India's response in case of an NSG Snub

Discussion in 'Defence & Strategic Issues' started by trackwhack, May 4, 2012.

?

What should India do if we are not given full NSG membership

  1. Test a TN warhead and give them the bird

    31 vote(s)
    59.6%
  2. Dont test and continue with diplomatic begging

    5 vote(s)
    9.6%
  3. Dont test and use diplomatic clout in issues like Iran to defy the P5

    16 vote(s)
    30.8%
  1. olivers

    olivers Regular Member

    Joined:
    Mar 25, 2010
    Messages:
    123
    Likes Received:
    91
    New Delhi, June 30, 2011
    Difficult task ahead for India at NSG: Kakodkar
    Sandeep Dikshit Share · print · T+

    Outgoing U.S. Ambassador to India Timothy Roemer interacts with children at the India Gate before making farewell statement in New Delhi. Photo: Sandeep Saxena

    In farewell statement, Roemer confident of Washington backing New Delhi's quest for ENR technologies

    India will have to dig in its heels and gear up for a difficult battle if the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) decides to bar transfer of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies to countries that have not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), according to the former Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) chief, Anil Kakodkar.

    “The general impression is that India is a soft state and will put up with everything. We have to dispel this impression. We will have to calibrate our response. If they do not keep their side of the bargain, then we should look at other options,” said the man who was in the thick of things when India inked the bilateral civil nuclear agreements and got an exemption from the NSG, gatekeeper to global civil nuclear commerce.

    Clean record

    At stake is the issue of India not signing the NPT. In a process that began at G8 conclaves, the latest NSG plenary decided to tighten norms for transfer of ENR technologies by its members to non-NPT signatories, of which India is one.

    Dr. Kakodkar also explained why India would have to fight hard to get its point of view accepted. “Strictly speaking, NPT should not come in the way at all because cooperation with India was opened on the basis of its clean track record with respect to non-proliferation. If that was the basis then, that should remain the basis now [also],” he said.

    On the other hand, the outgoing U.S. Ambassador, Timothy Roemer, is confident of Washington backing New Delhi's quest for ENR technologies despite the NSG seeking to tighten the transfer guidelines. He referred to his recent visit to Washington and said his impression was that the White House “vehemently” supported clean waiver for India.

    “The President firmly supports it, the 1-2-3 Agreement firmly supports the clean waiver, and our law firmly commits us to it. So with India's commitment as they move forward to ratify the Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC) and they work more closely with the U.S. companies, I think you'll see the civilian nuclear agreement hopefully continue to move in a very positive direction in the future,” said Mr. Roemer in his “farewell” address to the media from a corner of the India Gate lawns.

    But Dr. Kakodkar differed from Mr. Roemer. Things were moving in a negative direction and India would have to assert itself to ensure that the clean exemption did not get diluted to exclude the transfer of ENR technologies, he said.

    “The issue is that the explicit provisions in bilateral agreements are essentially on reactors. They also speak in general in terms of broad-based cooperation. But when it comes to actual specifications, the agreements would have to work around the NSG guidelines on that particular day,” he said.

    Way out possible

    There could be a way out because Russia several times interpreted the NSG guidelines in its own way when it came to supplying fuel for the Tarapur plant. But Dr. Kakodkar feels that finally it will all depend on “the politics of the day. [Russia has indicated that as things stood, it was prepared to transfer ENR technologies to India].”

    Admitting that the situation has “changed a bit,” the former DAE chief said though the issue was moving in a negative direction, the experience was that the issue of ENR technology transfer to India should become relatively easy with time.
     
  2. olivers

    olivers Regular Member

    Joined:
    Mar 25, 2010
    Messages:
    123
    Likes Received:
    91
    Reversing the logic of the nuclear deal
    Anil Kakodkar Share · Comment (19) · print · T+

    The Hindu
    File photo of Tarapur atomic power station. The NSG waiver for India does not affect the commerce related to nuclear reactors and their fuel supplies, it appears to shut doors on commerce related to enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Photo: V.V.Krishnan

    The recently reported decision of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) on additional restrictions for transfer of ENR (enrichment and reprocessing) technologies with adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) being a condition for transfer has caused huge unease in India. It negates the positive and forward-looking orientation with respect to ENR issues that was built into bilateral and multilateral agreements developed as a part of development of our international civil nuclear cooperation. The NSG waiver for India now seems to have been circumscribed. While this does not affect the commerce related to nuclear reactors and their fuel supplies and our rights to reprocess and recycle used fuel, it appears to shut doors on commerce related to enrichment and reprocessing technologies. The United States, Russia, and France have issued statements reiterating their adherence to understandings with India. One would only hope that this does not amount to doublespeak and the NSG waiver in respect of the NPT condition that was granted to India earlier remains undiluted in respect of ENR transfers as well. The statements of these countries are far from being explicit in this respect.

    India is a responsible country with advanced nuclear technologies. Indian capability is comprehensive and covers the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing. Understandings embedded in our international civil nuclear cooperation arrangements are premised on sustained access to international commerce for facilities that we place under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. At some stage, we would set up reprocessing plants to reprocess used fuel arising from reactors under IAEA safeguards. Similarly, we could set up enrichment plants for enriching imported uranium under IAEA safeguards to feed our growing programme. Such plants, if they have to be under IAEA safeguards, must have the benefits of international commerce and not denied that access. That we have our own technological capability in respect of these technologies cannot be an argument to allow others to reverse the positive and forward-looking sentiment built into our understandings.

    Reprocessing and recycle (particularly in fast reactors) of used fuel from nuclear reactors enables extraction of several tenfolds larger carbon-dioxide-free energy from a given amount of uranium. Reprocessing is thus the key to nuclear energy, addressing the twin challenge of sustainable global energy supply as well as mitigating the threat of climate change. Claims made about the capability of available uranium to meet global energy needs, in once-through mode, for a long enough time are true only in the context of the current rate of consumption, which is primarily in rich countries with more or less stabilised energy supply needs. They are not true in the context of the rapidly growing energy needs of countries in the developing world. A closed fuel cycle involving reprocessing is thus a key necessity. Concerns on ENR technologies arise because they handle large quantities of weapon usable material in loose form. To meet the needs of the energy-hungry world and make the energy benefits more widely accessible, such technologies should be in responsible hands and technological solutions worked out to minimise the proliferation concerns. Simply depending on inspection and policing regimes and placing additional restrictions on ENR technologies, though necessary, could in fact jeopardise the larger contribution of nuclear energy to sustainable development and bring the climate change-related threat closer. We need to realise that restricting access to fuller carbon-free nuclear energy potential could present far greater risks to humankind eventually.

    During the Bush regime, restrictions were sought to be placed on transfer of ENR technologies to countries that do not have them already. This would have limited the spread of these sensitive technologies, with India remaining eligible for their transfers, as we already have our own technology in this area. The latest NSG decision has changed the logic completely: it essentially targets India as we are the only country outside the NPT eligible for nuclear transfers.

