Indian Air Force strength compared to PLAAF(Fighters+Attackers)

Iamanidiot

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Will everybody knock some Common sense into their heads.The PLAAF doctrine is air denial using SAMS in conjunction with the PLAAF.Even for the specified 3 months the weather in the himalayas is so fickle the pilots have to put more effort to even stay in Air than have combat with each other.The Chinese rather than using the PLAAF will rather use the 2nd Artillery divisons 1600 conventionally armed missiles,Two of those can send a brigade HQ to smoke.

If anyone wants to discuss war wrt to China discuss WZC if u know it.Not these tool measuring contests
 

Iamanidiot

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By modern air war, you mean the one sided aerial campaigns we are seeing these days, right?

Think of WW2. It went on for years. I think 3 months is reasonable if not less for a full blown India-PRC conflict.
Another time another age not applicable now
 

Poseidon

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PLA has changed it's doctrine which was a modified version of a Soviet Doctrine of WW2,that is mainly scorched earth policy.PLA is now basing it's strategy on fast mobilization,air support,real time updates to commanders & massive Artillery support.

There has been massive changes on both sides post 1962,nukes have lowered the threat of war,Chinese troops will not have the 1:8 advantage over India,technological gap has reduced(In 1962 IA had Lee enfield's whereas PLAGF had German SMG's)

IAF has one significant advantage over PLAAF that is PLAAF fighters will be based at an higher altitude they will be able to carry less combat payload compared to MKI's.
 

Iamanidiot

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PLA has changed it's doctrine which was a modified version of a Soviet Doctrine of WW2,that is mainly scorched earth policy.PLA is now basing it's strategy on fast mobilization,air support,real time updates to commanders & massive Artillery support.

There has been massive changes on both sides post 1962,nukes have lowered the threat of war,Chinese troops will not have the 1:8 advantage over India,technological gap has reduced(In 1962 IA had Lee enfield's whereas PLAGF had German SMG's)

IAF has one significant advantage over PLAAF that is PLAAF fighters will be based at an higher altitude they will be able to carry less combat payload compared to MKI's
.
That can be countered by having longer runways and they are promptly doing it
 

Iamanidiot

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I wish we had some professional who could explain all these intricacies.I have got a vague idea after reading other fora
 

Poseidon

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That can be countered by having longer runways and they are promptly doing it
Yes,they are.The main bottlenecks on Indian side are more infrastructural problems than technological;Though I expect the situation to improve soon.
Anyway does anybody know about the tactics,skill employed by PLAAF pilots,after they were not involved in Aerial combat post Korea.
I think PLAAF also participates in less international combat exercises.
 

Poseidon

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Assessing the PLA Air Force's Ten Pillars
Publication: China Brief Volume: 11 Issue: 3
February 10, 2011
By: Kenneth Allen

During Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' visit to China in January 2011, he stressed the importance of solid military-to-military relations. As a result of his visit, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) and People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) will hopefully engage each other through military exchanges across a wide range of issues rather than in combat. Unfortunately, his emphasis on the resumption of military dialogue was overshadowed by the timing of China's first flight test of its J-20 stealth aircraft at the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation during his visit. While the implications of the timing of the flight test are debatable, the USAF now has a window into understanding more about the aircraft, as well as an opportunity to discuss it openly with the PLAAF and aviation industry personnel.

Although most PLAAF analysis focuses on the impressive array of advanced weapon systems it has fielded over the past decade and is planning to field over the next decade, including the J-20, it is important to examine the PLAAF from a broad perspective by pointing out some of its strong and weak points beyond its weapons and equipment. Indeed, analyzing the weak points, as well as the strong points, could provide significant clues about the PLAAF's overall capabilities in combat.

The purpose of this article is to help analysts at different levels (tactical, operational, and strategic) examine and engage the PLAAF using the Ten Pillars as a base. The Ten Pillars include organizational structure, leadership, doctrine, officer corps, enlisted force, education, training, logistics and maintenance, and foreign relations [1]. The article also provides information about the key joint billets PLAAF, PLA Navy (PLAN), and Second Artillery officers hold within the PLA's joint leadership structure. Although the Army still dominates the leadership structure, patterns are emerging for permanent PLAAF, PLAN, and Second Artillery billets as Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff. These are important clues for examining the future commanders for each organization as the Chinese Communist Party's 18th Party Congress in 2012 approaches.

Key Findings

Based on an assessment of the pillars, the following key findings are made:

The PLAAF and USAF are different. What works for one doesn't necessarily work for the other. Analysts need to examine the PLAAF through its eyes without always comparing it to the USAF.

