IDN TAKE: Why India Should Buy the F-35 Lightning II

[pmaitra]

So we're shifting the goalposts now ?
What happened to the "400km" number.

Fine ,quote someone regardless of their views on F-35 who claimed 400km detection range against Flankers.



Nice excuse to back out.

The amount of effort you are spending writing these posts is better spent reading the thread. You will eventually discover where that 400 km came from.

 

[Scarface]

The amount of effort you are spending writing these posts is better spent reading the thread. You will eventually discover where that 400 km came from.

It came from you,quoting @Immanuel and his post which said 200km, not 400.

I am trying to think how much power the single engine F-35 has to generate and how long it has to keep its radar on (making it a non-stealth aircraft) to detect a Flanker 400 km away and a rocket launch 1200 km away.

Radar waves attenuate with the square of the distance (already discussed but not everyone reads the threads). Double the distance for outward and return reflection of radar waves.

Hard to believe what you are saying.

And now I'll quote all my post in reply to you to show you that all my posts were pertaining to the rocket launch and not the 400km claim which ironically no one made.

I think he's talking about F-35s EOTS-DAS -(Electro-Optical Targetting System and Distributed Aperture System) not the Radar itself.

There are no figures on Northrop-Grumman website , but you can find them here.

http://defense-update.com/features/2010/november/02112010_das_missile_track.html

Doesn't mention anything about APG-81 AESA aiding it , says DAS detected without any external cues

This one ?
http://www.northropgrumman.com/capabilities/anaaq37f35/pages/default.aspx

Nowhere does it say DAS and AESA did the detection together, in fact

"The DAS autonomously detected all five rockets, launched in rapid succession, and tracked them from initial launch well past the second stage burnout."

According to the Northrop Grumman website DAS did the detection autonomously as does my source.

Yes we're on the same page.
I've quoted from that page


"The DAS autonomously detected all five rockets, launched in rapid succession, and tracked them from initial launch well past the second stage burnout."

I don't know how to draw the conclusion that APG-81 aided DAS in doing so.

The same way IRSTs detect and track targets, it's one of DAS' capabilities




The word "and" doesn't necessarily imply a co-operation between the two.

It could also be interpreted as the DAS can track rockets and the APG-81 can too.

This is in response of you asking me how DAS works

IRST does not use radio signals for detection,neither will DAS.

The video you linked me to also mentions the fact that EOTS can be used for identifying and tracking the target which is an IRST system and an extension of DAS.

This is in response to when you said DAS uses IR signals with Radio together and referring to the video which you gave me

What ?
Are you asking me how does IRST work ?

The IRST uses a thermographic camera(s) to detect and track IR signatures of Aircraft/Missiles/Ground targets without emitting electromagnetic radiation.

In response to you asking me how does IRST work

I can't, there is no simple unit of measurement of IR signature like there is RCS,but claim of detecting rockets at 1200km is not very revolutionary,as you know Temperature plays a great role in IR signatures and Missiles/Rockets run extremely hot, definitely hotter than an aircraft.

As far as IRST detecting flankers 400 km away is concerned ,nobody made such a claim.The post which started this discussion said about 200km and it's speculation too,it may be even lower,EOTS range is kept under very thick wraps.

And you are indeed correct when you said that DAS cannot detect targets beyond a few hundred kms tops but the targets being fighters.

But Ballistic missiles ? Those should be IR hotspots and I don't think it's a big deal to detect rockets 1,200km away.[/QUOTE]

And we find ourselves here

 

[jaci_zenfone2]

DFRM jammers aren't very effective against any AESA radar.

Mainly because DFRMs receive and remember the frequency of the radar emissions and then replicate those to create false receives.

Modern AESA radar have LPI which mixes the original frequency with many others making it difficult for DFRM to get memorize the correct frequency.

