran are negotiating the investment project on the development of Farzad-B gas offshore field in the Persian Gulf by India’s ONGC Videsh. In April 2016, the parties agreed the project’s implementation schedule.


More:
http://tass.com/economy/947564
 

Innocent

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Iran threatens to let Russian cos develop Farzad B gas field after India plans to cut oil purchase

IndiaFP StaffMay, 31 2017 12:25:57 IST

After India said it planned to order less Iranian crude oil, Iran has threatened to let Russian companies enter the race for developing the Farzad B gas field.

The Times of India reported that if Iran does indeed go through with this, the part of the oil field which the consortium of Indian state-run entities get will be much smaller.



Representational image. Reuters

Reports from Vienna quoted Iranian oil minister Bijan Zanganeh as saying that he expected Russian firms to develop a substantial portion of the oil field if the Indian consortium failed to come up with a satisfactory offer.

India's plans to order about a quarter less Iranian crude oil than it bought last year followed its threat to order state refiners — Hindustan Petroleum, Bharat Petroleum, Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Ltd, and Indian Oil Corp — to reduce purchases from Iran if an Indian consortium is not awarded the rights to develop Iran's huge Farzad B natural gas field, reported Reuters.

The volume cuts would put India's imports of Iranian crude for this fiscal year at 3,70,000 barrels per day (bpd), according to the sources with knowledge of the planned deals.

India is Iran's top oil client after China, and last year imported about 5,10,000 bpd of crude from the country, according to shipping data in Thomson Reuters Eikon.

The reduced 2017/2018 imports include 1,99,000 bpd by state refiners, a decline of about a third from last year, the sources said. Private refiners Essar and HPCL-Mittal Energy Ltd (HMEL) have renewed last year's term contracts to buy 1,20,000 bpd and 20,000 bpd, respectively, they said.

Most of the state refiners did not respond to queries on the matter, while Essar Oil, MRPL and HMEL declined comment.

India's oil ministry also said it had no immediate comment.

Analysts said apart from the gas-field row, India is also taking advantage of a narrow price spread between European oil benchmark Brent and Middle East price-setter Dubai crude, which makes it attractive to bring more oil from Europe into Asia.

With inputs from Reuters

Published Date: May 31, 2017 12:25 pm | Updated Date: May 31, 2017 12:25 pm
 

airtel

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Russia may replace India in Farzad-B gas field project — Iran’s minister
May 25, 13:51UTC+3
Russia may enter the Farzad-B gas field project replacing India

VIENNA, May 25. /TASS/. Russia may enter the Farzad-B gas field project replacing India, Iran’s petroleum minister Bijan Namdar Zanganeh said Thursday.


"Russians," he said when asked who may enter the project if the deal with Indian partners fails.

According to the minister, the Iranian side has failed to make an appropriate offer.

Earlier it was reported that India and Iran are negotiating the investment project on the development of Farzad-B gas offshore field in the Persian Gulf by India’s ONGC Videsh. In April 2016, the parties agreed the project’s implementation schedule.


More:
http://tass.com/economy/947564
Iran threatens to let Russian cos develop Farzad B gas field after India plans to cut oil purchase

IndiaFP StaffMay, 31 2017 12:25:57 IST

After India said it planned to order less Iranian crude oil, Iran has threatened to let Russian companies enter the race for developing the Farzad B gas field.

The Times of India reported that if Iran does indeed go through with this, the part of the oil field which the consortium of Indian state-run entities get will be much smaller.



Representational image. Reuters

Reports from Vienna quoted Iranian oil minister Bijan Zanganeh as saying that he expected Russian firms to develop a substantial portion of the oil field if the Indian consortium failed to come up with a satisfactory offer.

India's plans to order about a quarter less Iranian crude oil than it bought last year followed its threat to order state refiners — Hindustan Petroleum, Bharat Petroleum, Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Ltd, and Indian Oil Corp — to reduce purchases from Iran if an Indian consortium is not awarded the rights to develop Iran's huge Farzad B natural gas field, reported Reuters.

The volume cuts would put India's imports of Iranian crude for this fiscal year at 3,70,000 barrels per day (bpd), according to the sources with knowledge of the planned deals.

India is Iran's top oil client after China, and last year imported about 5,10,000 bpd of crude from the country, according to shipping data in Thomson Reuters Eikon.

