India's Look-East Policy - Targets China, says commentator
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SHASH2K2
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Changes in the distribution of power, historians hold, are the main source of systemic conflict in world politics. The rise of new powers and the decline of the old sets up the context for destabilizing struggles for rebalancing the world.
Either preventing the power transition from one great power to another or facilitating it involves much bloodletting. One of the big debates in international politics today is whether we (India) are on the cusp of a power transition in the Indian Ocean, the Asia Pacific and the world at large.
Some argue that the relative decline of the United States is inevitable and a reorganization of the balance of power in the Indian and Pacific Oceans is necessary amidst the rise of China and the emergence of India. Others argue that structural change in the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean may be inevitable, but not imminent.
Some insist that the United States will remain the pre-eminent power in the world and in our own littoral. Either way there is no denying the new imperatives for some structural adjustment in the region amidst the unfolding change in the regional and global distribution of power. For China is about to become the second largest economy in the world.
India is inching its way to become the third largest in the next couple of decades if not earlier. The rapid accretion of economic power means Beijing and Delhi will be able to devote a part of it to acquiring a stronger military muscle.
For a long time to come China and India will be countries with low per capita incomes. Yet given the large size of their population, Beijing and Delhi can become major military powers by spending a small portion of their GDP on defence in a sustained and purposeful manner.
Put another way, China and India can become powerful without being rich in the traditional per capita sense. While all trend lines point to the inevitable emergence of China and India as great powers, nothing is assured in the life of nations.
Recall the debate on the rising Japan a quarter century ago. Remember too the celebrated 'declinist' literature on the United States at the end of 1980s. It was the Soviet Union that collapsed against all expectations and the United States bounced back.
China and India have enormous internal problems and their leaderships could either stumble or over-reach -- both of which could delay or destroy their much-awaited moment in the sun.
In any case, China and India will have to earn their greatness; I doubt it will be simply thrust upon them. Having entered those caveats let's turn to some of the important geopolitical consequences of China's rise and India's emergence, with a focus on the maritime context. Allow me take up five themes.
The first is the nature of the economic transformation in China and India that is fundamentally different from that of Soviet Russia -- the previous challenger to Anglo-American primacy in the world. In the first half of the 20th century, Stalin extracted every possible ounce of human and material resource at home to make Russia a great military .
China and India, in contrast, are elevating their international standing through economic globalization and regional integration. Soviet Russia disconnected itself from the world economy as it rose. China and India are deepening their ties to the world economy, as they become major powers. Their extraordinary international exposure today is marked by the fact that trade forms nearly 70 per cent of China's GDP and closer to 35 per cent and rising in India.
Second, the increase in the economic mass of China and India will intensify their gravitational pull and most certainly reconfigure the geopolitical space in the littoral of the Indian Ocean and the Asia Pacific.
This would mean a restructuring of the relationships among major powers and regional actors. In my view the most important 'strategic triangle' in our littoral and the maritime world will be that between the United States, China and India.
While other major powers like Russia, Japan, France and medium powers like Korea, Indonesia, Australia and Iran to name a few will indeed have a bearing on the maritime structures of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, it is the triangular dynamic between Washington, Beijing and Delhi that will be the most consequential.
There are many ways in which the triangular relationship could unfold. Some Americans see the importance of accommodating the rise of China through the construction of a condominium; some others see India as a natural balancer against China's rise. Yet other Americans argue that Washington must balance against both Beijing and Delhi.
Some in Beijing worry that India's naval power, acting in collaboration with the United States and Japan, could hit at the vital maritime interests of China.
There are others in Beijing who speculate that the rise of Indian naval power is a threat to the United States rather than to China. Delhi is itself quite coy about identifying the hierarchy of its threats. Standing with Chinese leaders we talk about the promotion of a multipolar world; shaking hands with the Americans we proclaim a natural alliance with the United States.
Third, the logic of globalization and trade means China and India are today more reliant on the seas than ever before in their history. Nearly 90 per cent of world trade in commodities and goods continues to flow by the seas. China's per capita income today is around $4000 and India's a little over $1000.
As their per capita incomes continue to grow rapidly, it is not difficult to see that the scale and scope of Chinese and Indian interaction with the rest of the world will be breath-taking.
The more integrated China and India become with the world economy, greater are their stakes at sea. If oceans are the lifelines for the economic well-being of nearly two and a half billion people, Beijing and Delhi are bound to invest heavily -- in diplomatic and military terms -- in the management of the order in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
Fourth, unlike in the past when China and India emphasized their autarky, their growing interdependence with the rest of the world now demands more supple and complex military strategies to realise their transformed national interests. As the most versatile of the military instruments, the navies will become increasingly weighty in the strategic calculus of China and India.