    For us, a closed fuel cycle involving reprocessing of uranium and thorium has been an integral part of our policy from the beginning of our nuclear energy programme. While our interest in thorium arises primarily due to the huge energy potential that thorium provides for us, it is now becoming increasingly clear that the thorium fuel cycle also offers several advantages with respect to proliferation resistance. Since thorium by itself does not have a fissile component, it needs initial fissile inputs. Enriched uranium with thorium makes for an efficient fuel that could produce as much energy from mined uranium and leads to used fuel that can be recycled with a much-reduced proliferation risk. Uranium enrichment has thus a special significance in the context of the thorium-based proliferation-resistant fuel cycle as well. Given the present comprehensive capability and the rapid pace towards reaching the full objectives of the three-stage programme, Indian developmental efforts could well be a part of the solution the world is so desperately seeking. While we have a well-defined programme ahead of us for setting up reactors as well as fuel cycle facilities to support a growing power programme, progressively these technologies would evolve towards large-scale thorium utilisation. This programme being somewhat unique would anyway have to be evolved by us on our own. However, the inherent proliferation-resistant features of thorium that are of wider interest should have led to greater interest in collaboration with India. That somehow does not seem to be the case, at least for the present.

    There is also a question of supply of other hardware and equipment not specifically concerning ENR technologies to enrichment and reprocessing plants that India might set up under IAEA safeguards. Clearly, there could be a number of alternative approaches to configuring such plants. Denial of a specific hardware or equipment cannot be allowed to jeopardise a mutually satisfactory resolution between the IAEA and India to ensure the safeguardability of such plants.

    We live in an interdependent world where the terms of engagement depend upon how strong and capable you are. We have an ongoing mission to expand the share of nuclear energy in our energy mix to meet our rapidly growing energy needs and to reduce carbon intensity in our energy production. With the framework for international civil nuclear cooperation and the key provisions that are already in place, we can accelerate that process keeping our strategic interests intact. We however need to exercise caution and due diligence at every specific step as we negotiate the establishment of nuclear power plants with France, Russia, the U.S., and possibly others and as we do so, also press for adherence to the letter and spirit of our understandings.

    There is also the question of NSG membership in the air. It would be strange if India were to become a member of a group that denies us cooperation on the basis of the NPT.

    (Dr Anil Kakodkar, an eminent nuclear scientist, is a former Chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission. He was a key negotiator of the Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear deal.)
     
  3. olivers

    olivers Regular Member

    Joined:
    Mar 25, 2010
    Messages:
    123
    Likes Received:
    91
    Frontline article is August the last of the series and it's still the last word from Anil Kakodkar. I will take his word over the three cover-up articles in Times of India. It's clear it's a cover up by just reading all three and taking note of tone change.
     
    Last edited: May 17, 2012
  4. olivers

    olivers Regular Member

    Joined:
    Mar 25, 2010
    Messages:
    123
    Likes Received:
    91
    Further proof of ENR problems

    India and Russia to discuss comprehensive economic pact
    posted 17-December-2011

    The Hindu, India

    India and Russia to discuss comprehensive economic pact

    By Sandeep Dikshit

    ‘Aiming for a common Eurasian market’

    16 December 2011

    India and Russia will add another facet to their bilateral relationship by holding talks on a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), an omnibus free trade agreement, during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s confabulations with the top Russian leadership here on Friday.

    India and Russia have very close ties in defence, science & technology, nuclear and space sectors but have been trying to plug the gap of low bilateral trade for a number of years with modest success. “We are ultimately looking at a common Eurasian market,” said government sources while referring to Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s vision of having a customs union with several republics of the former Soviet Union.

    “With Russia, most of the issues relating to CEPA have been sorted out. But we have to now see how this fits in with the Russia plan of customs union.”

    For India, tailoring the CEPA to fit in with Russia’s customs union with Kazakhstan, by far the largest Central Asian country, and Byelorussia will help enlarge the market for Indian entrepreneurs.

    The sources said the summit meeting between Dr. Singh and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev will address the deadlock in talks on Kudankulam 3 and 4 civil nuclear reactors by declaring their broad concurrence to all the terms and conditions but a signing ceremony is not on the cards. A joint statement to be issued after the summit meeting is slated to take the civil nuclear partnership between the two countries a step forward. On the Russian offer to host an Indian enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) plant on its soil and offer shares to New Delhi does not seem to have found favour as yet with South Block. In a move that began in the G-8, the Nuclear Suppliers Group has tightened rules for transfer of ENR equipment and technology. India terms this unfair because the exemption given by NSG, it says, was for the full fuel cycle of which ENR is a part. Caught between the need to honour their commitment to India and the need to comply with the decision taken by the civil nuclear cartel, Moscow sought to find a middle path by suggesting that the plant be set up in Russia. “We are still talking. We haven’t reached closure. Russia has international obligations to which they would be sensitive. We already have the full fuel cycle [and are in no hurry]. So let us see how to cooperate,’’ said the government sources.


    The sources said one of India’s major defence acquisition in terms of technology and ability to strike fear in the adversary – the Nerpa nuclear-powered submarine – will be leased by the end of next month. Unlike a diesel submarine, the nuclear powered version does not have to intermittently come up for air to recharge its batteries, and can thus lurk beneath the waves for indefinite periods giving no clue about its location.

    Hydrocarbons will be another focus area where India has been trying to close several exploration deals without much success. After demurring for years when the offer was made on a platter, India has now evinced interest in the blocks off Yamal Peninsula. It is also keen on a stake in Sakhalin-III and the Trebs and Titov gas fields.
     
    HariPrasad-1 likes this.
  5. olivers

    olivers Regular Member

    Joined:
    Mar 25, 2010
    Messages:
    123
    Likes Received:
    91
    NSG norms make Russia rethink N-plant in India
    Sachin Parashar, TNN Nov 3, 2011, 03.05AM IST


    Tags:
    Russia wary of ENR transfer to India|Nuclear Suppliers' Group|NPT|Minister Manmohan|ENR transfer
    NEW DELHI: Even as India continues to negotiate ENR transfer with Russia without any result, Russia is insisting that New Delhi and Moscow jointly set up a reprocessing plant on Russian soil.

    Diplomatic sources told TOI that the proposal had been first made to India last year, but it has assumed more significance after the fresh Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) guidelines that seek to ban transfer of such technology to any non-NPT signatory.


    "This proposal was there earlier too but the Russian side has now taken it up actively saying that the this way Russia can take care of both its international obligations and bilateral commitments in the civil nuclear deal with India. The plant will function in keeping with all international guidelines," said a source. He, however, clarified that the negotiations for a separate ENR transfer agreement will go on even though there is hardly any progress.

    After signing the civil nuclear pact, India has been negotiating with Moscow for a separate agreement to facilitate transfer of ENR. The contentious new NSG guidelines, however, have come as a setback.

    Even though Russian has officially maintained that the new guidelines will have no impact on these negotiations, they have also said that any commitment made to India will be in keeping with Russia's international obligations, internal laws and its bilateral agreement.

    Russian officials had maintained until last year that Russia was looking at establishing a reprocessing plant in India, but the fresh emphasis on building it there suggests that Moscow is wary of NSG guidelines.

    Earlier, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh himself had said the nuclear deal with Russia is crucial because it goes beyond supply of reactors "to areas of research and development and a whole range of areas in nuclear energy". Along with the US and France, Russia is India's most significant nuclear partner.
     
  6. olivers

    olivers Regular Member

    Joined:
    Mar 25, 2010
    Messages:
    123
    Likes Received:
    91
    French fighter jets for ENR technology.

