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http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/IndiaICBM.pdf
Indian Space Launch Vehicles and ICBM
February 29, 2008
Kartik Bommakanti
This piece explores why it is assumed within India and elsewhere that New Delhi will
adapt its space launch vehicles to build an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM).
Some Indian commentators justify acquiring an ICBM by arguing it has special
symbolism or that the country has the technical capability to do so. Elsewhere, analysts
draw inferences about India’s intentions from its space capabilities. Surveying the
technical and the political factors will reveal that an Indian ICBM is a remote possibility.
It shows that technical impediments can be potentially overcome, but argues that these
are unlikely to override political preferences. The empirical evidence suggests that
advances in India’s missile capabilities do not and have not paralleled the pace and
intensity in development of India’s space launch rocketry.
Bharat Karnad, one of India’s leading strategic analysts, says the Polar Satellite Launch
Vehicle (PSLV), Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV) or the Geostationary
Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) can be easily turned into an ICBM with their satellite
payloads replaced with a thermonuclear warhead.1 Contrary to Karnad’s assertion, India’s
space launch vehicles cannot be automatically converted into usable ICBMs, even if their
technologies could help build one.
A brief survey of the technical evidence will demonstrate why this is difficult to achieve.
Compared to the most sophisticated ICBMs in the Russian missile inventory, whose
road-mobile SS-27 has a launch weight of 47.2 tons,2 while its rail-mobile SS-24 variant
weighs 104.5 tons,3 India’s SLVs are in a completely different launch weight category.
The GSLV has a total weight that is over eight times (401 tons)4 greater than the SS-27
and almost three times the weight of the SS-24. The PSLV, lighter than the GSLV, still
weighs six times (294 tons) more than the SS-27 and approximately three times heavier
than the SS-24.5 Thus, the Indian space launch vehicles’ excessive weight alone
precludes easy conversion into an ICBM.
However, a 2005 U.S. Department of Defense report, making a generic observation about
reconfiguring space launch vehicles into ICBMs, noted, “Demonstrating multistage
booster technology sufficient to reach GEO [Geostationary Orbit] is an indication that a
nation has capability to seriously pursue ICBM capabilities.”6 An indigenous GSLV
capability is something India is yet to develop fully. The Indian Space Research
Organization (ISRO) has launched five developmental flights of its GSLV, using
Russian-supplied cryogenic engines. These engines are used in the upper stage of the
GSLV, which bear similarity to their use in the American Saturn V and Saturn 1B
rockets.7 India is poised to launch in 2008 its GSLV-III with an indigenously developed
cryogenic rocket engine, which can carry a 4-ton payload to geosynchronous orbit.8 This
launch platform is completely new: the vehicle is not a derivative of its previous Indian
space launch vehicles.9 The ground test was successfully carried out in November 2007 at
the Liquid Propulsion Test Facility in Southern India. This engine will form the
cryogenic upper stage of the GSLV-III.10
Even with this step forward, technical hurdles will remain in changing the GSLV into an
ICBM. GLSVs use cryogenic engines which are liquid-fueled. The very low temperatures
of cryogenic engines, if used for ICBM propulsion, render their storage over prolonged
periods of time very difficult.11 Indian SLVs use solid fuels for initial propulsion and
liquid fuel during intermediate stages.12 Unlike other fuels, the storage volume of liquid
hydrogen is very high due to its extremely low density, which stands at 0.59 pounds per
gallon.13 In addition, as the 2005 DOD report mentioned earlier noted, “A propellant with
a low storage temperature i.e., a cryogenic, will require thermal insulation, thus further
increasing the mass of the launcher.”14 The United States in the 1960s decided to shift
from its liquid-fueled ICBMs to solid-fueled rockets due to the problems associated with
the storability of liquid-fueled engines and the enormous time it takes in preparing a
liquid-fueled ICBM launch.15
continued
Indian Space Launch Vehicles and ICBM
February 29, 2008
Kartik Bommakanti
This piece explores why it is assumed within India and elsewhere that New Delhi will
adapt its space launch vehicles to build an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM).
Some Indian commentators justify acquiring an ICBM by arguing it has special
symbolism or that the country has the technical capability to do so. Elsewhere, analysts
draw inferences about India’s intentions from its space capabilities. Surveying the
technical and the political factors will reveal that an Indian ICBM is a remote possibility.
It shows that technical impediments can be potentially overcome, but argues that these
are unlikely to override political preferences. The empirical evidence suggests that
advances in India’s missile capabilities do not and have not paralleled the pace and
intensity in development of India’s space launch rocketry.
Bharat Karnad, one of India’s leading strategic analysts, says the Polar Satellite Launch
Vehicle (PSLV), Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV) or the Geostationary
Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) can be easily turned into an ICBM with their satellite
payloads replaced with a thermonuclear warhead.1 Contrary to Karnad’s assertion, India’s
space launch vehicles cannot be automatically converted into usable ICBMs, even if their
technologies could help build one.
A brief survey of the technical evidence will demonstrate why this is difficult to achieve.
Compared to the most sophisticated ICBMs in the Russian missile inventory, whose
road-mobile SS-27 has a launch weight of 47.2 tons,2 while its rail-mobile SS-24 variant
weighs 104.5 tons,3 India’s SLVs are in a completely different launch weight category.
The GSLV has a total weight that is over eight times (401 tons)4 greater than the SS-27
and almost three times the weight of the SS-24. The PSLV, lighter than the GSLV, still
weighs six times (294 tons) more than the SS-27 and approximately three times heavier
than the SS-24.5 Thus, the Indian space launch vehicles’ excessive weight alone
precludes easy conversion into an ICBM.
However, a 2005 U.S. Department of Defense report, making a generic observation about
reconfiguring space launch vehicles into ICBMs, noted, “Demonstrating multistage
booster technology sufficient to reach GEO [Geostationary Orbit] is an indication that a
nation has capability to seriously pursue ICBM capabilities.”6 An indigenous GSLV
capability is something India is yet to develop fully. The Indian Space Research
Organization (ISRO) has launched five developmental flights of its GSLV, using
Russian-supplied cryogenic engines. These engines are used in the upper stage of the
GSLV, which bear similarity to their use in the American Saturn V and Saturn 1B
rockets.7 India is poised to launch in 2008 its GSLV-III with an indigenously developed
cryogenic rocket engine, which can carry a 4-ton payload to geosynchronous orbit.8 This
launch platform is completely new: the vehicle is not a derivative of its previous Indian
space launch vehicles.9 The ground test was successfully carried out in November 2007 at
the Liquid Propulsion Test Facility in Southern India. This engine will form the
cryogenic upper stage of the GSLV-III.10
Even with this step forward, technical hurdles will remain in changing the GSLV into an
ICBM. GLSVs use cryogenic engines which are liquid-fueled. The very low temperatures
of cryogenic engines, if used for ICBM propulsion, render their storage over prolonged
periods of time very difficult.11 Indian SLVs use solid fuels for initial propulsion and
liquid fuel during intermediate stages.12 Unlike other fuels, the storage volume of liquid
hydrogen is very high due to its extremely low density, which stands at 0.59 pounds per
gallon.13 In addition, as the 2005 DOD report mentioned earlier noted, “A propellant with
a low storage temperature i.e., a cryogenic, will require thermal insulation, thus further
increasing the mass of the launcher.”14 The United States in the 1960s decided to shift
from its liquid-fueled ICBMs to solid-fueled rockets due to the problems associated with
the storability of liquid-fueled engines and the enormous time it takes in preparing a
liquid-fueled ICBM launch.15
continued