In a fully active Radar situation , most modern radars including PESAs which are old tech can carry out frequency hopping

AESAs can also spread it's frequencies over a very wide band , again making it difficult for DFRM to memorize and replicate all those frequencies

As a matter of fact F-15s equipped with DFRM jamming pods were unable to jam the F-22s AESA radar during Red Flag combat exercise

Here's what Air Marshall Brown had to say about the F-35 and about F-15s equipped with DFRM jamming pods vs F-22s AESA


"To me that is key: it is not only stealth; it is the combination of the EOS and the radar to be able to build a comprehensive picture. In that engagement I talked about at Nellis, in Red Flag, the ability to be in a cockpit with a God's-eye view of what is going on in the world was such an advantage over a fourth-generation fighter—and arguably one of the best fourth-generation fighters in existence, the F15. But even with a DRFM jamming pod, we still had no chance in those particular engagements"

This was from a Parliamentary report in Australia, link below

http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:"committees%2Fcommjnt%2Ffb49a6a2-5080-4c72-a379-e4fd10cc710a%2F0002"

Their is already many systems to counter LPI Radars.Since many of the information is classified i can only get to name a few:-

1:-Tenix Defense Electronic System Division’s High Sensitivity Microwave
Receiver (HSMR).

2:-Thales Vigile 300

3:-Thales Sabre

4:-NS-9003A-V2 ES System

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[Chinmoy]

AESA radar have been jammed ,so it will not be a big problem to jam it but see F 35 cannot defeat missile kinetically.What if the requirement are for perfect radio silences and no communication ( perfect stealth ),so no radar on.See we will not fight 3 class air force but force that will be in equal or slightly less in technological terms and superior in number,so for the first week of war we will not be able to use network centric warfare.F 35 is designed to work only with network centric warfare .It does not fit our doctrain. It sensor are world class but the plane itself is poorly design.Unless and until it flight problem are solved ,I am not for F 35 .Buy 36 single seater and 4 trainer and see if the kinetic performance are OK and sensor work as advertise then by ,more.The PR in this fighter is extreme while performance is missing.

That's the reason I said that, you simply can't bank on stealth for your fighter to fight. Along with stealth it do need raw power.

 

[Scarface]

Their is already many systems to counter LPI Radars.Since many of the information is classified i can only get to name a few:-

1:-Tenix Defense Electronic System Division’s High Sensitivity Microwave
Receiver (HSMR).

2:-Thales Vigile 300

3:-Thales Sabre

4:-NS-9003A-V2 ES System

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All those are naval systems for ships and no, even they can't effectively jam LPI radars.

Here is an analysis and conclusion on effectiveness of those very systems when it comes to jamming AESAs and LPI.


http://dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a456960.pdf

It's a PDF,so you'll have to download.

The conclusion was drawn that

"Electronic Warfare Support (ES) receivers currently in service are not optimized for the detection of LPI radars as they lack the sensitivity to detect the signals at a sufficient range to provide military crews with an operational range advantage"

 

[jaci_zenfone2]

All those are naval systems for ships and no, even they can't effectively jam LPI radars.

Here is an analysis and conclusion on effectiveness of those very systems when it comes to jamming AESAs and LPI.


http://dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a456960.pdf

It's a PDF,so you'll have to download.

The conclusion was drawn that

"Electronic Warfare Support (ES) receivers currently in service are not optimized for the detection of LPI radars as they lack the sensitivity to detect the signals at a sufficient range to provide military crews with an operational range advantage"

They dont have the classified files to evaluate them.They dont know how it operates,Its performance is not pulic to you,me or the persons who evaluate them.They did not evaluate the capabilities of this systems performance against LPI radars rathar they evaluated how to counter lpi radars.They just made an example of modern systems created to counter lpi radars.Read it before you post it.