    Nothing after this came out in the press from the French. It's probably part of the aircraft deal + another 6 submarines we want. This is the secret agreement which Anil Kakodkar was referring to. So the hopeful can hope. Even there there is this tiny matter of internal laws of France. I will believe it when I see a French plant being built on Indian soil or a Russian plant on Indian soil. So much for noo-clear deal. It was a collosal failure or the gubmint sold us off. Choose your pick. So we should test our weapons soon. It makes no sense to have this deal. We will get another 10 years down the line. Shows how spineless we are or rather the gubmint is. Plan a series of tests in full view of satellites and watch the fun.

    Challenges ahead for India's nuclear diplomacy

    SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN
    SHARE · COMMENT (10) · PRINT · T+

    Indian officials will have taken heart from French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe’s (left) public articulation in a recent interview that Paris did not consider itself bound by the new guidelines when it came to nuclear commerce with India. Photo: AFP
    Nullifying the effect of the Nuclear Suppliers Group's ban on enrichment and reprocessing exports will require diplomatic finesse and commercial hardball.

    After the diplomatic successes of 2008, when the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) exempted India from the cartel's ban on atomic sales to countries that have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or placed all their nuclear facilities under international safeguards, 2011 has not been a very good year at all.

    Negotiations with the Japanese on a nuclear agreement have run aground, India's liability law is being unfairly attacked by its potential partners and, of course, the 46-nation NSG adopted new guidelines for the export of sensitive nuclear technology this June — Including enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) equipment and technology — that made the sale of these items conditional on the recipient state fulfilling a number of “objective” and “subjective” conditions. The first of these conditions, namely NPT membership and full-scope safeguards, were specifically designed to dilute the 2008 waiver India received and were not needed to ban ENR sales to any of the other three countries outside the NPT (Pakistan, Israel and North Korea) since the NSG's original guidelines — with their catch-all NPT conditionality for the export of any kind of nuclear equipment — continue to apply to them.

    Though Washington denies targeting New Delhi and says it has been working to restrict the sale of ENR equipment and technology for many years now, the new guidelines' redundant reference to the NPT was introduced in order to fulfil an assurance that Condoleezza Rice, who was U.S. Secretary of State at the time, gave Capitol Hill in 2008. Some Congressmen feared other nuclear suppliers would steal a march on the United States by offering India technologies the U.S. wouldn't. To allay their concerns, the U.S. administration said it would ensure an NSG-level ban on sensitive nuclear technology exports to India. A draft was circulated in November that year and finally approved in June 2011.

    THE HINDU'S REPORT

    The fact that India failed to prevent the adoption of the new guidelines despite knowing they were in the pipeline for more than two years suggests a certain complacency on the Manmohan Singh government's part. We know from WikiLeaks cables that the issue was dutifully raised by Indian diplomats in many of their meetings with U.S. officials. But never was the proposed ENR ban projected by the government as an attempt by Washington to unilaterally rewrite the terms of the nuclear bargain it had struck with India.

    When The Hindu broke the story about the G-8 deciding to implement such a ban in 2009 pending its adoption by the full NSG, senior Indian ministers took the view that this did not matter. It was only when the Nuclear Suppliers Group finally adopted the new guidelines this June that South Block decided to put on its punching gloves.

    The fact is that the NSG's 2008 decision to lift its embargo on India was not some kind of unilateral concession. It was part of a complex bargain involving reciprocal commitments by both sides. If the supplier nations agreed to drop their insistence on the NPT and full-scope safeguards and open the door to full civil nuclear cooperation with India, India committed itself to fulfilling several onerous steps, including the difficult and costly separation of its civilian and military nuclear programmes, the placing of its civilian facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, the signing of an Additional Protocol, as well as extending support to a number of nonproliferation and disarmament-related initiatives at the global level. At a fundamental level, the logic of this bargain hinged on two components. First, the NSG was making a judgment about India's status as a responsible country with advanced nuclear capabilities. Second, the NSG and India were acting on the basis of reciprocity.

    INDIA'S EXPECTATIONS

    Though Indian officials made their anger known almost immediately in off the record briefings, External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna finally provided the government's formal response to the new NSG guidelines in a suo moto statement to Parliament in August. Noting the concerns that had been raised by MPs, he made the following “clarifications”: (1) The basis of India's international civil nuclear cooperation remains the special exemption from the NSG guidelines given on September 6, 2008 “which contain reciprocal commitments and actions by both sides.” (2) That exemption accorded “a special status to India” and “was granted knowing full well that India is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.” Pursuant to the “clean” exemption, “NSG members had agreed to transfer all technologies which are consistent with their national law” including technologies connected with the nuclear fuel cycle.

    Mr. Krishna said the only outstanding issue is the “full implementation” of the September 2008 understanding. “This is what we expect and our major partners are committed to.” This understanding contained commitments on both sides. “We expect all NSG members to honour their commitments as reflected in the 2008 NSG Statement and our bilateral cooperation agreements.”

    The Minister then noted the statements made by the U.S., France and Russia following the NSG's June 2011 meeting in which each country tried to assure India that the new guidelines would not “detract” from or “affect” the original waiver granted in September 2008. Stating that not every NSG member has the ability to transfer ENR items to other countries, Mr. Krishna added: “We expect that those that do and have committed to do so in bilateral agreements with India, will live up to their legal commitments.” He also held out a carrot — the huge expansion planned for India's civil nuclear industry — and repeated once again in that context that “we expect that our international partners will fully honour their commitments in this regard.”

    FRENCH EXAMPLE

    While the three big nuclear suppliers have all said the new guidelines do not “detract” from the grand bargain of 2008, South Block should not set much store by these assurances. The fact is that there has been a setback and a diplomatic effort is needed to recover lost ground and ensure that India is excluded from the purview of the new ENR restrictions imposed by the NSG.

    The one supplier that has been the most forthcoming so far is France. Indian officials will have taken heart from French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe's public articulation in an interview in Delhi last month that France did not consider itself bound by the new guidelines when it came to nuclear commerce with India. The Minister confirmed that notwithstanding the NSG rules, Paris remained free to sell ENR items and technology in a manner consistent with its national law and its bilateral agreement. French diplomatic sources also told this writer that the French delegation at the NSG meeting in June had entered a verbal reservation to the new ENR guidelines questioning their applicability to India. The French intervention was not challenged and was duly recorded in the minutes, the sources said.

    Of course, the challenge for India will be to hold the French to their word, as and when the requirement for cooperation in the ENR field is required. Though India has its own capabilities in these fields, there is no reason why it should not seek access to the best international components and equipment for the new reprocessing plant it has committed to build. With both France and Russia, India must make it clear that the multibillion dollar contracts which are on the anvil for the purchase of new reactors will also depend on Paris and Moscow's willingness to follow through on their promises and commitments on full civil nuclear cooperation. The U.S. has not so far committed itself to sell ENR equipment to India. New Delhi can live with that. But not with American efforts to block others from cooperating with it
    .
     
    Last edited: May 18, 2012
  7. sukhish

    sukhish Senior Member Senior Member

    Joined:
    Dec 30, 2009
    Messages:
    1,321
    Likes Received:
    310
    read the offcial iaea letter below
    http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Doc...nfcirc734c.pdf.

    also read the article below. this was published right after the ENR restrictions for NON NPT.
    Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology, NSG and India | Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

    what you have shown are just articles and some one assemment. ENR is very much part of the nuclear deal as it is mentioned in the
    NSG communiqe to IAEA. india GOI is not obthered about russia dilly dallying. anyways russians have not officialy stated about ENR being not for India.

