On the topic, I like the suggestion that one terror attack= one Pakistani General must come into force. As I understand it, the problem for us in the Pakistani scenario is military-political. It is the political aspect of the top military hierarchy in Pakistan, that causes them to use terror groups in India. It is a typical dominance-through-subversive-and asymmetric-warfare strategy. To drive home the point that terrorism is unacceptable, the consequences have to be direct. Of course, this is easier said than done. And would require strengthening of the intelligence apparatus in Pakistan. Which brings its own considerations, consequences and complications.
Another strategy I would like to suggest, and this is again an offensive one, is to foment multiple and vicious- but not antipodal - anti-state organizations to confuse the enemy, just as they have done with us and to continuously weaken their federal system. This would require the creation of 'false crises', as in American parlance, to create scenarios where suspicion- and anxiety- prevail contra-dynamcally, within the system: as with the 'Red-Scare' the CIA used to foment takeovers and instability in countries such as Indonesia during the Cold War. In the case of Pakistan, at the two opposite poles, these would be the threat of Islamic/militant incursion for the military elite; and a Fascist, pro-American societal-cultural rampage by the military for the Islamists. The plus-point is that the sentiment has already existed. The minus side is that this dynamic, brought about by the sentiment and stabilized, albeit in the military's favor, in the Musharaf era ended with the convergence of US interests with Pakistan's in the Afghanistan war.
Now, because in Pakistan, the military has controlled these organizations before and because information is too perfect for our scenario, this would necessitate the creation of multiple, independent and quasi-potent organizations, to sow the seeds of discord and confusion in the minds of the military elite and to erode the military information campaign. That is at the one end of the groundwork of this strategy. On the other hand, because there is a sense that the military are themselves anti-American, it would require the consolidation of focus and (some) power into one man, that is both ambitious and virulently anti-Islamist, and at the same time administratively incompetent. So that he comes to represent the military elite, and by extension the military. This is the other end of the 'weakening federalism' tactic referred to earlier. His opponents should principally be the militants, but should also include the politicians. This has two 'resource denial' implications: domestically and politically, the institution is concerned with management issues of bureaucratic elite; domestically and militarily, the institution is concerned with curtailing the diffuse and widespread insurgency. The 'administratively incompetent' argument also ensures that decisions taken do not bring the dynamic to a 'final end' or do not envisage the terminal and favorable resolution of 'false crises' arbitrarily. This is a difficult and expensive solution. But one that is not entirely impossible. Military officials are inherently ambitious, administratively incompetent or conservative. The key is to find the right man, with the right combination of all three. It also has the potential of keeping the enemy in long-term, political and economic, stagnant turmoil. It would of course require a massive bloating of the intelligence budget. It would require the buying up of newspapers, officials, funneling channels and materials. But it is also a strategy that is calibrat-able, by reducing or increasing inputs at either or both ends of the spectrum: the military locus or any one or the other militant organizations. We should also understand what makes Pakistanis tick: personality politics. At the other end, should exist a father figure that acts as a pinion, a catalyst for the Islamist movement, but in whom power is not vested or consolidated. He is just a vocal representative, elusive and charismatic, and untouchable because of the pull he generates from the social outcomes that would follow his arrest.
What we should realize in the context of India and Pakistan is that our interests are inherently mutually-exclusive. What Pakistan has been doing so far and is doing, is to use a strategy of assymetric warfare in the pursuit of what are somewhat parallel interests: water, Afghanistan, land in Kashmir, and geopolitical advantage, influence and dominance over South Asia, Central Asian land, trade and energy routes and the securitization of living space. And therefore, this strategy has to be and effective one, which would explain the emotional argument to the 'right of self determination' of the Kashmiris. This scenario will continue as long as the two nations persist. As, ironically, also will the imbalance. And therefore, the solution is one that recognizes the situation for what it is: imbalanced, and pursues a 'resource denial' strategy as an exploitation of that inherent imbalance. The most effective 'optimum-solution' is one that lasts long-term and can be calibrated from both ends of the spectrum.