Both Beijing and Delhi have begun to increase the share of resources devoted to their Navies. This would mean a steady expansion of the size and quality of Chinese and Indian naval forces. It is also clear that both Beijing and Delhi will move towards building blue water navies.
That Chinese and Indian security interests go beyond the local and regional is underlined by the fact that the economic prospects of their large populations are dependent on access to vital natural resources and markets in distant lands. Powerful blue water navies, then, become inevitable adjuncts to the globalizing economies of China and India.
Fifth, this Chinese and Indian interest in acquiring maritime power marks a historic break from the strategic traditions. Naval nationalists in both China and India do speak of the ancient maritime traditions of their respective nations.
China has made special effort to rediscover its naval heritage and elevate the maritime consciousness of its people. In India the belief in the past greatness is equally intense, while the collective effort to express it is far less impressive.
While China has Admiral Zheng He and India has Rajaraja Chola as maritime heroes, it would not be inaccurate to state that the naval orientation in China and India has at best been episodic. The principal security threats in both China and India were from their land frontiers, and interestingly from the same direction, the northwest.
The Chinese preoccupation with barbarian invasions from the northwest saw the building of a great wall, and India had to devote most of defence energies to the stabilization of the region between the Indus and the Hindu Kush. That did not leave much time and space for the sustained development of naval capabilities, despite being blessed with long coastlines.
http://news.rediff.com/slide-show/2010/jul/19/slide-show-1-new-equations-in-the-indian-ocean.htm#contentTop
Either preventing the power transition from one great power to another or facilitating it involves much bloodletting. One of the big debates in international politics today is whether we (India) are on the cusp of a power transition in the Indian Ocean, the Asia Pacific and the world at large.
Some argue that the relative decline of the United States is inevitable and a reorganization of the balance of power in the Indian and Pacific Oceans is necessary amidst the rise of China and the emergence of India. Others argue that structural change in the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean may be inevitable, but not imminent.
Some insist that the United States will remain the pre-eminent power in the world and in our own littoral. Either way there is no denying the new imperatives for some structural adjustment in the region amidst the unfolding change in the regional and global distribution of power. For China is about to become the second largest economy in the world.
India is inching its way to become the third largest in the next couple of decades if not earlier. The rapid accretion of economic power means Beijing and Delhi will be able to devote a part of it to acquiring a stronger military muscle.
For a long time to come China and India will be countries with low per capita incomes. Yet given the large size of their population, Beijing and Delhi can become major military powers by spending a small portion of their GDP on defence in a sustained and purposeful manner.
Put another way, China and India can become powerful without being rich in the traditional per capita sense. While all trend lines point to the inevitable emergence of China and India as great powers, nothing is assured in the life of nations.
Recall the debate on the rising Japan a quarter century ago. Remember too the celebrated 'declinist' literature on the United States at the end of 1980s. It was the Soviet Union that collapsed against all expectations and the United States bounced back.
China and India have enormous internal problems and their leaderships could either stumble or over-reach -- both of which could delay or destroy their much-awaited moment in the sun.
In any case, China and India will have to earn their greatness; I doubt it will be simply thrust upon them. Having entered those caveats let's turn to some of the important geopolitical consequences of China's rise and India's emergence, with a focus on the maritime context. Allow me take up five themes.
The first is the nature of the economic transformation in China and India that is fundamentally different from that of Soviet Russia -- the previous challenger to Anglo-American primacy in the world. In the first half of the 20th century, Stalin extracted every possible ounce of human and material resource at home to make Russia a great military .
China and India, in contrast, are elevating their international standing through economic globalization and regional integration. Soviet Russia disconnected itself from the world economy as it rose. China and India are deepening their ties to the world economy, as they become major powers. Their extraordinary international exposure today is marked by the fact that trade forms nearly 70 per cent of China's GDP and closer to 35 per cent and rising in India.
Second, the increase in the economic mass of China and India will intensify their gravitational pull and most certainly reconfigure the geopolitical space in the littoral of the Indian Ocean and the Asia Pacific.
This would mean a restructuring of the relationships among major powers and regional actors. In my view the most important 'strategic triangle' in our littoral and the maritime world will be that between the United States, China and India.
While other major powers like Russia, Japan, France and medium powers like Korea, Indonesia, Australia and Iran to name a few will indeed have a bearing on the maritime structures of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, it is the triangular dynamic between Washington, Beijing and Delhi that will be the most consequential.
There are many ways in which the triangular relationship could unfold. Some Americans see the importance of accommodating the rise of China through the construction of a condominium; some others see India as a natural balancer against China's rise. Yet other Americans argue that Washington must balance against both Beijing and Delhi.
Some in Beijing worry that India's naval power, acting in collaboration with the United States and Japan, could hit at the vital maritime interests of China.