    I know for a fact that french FM juppe said ENR will be as per 2008 NSG accord and also the above article precisely mentiones just that.
     
  8. olivers

    olivers Regular Member

    Joined:
    Mar 25, 2010
    Messages:
    123
    Likes Received:
    91
    So we delay French plants as well. ENR and particularly reprocessing in India for FBR isn't up yet. You can continue to hope. NSG rules have changed. I don't see it that way. Thanks. 2008 and 2011 are different. There is no exception made for India in 2011 as was required. Only a verbal French interjection. So let's see. As of now no ENR is what we are seeing. It's real. Even the French hyperbole is attacked by Anil Kakodkar. All the articles are repetition of hyperboles. Nothing concrete. So the French plants are not coming up as well. It's a last ditch attempt at forcing ENR for new plants. Let's see if it works. Either Anil Kakodkar was lying in June, July August 2011 or the GOI was lying. If Anil Kakodkar was lying then did he also lie about the nuclear bombs being 100% successful? So is it a cover up. It seems from all evidence to be so. The article just after NSG statement is also over taken by events from Russia as pointed out and the French hyperbole as pointed out.

    These hyperboles were much much later in August. So there is no clear intention on anyones part to give us ENR if they can get away with it. The NSG rule was for India. Read the hindu article posted. It clearly states that the US was upset that India will get better terms from French and Russia and pushed the ENR through NSG. This was done in 2009 itself and was in the works. Also notice it states, G8 passed this resolution before NSG did.

    Please also read the French and Russian statements before and after the 2011 NSG change. It's light and day. French in 2010 said we will build ENR plants in India. Similar statment from Russia. Now we will abide by the bilateral agreement.
    I am done with the arguments on this one word. Hope.[/B
     
    Last edited: May 18, 2012
  9. olivers

    olivers Regular Member

    Joined:
    Mar 25, 2010
    Messages:
    123
    Likes Received:
    91
    Enrichment, reprocessing tech not part of Indo-French deal
    TNN Sep 19, 2008, 12.32am IST


    NEW DELHI: The India-France nuclear agreement does not touch upon the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to India. This puts it on par with the US agreement.

    French ambassador to India Jerome Bonnafont told a TV channel that the India-French nuclear agreement was ready for signing. Like the 123 agreement, the French agreement too gives India the right to negotiate a separate reprocessing agreement with them. Meanwhile, again like the US, France would allow India to reprocess spent fuel, provided it is under IAEA safeguards in the dedicated reprocessing facility that India has committed to build.


    Certainly, it's a blow to all those who trumpeted that if the US wasn't prepared to give things, let's go to the French.

    Here's the deal: the Hyde Act allows India to access enrichment and reprocessing technology for use under three conditions — in a bilateral or multilateral facility, for a proliferation-free fuel supply system and if the US president certified that India would only use it for peaceful purposes.

    According to Section 129 of the US Atomic Energy Act, India would be able to conclude a separate reprocessing technology agreement with the US to access such technology. With France, a similar agreement would have to be worked out. Talking to journalists a few days ago, Bonnafont said, "France will examine India's request for reprocessing."

    The French agreement, like that with the US, is a "political framework agreement". French officials said the agreement would be based on France's relations with India, IAEA and non-proliferation norms. In fact, in the covering note to the India-specific safeguards agreement, IAEA director general Mohammed ElBaradei said clearly that India would have to negotiate a separate agreement for enrichment if it wanted to do so later.

    What do all of these mean? Simply, that the present nuclear agreements between India and other countries will stick to the rules of reactor sales. Bonnafont said the reactors would come with a lifetime supply of fuel. "The logic of the system is that when you give a reactor, you give fuel... there will be fuel supply guarantees to India," Bonnafont had said earlier. This is a definite step forward from the American position that said "fuel supply assurances" were not "legally binding" but a mere "political commitment". Indian officials, furious with the US formulation, said India would go by the 123 agreement.

    When India was negotiating the 123 agreement with the US, its top priority was to get reprocessing rights for the spent fuel. India already possesses reprocessing technology and the negotiating deadlock was broken only after India promised to build a fully dedicated reprocessing facility under IAEA safeguards to reprocess the civilian sector fuel.

    India, however, still wants access to ENR technology because its own homegrown technology cannot scale up to massive commercial proportions.
     
  10. olivers

    olivers Regular Member

    Joined:
    Mar 25, 2010
    Messages:
    123
    Likes Received:
    91
    Earlier Russian position.

    Russia to share ENR technology
    AGENCIES Jun 8, 2010, 04.55pm IST


    Tags:
    nuclear fuel|
    ENR technology

    MOSCOW: Russia today said it will share the enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology with India for production of nuclear fuel for atomic power plants in the country.

    "We plan to set up joint facilities for enrichment and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel in India and some European countries. In China we already have such facility," Sergei Kiriyenko, the chief of Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation, said at the 3-day Atomexpo-2010 international forum.



    Russia is completing two nuclear reactors at Kudankulam NPP in Tamil Nadu and is to build six more, including in Haripur in West Bengal.

    Kiriyenko also invited the countries involved in developing atomic energy to invest in nuclear fuel joint ventures on the Russian soil to ensure sustained fuel supplies for their power plants.

    At its today's session chaired by Anil Kakodkar, former chief of India's Atomic Energy Commission, Kiriyenko said Russia is also creating a buffer stock of nuclear fuel, which will be under the control of International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEA) to guarantee the smooth functioning of nuclear reactors in any part of the world in case of political and market constraints.

    At the start of his speech, Kiriyenko greeted Kakodkar as the "world's one of the most outstanding" nuclear scientists, who has made immense contribution to the development of atomic energy.
     
  11. olivers

    olivers Regular Member

    Joined:
    Mar 25, 2010
    Messages:
    123
    Likes Received:
    91
    Read the 2008 Times of India article on ENR being not part of the Agreement with this statement. Hyperbole. So keep hoping.

    AsianScientist (Nov. 30, 2011) – France will provide sensitive enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies to India despite recent guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) stipulating that only those nations which are signatories to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) can obtain this technology.

    India has refused to sign the Treaty saying that it was discriminatory.

    This assurance came from none other than the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of France, Bernard Bigot, during a media session on Monday evening.

    His statement assumes significance in the context of India securing a “clean waiver” in September 2008 from the 46-member NSG to enter into nuclear commerce with various countries, despite the fact that India is not a part of the NPT regime.

    However, following the “clean waiver,” the NSG declared that only those nations which have signed the NPT will be entitled to ENR. This new rule came in for scathing attack from India’s nuclear fraternity, including former chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, Anil Kakodkar.

    “We are committed to the intergovernmental agreement between India and France. We will stand by the NSG exception to India and we have accepted that India will not sign the NPT,” said Bigot.

    About Japan hesitating to supply a critical component for the European Pressurized Reactors (EPR) to be built by the French firm Areva at Jaitapur in Maharashtra, Bigot said that an agreement has to be reached between India and Japan on this issue.

    “I was in Japan recently and the officials said that they were willing to discuss the issue with India,” he said, referring to Japan’s earlier reluctance to cooperate because India is not a NPT signatory.

    He added that if the component cannot be obtained from Japan, France will source it elsewhere, noting that the component would be less costly in Japan.