Edit:-From your posted evaluations conclusion:-In a network-centric architecture, the network acts as a force multiplier by
networking sensors (e.g., ES receivers), decision makers, and shooters (e.g., Weapon
Systems and HARM shooters) by achieving shared awareness in order to detect and jam
LPI radars (Pace 2004, 455). Stand-off platforms are augmented by specialized receivers
that can go to the emitters (stand-in platforms). These specialized receivers are mounted,
for example, in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) such as the Predator.
The use of “swarm intelligence” technology is fast becoming an important
concept in network-centric sensor configurations. Swarm intelligence allows the design
of ES receiver networks to detect LPI emitters, and is inspired by the behavior of social
insects (Bonabeau, Dorigo M, and Theraulaz 1999, ). With the swarm approach, LPI
radars run the risk of detection and classification, especially when the intercept receiver
incorporates advanced signal processing techniques that take the advantage of time
frequency, bi-frequency processing (Pace 2004, 455).
While modern LPI radar systems and waveforms present formidable challenges to
older and presently deployed ES receivers, there are techniques and technologies
available on the near-horizon equipped to meet this challenge. Digital receivers with high
sensitivities, time-frequency and bi-frequency signal processing techniques with high
processing gains working in the neural networks will overcome the LPI radar’s signal
masking and hiding techniques. Furthermore, using miniaturized receivers at UAVs with
network centric and swarm intercept strategies will carry LPI radar and ES receiver battle
into a different dimension.

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[Scarface]

They dont have the classified files to evaluate them.They dont know how it operates,Its performance is not pulic to you,me or the persons who evaluate them.They did not evaluate the capabilities of this systems performance against LPI radars rathar they evaluated how to counter lpi radars.They just made an example of modern systems created to counter lpi radars.Read it before you post it.


Edit:-From your posted evaluations conclusion:-In a network-centric architecture, the network acts as a force multiplier by
networking sensors (e.g., ES receivers), decision makers, and shooters (e.g., Weapon
Systems and HARM shooters) by achieving shared awareness in order to detect and jam
LPI radars (Pace 2004, 455). Stand-off platforms are augmented by specialized receivers
that can go to the emitters (stand-in platforms). These specialized receivers are mounted,
for example, in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) such as the Predator.
The use of “swarm intelligence” technology is fast becoming an important
concept in network-centric sensor configurations. Swarm intelligence allows the design
of ES receiver networks to detect LPI emitters, and is inspired by the behavior of social
insects (Bonabeau, Dorigo M, and Theraulaz 1999, ). With the swarm approach, LPI
radars run the risk of detection and classification, especially when the intercept receiver
incorporates advanced signal processing techniques that take the advantage of time
frequency, bi-frequency processing (Pace 2004, 455).
While modern LPI radar systems and waveforms present formidable challenges to
older and presently deployed ES receivers, there are techniques and technologies
available on the near-horizon equipped to meet this challenge. Digital receivers with high
sensitivities, time-frequency and bi-frequency signal processing techniques with high
processing gains working in the neural networks will overcome the LPI radar’s signal
masking and hiding techniques. Furthermore, using miniaturized receivers at UAVs with
network centric and swarm intercept strategies will carry LPI radar and ES receiver battle
into a different dimension.

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They do have the details, the person who published that thesis Aytug Denk has expertise and credentials in Electronic Warfare topics.

Here's his LinkedIn profile

https://tr.linkedin.com/in/aytuğ-denk-a3a00063


I've read the conclusions before posting , and you haven't. The part you're quoting clearly says


"While modern LPI radar systems and waveforms present formidable challenges to
older and presently deployed ES receivers, there are techniques and technologies
available on the near-horizon equipped to meet this challenge. "

So as I said your claim that those radars can successfully jam LPI radars holds no ground.Presently deployed systems cannot reliably jam LPI radars.Maybe in the future.

 

[pmaitra]

It came from you,quoting @Immanuel and his post which said 200km, not 400.




And now I'll quote all my post in reply to you to show you that all my posts were pertaining to the rocket launch and not the 400km claim which ironically no one made.














This is in response of you asking me how DAS works


This is in response to when you said DAS uses IR signals with Radio together and referring to the video which you gave me



In response to you asking me how does IRST work

My apologies. I see it was 200 km, not 400 km. Perhaps I misread.

