Hari Sud
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Bad assessment of 1962 situation around China:
Capabilities and intentions are two different aspects. However, intent will depend largely on capabilities.
In 162, China was almost starving and their relation with USSR were deteriorating. Their Army was fatigued of the Korian war. They had no hopes of sucess against veteran India Army. Still they attacked and attained their objective of bringing Nehru's downfall.
No, Chinese were not fatigued. The Korean war had been over for 10 years. USSR had pumped $4 Billion (in 1950 dollars) into Chinese army in that period; which Mao refused to pay back. They were starving but not to the extent you seemed to imply. Indian army was under funded; thanks to Panchsheel and Nehru & Krishana Menon. The timing picked in October & November was bad. Worst of all they picked the wrong leadership of the army, which had not practised in mountain and snow warfare. On the other hand the Chinese brought their elite snow warrios from Manchuria with snow and mountain trained troops. The refugees arriving from Tibet in Tawang had elements of intelligence amongest them. Hence Chinese had better troops, good leadership and great intelligence. For them reaching Bomdila was piece of cake. Indian army did not even know the pathways let alone the roads to reach Nam Ka Chu River (the first flash point of the trouble).
The above is not true today. So Chinese are wiser and would keep the glory of 1962 victory with them. Instead of loosing all that glory in a fresh clash.
Capabilities and intentions are two different aspects. However, intent will depend largely on capabilities.
In 162, China was almost starving and their relation with USSR were deteriorating. Their Army was fatigued of the Korian war. They had no hopes of sucess against veteran India Army. Still they attacked and attained their objective of bringing Nehru's downfall.
No, Chinese were not fatigued. The Korean war had been over for 10 years. USSR had pumped $4 Billion (in 1950 dollars) into Chinese army in that period; which Mao refused to pay back. They were starving but not to the extent you seemed to imply. Indian army was under funded; thanks to Panchsheel and Nehru & Krishana Menon. The timing picked in October & November was bad. Worst of all they picked the wrong leadership of the army, which had not practised in mountain and snow warfare. On the other hand the Chinese brought their elite snow warrios from Manchuria with snow and mountain trained troops. The refugees arriving from Tibet in Tawang had elements of intelligence amongest them. Hence Chinese had better troops, good leadership and great intelligence. For them reaching Bomdila was piece of cake. Indian army did not even know the pathways let alone the roads to reach Nam Ka Chu River (the first flash point of the trouble).
The above is not true today. So Chinese are wiser and would keep the glory of 1962 victory with them. Instead of loosing all that glory in a fresh clash.