    Bigot revealed that an interim report released by the French nuclear safety regulatory authorities on November 10 called for no changes in the design of the EPRs, in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear accident.

    “They are absolutely safe and can withstand extreme stress,” he said.
     
  12. olivers

    olivers Regular Member

    Joined:
    Mar 25, 2010
    Messages:
    123
    Likes Received:
    91
    The IAEA letter is not an NSG waiver it's just information to IAEA. Look at the third page a) of the IAEA letter which also has provisos to guidelines which then link to other rules preventing transfers which are against international rules. IAEA letter has no locus standing on ENR transfers. It is just a monitoring mechanism. Confusing a legal instrument for establishing monitoring with a legal instrument with an obligation to transfer ENR is the worst argument.

    No lawyers were obviously involved in these drafts from the Indian side. You see the results for India. I am stopping here. No more rational arguments possible in this case. It's already gone beyond what I bargained for. Hope.
     
    Last edited: May 18, 2012
  13. sukhish

    sukhish Senior Member Senior Member

    Joined:
    Dec 30, 2009
    Messages:
    1,321
    Likes Received:
    310
    olivers,
    the NSG comminuque to the IAEA was according to the 2008 NSG agreement to India.
     
  14. sukhish

    sukhish Senior Member Senior Member

    Joined:
    Dec 30, 2009
    Messages:
    1,321
    Likes Received:
    310

    Please see the text of the NSG waiver below, please see the items 3 (a), (b), (c) , (d), it clearly sates about the ENR technologies. the letter to the IAEA by the NSG was to notify the IAEA as to what would be allowed to India as per the NSG guidelines. when India got the waiver as you can see it clearly involved the ENR technologies under IAEA safeguards. later in 2011 the NSG included NPT conditions to the ENR technologies. But that document is not India specific. India specfic document in the one below. I don't know what it would take for you to visulaize that India NSG agreement is different than that of the general NSG guildelines. tell me one thing, does it mean that the NSG conditions prior to 2008 apply to Inida. no they don't, but they do apply to other countries. in a simlar way 2011 NSG guidelines regarding NON NPT ENR condition does not apply to india , why because india already got the ENR techology waiver in 2008 as can be seen below.

    INFCIRC/254/Rev. 9/Part 1 paragraph 6 and 7 details the ENR technologies. these paragraphs were changed to include the NPT requirement in 2011, but that condition was not there in 2008 when india got the waiver. which means India gets ENR technologies as per 2008 agreement. do a google on INFCIRC/254/Rev. 9/Part 1 paragraph 6 and 7 and you will what they are.




    Text of the India-related waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG)

    Posted on September 8, 2008



    NSG Rule-Change Allowing Civil Nuclear Cooperation With India



    1. At the Plenary meeting on September 6, 2008, the Participating Governments of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group decided that they:

    a. Desire to contribute to the effectiveness and integrity of the global non-proliferation regime, and to the widest possible implementation of the provisions and objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

    b. Seek to avert the further spread of nuclear weapons;

    c. Wish to pursue mechanisms to affect positively the non-proliferation commitments and actions of all states;

    d. Seek to promote fundamental principles of safeguards and export controls for nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes; and

    e. Note the energy needs of India.

    2. Participating Governments have taken note of the steps that India has voluntarily taken with respect to the following commitments and actions:

    a. Deciding to separate civilian nuclear facilities in a phased manner and to file a declaration regarding its civilian nuclear facilities with IAEA, in accordance with its Separation Plan (circulated as INFCIRC/731);

    b. Concluding negotiations with the IAEA and obtaining approval by the Board of Governors on August 1, 2008, for an “Agreement between the Government of India and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities,” in accordance with IAEA safeguards, principles, and practices (including IAEA Board of Bovernors Document GOV/1621);

    c. Committing to sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol with respect to India’s civil nuclear facilities;

    d. Refraining from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and supporting international efforts to limit their spread;

    e. Instituting a national export control system capable of effectively controlling transfers of multilaterally controlled nuclear and nuclear-related material, equipment and technology;

    f. Harmonizing its export control lists and guidelines with those of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group and committing to adhere to the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group guidelines; and

    g. Continuing its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, and its readiness to work with others towards the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

    3. Based on the commitments and actions mentioned above, as reiterated by India on September 5, 2008, and without prejudice to national positions thereon, Participating Governments have adopted and will implement the following policies on civil nuclear cooperation with IAEA-safeguarded Indian civil nuclear program:

    a. Notwithstanding paragraphs 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c) of INFCIRC/254/Rev. 9/Part 1, Participating Governments may transfer trigger list items and/or related technology to India for peaceful purposes and for use in IAEA-safeguarded civil nuclear facilities, provided that the transfer satisfies all other provisions of INFCIRC/254/Part 1, as revised, and provided that transfers of sensitive exports remain subject to paragraphs 6 and 7 of Guidelines.

    b. Notwithstanding paragraphs 4(a) and 4(b) of INFCIRC/254/Rev .7/Part 2, Participating Government may transfer nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials, software, and related technology to India for peaceful purposes and for use in IAEA-safeguarded civil nuclear facilities, provided that the transfer satisfies all other provisions of INFCIRC/254/Part 2, as revised.

    c. At each Plenary, Participating Governments shall notify each other of approved transfers to India of Annexure A and B items listed in INFCIRC/254/Part 1, as revised. Participating Governments are also invited to exchange information, including about their own bilateral agreements with India.

    d. With a view to intensification of dialogue and cooperation with India, the Chairman is requested to confer and consult with India and keep the Plenary informed of these consultations.

    e. Participating Governments will maintain contact and consult through regular channels, including the Consultative Group and Plenary, for the purpose of considering matters connected with the implementation of all aspects of this Statement, taking into account relevant international commitments or bilateral agreements with India. In the event that one or more Participating Governments consider that circumstances have arisen which require consultations, Participating Governments will meet, and then act in accordance with Paragraph 16 of the Guidelines.

    4. In order to facilitate India’s adherence to INFCIRC/254/Parts 1 and 2 and to remain current in its implementations of the Guidelines, the NSG Chair is requested to consult with India regarding changes to and implementation of the Guidelines and inform the Plenary of the outcome of the dialogue with India. Consultations with India regarding proposed amendments will facilitate their effective implementation by India.

    5. Upon request by Participating Governments, the Chairman is requested to submit this Statement to IAEA Director General with a request that it be circulated to all Member States.
     
    Last edited: May 18, 2012
  15. olivers

    olivers Regular Member

    Joined:
    Mar 25, 2010
    Messages:
    123
    Likes Received:
    91
    Let me point out the legal interpretation of the monitoring agreement as well. Other than the fact that it serves a notice to a monitoring agency and has no impact on transaction of business by NSG.

    Look at Page 3, look at the provisos.

    [​IMG]

    The provisos lead to Paragraph 6 and 7. Look at the earlier interpretation and the US arm twisting of France and Russia in the article posted below. I can't spend too much time on this so I have posted the articles as is. It's my job to read scientific and legal documents and I am not a bad at it. So legally Indian position is quiet weak. We have nothing in writing. Even the old version required countries to exercise restraint. France and Russia had internal laws on "exercising restraint". This was expanded to an international commitment in G8 even before the NSG. This was binding on both these countries. In addition they have the NSG. Now they can cite any of these and reject ENR. They are doing it. If all of them don't give you have no option. When everyone was ready you should have squeezed them. So failure of policy.

