India's Nuclear Doctrine

[Officer of Engineers]

Easy,

They're bluffing.

 

[Soham]

Easy,

They're bluffing.

So all their strategies are based on the effectiveness of one bluff ?

It is working well though. Unfortunately our politicians can't call off the bluff.

 

[advaita]

It wasn't the US.

You are writing about 67. What I heard was for 73.
I dont have any link - that is why i am so sketchy. Never heard of this one about 67. Thanks for leting me know.

I think though US/USSR is besides the point.

The point is fear rules and rules so that even the superpower of 67 (USSR) and 73 (USA) were so fearful that Isrealis still remain.

See just as in peace the stake has to be distributed properly in wartime too (just to re-establish balance)

The links by the shiva guy writing mails are really long and I am under pressure to get off this forum.....(yes i know exactly how you feel like.)

 

[ppgj]

on a realistic note-our hostile neighbour keeps talking of the use of N-bombs 'cos they do not have conventional superiority and they can never hope of achieving it.by making noises of N use they just try to scare india.they know well that if they do it they will be wiped out.that is what it is just noise

 

[John]

well depends, by 2011/12 we'll have gr8 defence against both Chinese and Pak Medium range ballistic missiles and considering Sypder SAMs and is SH wins we'll have good defense against low flying cruise missiles as well. The real future threat is ICBMs now taking into account work is already underway on hypersonic interceptors and long range radars with ranges over 1500km in detection ranges, by 2015 we should be able to see a full scale defense against all kinds of threats, so between now and then if we keep a peaceful state, a war with India by then would become un-imaginable, We'll be the first to field hypersonic cruise missiles, lots of brahmos on ships, fighters and land launchers, lots of Nirbhays, good numbers of MRCA, Su-mki upgraded versions and the PAKFA beginning to show up, LCA mk-2 fully fielded, FINSAS program in advanced stages, lots of new field artillery, Uprated guided pinakas, MR-SAM/LR-SAM etc..

Well no first use policy gives us credibility and gives an image of a defensive nation, the key to prevent any attack is to bolster defenses to such an extent that all the enemy has in their inventory seems useless against us.

To find out if an incoming ballistic missile has nuke or conventional warheads is almost impossible and any incoming ballistic missile will quickly be perceived by us as a nuke strike and hence we'll retaliate, in that case even if the enemy launched conventional first and we hit back with nukes we stand corrected, its the enemies fault to have launched ballistics against us in the first place. But in case of ICBMS our long range radars should be able to spot RV separations and spot the fight path with many stages falling off, its easy to see RVs being ejected from a ICBM this can quickly be classified as a nuke but the problem comes with IRBMS with no RVs and cruise missiles hard to know if they have nuke or conventional warheads. but since by 2012 their IRBMs can be intercepted, the threat will be not be so real anymore. The problem remains with cruise missiles and SH remains the only aircraft capable of tackling them.

 

[natarajan]

just one question to our beloved jawans,is our netas giving freedom and taking ideas and suggestion from you or they are commanding you?

 

[ppgj]

actually the thread should have been-
imagine a non-state actor(euphemism our neighbour uses for actors sponsored by its agencies)getting hold of the dirty bomb and exploding on indian soil..
they have been doing it for decades now with other bombs.so it is better we prepare ourselves from that.US started thinking and preparing for it long time back.

 

[INDIANBULL]

For one thing, how about listening to what your strategic planners are telling you. In case you haven't noticed, I am not a decision maker. I was not the one who decided what India should have. You're the one with the wet dreams and instead of trying to understand your own nuclear doctrines and what your strategic planners are telling you, you're just lusting for big peeing contest.

And you think the enemy has not thought this through? And you think that your strategic planners also has not thought this through that the enemy has thought this through?

Since you're the one who refused to accept what your strategic planners are telling me, I think it is clear whose statements are oxymoron.

In case you still don't get it. I am not an Indian decision maker. I can only try to understand their decisions.
Mod Edit: No derogatory language please.

KK tell us what our strategic planners are planing to do, tell us what types of weapons they think are credible for minimum detterence and what they think about thermonuclear weapons of 100-300kt yeild, you seem to be well connected with our strategic parteners so please enlighten us all about all these issues in your own words and not just by bragging about yourself .

