captscooby81
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@TheHurtLocker
Who needs it most, if anyone?
So are submarine-launched air missiles really a capability we’ll find widespread on submarines in the future? Maybe: But there will be a clear delineation in the motives of the countries that deploy them.
These systems might prove most valuable on diesel-electric submarines, especially those that are not air-independent propulsion (AIP) equipped, and have to surface far more often to recharge their batteries. With the window for undersea operations narrowed, a SLAM at least gives air-breathing subs a shot at defending themselves from an imminent attack.
These boats spend much of their operational careers close to shore in littoral combat environments where hiding places are prevalent, but once detected, escape options may be limited. But even then, SLAMs would be a weapon of last resort—used under extreme circumstances due to its massive implications.
Another hindrance is that diesel electric subs have less space for weaponry and sensor masts than their larger and more complex nuclear counterparts. Taking up valuable real estate with a questionable last line of defense weapon may prove unpalatable. IDAS, with its potential land and surface attack capability, would at least exchange multi-role flexibility for the space it takes up and the cost of integration and training.
Considering China’s large fleet of diesel-electric submarines, shallow operating areas in the South China Sea, and the prevalence of American, Japanese and other navies in the region operating high-quality anti-submarine warfare capabilities, a Chinese SLAM may become a reality in the near future. In fact, the PLAN has worked on various submarine-based anti-aircraft weapons concepts in the past.
The DCNS SLAM missile they were talking about in the brochure
Who needs it most, if anyone?
So are submarine-launched air missiles really a capability we’ll find widespread on submarines in the future? Maybe: But there will be a clear delineation in the motives of the countries that deploy them.
These systems might prove most valuable on diesel-electric submarines, especially those that are not air-independent propulsion (AIP) equipped, and have to surface far more often to recharge their batteries. With the window for undersea operations narrowed, a SLAM at least gives air-breathing subs a shot at defending themselves from an imminent attack.
These boats spend much of their operational careers close to shore in littoral combat environments where hiding places are prevalent, but once detected, escape options may be limited. But even then, SLAMs would be a weapon of last resort—used under extreme circumstances due to its massive implications.
Another hindrance is that diesel electric subs have less space for weaponry and sensor masts than their larger and more complex nuclear counterparts. Taking up valuable real estate with a questionable last line of defense weapon may prove unpalatable. IDAS, with its potential land and surface attack capability, would at least exchange multi-role flexibility for the space it takes up and the cost of integration and training.
Considering China’s large fleet of diesel-electric submarines, shallow operating areas in the South China Sea, and the prevalence of American, Japanese and other navies in the region operating high-quality anti-submarine warfare capabilities, a Chinese SLAM may become a reality in the near future. In fact, the PLAN has worked on various submarine-based anti-aircraft weapons concepts in the past.
The DCNS SLAM missile they were talking about in the brochure