There are others in Beijing who speculate that the rise of Indian naval power is a threat to the United States rather than to China. Delhi is itself quite coy about identifying the hierarchy of its threats. Standing with Chinese leaders we talk about the promotion of a multipolar world; shaking hands with the Americans we proclaim a natural alliance with the United States.
Third, the logic of globalization and trade means China and India are today more reliant on the seas than ever before in their history. Nearly 90 per cent of world trade in commodities and goods continues to flow by the seas. China's per capita income today is around $4000 and India's a little over $1000.
As their per capita incomes continue to grow rapidly, it is not difficult to see that the scale and scope of Chinese and Indian interaction with the rest of the world will be breath-taking.
The more integrated China and India become with the world economy, greater are their stakes at sea. If oceans are the lifelines for the economic well-being of nearly two and a half billion people, Beijing and Delhi are bound to invest heavily -- in diplomatic and military terms -- in the management of the order in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
Fourth, unlike in the past when China and India emphasized their autarky, their growing interdependence with the rest of the world now demands more supple and complex military strategies to realise their transformed national interests. As the most versatile of the military instruments, the navies will become increasingly weighty in the strategic calculus of China and India.
Both Beijing and Delhi have begun to increase the share of resources devoted to their Navies. This would mean a steady expansion of the size and quality of Chinese and Indian naval forces. It is also clear that both Beijing and Delhi will move towards building blue water navies.
That Chinese and Indian security interests go beyond the local and regional is underlined by the fact that the economic prospects of their large populations are dependent on access to vital natural resources and markets in distant lands. Powerful blue water navies, then, become inevitable adjuncts to the globalizing economies of China and India.
Fifth, this Chinese and Indian interest in acquiring maritime power marks a historic break from the strategic traditions. Naval nationalists in both China and India do speak of the ancient maritime traditions of their respective nations.
China has made special effort to rediscover its naval heritage and elevate the maritime consciousness of its people. In India the belief in the past greatness is equally intense, while the collective effort to express it is far less impressive.
While China has Admiral Zheng He and India has Rajaraja Chola as maritime heroes, it would not be inaccurate to state that the naval orientation in China and India has at best been episodic. The principal security threats in both China and India were from their land frontiers, and interestingly from the same direction, the northwest.
The Chinese preoccupation with barbarian invasions from the northwest saw the building of a great wall, and India had to devote most of defence energies to the stabilization of the region between the Indus and the Hindu Kush. That did not leave much time and space for the sustained development of naval capabilities, despite being blessed with long coastlines.
http://news.rediff.com/slide-show/2010/jul/19/slide-show-1-new-equations-in-the-indian-ocean.htm#contentTop
dulce bellum inexpertis
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In my opinion, the best bet is for India to expand its Navy. You guys need a few more subs (the recent Project 75 is a good move), although India should also look for atleast 6 nuclear subs.
Secondly the aircraft carriers are a major force multiplier, and the India seems to be going good in that direction. With your neighbours, India has had majority influence on the western side, while the countries to East are not that well covered, and these are the places where China enjoys major influence. Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia these places can play important role strategically. SG, and Thailand will support India, while the others do need some further influence.
Another point to keep in mind is that China is extremely wary of its neighbours S.Korea & Japan, whith whom as I understand, India has good naval co-operation.
Aegis system in Kolkata class vessels,can greatly increase India's naval capabilities, along with the Bug or if India can, the F-35.
Also you must keep in mind, that the most potent & powerful AirForce in Asia is the USN!
Secondly the aircraft carriers are a major force multiplier, and the India seems to be going good in that direction. With your neighbours, India has had majority influence on the western side, while the countries to East are not that well covered, and these are the places where China enjoys major influence. Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia these places can play important role strategically. SG, and Thailand will support India, while the others do need some further influence.
Another point to keep in mind is that China is extremely wary of its neighbours S.Korea & Japan, whith whom as I understand, India has good naval co-operation.
Aegis system in Kolkata class vessels,can greatly increase India's naval capabilities, along with the Bug or if India can, the F-35.
Also you must keep in mind, that the most potent & powerful AirForce in Asia is the USN!
sandeepdg
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Mate, Chabahar port is till under development and India is pressurizing Iran to quicken the pace of development , though reports say that it will become operational sometime in 2011, nothing concrete is known about the timeframe for operations to start fullscale as yet. India is also developing the the Chabahar-Zaranj-Dilaram route from Iran to Afghanistan.
Illusive
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after reading this thread and its videos.......i dont understand what is US interests........why would India fear going against US intrests for its implementing its own naval policies for its nations safeguard...........i mean Indian ocean is thousands of miles away from US shores
dulce bellum inexpertis
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In the present day, there is no animosity between the armed forces of the two countries, and future co-operation looks very bright. US is promoting India's role in Indian Ocean. US has always wanted free shipping lines in International waters, which some countries are against, citing greater region of influence. In such a scenario, US looks towards India as a responsible parter in promoting peace & stability in the region and keeping the shipping lines open.