Please quote some words of our strategic nuclear planners or some links etc which show that our planners are not developing or havnt developed 100-300kt nukes or you will be considered as one of those chinese guys who just can moan with their big mouth and cannt post anything relevant.

 

[INDIANBULL]

Here i am posting some links about Pokharan-2, in these nuclear tests we have tested a actual nuclear warhead(boosted fission type), this warhead fitted into aagni-2 is having approx 100kt yeild which is pretty sufficient for wiping off any chinese city in our range. 2ndly we also tested a thermonuclear device(not actual warhead) which can be upgraded to a yeild of 200kt or more, so nowhere there are signs that India is not going to develop 100-300kt nukes especially for our chinese friends. I dunno what officer is trying to prove. Read it officer we are realy having somthing big for you chinese.

Pokhran-II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Shakti I
A two stage thermonuclear device with a boosted fission primary, its yield was downgraded from 200 KT(theoretical) to 45 KT for test purposes. The thermonuclear device tested at Pokhran was not an actual warhead. It was a device that was designed mainly to produce data to analyze the performance of India's Hydrogen bomb technology for future computer simulations and actual weaponisation.

Shakti III
An experimental boosted fission device that used reactor grade Plutonium for its primary with a yield of 0.3 KT. This test device was used to test only the primary stage. It did not contain any tritium required to boost the fission. This test was designed to study the possibility of using reactor grade plutonium in warheads and also to prove India's expertise in controlling and damping a nuclear explosion in order to achieve a low (sub-kiloton) yield
Agni [Strategic Ballistic Missile]

Warhead Options

India's nuclear warhead options are still relatively limited, though adequate. Since the first Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in 1974 (PoK-I), India adopted the recessed deterrence posture initially consisting of fission weapons (~15 KT yield) followed by boosted fission weapons of 200 KT yield, suitable for the Agni-TD/TTB. The PoK-II 1998 'Shakti' series of nuclear tests in Pokhran were reportedly done to validate multiple weapon designs, of 1995 vintage. Interestingly the 200 KT boosted fission design of 1980 was not tested in PoK-II, evidently its core components and technologies were validated in newer designs, and giving way to a lighter and more efficient S1 design. It is interesting to note that India has access to large quantities[135] of Tritium - produced at an extremely low cost - which lends flexibility to Indian weapon design options, an option that is not available or viable to prior nuclear weapon states.


Shakti-1 Thermo-Nuclear weapon during 1998 Pokhran-II nuclear tests. [Image: Govt. of India]
Notional old and new Indian strategic weapon shape & size

[© Arun Vishwakarma]

Weapon Fission Fuel Yield (KT) Weight (kg) Note
1 High yield, Thermonuclear

(Plutonium [Pu], Deuterium & Tritium)[136]
Pu

(Weapon Grade)
200 - 300

(DAY:0.3/10/250)
250[137] • Shakti-I test at Pokharan-II (PoK-II)
• Boosted fission primary of ~20KT
• Plutonium based boosted primary stage. Li-D secondary
• Reportedly dial-a-yield weapon (0.3/10/250 Kt)

2 High yield, fusion boosted fission
Pu

(Weapon Grade)
150-200 < 500 • Assured deterrence to those who doubt full yield 250Kt Thermo-Nuclear weapon.

• About 20% yield from fusion

• Its larger size and mass limit Agni-3 configuration to 3 MIRV and lesser range.

3 Intermediate yield, fusion boosted fission
Pu

(Weapon Grade)
50 < 200 • In inventory small size medium yield weapon

4 Medium yield, fusion boosted fission
Pu

(Weapon Grade)
15 - 20 100[137a] • Primary stage of Shakti-1 test at PoK-II
• Standard medium yield weapon

5 Medium yield, pure fission
Pu

(Weapon Grade)
15[138] 170 - 200 • Shakti-2 test at PoK-II
• This was tested from a weapon stockpile. Very high probability that it was 150-200kt Fusion Boosted fission version, described above (item 2) tested without boosting material.