The reduced 2017/2018 imports include 1,99,000 bpd by state refiners, a decline of about a third from last year, the sources said. Private refiners Essar and HPCL-Mittal Energy Ltd (HMEL) have renewed last year's term contracts to buy 1,20,000 bpd and 20,000 bpd, respectively, they said.

Most of the state refiners did not respond to queries on the matter, while Essar Oil, MRPL and HMEL declined comment.

India's oil ministry also said it had no immediate comment.

Analysts said apart from the gas-field row, India is also taking advantage of a narrow price spread between European oil benchmark Brent and Middle East price-setter Dubai crude, which makes it attractive to bring more oil from Europe into Asia.

With inputs from Reuters

Published Date: May 31, 2017 12:25 pm | Updated Date: May 31, 2017 12:25 pm
that means Indians are excepting a saudi-Iran war and we dont want to invest money in risky projects .
 

vinuzap

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today they attacked shia in Saudi and earlier Iranian embassy in Afghanistan sooner or later Iran will react


saudi -iran war is eminent
 

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An Iranian role in Indo-Israel defense ties

With the start of Indian Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Israel, it is opportune to discuss what can influence areas of mutual partnership between Israel and India. Defense is one area, and its future seems partially dependant on Iran. Iran and Israel are longtime foes, however, the standard dogma may need some adjustment at times to ensure a constructive commercial relationship in line with contemporary concerns. The Israelis, known for their pragmatism, may see the reasoning behind Iran’s role in determining the future of Indo-Israeli defense partnership.

First, there is the Pakistani-Chinese military presence in Pakistan’s port city, Gwadar, which poses a threat to India’s coastline and its assets in southeast Iran. Pakistan was the country where Bin Laden was found in 2011, where, in 1999, an Indian Airlines flight was hijacked to, and where US journalist Daniel Pearl was killed by terrorists in 2002. So far, Pakistan has failed to act decisively on Islamist proxies like Hafiz Saeed, Syed Salahuddin and Masood Azhar, who continue to threaten India.

Any plans India has for overland connectivity into Central Asia for trade and economic linkages cannot bear fruit with a transit route through Pakistan. The only other option for that is transit through Iran, hence a need for India to act fast on its project to build a port in the southeastern Iranian city of Chabahar. But the Iran-Pakistan border is already heated up, following the recent killing of ten Iranian border guards by Sunni militants from Pakistani soil. Such attacks can hit Indian assets in Chabahar too. With China taking over Pakistan’s Gwadar port, the fear in India is that Gwadar will become a Chinese Naval base intimidating India from close quarters.

Given these imperatives, India might explore establishing some form of a defense presence in Chabahar, 70 km west of Gwadar. Whether Iran will allow Indian defense presence on its soil remains debatable, especially as the Chinese are now actively wooing the Iranians to extend its massive Belt and Road Initiative, sometimes called the New Silk Road. Nevertheless, the Indian defense presence in Iran (and/or extending into Afghanistan) may help protect the Indian assets being constructed there.




Iranian – Pakistani border.

Thus, Chabahar has tactical importance for the Indian defense to keep a counter-pressure on Pakistan/China from the other side. This would mean a significant opportunity for Israel to meet India’s increased requirement. Israel had already filled the supply-gap after the Glenn Amendment adopted after India’s 1998 nuclear tests restricted arms sales from US/Europe, which had filled the gap in the 1990s following the USSR’s collapse. According to the SIPRI, Indo-Israeli defense trade averaged about $1 billion a year during the last five years, and Israel ranks as one of India’s largest defense suppliers today. But the military threat from Gwadar poses a strong rationale to take the Indo-Israeli defense cooperation to the next level, and one way for it can be through Iran!

Second, the borders along Jammu and Kashmir face an ongoing threat from Pakistan-based terrorists and its army, and Indo-Israeli partnership has worked well so far in technologies related to border-control, radars, identifying insurgents hiding in caves, etc. However, the increasingly assertive Chinese military presence adds a further dimension. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor project, part of which runs through disputed Kashmir soil, has meant increased military deployment along its line to counter threats from insurgents; the Chinese military to control East Turkestan insurgents in Xinjiang and the Pakistani military to control Taliban insurgents in KPK, etc. This military deployment could also be used to intimidate India, especially as the Chinese become increasingly assertive in expanding its geopolitical influence along the high-seas and contentious borders.