SHASH2K2
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Denial of visa part of China's grand strategy
China's refusal to give visa to Lt Gen B S Jaswal, Army Commander of the Northern Command, is part of its grand strategy. However, what is significant to note is that while in the past China had not refused visa to the Army Commander who was also commanding troops deployed in Arunachal Pradesh -- an area claimed by the Chinese - this time it has denied visa to the General who is commanding troops in J&K - an area claimed to be disputed by Pakistan. This was obviously done to strengthen the claim of Pakistan on Kashmir and therefore reflects a sinister design of China and Pakistan to have a coordinated approach on the Kashmir issue. Pak-occupied Kashmir is strategically important for China as it provides road connectivity to transport cargo and oil tankers from eastern China to Pakistan's Gawader, Pasni and Ormara ports. A recent report in New York Times indicated that 7,000-11,000 Chinese troops were in the Gilgit-Baltistan region, which was witnessing a rebellion against the Pakistani rule. These Chinese troops were involved in extending the Karakoram highway and construction of railroad. China wants a firm grip on this strategic area to have unfettered road and rail access to the Gulf through Pakistan. The report also suggests that the Chinese troops constructed 22 tunnels perhaps for the China-Iran gas pipeline. Keeping the strategic importance of Kashmir for China, it is not surprising that it considers Kashmir more valuable than Arunachal Pradesh.
In the past, China had started giving visa to people from this region on a separate page attached to the passport instead of stamping on the passport itself. That China had been supporting Pakistan at various international forums on the Kashmir issue is well documented. China did not come openly to support Pakistan during any of the Indo-Pak conflicts, though there was speculation about such a move. However, an analysis of the events during 1998-1999 indicates that in the pre-Kargil period, there could have been an understanding between the two countries. In 1998, the number of Chinese intrusions on our side had significantly increased. Not only the frequency of intrusions but the number of troops crossing to our side had substantially increased as well as duration of their stay on our side. Was it done to divert our troops to the India-China border at a time when Pakistan was implementing its plan to occupy Kargil area? At least, the circumstances and the Chinese stance on the Kashmir issue suggest such a possibility. It may be recalled that the telephonic conversation, which gave details of the Pak Army's plans in Kargil, between the then Pak Army Chief Gen Musharraf and his junior, was recorded when the former was in China. Was he not consulting the Chinese on the developing situation?
Of late, China had been indulging in unfriendly manner although we have an agreement on confidence building measures (1996) and another on the maintenance of peace and tranquility on the border (1993). The visit of our PM to Arunachal Pradesh was criticized by the Chinese. The Dalai Lama's stay in India and his meetings with political leaders also receive severe criticism from China. The cartographic aggression continues. Sikkim is often shown as an independent country. All these activities are undertaken by the Chinese without provocation from India.
In fact, India-China ties are under strain not because of the unresolved border dispute between the two countries but because of China's grand strategy to keep India under pressure so that the latter may not achieve even the status of a regional power and would not be in a position to challenge China. The factors which have contributed to the evolution of this grand strategy are the legacy of Cold War alignments (China-Pakistan-US versus Soviet Union-India axis), the Dalai Lama's refuge in India, China-India War of 1962 and the Chinese occupation of a part of Kashmir which belongs to India. Recently two more factors have been added - India's emergence as a nuclear power and the plan of China to establish its supremacy in the Indian Ocean.
The Chinese grand strategy stems from China's perception that South and Southeast Asia fall within its sphere of influence and India as the main obstacle to achieve its strategic objective of regional supremacy in mainland Asia. This has led the Chinese policy makers to provide military and policy support to those countries which can serve as counterweights to China's perceived rivals and enemies. Recognizing that India could pose a serious challenge to China, Beijing has for long been following the policy of uniting with all our neighbours to counter India (hexiao gongda policy). In the last five decades, China has established close relations with Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Experts call it the Chinese "string of pearls". Barring Nepal, in all other countries, China has acquired interests in the naval ports with a view to have sufficient control in the Indian Ocean.
Other dimensions of the Chinese grand strategy against India too deserve mention. The Chinese intelligence agency Ministry of State Security continues to support our insurgent groups of the northeast. Manipuri insurgents belonging to PLA continue to get Chinese support. They have been given shelter in the Yunnan province. The Chinese Intelligence agency also gives the NSCN(IM) weapons. In Nepal, China has established a string of branches of Nepal-China Study Centre (NCSC) along the Indo-Nepal border, which is used to gather intelligence against India. In addition, the Chinese cyberattacks on important Indian networks have increased. China's assistance to Pakistan in nuclear and missile fields as well as in military hardware is also a disturbing factor.