6 Low yield, sub-KT
Pu (Weapon Grade)
0.1 to 1 < 100 (est.) • Battlefield Weapon

7 Low yield, sub-KT[139]
Pu or U233 (Reactor Grade)[140]
0.3 to 1 < 100 (est.) • Reactor Grade Pu or U233




The primary warhead for the Agni family would be a 200-300 Kt fusion weapon based on the Shakti-1 (Pokhran-II) test in 1998. The weapons yield is adjustable from 45-300Kt by changing the amount and quality of tertiary fuel. Yield of 45-200Kt range using natural Uranium and 45-300Kt range using moderately enriched fuel (U235 or Pu).

The fusion weapon based on the S-1 design reportedly weighs less than 450 Kg, however other sources indicate a mass of between 300 to 200 Kg[137A]. The 45kT S1 device reportedly weighed 450 kg and used an inert mantle to ensure third stage did not generate any yield[141]. It has also emerged that by 1982, the BARC/DRDO team had produced a design for a (pure) fission device that weighed between 170 and 200 kg for a yield of 15 KT - a huge change from the 1000 kg monster tested in 1974[142]. This would mean that a missile warhead based on this 1982 vintage design would weigh some 250 - 350 kg. On the eve of Agni-III D1 test flight on 12 April 2007, Union Minister of State for Defence MM Pallam Raju confirmed that "the strategic payload of the missile is between 100 kg to 250 kg"[142a]. One can conservatively deduce that the 250 kg mentioned by the minister corresponded to Indian Thermo-nuclear weapon, and 100Kg correspond to either 20Kt medium yield boosted fission weapon because low yield sub-KT weapon are tactical & not considered as strategic weapons. Therefore, when considering the range and payload parameters of the Agni and Prithvi missiles, these figures must be borne in mind.

 

[Officer of Engineers]

[Mod Edit] Please refrain from getting personal and abusive.

did you not read MULTI-MEGATON? And does the fact that I'm Canadian to the core still escape you.

RAND | Monograph/Reports | India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal

And I know far more about nukes than you could ever will.

 

[Yusuf]

Guys,
don't get personal and respect the military pros. You can have a debate and get your doubts cleared, but no disrespect to any military pro will be tolerated.

 

[Payeng]

Should India review its declaration of 'no first use' policy, I think no, because that won't be helpful, BTW its just a policy unilateral and theoretical, it is no way an agreement, so what can we gain by reviewing that policy?

 

[Officer of Engineers]

By itself, nothing but NFU is part of the entire deterrence package. That's what people don't understand. The minimum arsenal is but one part of the deterrence package. The other parts are conventional force confidence, either strategic (Pakistan) or theatre (China). The 3rd part is a declaration that if you (China) don't use nukes, we (India) don't use nukes.

 

[Officer of Engineers]

Nuclear science maybe but nothing about nuclear warfare. Only people with zero knowledge about nuclear targetting priorities get worked up about 200kt warheads.

From Stuart Slade, a real nuclear targeteer

The Nuclear Game (Two) - Targeting Weapons

One of the interesting aspects of a nuclear war is planning how its going to be done. Most fictional accounts of this process seem to assume that cities will be the primary targets and there will be one device allocated per city. This is very far from the truth. In fact, nuclear attack plans are very complicated things and, in a quite real sense, they don't exist. What does exist is a whole series of strategies aimed at achieving specific results. Which of those strategies are adopted and in what combinations is determined by the specific events taking place. Very often we'll hear of people talking about "The SIOP" as the Holy Grail of the US nuclear war plans. A good touchstone because there is no such thing - if people claim to have worked on the SIOP, they are being economical with the truth. What does exist are a very large number of plans and options that are put together on a mix-and-match basis.

Unfortunately planning a nuclear strike isn't just a matter of working out which cities to destroy. In fact it isn't even a matter of working out which cities to destroy. In fact, we don't target cities at all per se. We target things, some of which happen to be in cities. Its necessary to remember the key; nuclear weapons are a tool, no more, no less. We don't blow up cities just because they are there any more than we fix a TV antenna on the roof by digging a hole in the back garden.