The realistic chances of China opting for an armed conflict with India along its own borders may be less, since it would lead to collateral damage on its own soil, not to mention an opportunity for Xinjiang insurgents to take some advantage with the Chinese military preoccupied elsewhere. However, this threat to India continues, and its need for defense supply will continue. China has nothing to lose by engaging in an armed conflict from its naval base in Gwadar, backed by its ever-increasing military presence along the Indian Ocean. The collateral damage would be on Pakistani soil, and it would not impact Xinjiang significantly. This brings the discussion back to Chabahar. Thus, Chabahar has strategic importance for the Indian defense to keep a counter-pressure on Pakistan/China from the other side.

Why would Iran allow Indian defense presence on its soil? President Rouhani announced plans for job-creation in his first term. But this was yet to show full results, and the Opposition raised voice on this during the recent campaigns. This agenda is now top-most for Rouhani in his new term. Development of the Chabahar port and free-trade zone, Afghanistan Corridor and the International North–South Transport Corridor can be a game-changer in job-creation, which can help Rouhani win significant political dividends from voters. China has approached Iran, given India’s delays on the Chabahar project. However, most BRI projects have been seen to employ significant Chinese labour, as per anecdotes in the book “China’s Silent Army” in which two journalists travelled several countries to see Chinese outbound projects up-close. That may not address the job-creation challenge Iran faces. Conversely, India is not known to employ significant Indian labour in its outbound projects. If Indian defense presence can help it close the Chabahar and Corridor projects fast using Iranian labour, there exists an opportunity for Rouhani to earn political mileage by addressing a key socio-economic challenge.

In the end, Israel seeing eye-to-eye with Iran is unlikely given their past and the recent Saudi-Qatar rift. However, Israel is actively looking to further its relations with India. In that context, whatever benefits India may in turn benefit Israel, even if indirectly through Iran. The Pak-Sino military threat remains a huge overhang, and the role of Chabahar as a potential strategic and tactical base for Indian defense can be a game-changer in the future course of Indo-Pak relations, and in the future course of Indo-Israeli defense partnership. During PM Modi’s visit to Israel, it may just be opportune to bring Chabahar into the agenda!


http://www.trackpersia.com/iranian-role-indo-israel-defense-ties/
 

Kshatriya87

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Ties are getting bitter. In the last few months, Iran has condemned kashmir "atrocities" several times.
 

Cutting Edge 2

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Iran isn't a trustworthy nation. It never was and never will be. The whole idea of setting military base in Iran is another failed idea of Khangress party. Salman Khurshid (a shia muslim) to be specific.

Iran is at its core a fundamental Islamic country. You can never change this fact. They will never let kufar Hindu use their land against Pak Muslims.

There is nothing to gain from India Iran relations. We are just wasting our tax payer's money. We too should join world community and put sanctions on Iran.
 

Kshatriya87

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Iran isn't a trustworthy nation. It never was and never will be. The whole idea of setting military base in Iran is another failed idea of Khangress party. Salman Khurshid (a shia muslim) to be specific.

Iran is at its core a fundamental Islamic country. You can never change this fact. They will never let kufar Hindu use their land against Pak Muslims.

There is nothing to gain from India Iran relations. We are just wasting our tax payer's money. We too should join world community and put sanctions on Iran.
I know we can't trust them, afterall they've helped pak in previous wars against India. But its more complicated than that. Due to the sanctions on Iran, it sells gas for much cheaper rate to India which we needed desperately since a couple of decades. Hence the relations there. Also, India hopes to counter pak by building better and massive economic relations with Iran. Once the money becomes overwhelming, Iran will conveniently ignore pak.
 

Cutting Edge 2

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I know we can't trust them, afterall they've helped pak in previous wars against India. But its more complicated than that. Due to the sanctions on Iran, it sells gas for much cheaper rate to India which we needed desperately since a couple of decades. Hence the relations there. Also, India hopes to counter pak by building better and massive economic relations with Iran. Once the money becomes overwhelming, Iran will conveniently ignore pak.
Aren't we getting gas from Qatar? I think we have long term agreement for gas with them. yeah Iranian oil is cheap but recently we have moved to GCC for most of our needs.

Coming to geopolitics. Iran will never side with India against Pak. They are religious fanatics. They don't care about money or economics.

I heard some rumors from some sources that Iran wants to merge their Chabhar with Gwadar once India finishes its development. Basically they are taking us on a ride.

Their Aayatolla has recently started to cry about Kashmir and now Pakis want their support. Its all in today's paper H.Times.
https://www.pressreader.com/india/hindustan-times-delhi/20170707/281848643633454
 

Kshatriya87

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Aren't we getting gas from Qatar? I think we have long term agreement for gas with them. yeah Iranian oil is cheap but recently we have moved to GCC for most of our needs.