Notwithstanding the above activities of China, the Indian and the Chinese representatives keep on meeting to resolve the border dispute. From an analysis of the Chinese attitude at such meetings, it appears that they are not in a hurry to resolve the issue. China has come up with guiding principles like MUMAMA (Mutual Understanding, Mutual Agreement and Mutual Adjustment), which were interpreted in a positive manner by the Indian side. However, some experts now conclude that these principles were deliberately brought to gain time and keep the Indian side optimistic about the Chinese seriousness to resolve the issue. In fact, China desires to shelve the issue to a later period when it would have a substantial edge over India. This aspect must remain in the sharp focus of Indian planners who should evolve a suitable approach to resolve the issue as early as possible.
The Chinese in order to cover their actual designs of strengthening its military structures and enhancing its influence in our neighborhood project that this is the peaceful rise of China which is not against India or any other country. However, once China's military capability and influence grow, it would be in an advantageous position to bargain with India.
While it is in the interest of both China and India to maintain regional stability as well as the need to allow trade between the two countries, in the long run neither Indian nor Chinese defence planners can rule out confrontation over Tibet, Kashmir and Indian Ocean. Of course, the nature of confrontation will be determined by domestic political and economic developments in the two countries. For India, it is necessary to take suitable steps keeping in view the Chinese grand strategy.
In the present case, India's apt action has sent a clear message to China that India would not take such pinpricks lying down. Not only India has cancelled the trip of the delegation of Lt Gen Jaswal, but also the visit of three Chinese officers to India. India also summoned the Chinese ambassador to protest against the denial of visa to the Indian senior army officer. The message India gave was that China was solely responsible for the current problem and that India would not allow China to meddle in J&K. Hopefully, China would in future desist from such acts.
China's refusal to give visa to Lt Gen B S Jaswal, Army Commander of the Northern Command, is part of its grand strategy. However, what is significant to note is that while in the past China had not refused visa to the Army Commander who was also commanding troops deployed in Arunachal Pradesh -- an area claimed by the Chinese - this time it has denied visa to the General who is commanding troops in J&K - an area claimed to be disputed by Pakistan. This was obviously done to strengthen the claim of Pakistan on Kashmir and therefore reflects a sinister design of China and Pakistan to have a coordinated approach on the Kashmir issue. Pak-occupied Kashmir is strategically important for China as it provides road connectivity to transport cargo and oil tankers from eastern China to Pakistan's Gawader, Pasni and Ormara ports. A recent report in New York Times indicated that 7,000-11,000 Chinese troops were in the Gilgit-Baltistan region, which was witnessing a rebellion against the Pakistani rule. These Chinese troops were involved in extending the Karakoram highway and construction of railroad. China wants a firm grip on this strategic area to have unfettered road and rail access to the Gulf through Pakistan. The report also suggests that the Chinese troops constructed 22 tunnels perhaps for the China-Iran gas pipeline. Keeping the strategic importance of Kashmir for China, it is not surprising that it considers Kashmir more valuable than Arunachal Pradesh.
In the past, China had started giving visa to people from this region on a separate page attached to the passport instead of stamping on the passport itself. That China had been supporting Pakistan at various international forums on the Kashmir issue is well documented. China did not come openly to support Pakistan during any of the Indo-Pak conflicts, though there was speculation about such a move. However, an analysis of the events during 1998-1999 indicates that in the pre-Kargil period, there could have been an understanding between the two countries. In 1998, the number of Chinese intrusions on our side had significantly increased. Not only the frequency of intrusions but the number of troops crossing to our side had substantially increased as well as duration of their stay on our side. Was it done to divert our troops to the India-China border at a time when Pakistan was implementing its plan to occupy Kargil area? At least, the circumstances and the Chinese stance on the Kashmir issue suggest such a possibility. It may be recalled that the telephonic conversation, which gave details of the Pak Army's plans in Kargil, between the then Pak Army Chief Gen Musharraf and his junior, was recorded when the former was in China. Was he not consulting the Chinese on the developing situation?
Of late, China had been indulging in unfriendly manner although we have an agreement on confidence building measures (1996) and another on the maintenance of peace and tranquility on the border (1993). The visit of our PM to Arunachal Pradesh was criticized by the Chinese. The Dalai Lama's stay in India and his meetings with political leaders also receive severe criticism from China. The cartographic aggression continues. Sikkim is often shown as an independent country. All these activities are undertaken by the Chinese without provocation from India.
In fact, India-China ties are under strain not because of the unresolved border dispute between the two countries but because of China's grand strategy to keep India under pressure so that the latter may not achieve even the status of a regional power and would not be in a position to challenge China. The factors which have contributed to the evolution of this grand strategy are the legacy of Cold War alignments (China-Pakistan-US versus Soviet Union-India axis), the Dalai Lama's refuge in India, China-India War of 1962 and the Chinese occupation of a part of Kashmir which belongs to India. Recently two more factors have been added - India's emergence as a nuclear power and the plan of China to establish its supremacy in the Indian Ocean.