    So the real import is no ENR and unkil is preventing others from transferring ENR. Read the US statement on this. Crystal clear even the 2008 waiver was subject to not exporting ENR. We only made the position which was applicable through internal laws of France, US, Russia and G8 commitment which predated 2008 agreement which did not exempt India from ENR official. In other words in 2008 we did not give ENR technology transfer waiver. Arun shorie was making this point in 2008 as well. No one listened to him. Anil Kakodkar joined him in 2011 and yet no one listens. So It's all just hope.

    I have tried my best given my lack of time to get this across. It's a complex issue and reading provisos is a matter of legal interpretation. The American position is clear. The Indian position unfortunately is lacking in candor. The Indian way is to bury and hope the government isn't blamed. The shit hit the fan in 2011. The biggest achievement of a government being a colossal failure is not easy to digest. So it's being buried. They also indulged in horsetrading to get this through. So it's big prestige issue. It's a cover-up. You can still believe what you want to. I can't change anyone position. My position is supported by 90% of documents from within India and without. The only statements against mine are from the Government of India. I don't buy their cover-up sorry. All the rest are hyperboles used to prop up the argument from the foreign powers to get nuclear reactors into India and not lose out. That means they will not transfer ENR. But to save your government embarrassment we will stick to the agreement is intact hyperbole. It's not changed. There was never any ENR transfer even in 2008.It won't be a lie because you never were entitled to ENR is the French and Russian position as required by US. US did that to us. I am all done.

    Let's grow some balls and test some nukes. ENR will be the first thing provided. We are not getting any help so let's blast our way into the order.


    NSG Revises Rules on Sensitive Exports
    Latest ACA Resources

    India
    Australia Allows Uranium Sales to India
    (January/February 2012)
    India Extending Missile Reach
    (January/February 2012)

    Nuclear Suppliers Group
    NSG Revises Rules on Sensitive Exports
    (July/August 2011)
    New Nuclear Suppliers Rules a Net Plus
    (July/August 2011)

    The following is an early version of a story that appears in the July/August issue of Arms Control Today.

    Originally posted June 27, 2011

    Updated July 5, 2011

    Seven years after they started discussions on the issue and two and a half years after they formulated a “clean text,” the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) agreed in June on revised guidelines for exports relating to uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing.

    At issue were paragraphs 6 and 7 of the NSG guidelines. The old version of paragraph 6 said that suppliers should “exercise restraint” in exports of sensitive technology. The new paragraph 6 essentially retains that language, but specifies a list of criteria to be considered. The new paragraph 7, which deals with “pecial arrangements for export of enrichment facilities, equipment and technology,” adds details on restrictions on sharing such technology.

    A June 24 NSG press release issued at the end of the group’s annual plenary meeting in Noordwijk, the Netherlands, said only that the group had “agreed to strengthen its guidelines on the transfer of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies.” The NSG did not release the text of the new guidelines, but a copy was obtained by Arms Control Today.

    The NSG is not a formal organization, and its guidelines are not legally binding.

    The main change from the previous guidelines is the addition of the list, known as “objective criteria.” Among other requirements, potential recipients of sensitive technology must be parties to and “in full compliance” with the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and they must be adhering to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards requirements.

    Focus on Additional Protocol

    In a separate section, the text says that suppliers should authorize enrichment and reprocessing exports only if the recipient has brought into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol or, “pending this, [the recipient] is implementing appropriate safeguards agreements in cooperation with the IAEA, including a regional accounting and control arrangement for nuclear materials, as approved by the IAEA Board of Governors.” In a June 27 interview, a U.S. official said one significant aspect of the new guidelines is the reference to an additional protocol as a condition of supply.

    The language on “a regional accounting and control arrangement” is a clear reference to the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). Argentina and Brazil have not signed an additional protocol, which would give IAEA inspectors greater latitude to carry out their inspections in those countries, including the right to inspect any undeclared facilities. The NSG language would make Argentina and Brazil eligible to receive sensitive exports without having an additional protocol in force.

    Since the appearance of the November 2008 “clean” draft text, critics have said the group’s concession on this point is a major flaw in the NSG’s approach because the ABACC arrangements do not provide the level of assurance about the countries’ nuclear programs that an additional protocol would.

    In a June 30 interview, a Brazilian official said the Quadripartite Agreement among Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the IAEA furnishes a “more than sufficient guarantee” of the peaceful nature of the two countries’ nuclear programs. It “add value” to INFCIRC/153, the standard safeguards agreement that the IAEA signs with NPT non-nuclear-weapon states, in part because it provides for the application of safeguards by ABACC as well as the IAEA, he said.

    Compared to comprehensive safeguards agreements, it furnishes “an amount of information and mutual confidence that is superior,” he said. Additional protocols are not a legal requirement under the NPT or the IAEA, and that point has been recognized in all relevant forums, including the NSG, he said.

    Brazil’s 2008 National Defense Strategy was “very clear” that the country would not adhere to new safeguards commitments until the nuclear-weapon states made significant progress toward fulfilling their disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT, he said.

    Asked if the “pending this” language in the new guidelines suggested that the Quadripartite Agreement eventually would be supplemented by an additional protocol, the official said, “We do not see an obligation deriving from this [language].” Citing the NPT and IAEA resolutions, he said it is the “sovereign decision of any country” to conclude an additional protocol.

    The U.S. official said the language “was a way of saying that the NSG would continue to review the situation with respect to the status of adherence to the additional protocol.”

    ‘General’ Subjective Criteria

    The proposed November 2008 version of the NSG guidelines also included so-called subjective criteria: “[w]hether the recipient has a credible and coherent rationale for pursuing enrichment and reprocessing capability in support of civil nuclear power generation programmes,” “[w]hether the transfer would have a negative impact on the stability and security of the recipient state,” and “[g]eneral conditions of stability and security.”

    The new text dispenses with that list. Instead, it invokes other sections of the guidelines that give suppliers broad authority to ensure that their exports do not contribute to proliferation. It also adds language saying that suppliers should “tak[e] into account at their national discretion, any relevant factors as may be applicable.”

    The U.S. official said the section retains the concept of subjective criteria, but “has been written in a much more general manner.”

    The guidelines also contain new language at the beginning of paragraph 7, saying in part, “All States that meet the criteria in paragraph 6 above are eligible for transfers of enrichment facilities, equipment and technology.”

    According to the U.S. official, being “eligible” to receive enrichment and reprocessing exports does not equate to a “right” to receive them. A key point of the new guidelines is that “the suppliers as a group were concerned with more than a specific list,” he said.

    However, in additional new language at the beginning of paragraph 7, the guidelines say that “uppliers recognize that the application of the Special Arrangements [on enrichment-related exports] below must be consistent with NPT principles, in particular Article IV. Any application by the suppliers of the following Special Arrangements may not abrogate the rights of States meeting the criteria in paragraph 6.”

    Article IV of the NPT establishes an “inalienable right” of treaty parties to pursue peaceful nuclear programs.

    The section on enrichment-related transfers requires that they be under so-called black box conditions that seek to prevent the technology from being replicated. There is a limited exception to allow cooperation on development of potential new enrichment technologies, but the restrictions would apply once the technology was commercialized.

