It was a military miossion for recapturing Skardu and Gurais IN 1948.Gurais was captured but could'nt capture Skardu.
"In response, General Thimayya submitted a plan on 20 June for the
recapture of Gurais and the relief of Skardu. No details of this plan,
named `Operation Snipe' are available. It seems the plan
envisaged an
early capture of Gurais followed by an advance across the Burzil Pass
and the Deosai plateau to Skardu. This ambitious plan would have not
only removed the threat to Bandipur and raised the siege of Skardu,
but would also have cut off the enemy's line of communication to
Kargil, Dras and the Leh area.
The first part of the plan was accomplished by the recapture of Gurais
on 29 June, as described earlier. But the plan for advance to the
Burzil Pass and over the Deosai plains was never attempted, or even
approved by HQ Western Command. The administrative difficulties of
moving and maintaining a large force across that barren and icy region
would have been well-nigh insurmountable, and after crossing the
Burzil Pass the operation might not have even had the advantage of
surprise. Moreover, enemy pressure was very heavy in the Southern
sector in July, and the entire 9th (Frontier) Division of the Pakistan
Army was reported to be in action in the Chakothi-Tithwal area. Sri
Div, therefor, had no troops to spare for the advance to Burzil or
Dras, and no help could be sent to 1 Patiala to enable them to
maintain their valuable positions at Machhoi. On 25 July, Thimayya
reported that the hostiles were attacking Kanzalwan, infiltrating
towards Chowkibal, Kupwara and the vital Nastachhun Pass from Tithwasl
area, concentrating near Haji Pir Pass and threatening Punch, Uri and
Gulmarg. Thimayya had all his troops already committed : 161 Infantry
Brigade and 163 Infantry Brigade had only two coys each in reserve,
and the 77 Para Brigade had no reserve at all. Of his outlying
garrisons, both Leh and Skardu appeared on their last legs. The 5
Mahratta, 3 Jat and 1 Royal Gorkha Rifles arrived about the end of
July 1948 to reinforce Sri Div and enable it to attack Dras-Kargil and
link up with Skardu, but all these three battalions had to be rushed
to hold the enemy attacks on the Tithwal-Chakothi front. The Gwalior
Mountain Battery was expected to reach Srinagar early in August, but
no other major reinforcements were available, and Lieut-General K. M.
Cariappa, the COC-in-C, Western Command, was compelled to authorise
Thimayya to fall back on Uri if forced to withdraw.
On 5 August 1948, Thimayya submitted a statement of his requirements
and the troops available in his command. To stabilise the position and
to hold each sector firmly, he estimated the requirements as:
For Uri-Chakothi sector 10 battalions
For Tithwal area 5 battalions
For line of communication from Tithwal to Handwara 2 battalions
For Gurais-Kanzalwan sector 2 battalions
For the Zoji La 1 battalions
For the Pir Panjal-Gulmarg area 1 battalions
Total 21 battalions
But he had only 17 battalions of the Indian Army and one SF battalion,
i.e. 7 K. I. Available with him. Three more Indian Army battalions at
least were, therefore, required before Sri Div could be safe.
Thimayya had in fact staved off disaster only by exploiting to the
full his advantage in operating on interior lines. He had rushed his
forces quickly from one sector to another, to meet acute danger, and
somehow held the enemy at bay. But he could not spare additional
troops for operation `Snipe' or for operation `Duck'
(for the
recapture of Dras and Kargil), unless and until the hostile pressure
on Chakothi and Tithwal eased considerably and thus permitted him to
take out some troops from those sectors.
Then, with the fall of Skardu on 14 August, the main purpose of
operation `Snipe' ceased to exist. All efforts were
concentrated on
the recapture of Dras and Kargil and the link up with Leh-
`Operation
Duck'."
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