The Chinese grand strategy stems from China's perception that South and Southeast Asia fall within its sphere of influence and India as the main obstacle to achieve its strategic objective of regional supremacy in mainland Asia. This has led the Chinese policy makers to provide military and policy support to those countries which can serve as counterweights to China's perceived rivals and enemies. Recognizing that India could pose a serious challenge to China, Beijing has for long been following the policy of uniting with all our neighbours to counter India (hexiao gongda policy). In the last five decades, China has established close relations with Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Experts call it the Chinese "string of pearls". Barring Nepal, in all other countries, China has acquired interests in the naval ports with a view to have sufficient control in the Indian Ocean.
Other dimensions of the Chinese grand strategy against India too deserve mention. The Chinese intelligence agency Ministry of State Security continues to support our insurgent groups of the northeast. Manipuri insurgents belonging to PLA continue to get Chinese support. They have been given shelter in the Yunnan province. The Chinese Intelligence agency also gives the NSCN(IM) weapons. In Nepal, China has established a string of branches of Nepal-China Study Centre (NCSC) along the Indo-Nepal border, which is used to gather intelligence against India. In addition, the Chinese cyberattacks on important Indian networks have increased. China's assistance to Pakistan in nuclear and missile fields as well as in military hardware is also a disturbing factor.
Notwithstanding the above activities of China, the Indian and the Chinese representatives keep on meeting to resolve the border dispute. From an analysis of the Chinese attitude at such meetings, it appears that they are not in a hurry to resolve the issue. China has come up with guiding principles like MUMAMA (Mutual Understanding, Mutual Agreement and Mutual Adjustment), which were interpreted in a positive manner by the Indian side. However, some experts now conclude that these principles were deliberately brought to gain time and keep the Indian side optimistic about the Chinese seriousness to resolve the issue. In fact, China desires to shelve the issue to a later period when it would have a substantial edge over India. This aspect must remain in the sharp focus of Indian planners who should evolve a suitable approach to resolve the issue as early as possible.
The Chinese in order to cover their actual designs of strengthening its military structures and enhancing its influence in our neighborhood project that this is the peaceful rise of China which is not against India or any other country. However, once China's military capability and influence grow, it would be in an advantageous position to bargain with India.
While it is in the interest of both China and India to maintain regional stability as well as the need to allow trade between the two countries, in the long run neither Indian nor Chinese defence planners can rule out confrontation over Tibet, Kashmir and Indian Ocean. Of course, the nature of confrontation will be determined by domestic political and economic developments in the two countries. For India, it is necessary to take suitable steps keeping in view the Chinese grand strategy.
In the present case, India's apt action has sent a clear message to China that India would not take such pinpricks lying down. Not only India has cancelled the trip of the delegation of Lt Gen Jaswal, but also the visit of three Chinese officers to India. India also summoned the Chinese ambassador to protest against the denial of visa to the Indian senior army officer. The message India gave was that China was solely responsible for the current problem and that India would not allow China to meddle in J&K. Hopefully, China would in future desist from such acts.
SHASH2K2
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cross post from other thread .
http://www.defenceforum.in/forum/chinese-defence-affairs/13999.htm
http://www.defenceforum.in/forum/chinese-defence-affairs/13999.htm
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I think we have to get the Burmese government to become "neutral" if not on our side. This has to be of utmost importance because even if we cannot earn a station in their country, we can deny that to the Chinese too. Bangladesh and SL are largely neutral even if being a bit more friendlier to the Chinese. Only problem are Pakistan's Gwadar port as Pakistanis have allegedly offered an air base to Chinese (according to PDF).
Other than Burmese, I don't see what other countries we can make neutrals out of. And we should start considering sharing the Diego Garcia base with US and start securint IOR region even more seriously. That ocean is named after us and it is a shame that we are not patrolling it entirely or calling it a part of our territory. Even if by UN conventions we cannot claim oceans as a part of national territories, then we should make sure that in the next decade, we should be controlling at least 65% of the IOR.
If we attain that kind of naval capability, PLAN would never consider entering our backyard and all the listening posts can be just sitting ducks. PLA still uses its old philosophy of "more land" that olden days emperors used to do and therefore we must eliminate every means for China to secure more territory. Already it has taken Aksai Chin and illegally occupied the Nation of Tibet. Now it is claiming Vietnamese islands that are resource rich. We should explore further opportunities with Vietnam. Merely defending IOR is not enough when China has already constructed ports and listening posts in countries that fall in our territory of Ocean. We have to build a military relationship with Vietnam in such a way that we have open access to South China Sea as a tit for tat response. Should PLAN consider adventures with its submarines, we must reply in similar language through ports in Vietnam. I am sure considering the bitterness between the two, Vietnamese would certainly welcome our strategic overtures.