    As the U.S. official noted, black-box requirements are now a global industry standard and are being applied to two enrichment plants in the United States. He said “enshrin[ing]” industry practice in the NSG guidelines is “a very useful thing to do.”

    Effect on India

    In September 2008, the NSG made an exception for India from the group’s general requirement for so-called full-scope safeguards, the requirement that recipients of exports open all their nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection. In the run-up to the announcement on the revised guidelines on enrichment and reprocessing, a key question was whether India would be exempted from the new restrictions as well.

    Even before the NSG or the United States announced the agreement on the new guidelines, the U.S. Department of State’s press office issued a statement saying that the Obama administration “fully supports” the “clean” NSG exception for India and “speedy implementation” of the U.S.-Indian civil nuclear cooperation agreement, which Congress approved in 2008. “Nothing about the new Enrichment and Reprocessing (ENR) transfer restrictions agreed to by NSG members should be construed as detracting from the unique impact and importance of the U.S.-India agreement or our commitment to full civil nuclear cooperation,” the statement said.

    Indian officials and observers often use the term “clean waiver” to suggest that the 2008 NSG decision lifted all the restrictions that previously had been in place on nuclear exports to India. However, the June 23 State Department press release said, “Efforts in the NSG to strengthen controls on the transfers of ENR are consistent with long-standing U.S. policy that pre-dates the Civil Nuclear Agreement and have been reaffirmed on an annual basis by the [Group of Eight industrialized countries] for years.”

    The U.S. official said that NSG members had begun discussing a list of criteria for enrichment- and reprocessing-related exports in 2004 and, by the end of the year, had agreed that NPT membership should be a criterion. The plans for U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation were announced in July 2005. (See ACT, September 2005.)

    The official also noted that the text of the 2008 NSG decision exempts India only from the section of the NSG guidelines dealing with the requirement for full-scope safeguards and specifically says that “transfers of sensitive exports remain subject to paragraphs 6 and 7.”

    In a June 30 interview, a European diplomat agreed that, under the guidelines, India could not receive enrichment and reprocessing technology. India’s Ministry of External Affairs and its embassy in Washington did not respond to requests for comment.


    Indian Membership

    According to the NSG press statement, the members also “continued to consider all aspects of the implementation of the 2008 Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India and discussed the NSG relationship with India.” Last November, President Barack Obama announced his support for Indian membership in the NSG and three other export control regimes. (See ACT, December 2010.)

    India would be the first member of the NSG that is not a party to the NPT. A key criterion for membership in the group is that the country is a party to and complying with the NPT or a nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty.

    A confidential May 23 U.S.-drafted “Food for Thought” paper circulated to NSG members offers two options for bringing India into the group. One would be to revise the admission criteria “in a manner that would accurately describe India’s situation.” The other would be to “recognize” that the criteria, known as “Factors to Be Considered,” are not “mandatory criteria” and that a candidate for membership does not necessarily have to meet all of them.

    At the Noordwijk meeting, the United States “did not ask anybody to take a decision,” the U.S. official said. There was “a good, solid discussion” with expressions of “views on both sides,” he said. According to the official, some delegates were “very concerned about the NPT issue.”

    The United States invited additional comments, with a deadline of Sept. 1, he said. That would allow time to prepare for follow-up discussions on the sidelines of the IAEA general conference later that month and at the meeting of the NSG’s consultative group in October or November, he said. —DANIEL HORNER
     
    Last edited: May 18, 2012
  16. sukhish

    sukhish Senior Member Senior Member

    Joined:
    Dec 30, 2009
    Messages:
    1,321
    Likes Received:
    310
    olivers,
    U.S does not allow ENR to any country because of domestic requirement. but that does not mean france or russia cannot do it. the NSG level restrcition has been waived for india. now India has to enter country specific agreements thats it.

    and as per your text below :
    The official also noted that the text of the 2008 NSG decision exempts India only from the section of the NSG guidelines dealing with the requirement for full-scope safeguards and specifically says that “transfers of sensitive exports remain subject to paragraphs 6 and 7.”

    paragraph 6 and seven 7 were changed in 2011, but India will go by paragraph 6 and 7 as they were in 2008 and not by 2011 paragraph. if that is the case then even full scope safeguards are not valid for india. prior to 2008 full scope safeguards were required for india to begin nuclear trade. does it mean those safe guards requirements are valid for india also. no they do not. in the same way 2011 NPT requirement is not valid for india as paragraph 6 and 7 of 2008 did not have NPT for india. no country has offcially said that ENR is not part of 2008 NSG waiver. what you are refering to in the views of some people.

    how come full scope safe guards are not valid india. they are for all other countrries. NSG still has full scope gaurds requirements for all other countries other than india. just because paragraph 6 and paragraph 7 were changed after 2008 date does not mean they apply for india. since 2008 India NSG agreement is in place, and any change required for india has to be in that, agreement. general guidelines do not apply to india any more. that is the crux of the matter.

    how come NSG is not asking india to have full scope safeguards, they are still part of the NSG guidelines, aren't they ?, these guidelines were change for india in 2008 along the paragraph 6 and 7 relating to ENR. 2011 changed paragraph 6 and 7 do not apply to india, as these are not part of india specific NSG document period.
     
    Last edited: May 18, 2012
  17. sukhish

    sukhish Senior Member Senior Member

    Joined:
    Dec 30, 2009
    Messages:
    1,321
    Likes Received:
    310


    also the IAEA commique fom the NSG was sepcific about India only. this was issued by the NSG to the IAEA so that it can moitor as the NSG guidelines. NSG as such does not have inspection teams. it issues guidelines and communicate those guildlines to IAEA for compliance.

    INFCIRC/734 (Corrected)

    …Participating governments may transfer trigger list items and/or related technology to India for peaceful purposes and for use in IAEA safeguarded civil nuclear facilities, provided that the transfer satisfies all other provisions of INFCIRC/254/Part 1, as revised and provided that the transfers of sensitive export remain subject to paragraphs 6 and 7 of the guidelines.

    paragraph 6) and 7) in 2008 only regulated the the transfer of ENR technologies and did not bar them.


    paragraph 6 ( 2008 ) of the guidelines had stated that:


    Suppliers should exercise restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and material usable for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. If enrichment or reprocessing facilities, equipment or technology are to be transferred, suppliers should encourage recipients to accept, as an alternative to national plants, supplier involvement and/or other appropriate multinational participation in resulting facilities. Suppliers should also promote international (including IAEA) activities concerned with multinational regional fuel cycle centres.

    Similarly, the unamended paragraph 7 noted:


    For a transfer of an enrichment facility, or technology therefor, the recipient nation should agree that neither the transferred facility, nor any facility based on such technology, will be designed or operated for the production of greater than 20% enriched uranium without the consent of the supplier nation, of which the IAEA should be advised.

    it is pretty clear to me that ENR is very much included for india. it's just that india has to negotiate with each individual country , but the blanket NSG restriction is gone. of course these countries will require lucrative contracts to offer these technologies. also rafale selection has nothing to do with ENR technologies. if there were to be a blanket restriction for ENR tech to india. then rafale deal with france would not have altered it. india is simply going with the best and cost effective and proven fighter plane in the market. yes India will also use it's leverage to get ENR from france, and why shouldn't it, since the blanket NSG restriction is not valid anymore for india, and it can enter country specific agreements.