 

[jaci_zenfone2]

They do have the details, the person who published that thesis Aytug Denk has expertise and credentials in Electronic Warfare topics.

Here's his LinkedIn profile

https://tr.linkedin.com/in/aytuğ-denk-a3a00063


I've read the conclusions before posting , and you haven't. The part you're quoting clearly says


"While modern LPI radar systems and waveforms present formidable challenges to
older and presently deployed ES receivers, there are techniques and technologies
available on the near-horizon equipped to meet this challenge. "

So as I said your claim that those radars can successfully jam LPI radars holds no ground.Presently deployed systems cannot reliably jam LPI radars.Maybe in the future.

please read the date of the article.
And quote me where they evaluated the systems.

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[Scarface]

please read the date of the article.
And quote me where they evaluated the systems.

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They evaluated methods of detection for more than half of the PDF before coming to that conclusion.

All the systems you mentioned are included in the PDF

Section III of the PDF deals with methods of detection and the challenges they have to overcome

Section IV of the PDF deals with Probabilities of Jamming,sensitivity required for jamming,design requirements for jammers, etc.

That's more than 50 pages worth of analysis you are asking to be quoted.I gave you a source,and quoted it's conclusions,if you want to take a look at the analysis feel free to read the PDF

All the systems you mentioned are included in the PDF file, yet the analysis comes to the conclusions that present systems cannot jam AESA radars.

 

[Immanuel]

Stop having dreams of F35 for India or all those who are supporting the idea should start paying higher taxes to fund the program. Not only that knowing IAF, they will drop one or two to the ground every year that will require extra taxes on all the sponsores of the idea.

Well F-35 will eventually end up in India, its more a matter of timing. As for taxes, you sitting in Kaneda should be the last one to be encouraging Indians to be paying more taxes, pound for pound the Rafale is just as expensive both in terms of acquistion and life cycle costs while being neither stealth or having the same generation of sensors. Also, to blatantly claim that IAF will by default drop 1 or 2 aircraft every year is utter BS. IAF trains its pilots far more than the average AF anywhere with some pilots getting over 300 hrs of flying per year, so you should chill with such BS remarks. There is hardly another air force that operates in the extremes that IAF does.

 

[tharikiran]

http://aviationweek.com/defense/test-report-points-f-35-s-combat-limits-0
Test Report Points to F-35’s Combat Limits
Jan 31, 2016 Bill Sweetman | Aviation Week & Space Technology

"The Block 2B version of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which the Marine Corps declared operational in July last year, is not capable of unsupported combat against any serious threat, according to Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon’s director of operational test and evaluation (DOT&E). In a 48-page annual project report to be published shortly, a copy of which was obtained by Aviation Week, the DOT&E states that “the F-35B Block 2B aircraft would need to avoid threat engagement… in an opposed combat scenario, and would require augmentation by other friendly forces.”

Most of the same limitations will apply to the U.S. Air Force’s initial operational capability (IOC) version, the F-35A Block 3i. “Since no capabilities were added to Block 3i, only limited corrections to deficiencies, the combat capability of the initial operational Block 3i units will not be noticeably different.”..."

""Giving more details on the software deficiencies mentioned in a December memo, Gilmore says 11 out of 12 weapon delivery accuracy (WDA) tests carried out during Block 2B developmental testing “required intervention by the test and control team to overcome system deficiencies and ensure a successful event,” Gilmore says that the F-35’s performance in combat “will depend in part on the operational utility of the workarounds” that were used in testing...."

"....the Marines accepted several substantial flaws in their IOC standard, causing problems with the way that the “performance and accuracy of mission systems functions,” including the aircraft’s data fusion system and radar performance, were displayed to the pilot....."

"Specific technical problems continue to impose speed and maneuver limitations on the F-35, the report says. The weapon bay temperatures exceed limits during ground operations at on days warmer than 90-deg. F, and at high speeds below 25,000 feet, if the weapon bays are closed for more than 10 min. (The F-35 is not stealthy with the doors open.) On the F-35A, the time limit is applied at speeds from 500 to 600 kts, depending on altitude...."