Other than Burmese, I don't see what other countries we can make neutrals out of. And we should start considering sharing the Diego Garcia base with US and start securint IOR region even more seriously. That ocean is named after us and it is a shame that we are not patrolling it entirely or calling it a part of our territory. Even if by UN conventions we cannot claim oceans as a part of national territories, then we should make sure that in the next decade, we should be controlling at least 65% of the IOR.
If we attain that kind of naval capability, PLAN would never consider entering our backyard and all the listening posts can be just sitting ducks. PLA still uses its old philosophy of "more land" that olden days emperors used to do and therefore we must eliminate every means for China to secure more territory. Already it has taken Aksai Chin and illegally occupied the Nation of Tibet. Now it is claiming Vietnamese islands that are resource rich. We should explore further opportunities with Vietnam. Merely defending IOR is not enough when China has already constructed ports and listening posts in countries that fall in our territory of Ocean. We have to build a military relationship with Vietnam in such a way that we have open access to South China Sea as a tit for tat response. Should PLAN consider adventures with its submarines, we must reply in similar language through ports in Vietnam. I am sure considering the bitterness between the two, Vietnamese would certainly welcome our strategic overtures.
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Quoted off member Tshering "Other than Burmese, I don't see what other countries we can make neutrals out of. "
me: quite a handful i thinik , malaysia , indonesia , phillipines to name a few from among other such as thailand, cambodia laos etc . THey may not be pro prc at the moment but challenge is to get them into active mode
me: quite a handful i thinik , malaysia , indonesia , phillipines to name a few from among other such as thailand, cambodia laos etc . THey may not be pro prc at the moment but challenge is to get them into active mode
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China already has a base on Coco Islands, located just 18 km from Indian Andaman & Nicobar Islands. The Burmese have assured India they won't allow the Chinese to misuse their territory against India. But that still gives China a listening post on Coco Islands! And time will tell IF the Burmese will honor what they say!
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SHASH2K2
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I think we are active in securing Indian ocean and China cannot do much about it. we foiled their plan to secure bases in Maldives and hopefully will have a base in future . for coco Island we have our stationary Aircraft carrier name Andaman and Nicobar .We have more than enough firepower for Chinese .They can listen from coco but cannot dare to do anything from there . If they do something Myanmar will pay the price . Only problem is with Gwadar port in Pakistan . we had chabahar in Iran but due to sanction thats also not progressing at the rate they should be.
LETHALFORCE
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Let's not place China as a naval power in the same league as USA or Russia, they are nowhere close they don't control the South China seas and they will never get into the Indian ocean. They can pussyfoot as that is there style but let's not view them in the same context as REAL naval powers.
SHASH2K2
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Once we get p8I planes even their so called superior submarine fleets will be running for cover. So it will take years for china to come to Indian ocean . Let them control yellow sea first .
LETHALFORCE
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China will never be able to have supply lines to do anything in the Indian Ocean in a sustained manner.
SHASH2K2
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China's 'intentions' being closely monitored: India
India on Tuesday said China has been showing "more than the normal interest" in the Indian Ocean affairs and its "intentions" are being closely monitored. "The Government of India has come to realise that China has been showing more than the normal interest in the Indian Ocean affairs. So we are closely monitoring the Chinese intentions", External Affairs Minister SM Krishna said in the Lok Sabha.
"We are closely monitoring the developments in the Indian Ocean," he said and assured the House that "appropriate action and measures" would be taken to safeguard India's territorial integrity and the welfare of its fishermen.
Though he did not elaborate on the growing Chinese interests but was clearly referring to increasing engagement of China in projects in Sri Lanka and other countries in the Indian Ocean.
The statement, in response to a Calling Attention Motion on recent attacks on Indian fishermen by Sri Lankan Navy, came amid concerns here over reports that China had deployed around 11,000 of its troops in Gilgit-Baltistan region of Jammu and Kashmir which is under Pakistani occupation.
Earlier, TR Baalu (DMK), while moving the Motion, said that when an Indo-Sri Lanka agreement was signed on Katchathivu Islands in 1974, the then External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh had said the rights of fishing and navigation have been safeguarded for future.
Under the agreement on Katchathivu island which falls in Sri Lankan territory, Indian fishermen can rest and dry their nets during fishing in international waters.
Baalu claimed that in 1976, things changed on the Indian fishermen's rights when secretaries of India and Sri Lanka exchanged two sets of letters. "The letters became part and parcel of the agreement without taking Parliament and the state government into confidence...it is a blow to the fishermen," he said.