Since we are using a tool to do a job, the first stage is to work out a series of objectives (ie decide what that job is). Normally discussions of such things rotate around strategies being either counter-force or counter-city but its a lot more complex than that. At the last count there were about 30 distinct targeting strategies that could be adopted. As an example, there could be:-

Counter-military - aimed at destroying a country's armed forces. Such a strike would be aimed at things like arsenals, ports, airbases, military training sites etc

Counter-strategic - aimed at taking out a country's strategic weapons force. This would hit the ICBM silos, SSBN ports and bases, the SSBNs themselves, bomber bases, nuclear storage depots etc.

Counter-industrial - aimed at destroying key industrial assets and breaking the target country's industrial infrastructure

Counter-energy - aimed at destroying a country's energy supplies and resources plus the means for distributing them.
Counter-communications - aimed at disrupting and eliminating the target country's communications (radio, TV, landline, satellite etc)communications systems.

Counter-political - aimed at erasing the target country's political leadership - note this is MUCH more difficult than it seems and is very dangerous. Killing the only people who can surrender is not terribly bright

Counter-population - aimed at simply killing as much of the enemy population as possible. A very rare strategy.

There are plenty of others. One of the things that gets done at this level is to think up targeting strategies, work out the target sets associated with that strategy and the resources needed to eliminate that target set. Based on that we can then work out if that particular target strategy is an effective use of resources. Note also that adopting one particular target strategy does not preclude simultaneously putting another into play. Mix and match again.

So, the assumption about a 200kt warhead to wipe out any Chinese city is just plain wacko.

 

[Officer of Engineers]

The point is fear rules and rules so that even the superpower of 67 (USSR) and 73 (USA) were so fearful that Isrealis still remain.

It was the Israelis who were scared sh!tless

http://www.uncommonknowledge.org/800/806.html

Michael Oren: The Syrians who played such a prominent role in precipitating this war cleverly stay out of it. The rumor in the Arab world--the conventional wisdom in the Arab world is that the Syrians were willing to fight to the last Egyptian. And it's true. They stayed out of this war but they were shelling thousands of shells onto Israeli settlements. The Israeli government voted not to attack Syria. This is an interesting episode.

Peter Robinson: The Cabinet votes not to attack?

Michael Oren: They're afraid of Soviet intervention. The Soviets were so closely allied with the Syrians, they were afraid if Israel struck at Syria then the Soviets would intervene and destroy Israel. Many of the Israeli leaders in 1967 had grown up in Russia. They remembered the Cossacks and they were afraid of their--there's the nerd part. Okay.

 

[advaita]

It was the Israelis who were scared sh!tless

Sir I am entirely agreeing with the 1967 episode.
I do agree that Isrealis were scared ....

I wanted to put across the 1973 episode when the US had a fair share of doubters about the Isreali response and hence the type and extent of help to Isreal was said to be in doubt ....... ok just take a look at this.

Israel's Nuclear Weapons

Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, obviously not at his best at a press briefing, was, according to Time magazine, rattled enough to later tell the prime minister that “this is the end of the third temple,” referring to an impending collapse of the state of Israel. “Temple” was also the code word for nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Golda Meir and her “kitchen cabinet” made the decision on the night of 8 October. The Israelis assembled 13 twenty-kiloton atomic bombs. The number and in fact the entire story was later leaked by the Israelis as a great psychological warfare tool. Although most probably plutonium devices, one source reports they were enriched uranium bombs. The Jericho missiles at Hirbat Zachariah and the nuclear strike F-4s at Tel Nof were armed and prepared for action against Syrian and Egyptian targets. They also targeted Damascus with nuclear capable long-range artillery although it is not certain they had nuclear artillery shells.

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To DFI forum members - I request all to excercise restrain. OoE is one of our best assets on the DFI. Without this Pandit the ideas being discussed here would boil down to just the level displayed on another forum form the subcontinent. I am sure we dont want to achieve that level.

To OoE - Sir, with all due respect, many times you have used the word "we" while discussing the Chinese viewpoint. Unfortunately there is no way to discretely tell anyone where one is letting his logic get overtaken by passions.