Assessing the PLAAF requires understanding how all Ten Pillars fit together, which includes assessing all four branches (aviation, surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, and airborne) and five specialty forces (technical reconnaissance, electronic countermeasures, communications, chemical defense, and radar), as well as the education and training system.

The PLAAF is rapidly moving ahead technologically, especially through the deployment of new equipment, weapon systems, and information technology (e.g. informatization) with the goal of achieving integrated joint operations with the Army, Navy, and Second Artillery, but some advances are being held back by its historical culture and an Army-dominated leadership structure (See further discussion on this topic below). The PLAAF is also moving forward in its training capabilities. Key tactics training areas include unscripted, opposition force, jamming, night, all-weather, over water, minimum altitude, dissimilar aircraft, and aircraft-SAM/AAA de-confliction training, but the training is still not at the highest levels in several areas.

The PLA is a long way from becoming a truly joint military that incorporates senior PLAAF and PLAN officers in the highest-level organizations. The PLAAF remains underrepresented in the highest echelons, including the second and third tiers, of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee's Military Commission (CMC), the four General Departments—General Staff Department (GSD), General Political Department (GPD), General Logistics Department (GLD), and General Armament Department (GAD)—and the Military Region (MR) Headquarters.

Although the PLAAF recognizes that its capabilities, doctrine, and training must still evolve considerably in order to challenge U.S. power projection capabilities, it is exhibiting a growing sense of confidence in just about everything it is doing.

The PLAAF acknowledges that its training management and support systems are not adequate. In addition, the PLAAF recognizes that its operators are not granted sufficient autonomy to perform optimally in complex, dynamic operational environments. Centralized control remains a persistent and unresolved problem. Although the PLAAF uses tactics training coordination zones for combined-arms and joint training, most training is opposition force.

The PLAAF's annual training cycle revolves around two key periods: all new officers arrive at their unit between July and September during the peak exercise season; and one-half of the PLAAF's conscripts/recruits turnover and all enlisted personnel who are not promoted to the next grade are demobilized during November through January.

The PLAAF's officer corps is changing, but not in all areas. Whereas PLAAF college graduates receive their technical training as a cadet, civilian college graduates, who comprised a high percentage (possibly 60 percent) of all new officers in 2010, may or may not receive any technical training prior to assuming their new billets. In addition, officer intermediate and advanced professional military education (PME) is separated by the five career tracks, each of which is taught in a different location.

The PLAAF's enlisted force is gradually evolving from a conscript force based primarily on new personnel having only a ninth grade education to a force recruited from high school graduates, college students, and college graduates. The goal is to build a more highly skilled noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps.

The PLAAF has been heavily involved in domestic disaster relief operations the past few years, which have provided opportunities for real-world, unopposed experience and has highlighted a critical lack of airlift assets.

The PLAAF is increasing its engagement with foreign air forces through functional and educational exchanges, as well as joint exercises, but foreign contact and exposure remains tightly constrained by PLA guidelines. For example, the PLAAF commander and political commissar are restricted to one foreign trip annually, and the PLAAF posts military attachés to only a few foreign countries.

The PLAAF and Jointness

As China's economic center of gravity continues to shift from the interior to the coast, the role of the PLAAF, PLAN, and Second Artillery in terms of protecting sea lines of communication and territorial integrity through joint integrated operations will grow in relation to the Army. One indicator of the PLAAF's shifting role, as well as that of the PLAN and Second Artillery, in joint integrated operations concerns how it is, or is not, integrated into the PLA's "joint" leadership structure. The leadership structure, which is responsible for overseeing the entire PLA's ten pillars, consists of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee's Military Commission (CMC), the four General Departments—General Staff Department (GSD), General Political Department (GPD), General Logistics Department (GLD), and General Armament Department (GAD)—the Academy of Military Science (AMS), National Defense University (NDU), and the seven military region (MR) headquarters [2].

Although the PLAAF commander has been a member of the CMC since 2004, it is the author's opinion that the PLAAF does not, and will not for the foreseeable future, play a major role in the Army-dominated PLA leadership structure [3]. Specifically, there is debate about whether the current PLAAF commander, General Xu Qiliang, will become the Minister of Defense and/or a CMC vice chairman during the 18th Party Congress, which will be held in late 2012. Those arguing that he will move to one or both of these positions cite his age and seniority on the CMC and the grooming of General Ma Xiaotian as the next PLAAF commander [4]. Ma is currently one of the Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff (DCGS) and would have to retire if he does not become PLAAF commander. Those arguing against this cite the Army's historical domination of those positions. That said, however, it is the author's opinion that even if Xu does assume one or both of those billets, he will wear an Army uniform.

