Explaining the India-US Logistics Support Agreement

Zebra

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The other day I asked it........

@Ray Sir, not sure about that "Mutual Logistic Support Agreement (MLSA)" thing.

I mean pros-cons of it.

Please help us to understand it.
May be this thread will help.
 
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Zebra

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Explaining the India-US Logistics Support Agreement by Sameer Suryakant Patil

#2500, 28 February 2008

Sameer Suryakant Patil
Research Scholar, Jawaharlal Nehru University
e-mail: [email protected]

This week, US Defence Secretary Robert Gates is paying a two-day visit to India. On his agenda are many things, including the uncertain fate of the India-US nuclear deal, cooperation in the area of counter-terrorism, arms deals and the situation in Afghanistan. However, what has topped the agenda is the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) to be signed later this year between India and the US. Much has been made of the LSA by the opponents of the India-US strategic partnership. This article delineates the LSA and its likely implications for India.

The genesis of the LSA can be found in the Strategic Partnership document signed by both countries in March 2006 during the visit of the US President George W. Bush to New Delhi. The document stated that the US and India will soon sign an agreement to facilitate mutual logistic support during combined training, exercises and disaster relief operations. The agreement being envisaged was part of the larger security cooperation including maritime, counter-terrorism, defence trade and efforts for the speedy conclusion of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Afterwards, even as other areas of bilateral security cooperation blossomed, talks on LSA continued at snail's pace with India insisting that the agreement be renamed, citing domestic political compulsions. Currently, the LSA has been pending for more than six months before the Cabinet Committee on Security for clearance.

Stripped down to its basics, the LSA would require both countries to provide their bases, fuel and other kinds of logistics support to each others' fighter jets and naval warships. Logistical support with regard to weapons facilities would involve non-offensive military equipment. This support will involve cashless transactions on a reciprocal basis. The LSA would be particularly beneficial at the time of disaster relief operations like the one India undertook in the wake of the Asian Tsunami in 2004.

The LSA is similar to the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) that the US has with many of its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. The ACSA is governed by legal guidelines and is used for contingencies, peacekeeping operations, unforeseen emergencies and also exercises to correct logistic deficiencies which cannot be met by a nation on its own.

In South Asia, Washington has a similar arrangement with Sri Lanka. Just last year in March, both countries signed ACSA (valid for 10 years) to transfer and exchange logistics supplies, support and re-fuelling of services during peacekeeping missions, humanitarian operations, and joint exercises. This is also a logical culmination of the growing familiarity between the two militaries which were part of the largest military exercises last year along with Japan, Australia and Singapore. The important aspect here is 'interoperability' meaning the Indian and US forces can work together in times of emergency without wasting any time in familiarizing themselves with each other's forces. India and the US are no strangers to the arrangement outlined under the LSA. During the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the Indian government had provided refueling facility to American fighter jets at Mumbai's Sahar international airport. However, this move had come under criticism from opposition parties and the government had to withdraw the facility subsequently.

Opposition to the LSA comes mainly from the Left parties who do not want India to be party to the 'wrong designs' of the US military in the region and in the process, compromise India's strategic sovereignty. The LSA they argue, would oblige India to comply with Washington's agenda. Together with the civilian nuclear deal and the LSA, India's willingness to move closer to the US is what the Left parties do not want the present United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government to do. Consequently, the UPA government has put on hold not only the LSA but also some other crucial bilateral defence measures intended to enhance India's presence in the region, including the Maritime Security Cooperation Framework and Container Security Initiative.

However, the concerns of the Left parties seem unfounded as the past records of many NATO allies have shown that merely by signing the LSA or ACSA, they did not necessarily have to identify with the US' global agenda, evident from the policies adopted by France and Germany during the US invasion of Iraq in 2004 and as recently as last fortnight when Australia (which is part of the US-led security alliance -- ANZUS) decided to withdraw from the quadrilateral initiative. Financially too the LSA makes good sense for India. According to some official estimates, with LSA in place, India would be able to save around US$20 million per war game, when Indian forces take part in any of the joint military exercises with the US on American soil like the Red Flag War Games. Thus, from both the strategic and economic aspects, the LSA works in India's favour. The fundamental question is whether India possesses the political will to forge a closer relationship with the US, and at the same time have all its options open for any eventuality.
 

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Logistics support analysis - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



Logistics Support Analysis (LSA) is a structured approach to increase efficiency of maintenance and reduces the cost of providing support by preplanning all aspects of Integrated Logistics Support. A successful LSA will define those support requirements that are ideal for the system design.