    NO blanket NSG restriction for INDIA as far ENR technologies are concerned. paragraphs 6) and 7) of 2008 allow regulated transfer of ENR tech under IAEA safeguards that's it. INFCIRC/734 (Corrected) communique from NSG to IAEA clealry says that it is only india specific. general guidelines wether they are full scope safeguards or ENR restrictions do not apply to india.
     
    Last edited: May 18, 2012
  18. olivers

    olivers Regular Member

    Joined:
    Mar 25, 2010
    Messages:
    123
    Likes Received:
    91
    In 2008 the French agreement does not have ENR transfer. I posted the link and french ambassadors stating that when we signed the document in 2008. We have the right to re-process. This is all. No transfer is granted. It never was allowed by NSG as per US and is being towed by France and Russia. I am wasting my time here. The agreement is intact. However the agreement is not what you think. This is the legal interpretation. I agree with the American interpretation on this. The Indian legal claim is weak.Take it or leave it. We have been denied ENR. We don't have ENR. Go ahead and please go on. I am done with this. I am not wasting my time any more. I have better work to do. The 2011 just legalized the rules which already existed.

    Law is soft-law or hard-law. International law consists of customs and norms. This is a weaker set that is referred to in 2008. It's now become hard-law. So even though it did not exist as words in 2011 it existed in the legal books of Russia and France. So there is no ENR. You can take it to any international lawyer and get this verified. No point in discussing any more. Read up on International soft law and hard law. How norms become law. How interpretation of legal documents is done. In 2008 France says no ENR when signing document. We can discuss in later document if possible. Russia says the same. No new document is signed for ENR. in 2011 NSG says no ENR without NPT. It's a done deal. Please talk to a good international lawyer. It's a legal argument.

    Your legal argument is Proviso 6 and 7 don't apply. (A flawed legal argument. Excercise restraint means don't transfer. You can give cake but exercise restraint in giving icing. It means don't give icing to a lawyer.) They clearly apply. Assuming even if we go by your interpretation that it does not apply. We can negotiate with France and Russia. We failed to do that in the bilateral agreements as pointed out. The french ambassador said no ENR in 2008. International declarations which are public as opposed to bilateral carry the force of law. Legal 101 in International law. The statement by President sarcozy was bilateral and in a closed room he said I will go public if you want after G8 passed a resolution. We failed to force the president to go public.Non public discussions don't have the force of any law. So no International obligation a per international law. We didn't do anything that after G8 went with the ENR rules. Norm becoming harder law. We don't get any agreement even after this. This means there is no international law applicable here. From 2008 to 2011 we did not get ENR in any agreement in writing from France and Russia. So no International agreement here too. In 2011 the new rule does not except India which it could have. Therefore there is no exemption legally. As per international law. 2011 makes the soft law a hard codified law. This is international law 101.

    So legally the French and Russians will abide by the bilateral agreement which provide for ENR if there is a new agreement. The new agreement is now prohibited by 2011 rule change. We did not have anything in 2008 and failed to get it in the interim. So we don't have any.

    Any new agreement by French and Russian even based on 2008 bilateral agreement of a later agreement will be subject to their law and all obligations under international law. If we had an agreement before then legally we can force them. We just talk of intent to get into a new agreement rather than an agreement. Intent in law is like a proposal to marry. You can revoke it any day. Talk to a lawyer on what intent means and what an obligation means. Obligations are enforceable, intent isn't worth the paper it's written on.

    The only ray of hope and not legal obligations on anyone including France or Russia is us forcing them to give it in return for some other contracts. We only have a private word of a president who is no longer the president of France. No declaration by France. Waste of my legal skills to go on.

    We either did not have an international lawyer in NSG when this was done. Or we sold out to get waiver at all costs.

     
    Last edited: May 18, 2012
  19. olivers

    olivers Regular Member

    Joined:
    Mar 25, 2010
    Messages:
    123
    Likes Received:
    91
    Apart from this. US, France and Russia have consistently acted on this interpretation. They have denied ENR. This indicates a norm being formed right now in International law that this is the interpretation. Russia has offered to base facilities in Russia. This indicates following the letter of the law. France has said we will follow the agreement. They have refused to publicly state we will provide ENR to India. Therefore again norm formation.

    To top it all. Only four countries are non NPT in 2011. 2011 states no transfer of ENR to non NPT countries. India is the only country which can engage in such trade and not sign the NPT. Therefore it's the only country to which this ENR regime applies. Therefore such legislation can target only India as other non NPT Pakistan, North Korea and Israel can't engage in nuclear commerce much less ENR. NK is also NPT but withdrawn from NPT. Legally here also it's India specific action as of 2011.

    This is what arjuna's son got into. He did not know howto get out and died. Same thing was done to India. Norm forming and new cap on ENR. Let's not defend the indefensible. Let's discard the agreement and move forward with a strong India policy. We don't need the deal. It was a trap.

    Note: the previous post has an error in the 2011 date. One of the dates should read 2008.
    So even though it did not exist as words in 2008 it existed in the legal books of Russia and France. So there is no ENR.
     
    Last edited: May 18, 2012
  20. sukhish

    sukhish Senior Member Senior Member

    Joined:
    Dec 30, 2009
    Messages:
    1,321
    Likes Received:
    310
    we did not have ENR agreement because, ENR is suppose to be more regulated compared to just the nuclear fuel and also we never asked them for it.
    either 2008 NSG waiver applies in totality or it does not. you can't have 2008 waiver for full scope safaguards, then 2011 paragraph 6) and 7) for ENR technologies, even though NSG clearly gave guidelines for ENR in 2008 agreement itself. if that were to be the case then even for full scope safeguards they can apply rules prior to 2008 waiver, and then all waiver of 2008 is for nothing. the 2008 waiver has some meaning to it, in that it only applies to india.
    other general guidelines are for the rest of them. whatever is in 2008 agreement applies to india. INFCIRC/734 (Corrected) paragraph 6) and 7) of 2008 apply to india. the communique from NSG to IAEA specifically retains the word india in it. as per you logic for full scope safe guard some countires can use 2008 waiver, and then for the ENR then can use 2011 guidelines. it doesn't work that way. if the 2008 waiver would not have included ENR at all for india, then I would have agreed with your point. but 2008 waiver forcefully emphazied that paragraph 6) and 7) apply to india. and at that time paragraph 6) and 7) only had regulated restrictions for ENR not a blanket ban like 2011 paragraph 7). some countries are still dilly dallying because no country has ever supplied ENR transfer to any other country. it is considered to be very sensitive in nature. so it would require an additional arrangement. but the BLANKET restriction of
    2011 is not for india, that is one thing I'm 200% confident. also India is still trying to negotiate an agreement with japan for nuclear fuel itself. does that mean that japan doesn't consider the 2008 waiver for india at all. no countries are sensitive about these technologies and hence it is taking time.

    2008 AGREEMENT CLEARLY HAS ENR provisions in it in paragraph 6) and 7) and hence 2011 paragraph 7) cannot replace 2008 paragraph 7) for india. russia was trying to trick india as if india did not have ENR waiver in 2008 agreement. but GoI clearly refused the russian point of view as it believed that 2008 waiver included ENR tech. don't worry they will come around. NSG blanket restriction is clearly removed as far ENR restrictions are concerned.
     
    Last edited: May 18, 2012

Share This Page