Coming to geopolitics. Iran will never side with India against Pak. They are religious fanatics. They don't care about money or economics.

I heard some rumors from some sources that Iran wants to merge their Chabhar with Gwadar once India finishes its development. Basically they are taking us on a ride.

Their Aayatolla has recently started to cry about Kashmir and now Pakis want their support. Its all in today's paper H.Times.
https://www.pressreader.com/india/hindustan-times-delhi/20170707/281848643633454
Yes we take gas from Qatar as well. A country should always have multiple suppliers for critical items as contingency.

We shifted to GCC for oil recently due to barrel price tumble. Since last 3 years, prices are down and India can afford to buy from any country.
 

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Understanding foreign relations between India and Iran
The India-Iran relationship is often ignored yet it provides insights into shifting geostrategic relationships within Asia

Rick Rowden, Doctoral Researcher, Centre for Economic Studies & Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi

The West tends to view India and Iran one at a time, each in isolation. But what about India-Iran foreign relations? The often-overlooked bilateral relations between India and Iran are not only fascinating, but provide a prism by which to view and understand a host of other shifting geostrategic relationships across the whole of Asia.

Until the partition of the sub-continent and creation of Pakistan in 1947, India and Iran had long shared a common border as neighbours, with cultural and linguistic ties between the two ancient civilizations going back thousands of years. Indeed, the legacy of Persian influence on Mughal architecture stands to this day in major structures from Lahore to New Delhi, not the least of which includes the famous Taj Mahal. Shortly after Indian independence, the two countries established formal diplomatic relations in 1950.

However, during the early decades of the Cold War, India was aligned with the Soviet Union while Iran, under the Shah, was aligned with the US, which dampened their bilateral relations. Following the 1979 revolution in Iran, India-Iran foreign relations remained strained as Iran supported Pakistan in the long-standing India-Pakistan rivalry, while India supported Iraq during the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s. But following the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, bilateral relations between India and Iran improved, and the two nations signed a defense cooperation agreement in 2002.

Even as relations improved, however, the countries have disagreed over the NATO occupation in Afghanistan, which India supports and Iran opposes, and over Iranian attempts to build a nuclear programme, which India opposes. Yet, despite these differences, overall diplomatic and economic relations between India and Iran have improved and deepened in the new millennium. For example, India is one of Iran’s best customers for its oil exports.

A love triangle gone bad – India, Iran and the United States

In seeking to understand India-Iran relations, the first thing to consider is how they have been impacted by each country’s relationship with the United States. While the US has considered Iran an adversary since the 1979 Islamic revolution overthrew the pro-US regime under the Shah, it considers India as an important strategic ally, particularly in efforts to contain the growing power of China. The US became closer to India following a breakthrough 2005 civilian nuclear energy deal under which India agreed to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities. The deal saw India agree to place all its civil nuclear facilities under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in exchange for US cooperation in developing its civil nuclear energy programme (although the deal has been delayed over concerns about liability in the event of a nuclear accident and the financial troubles of the US nuclear energy giant, Westinghouse). The US and India became even closer in 2015, when they signed a 10-year defense agreement that opened the way for huge US military hardware sales to India in exchange for India providing the US military access to its harbours, airfields and bases.

Meanwhile US relations with Iran over the last decade have deteriorated. In 2006, the US led an effort at the UN to impose international economic sanctions against Iran after it refused to suspend its uranium enrichment programme. Following this, India was pressured by the US to curtail its purchases of Iranian crude oil, despite its dependence on such imports. At one point, in 2009, India was pressured by the US to vote against Iran and support sanctions at the UN. However, despite this, India got the US to give it waivers to continue purchasing oil from Iran, which the Obama administration allowed for a certain period. Additionally, India was forced to deposit Iranian payments in a bank account in Kolkata while it waited for sanctions to ease before being allowed to transfer the payments. These difficulties sometimes reduced trade relations to simple bartering in which India traded its rice for Iranian oil.

Following the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, signed between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and the European Union, in 2016 which saw Iran agree to scale back its nuclear programme the UN sanctions against Iran were finally eased and India began increasing its purchases of Iranian crude oil. India was also finally able to transfer nearly $6 billion in back payments for Iranian oil, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi held a bilateral summit with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in Tehran in May 2016 in an effort to renew relations. However, because separate unilateral US sanctions remain in place, Indian banks with exposure in the US remain reluctant to finance new Indian trade and investments in Iran.