"Overall, the report says, “the rate of deficiency correction has not kept pace with the discovery rate” – that is, problems are being found in tests faster than they can be solved. “Well-known, significant problems” include the defective Autonomic Logistics Information System, unstable avionics and persistent aircraft and engine reliability and maintainability issues...."

 

[Kshatriya87]

http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/...russian-su-35-in-tactical-capabilities.75424/

 

[pmaitra]

CNN: F-35 tests fell short, Pentagon report says

 

[Nuvneet Kundu]

If I am getting you right, you are suggesting a decoy. That certainly is possible, however, is that feasible?

Optical sensors have the advantage of light rays being very quick. The downside is that there is the possibility of thermoclines, refraction, and other types of noise. For it to work at long distances, it has to have assistance from radar.

The Northrop-Grumman site does not specify how far the target was that was detected.

That decoy thingy is already being used. BVR missiles have more line of sight than optical sensors. If you are a pilot and it shows in your radar that 4 planes are coming, you will release your missiles. Maybe later you will come to know that it was a decoy when you actually go close and verify with your optical sights. But the decoy has done its job.

Check this presentation :

 

[Bahamut]

@Zebra @Immanuel
You guy will enjoy it

 

[Zebra]

@Zebra @Immanuel
You guy will enjoy it

Sir, they are going for F-35 A.

The best part is they are spending about US$ 17 billion for nearly 100 aircrafts.

Out of that US$ 17 billion, about US$ 11 billion will come back in country as part of the manufacturing work share for entire F-35 project.

 

[Scarface]

http://aviationweek.com/defense/test-report-points-f-35-s-combat-limits-0
Test Report Points to F-35’s Combat Limits
Jan 31, 2016 Bill Sweetman | Aviation Week & Space Technology

"The Block 2B version of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which the Marine Corps declared operational in July last year, is not capable of unsupported combat against any serious threat, according to Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon’s director of operational test and evaluation (DOT&E). In a 48-page annual project report to be published shortly, a copy of which was obtained by Aviation Week, the DOT&E states that “the F-35B Block 2B aircraft would need to avoid threat engagement… in an opposed combat scenario, and would require augmentation by other friendly forces.”

Most of the same limitations will apply to the U.S. Air Force’s initial operational capability (IOC) version, the F-35A Block 3i. “Since no capabilities were added to Block 3i, only limited corrections to deficiencies, the combat capability of the initial operational Block 3i units will not be noticeably different.”..."

""Giving more details on the software deficiencies mentioned in a December memo, Gilmore says 11 out of 12 weapon delivery accuracy (WDA) tests carried out during Block 2B developmental testing “required intervention by the test and control team to overcome system deficiencies and ensure a successful event,” Gilmore says that the F-35’s performance in combat “will depend in part on the operational utility of the workarounds” that were used in testing...."

"....the Marines accepted several substantial flaws in their IOC standard, causing problems with the way that the “performance and accuracy of mission systems functions,” including the aircraft’s data fusion system and radar performance, were displayed to the pilot....."

"Specific technical problems continue to impose speed and maneuver limitations on the F-35, the report says. The weapon bay temperatures exceed limits during ground operations at on days warmer than 90-deg. F, and at high speeds below 25,000 feet, if the weapon bays are closed for more than 10 min. (The F-35 is not stealthy with the doors open.) On the F-35A, the time limit is applied at speeds from 500 to 600 kts, depending on altitude...."

"Overall, the report says, “the rate of deficiency correction has not kept pace with the discovery rate” – that is, problems are being found in tests faster than they can be solved. “Well-known, significant problems” include the defective Autonomic Logistics Information System, unstable avionics and persistent aircraft and engine reliability and maintainability issues...."

CNN: F-35 tests fell short, Pentagon report says

It's a shame,but it has been brought up and discussed in the thread already.