The DMK member asked the Centre to revisit the agreement on Katchathivu island and increase patrolling in the waters to protect Indian fishermen from the onslaught of Sri lankan Navy.
Krishna, however, ruled out revisiting of the pact, saying "we cannot go back on the solemn agreement between two governments."
Sri Lanka is a friendly country, an aspect that is needed to be kept in mind, he said adding that Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao was currently in Colombo, discussing such matters.
He said he was planning to travel to Colombo in October when issues related to fishermen would be discussed further.
Dissatisfied over Krishna's reply, AIADMK members led by M Thambidurai staged a walkout, while Baalu continued to raise several other questions even as the Speaker moved over to the Zero Hour.
India on Tuesday said China has been showing "more than the normal interest" in the Indian Ocean affairs and its "intentions" are being closely monitored. "The Government of India has come to realise that China has been showing more than the normal interest in the Indian Ocean affairs. So we are closely monitoring the Chinese intentions", External Affairs Minister SM Krishna said in the Lok Sabha.
"We are closely monitoring the developments in the Indian Ocean," he said and assured the House that "appropriate action and measures" would be taken to safeguard India's territorial integrity and the welfare of its fishermen.
Though he did not elaborate on the growing Chinese interests but was clearly referring to increasing engagement of China in projects in Sri Lanka and other countries in the Indian Ocean.
The statement, in response to a Calling Attention Motion on recent attacks on Indian fishermen by Sri Lankan Navy, came amid concerns here over reports that China had deployed around 11,000 of its troops in Gilgit-Baltistan region of Jammu and Kashmir which is under Pakistani occupation.
Earlier, TR Baalu (DMK), while moving the Motion, said that when an Indo-Sri Lanka agreement was signed on Katchathivu Islands in 1974, the then External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh had said the rights of fishing and navigation have been safeguarded for future.
Under the agreement on Katchathivu island which falls in Sri Lankan territory, Indian fishermen can rest and dry their nets during fishing in international waters.
Baalu claimed that in 1976, things changed on the Indian fishermen's rights when secretaries of India and Sri Lanka exchanged two sets of letters. "The letters became part and parcel of the agreement without taking Parliament and the state government into confidence...it is a blow to the fishermen," he said.
The DMK member asked the Centre to revisit the agreement on Katchathivu island and increase patrolling in the waters to protect Indian fishermen from the onslaught of Sri lankan Navy.
Krishna, however, ruled out revisiting of the pact, saying "we cannot go back on the solemn agreement between two governments."
Sri Lanka is a friendly country, an aspect that is needed to be kept in mind, he said adding that Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao was currently in Colombo, discussing such matters.
He said he was planning to travel to Colombo in October when issues related to fishermen would be discussed further.
Dissatisfied over Krishna's reply, AIADMK members led by M Thambidurai staged a walkout, while Baalu continued to raise several other questions even as the Speaker moved over to the Zero Hour.
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Malaysia and Indonesia have also started receiving Chinese missiles like the Indonesian Navy's latest Chinese shipborne missiles. We can make a hard pitch for BrahMos or even Nirbhay but unless and until Sarkari dodos get their act straight, Indonesians might allow Chinese to get a few bases. Unless we loosen up our hold on strategic weapons for exports, I don't see many countries who'd be willing to become our allies in the future. Philippines are just too far away and more towards Chinese side than in any way to affect us.
However, we must secure our Southeast: Camodia, Laos, Vietnam, Thailand and Burma. This is the jugular Chinese are sensitive about ESPECIALLY Vietnam.
Agantrope
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Even our tupolov is best in the business still now.
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Buddy, Burmese aren't as "evil" as portrayed by Western countries. They are a small country who want to be left alone We like idiots have meddled in their internal affairs by supporting Suu Kyi for the sake of appeasing United States and that blunder caused China to score a goal. Also we must consider future exports of Dhruv, Tejas, Arjun and Shivalik style strategic weapons alongside shipborne missiles like Dhanush and torpedoes like Varunastra. These strategic weapons will enable building confidence measures.
Amnesty International and Human Rights Commission are bigots and hypocrites who want to bog India down with unnecessary guilt. These bloody puppets of radicals and fundamentalists place us second to Iraq in religious freedom despite half of India being given to Missionaries and Mullahs. These bigots accuse India of trading nuclear secrets with Iran when we don't even have a decent defence relations with them. China shows these two organizations "The Finger" and that is why they don't dare to criticize her, enabling the Dragon to score goals after goals while we cower down to Western pressure for no bloody reason.
If we can ignore the violence against Buddhist monks and India can remain silent on that because of the sham our government calls 'secularism', then we should forget Western demands for democracy in Burma. Burmese are never against us, they did nothing against us and we needlessly made them trust China because of pressure from people who live 3 oceans away. About time we come to our senses and start developing our foreign policies independent of what other countries have to say.