India on the outside: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

Beyond these distortions caused by the India-US-Iran triangle, there are a range of important proposed infrastructure projects on the horizon, all of which provide a window into other shifting geostrategic relationships across Asia. All of them are a response to the super-ambitious China-led infrastructure plan to develop an expansive set roads and railways that would cut across the Central Asian heartland and link China’s eastern seaboard with Russia and Europe as well as all of South Asia, known as the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, or now called the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As the biggest infrastructure project ever proposed, the plan is historic, carries tremendous geostrategic implications, and could ultimately include over 60 countries.

However, the Indian government has refused to join the China-led endeavour. India is particularly angry that one small portion of the BRI, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, cuts across the Pakistan-controlled side of Kashmir, which India claims is legally part of its state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Chabahar Port and new trade routes

One major initiative between India and Iran is the long-planned Indian investment in the expansion and development of the port of Chabahar on Iran’s Arabian Sea coast. The project is central to India’s hopes to open a new transport corridor for Indian exports into Central Asia and Afghanistan that would bypass its main rival, Pakistan. India committed $500 million to the project as soon as it was clear that UN sanctions on Iran would be lifted. Many see the proposed project as India’s answer to China’s development of Pakistan’s Gwadar port, which lies barely 100 km east of Chabahar on the Pakistani coast.

And Japan, which shares India’s concerns about the growing economic and military strength of China, is likely to partner with India on the development of the Chabahar port in Iran, as well as an adjoining special economic zone. In fact, as part of their response to China’s BRI, India and Japan are partnering in what they call the Freedom Corridor, which would create new road, rail and shipping routes that would stretch from South East Asia to Sri Lanka, Iran and Africa. However, due to continuing US sanctions and a hostile Donald Trump administration, European companies are reluctant to supply equipment for India’s project in Chabahar for fear of renewed sanctions on Iran.

During Modi’s visit to Tehran in 2016, the leaders of India, Iran and Afghanistan signed the Trilateral Transit Agreement (TTA) that established the trade corridor that would link the Chabahar port to Afghanistan. India has also proposed ambitious investment plans for Chabahar’s development, including financing to build railways, roads and fertilizer plants that could eventually amount to $15 billion. The deal is of interest to landlocked Afghanistan because the TTA would provide it with an alternative route to the seas, and hence strengthen its bargaining power with Pakistan by reducing its current dependence on the Karachi port.

The International North-South Transportation Corridor

Another major project is India’s proposed International North-South Transportation Corridor (INSTC), which would develop a network of ship, rail, and road routes for moving goods over 7,000 km from India’s western ports up to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, run north through Iran to its Caspian sea port of Bandar Anzali, then across the Caspian Sea to the Russian port of Astrakhan and on to markets in Russia, Europe and Central Asia. The INSTC, which is also seen as an Indian response to China’s BRI, would greatly reduce costs over the current shipping route which runs through the Suez Canal, the Strait of Gibraltar and around the top of northern Europe.

The Farzad B gas field

Finally there is India’s investment in developing Iran’s Farzad B offshore gas field, which is believed to contain up to 12.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The Indian company ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) first discovered the field in 2008 and has been in discussions with Iran over the development of the field ever since. After sanctions were lifted on Iran, it was expected an agreement would quickly be reached and production could finally begin. However, discussions are bogged down over disagreements. India has blamed Iran over what it claims are unsatisfactory terms for an agreement, while Iran is unhappy with the $5.5 billion offer by OVL. To put pressureon one another, Iran first cut the time it gave to Indian refiners to pay for oil they buy from it by a third and raised shipping freight rates; in response India began reducing its imports of Iranian oil. Iran then signed an alternative agreement with the Russian company, Gazprom, for the development of the field; and in response, India announced plans to reduce its imports of Iranian crude oil by 20 per cent in 2017-18. Despite the pressure tactics, both sides insist a deal will eventually be worked out.

Shifting sands

Lingering questions about US policy and worsening Sunni-Shia tensions in the Persian Gulf are both factors that create uncertainty for the future of India-Iran foreign relations. Yet, whatever happens next, this bilateral relationship is sure to continue offering fascinating insights into a host of other important developments that are reshaping geopolitics across much of Asia.



http://speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/2017/07/12/understanding-foreign-relations-between-india-and-iran/
 

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