In my defence however,I have already conceded the fact that the F-35 isn't actually ready for purchase , it's stilll in IOC and barely so.

It's still a very young plane,whose capabilities are been impressive to say the least.
Of course it hasn't seen any real war scenarios so it is all on paper , but neither have any of the new aircraft,Rafale's only claim to fame is bombing Libya under little threat.

If it was something like Kosovo then it would be a different story

The F-35 when it actually reaches it's ideal operational capabilities will be an ace

Every country that has ordered F-35 understands this,they are just getting in on the stealth fighter action early

PAK FA has already disappointed from a stealth aspect , and it seems like we aren't getting it anytime soon.

AMCA is again too far down the pipeline
The Chinese stealth fighters have already entered LRIP

There really isn't a better alternative in the near future.

Apologies for my long hiatus,had studies on my mind.

 

[StealthFlanker]

I see they are using the word "and" between the two words: DAS, APG-81.

Working autonomously is not the same thing as working independently.

How does the DAS function? Assuming it is an optical instrument, how does it identify a missile 1200 km away or a Flanker 400 km away without the help of a radar? Identification is necessary step for detection and tracking.

There is a video for that , you can see the DAS detect and track the missiles before the APG-81 do so.
Generally , it should be able to distinguish missiles from fighter quite easily due to the different in temperature, missiles exhaust is put out much more infrared signature than jet exhaust at high altitude

 

[StealthFlanker]

Qutoe from a article:-
DRFM technology has several features. First, it provides coherent time delay of RF signals in applications like radar and electronic warfare. It also produces coherent deception jamming to a radar system by replaying a captured radar pulse with a small delay, which makes the target appear to move.

DRFM also can modulate captured pulse data in amplitude, frequency, and phase to provide other affects. A Doppler shift correlates range and range rate trackers in the radar. DRFM also can replay captured radar pulses many times to fool the radar into perceiving many targets.

Small packages, fast response, and large volumes of low-latency compute power define modern DRFM evolution, Mercury officials say. The company's latest DRFM technology produces modules as thin as 0.44 inches, and capitalizes on direct digital synthesizer (DDS) local oscillator (LO) technology.

DDS delivers sub-microsecond tuning speeds over a wide bandwidth, while advanced circuit design and simulation helps reduce spurious, inter-module and phase noise.


So the f15s equipped with DRFM Jammers could not jam the aesa radar but than it makes me to wonder why America is doing this:-

Maybe they are buying something with millions of dollars which they say cant do its job

Navy and Air Force choose DRFM jammers from Mercury Systems to help spoof enemy radar:-http://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/2014/06/mercury-drfm-jammer.html


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You deeply mistaken how jamming system work , jamming doesnt work like "oh ,if i have AESA radar i will be immune to all jamming " or " oh if i have DRFM jamming then i can jam every single kind of radar"
It is not that simple :
There are 2 class of jamming in general :
The first one is noise jamming : Noise jamming is the form of electronic countermeasure where jammer transmit an interference signal ( white noise) in enemy’s radar direction so that the aircraft reflection is completely submerged by interference.This type of jamming is also called ‘denial jamming’ or ‘obscuration jamming’. The primary advantage of noise jamming is that only minimal details about the enemy equipment need be known. This class of jamming is rather simple and can be used not only as self protection but also support ( cover )jamming , disadvantages is that it often require much higher jamming power than deceptive jamming

The second class of jamming is deceptive jamming : Deception jammers carry receiving devices on board in order to analyze the radar’ transmission, and then send back false target-like signals in order to confuse the radar.This is in contrast to noise type of jamming,whose objective is to obscure the real signal by injecting a suitable level of noise-like interference into the victim system.Techniques like “noise jamming” are useful for taking a radar installation out of commission, but more sophisticated deception jamming can make the enemy think their radar is still working when it is actually reporting incorrect target range and velocity information With deception jamming, an exact knowledge of not only the enemy radar’s frequency, but all other transmission parameters is required. Deceptive jamming, in a way , is spot or point jamming of a more intelligent nature, HoJ mode of missiles are often less effective again deception jamming because missiles often do not know they are being jammed ( It important to note that , if jamming is detected then HoJ can still be used ).