Sir, the trouble seems to be due to the fact that when Indians especially Hindus speak they speak with certain popular precepts of Gita in mind, which of course most minds (including Hindu minds) just cannot handle due to inherent passion. On the other hand when a westerner speaks he has a pure desire for freedom in mind. Both are just two half truths.

 

[Officer of Engineers]

Israel's Nuclear Weapons

Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, obviously not at his best at a press briefing, was, according to Time magazine, rattled enough to later tell the prime minister that “this is the end of the third temple,” referring to an impending collapse of the state of Israel. “Temple” was also the code word for nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Golda Meir and her “kitchen cabinet” made the decision on the night of 8 October. The Israelis assembled 13 twenty-kiloton atomic bombs. The number and in fact the entire story was later leaked by the Israelis as a great psychological warfare tool. Although most probably plutonium devices, one source reports they were enriched uranium bombs. The Jericho missiles at Hirbat Zachariah and the nuclear strike F-4s at Tel Nof were armed and prepared for action against Syrian and Egyptian targets. They also targeted Damascus with nuclear capable long-range artillery although it is not certain they had nuclear artillery shells.

Israeli nukes is a topic of hot debate, even within the IC and nuclear intel community. Just how advance is it ... or actually how primitive is it? The lack of positive yield tests would certainly put into question just how reliable is the arsenal if not the design.

I could bring up a whole sort of questions that would suggest that the Israelis are not as advance as they would like people to believe.

However, this being said, woe be he who does not assume the worst.

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To OoE - Sir, with all due respect, many times you have used the word "we" while discussing the Chinese viewpoint. Unfortunately there is no way to discretely tell anyone where one is letting his logic get overtaken by passions.

I am unaware that I have ever associated myself with the Chinese. When I use "we," it has always been with the Canadian/NATO sphere. If I did use "we" in association with the Chinese, then I apologize for confusing people.

Sir, the trouble seems to be due to the fact that when Indians especially Hindus speak they speak with certain popular precepts of Gita in mind, which of course most minds (including Hindu minds) just cannot handle due to inherent passion. On the other hand when a westerner speaks he has a pure desire for freedom in mind. Both are just two half truths.

Also part of my training. Land mines don't care if you win an arguement with passion.

 

[advaita]

However, this being said, woe be he who does not assume the worst.

Right said. And I just wanted my countrymen to live and die with full knowledge of this one fact that there are no guarantees in life. Absolutely not a thing more or less.
Nukes are just one of the component of the super structure. It is the balance of security, the balance of fear that counts, and to strike the right balance the completeness of knowledge will always remain indispensable.


*******************************************************

Also part of my training. Land mines don't care if you win an arguement with passion.

See you have met quite a lot of people here just the way I did and not all were ever the same. I too have to make a lot of edits before posting anything just to get my point across, without the clutter of my passions.

 

[Antimony]

Question to OOE

I went ahead and read the Slade essays.

Very, very interesting

A question here about Slade's target selection methodology and his overall assumptions about the goals and objective of the new nuclear power.

Whatever he says makes sense to me, but them I am clean slate. Is there any indication (or lack of it) that the Pakistanis (or Indians for that matter) think along similar lines?

After all, you yourself noted after reviewing the COLD START article by a retired Pakistani officer, that senior Pakistani military officers do not seem to have a knowledge of FM 3.0, which you consider basic reading for someone trying to understand and reform military organisations and operations.

So, is there a possibility that the non-western thought process around handling of nukes is different?

This seems plausible in light of Pakistan's declared policy of possible first use. Bruce Riedel has talked about how, during ther Kargil conflict, the Pakistani military prepared for a nuclear exchange without informing the PM

http://asr2.myweb.uga.edu/Fall 2004/Readings/Bruce Rydel - Kargil Lessons - CASI.2002.doc

And I still can't help feeling shaky when I read the article about Brigadier Amanullah. I know your views about him though...
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200203/landesman

 

[Antimony]

Sir, the trouble seems to be due to the fact that when Indians especially Hindus speak they speak with certain popular precepts of Gita in mind, which of course most minds (including Hindu minds) just cannot handle due to inherent passion. On the other hand when a westerner speaks he has a pure desire for freedom in mind. Both are just two half truths.

Err, what?