Concerning the PLAAF's, PLAN's, and Second Artillery's role in the four General Departments, the key to remember is that the General Departments serve not only as the joint command but as the Army Headquarters [5]. As such, the directors have always been, and will most likely always be, Army officers. As shown in Figure 1, within the four General Departments, PLAAF officers have served continuously since 2004 as one of the DCGSs, and since 2005 as one of the deputies in the GPD. As such, it appears that the GSD and GPD now have permanent PLAAF deputy billets. It does not appear, however, that the GLD has a permanent PLAAF deputy billet.

No PLAAF, PLAN, or Second Artillery officers have ever served as a deputy in the GAD, which indicates it is less joint than the GSD, GPD, and GLD. Furthermore, it appears that only Army officers have served as the director for any second-level departments, such as the Operations, Intelligence, Cadre, Propaganda, Transportation, and Finance Departments.

Each MR Headquarters, which "exercises direct leadership over the Army units within its area of responsibility," has an average of five deputy commanders [8]. Since 1988, each Military Region Air Force (MRAF) commander and Fleet commander has served concurrently as an MR deputy commander; however, all of the other MR deputy commanders who serve full time on the staff are Army officers. Furthermore, like the four General Departments, no PLAAF officers have served as the director of an MR first-level department and only a few PLAAF personnel apparently hold positions in any of the departments.

There are no indications this situation will change unless the PLA completely reorganizes the, CMC, General Departments, and MR Headquarters.

Conclusions

The USAF and PLAAF are different and will employ their assets differently in combat. As such, one should not necessarily compare the two using the same criteria. While it is important to focus on the PLAAF's weapon systems, it is also important to examine the PLAAF as a whole to see where it is moving forward and where it is not in terms of its goal of achieving integrated joint operations with the Army, Navy, and Second Artillery.

There is no doubt but that the PLAAF is modernizing its force with new weapon systems and equipment, including combat aircraft, air-to-air missiles, air-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and ground-based radar systems. It is also trying to conduct more realistic training with the new equipment with the goal of eventually implementing integrated joint operations with the Army, Navy, and Second Artillery. That said, however, the PLAAF is lagging behind in many areas that affect how it can use these new systems to the best of their abilities, especially during sustained offensive and defensive operations. One of the biggest areas of concern is the lack of sufficient airlift assets and the ability to coordinate between fighters and SAMs inside an air defense zone. In addition, it is dealing with trying to recruit, train, and retain a more educated enlisted force and officer corps to be able to operate and maintain these new systems.

One of the biggest reason the PLAAF is not moving forward as rapidly as it could across the board is that it is being held back by its historical culture, including subservience to the Army's dominance in the CMC, General Departments, and Military Region Headquarters, and its inability to push command decisions down to lower levels. As such, there are no indications this situation will change in the near future.

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37488

Some points hold for IAF too.
 
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Iamanidiot

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Yes,they are.The main bottlenecks on Indian side are more infrastructural problems than technological;Though I expect the situation to improve soon.
Anyway does anybody know about the tactics,skill employed by PLAAF pilots,after they were not involved in Aerial combat post Korea.
I think PLAAF also participates in less international combat exercises.
The PLAAF just needs to do Air Denial
 

asianobserve

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No need to sacrifice precious MKIs. You know should know by now where the Air bases (declared and undeclared), missile sites (declared and undeclared) of the PLA, just pulverise them in advance. Start the war from a stand off distance with cruise missiles, jamming and systems infection.

Whatever happens, the IAF should not send their MKIs near the effective range of Chinese AA batteries (not J10s) until they're neutralized. The Israelis learned this the hard way in Syria.
 

Kunal Biswas

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The PLAAF have 5 active airbase in TAR and Majority over eastern part of China, These 5 airbases have Air-defense fighters mainly, But can be used for CAS if needed but it have its own problems..
 

agentperry

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one need strong and short force to attack and neutralize and large and high on supply force to defend. as Indian force is small and in near future too the scope is not so rosy to accommodate bigger force like 1500 to 2000 fighter/bombers, so India should focus on being an aggressor in the region. highly capable fighters should be made to conduct high precision pre-emptive strike to take away the goods of chinese infra developement like destroying the bridges of trans tibetean railways and supply depots of pla and plaaf with missiles sites.
this will give enough advantage for Indian army to take over enough areas of tibet and once forward bases of china are taken over, the fight will be to protect them from chinese effort to re-capture them. then road mobile SAMs will be fun. wait for chinese and shoot them down.

huge losses will facilitate the dialogues and a relatively permanent settlement can be reached.
 

Kunal Biswas

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TAR region is more vulnerable than what on other side, Thanks to mountain terrain..

You dont need very highly capable fighters but better equipped onces, Better EW suit and LGB with typical MKIs as escorts..
 

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