In recent years capability of radar deceptive jamming has been enhanced significantly with the development of Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) techniques .Jammers with DRFM technology are widely reported in literature , for example ALQ-187(v)2 , ALQ-131 EA PUP , Falcon edge , ALQ-211(V)9 , ALQ-214(V)3 , Spectra , ASQ-239.DRFM is a technology in which a high-speed sampling digital memory is used for storage and recreation of radio frequency signals.The most significant aspect of DRFM is that as a digital “duplicate” of the received signal, it is coherent with the source of the received signal. As opposed to analog ‘memory loops’, there is no signal degradation caused by continuously cycling the energy through a front-end amplifier which allows for greater range errors for reactive jamming and allows for predictive jamming.
.Deceptive jamming require much less transmitting power and often less vulnerable to HoJ , however ,unlike noise jamming , radar can counter deceptive jamming by various method such as frequency hopping , PRF jittering , pulse compression or leading edge tracking ..etc ( more sophisticated jamming method will require more sophisticated ECCM method ).

But the most important factor that people always overlooked when talking about jamming is the jamming-signal ratio , that can be seen as the deciding factor whether jamming will work or not.

As a matter of fact when Jamming is factored into the radar equation,the quantities of greatest interest are Jamming to signal ratio (J/S) and Burn-Through Range.”J-to-S” is the ratio of the signal strength of the jamming signal (J) to the signal strength of the target return signal (S). It is expressed as “J/S” and often measured in dB.Apart from their unique requirements of each specific jamming technique, for jamming to be effective J must exceed S by some amount , therefore , the desired result of a J/S calculation in dB is a positive number .It is a common misconception that J/S ratio required to jam any radar is a fixed value.In reality, however the required J/S varied significantly depending on jamming techniques and radar type.Burn-through range is the radar to target distance where the target return signal can first be detected through the ECM and is usually slightly farther than crossover range where J=S. It is usually the range where the J/S just equals the minimum J/S requirement.

As shown in J/S equation above, factors affecting burn-through range are :

ERPs = Effective radiated power of radar
ERPj =Effective radiated power of jammer
G = Antenna gain
RCS = Target radar cross section
Most people know a powerful radar would be harder to jam or a powerful jammer will have an easier time jamming , but not many understand the important of RCS in jamming effectiveness

according to radar equation the power requirement for jamming will decrease directly proportional to RCS reduction , if the RCS of an aircraft is reduced to 0.75 (75%) of its original value, then the jammer power required to achieve the same effectiveness would be 0.75 (75%) of the original value
now let take example of 4 aircraft :
1) B-52 : RCS = 100 m2
2) Mig-31 : RCS = 10 m2
3) Mig-35 : RCS = 1 m2
4) F-35 : RCS = 0.001 m2
now compared them :
from B-52 to F-35 then RCS is reduced by 99.999% =>99.999% less power require
from Mig-31 to F-35 then RCS is reduced by 99.99%=>99.99% less power require
from Mig-35 to F-35 then RCS is reduced by 99.9% =>99.9% less power require
To put in layman terms: again a very powerful enemy radar : if F-35 need 5 kW jammer to shield it's radar reflection with noise signals then Mig-35 will need a 5 MW jammer , Mig-31 will need 50 MW jammer , B-52 will require 500 MW jammer.
Alternatively , if jamming power was keep constant and RCS changed then according to radar equation , the burn through distance will change significantly

Another factor that people always ignore is distance .Since jamming signal only has to travel one way, as the range get further , the jammer has more advantage than the radar because jamming power decrease at slower rate ,so the further you are from a radar , the easier it would be for you to jam it

https://basicsaboutaerodynamicsandavionics.wordpress.com/2016/03/29/electronic-countermeasure-ecm/