There is so much misinformation in this thread based on imaginary assumptions.
The estimate reported by
Dawn that India has enough fissile material to produce 2,000 nuclear weapons can be traced back to a 2014 assessment by Mansoor Ahmed, a Pakistani nuclear analyst. He estimated that at the end of 2013, India’s fissile material stockpile included 800 to 1,000 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, 2 metric tons of HEU, and 15 metric tons of reactor-grade plutonium. Assuming that 4 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, 50 kilograms of HEU, or 8 kilograms of reactor-grade plutonium would be necessary to make one nuclear warhead of each type, Ahmed estimated that India could produce 250 warheads from weapons-grade plutonium, 40 from HEU (gun-type implosion devices, not thermonuclear weapons), and 1,875 from reactor-grade plutonium—for a total arsenal of 2,165 nuclear weapons.
In contrast, the recent report from ISIS concluded that at the end of 2014, India likely possessed about 550 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, 100 to 200 kilograms of HEU intended for use in thermonuclear weapons, and 2.9 metric tons of separated reactor-grade plutonium. The study assessed that this fissile material was sufficient to produce about 75 to 125 nuclear warheads, with 100 nuclear weapons as the median estimate. ISIS arrived at this number mainly through an appraisal of India’s weapons-grade plutonium stockpile; they assume that India would not use reactor-grade plutonium in nuclear warheads, and that HEU would only be used to produce a handful of thermonuclear weapons at most. ISIS also considered that some plutonium is in weapons production pipelines or held in reserve, meaning that only about 70 percent of India’s stockpile is available to be made into weapons. Assuming that it would take 3 to 5 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium for each warhead, ISIS calculations yielded an arsenal that could range from 75 to 125 nuclear weapons.
The biggest difference between these two estimates comes from their assessments of, and assumptions about, reactor-grade plutonium. Not only does the ISIS study discount the possibility that India would use reactor-grade plutonium in its nuclear weapons, but its estimate of India’s reactor-grade plutonium stockpile is also significantly lower than Ahmed’s: 2.9 metric tons as opposed to 15 metric tons.
Other estimates of fissile material stockpiles typically do not include plutonium in spent fuel that has not been reprocessed, for the good reason that such fissile material is not available for use in nuclear weapons. Reprocessing is complicated and expensive, and India in particular has historically had trouble achieving consistent operations in its reprocessing facilities. In its Global Fissile Material Report 2015, the IPFM does not include unseparated plutonium as part of its estimate of India’s fissile material stockpile, citing the historically poor performance of India’s reprocessing plants at Tarapur and Kalpakkam.
The report notes that
India’s reactor-grade plutonium stockpile is most likely intended as fuel for the country’s Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor—not for nuclear weapons, as Ahmed assumes—but that the reactor’s start date has been pushed back several times. This is likely due to difficulty that India has reportedly experienced in separating sufficient plutonium to fuel the reactor. Considering this historically low rate of separation and the problems it has caused for India’s fast breeder reactor program.
After discounting unseparated plutonium in spent fuel as a source of proliferation in the near future, even Ahmed’s generous estimate from the South Asian Voices blog post is only equivalent to a potential Indian arsenal of 844 nuclear warheads—a significant number to be sure, but nowhere near 2,000 weapons.
If one discounts reactor-grade plutonium entirely, that estimate drops even further to an arsenal of just 219 weapons. In addition, it is likely that much, or even
most, of India’s HEU is intended for use in naval reactors rather than in nuclear warheads. It is also clear that some of India’s weapons-grade plutonium was already used in nuclear tests or is contained in process waste. Taking into account those factors, the estimate quickly begins to drop to something much more along the lines of the ISIS estimate of roughly 100 nuclear warheads.
Brigadier Vijay K. Nair suggested a force level of 132 nuclear warheads of different types, including weapons in the megaton range. For delivery, besides bomber and fighter-bomber aircraft, he recommended five SSBNs with sixteen SLBMs on each, and 48 ballistic missiles—twelve SRBMs and 36 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs).
Out of a total requirement of 111 nuclear warheads for retaliatory strikes against Pakistan (seventeen targets) and China (eight targets), he felt that 37 warheads were required for strikes and an additional 74 as a “65 percent reserve for reliability.” He added another 22 as a “post-war reserve,” taking the total to 132 warheads.
Requirements for Nuclear Warheads
Timeframe_____Strategic_____Tactical_____Total
2000–2010_____57__________30__________87
2010–2020_____131_________40__________171
2020–2030_____268_________60__________328
The breakdown of the final figure of 328 nuclear warheads and the proposed delivery systems.
- Four SSBNs with 48 SLBMs (with a single warhead each).
- 40 SU-30s with 40 NGBs and 40 N-ASMs (strategic) and 30 SU-30s with 30 NGBs and 30 N-ASMs (tactical).
- 25 ICBMs.
- 40 IRBMs.
- 25 ADMs.
- 50 reserve warheads.
Possible Nuclear Force Structure: 2000–2030
Phase I: 2000–2010
Delivery System_______________Quantity__________Warheads
Prithvi Two groups________________16__________20- to 30-kiloton, fission
Agni-I and -II Two groups___________24__________200-kiloton, thermonuclear
Dhanush Four to eight launchers_____ 8__________20- to 30-kiloton, fission
Su-30MKI, Mirage 2000, Jaguar_____32 __________200-kiloton, thermonuclear
Total: 80 warheads
Phase II: 2011–2020
Delivery System _________________Quantity__________Warheads
Prithvi Four groups_________________ 16 __________ 20- to 30-kiloton, fission
Agni-II and -III Two groups____________24__________200-kiloton, thermonuclear
Agni-IV and -V Two groups____________36__________200-kiloton, thermonuclear
SSBN Two boats; 24 SLBM launchers___26__________200-kiloton, thermonuclear
Su-30MKI, Mirage 2000, Rafale________48__________200-kiloton, thermonuclear
Total: 150 warheads
Phase III: 2021–2030
Delivery System____________________Quantity____________Warheads
Agni-I, -II, -III, and -IV Four groups________96__________200-kiloton, thermonuclear
Agni-VI and Surya One group____________18__________200-kiloton, thermonuclear
SSBN Four boats, 48 SLBM launchers_____50__________200-kiloton, thermonuclear
Su-30MKI and replacement______________36__________200-kiloton, thermonuclear
Total: 200 warheads
Pakistan’s nuclear warheads are based on a Chinese design that used highly enriched uranium as the fissionable core. According to public estimates, Pakistan probably had amassed between 30 and 85 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium from its Khushab research reactor and between 1300 and 1700 kilograms of weapon-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) from the Kahuta gas centrifuge facility. The Khushab reactor can probably produce between 10 and 15 kilograms of plutonium per year. Kahuta may be able to produce 100 kilograms of HEU each year. Assuming that Pakistani scientists require 5 to 7 kilograms of plutonium to make one warhead, and 20 to 25 kilograms of HEU to produce a bomb, then Pakistan would have accumulated enough fissile material to be able to manufacture between 70 and 115 nuclear weapons by the end of 2006.
2015 Estimates
Country__________Total Arsenal Estimates
China____________________250
Pakistan_______________110–130
India__________________110–120
Interesting read:
http://thebulletin.org/fuzzy-math-indian-nuclear-weapons9343
http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/india-s-nuclear-force-structure-2025-pub-63988