History

Logistics Support Analysis was codified into a military standard in 1973 with the publication of Military Standard 1388-1. Logistic Support Analysis (LSA)guidelines and requirements were established by Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction 5000.2, Major System Acquisition Procedures, and DOD Directive 5000.39, Acquisition and Management of Integrated Logistic Support for Systems and Equipment, to create a single, uniform approach by the Military Services to improve supportability of military weapon systems through a disciplined approach to defining the required operational support other Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) objectives during the acquisition development phase. 1388-1A was updated in 1983 and 1991 before being downgraded from a standard to a best practice on 26 November 1996. 1388-2A was updated in 1991 and 1993, and was also cancelled as a standard in 1996. The definitions for the database records of LSA were established by the Logistics Support Analysis Record, MIL-STD-1388-2A, on 20 JULY 84.

In 1986, the US Army began to transform the paper-intensive LSAR into a desktop application known as "Computer Aided Logistics Support" (CALS). The Navy began a similar effort in 1987. In 1991, the programs were combined and expanded to all services under the name Joint CALS (JCALS). JCALS was approved for use in August 1998....
 

Zebra

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Is this true? I am talking about the bold red color part.
Or
Its a kind of misinformation / deliberately wrong information to misguide people / propaganda war against 'the Logistics Support Agreement'...?


Modi, US and Indian Interests - The New Indian Express

By Bharat Karnad
Published: 28th November 2014

Banner headlines and over-the-top television anchors gushing about US president Barack Obama accepting prime minister Narendra Modi's invitation to be chief guest at the 2015 Republic Day celebrations and frenzied prognostications of what this means for bilateral relations, etc. reveals the Indian media's and the middle class' gaga attitude to anything American and, in a nutshell, the problem India has in dealing with the United States. Circus is not conducive to diplomacy, which is precisely what visits by US presidents to this country turn out to be when not diplomatic eye candy.

It is usually domestically beleaguered US presidents who jump at such visits. George W Bush came hither in March 2006 when his star was on the wane, his failed military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan daily eroding his political standing in Washington. With a resurgent Republican Party and the Obama administration in second term funk, the US president needs a foreign policy bump to up his domestic ratings. So, what's better than visiting "extraordinary" India guaranteed to capture the eyeballs at home?

Modi showed during his Madison Square Garden show that he had the Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) in the US massively behind him and can, if he chooses to, influence their vote for the Democratic or Republican Party in US elections. This is a completely new phenomenon—the power of the NRIs to push Indian national interest in Western countries, something Modi long ago discovered as Gujarat chief minister. Foreign leaders such as Tony Abbott in Australia are however only now beginning to grasp the importance of cultivating Modi, as did the phalanx of American legislators lining the stage at the New York event that it is not just good foreign policy theatre but courting the wealthy Indian-origin community makes domestic electoral sense.

What was most evident during Modi's recent travels abroad was the steel in his eye, the no-nonsense look of a man, unswayed by the hoopla around him, who was there to do the nation's business. He partook of diplomatic niceties and got his way in advancing the national interest (on agricultural subsidies at the summit, for example). Combined with his bonhomie unrestrained by convention, seen in his embracing Abbott on the Brisbane stage even as the rest of that select crowd had stilted smiles and handshakes with a buttoned-up host, it was a one-two punch. Plainly, a bowled-over Abbott (or any of the US lawmakers, for that matter) can't wait to be India's best friend!

That hint of steel in Modi has plainly escaped Indian commentators—the same lot who have long pitched for India to be part of the "political West", and who, because the invitation has been accepted, now expect the Indian prime minister to clamber on to the Obama bandwagon when, in truth, it is the US president who is hitching his horse to Modi's post.

In any case, for Obama his India visit will be win-win for the simple reason that the attention span of the American public is short, with people being swayed by the momentary diplomatic flash and fandango of the moment featured on their television screens. The US media horde descending on Delhi will ensure he will be in the public eye. Fawning Indians, colour, pageantry, marching columns in brass and buckle dazzle, gaily caparisoned elephants and camels, and the imposing colonial-era buildings on Raisina Hill will complete the exotic backdrop for talks between the two principals. The question is whether the Modi-Obama meeting will produce anything solid.

The growing military links between India and the US is, as former US under-secretary of state Nicholas Burns said, "the glue'' that is bonding the two countries in their quest to keep an aggressive China in check. Washington would like to cement such security cooperation by getting the Indian government to sign what it refers to as "foundational" agreements. Among the more problematic such accords is the Logistics Support Agreement, for instance, to permit American warships, US Army units, and US Air Force transport and combat planes to stage out of Indian ports and air bases for operations in the Indian Ocean basin and landward.

It is the sort of arrangement during the Cold War that enabled American U-2 spy planes to conduct sorties out of the Bareder air base outside Peshawar to monitor Russian underground nuclear tests at Semipalatinsk-21 testing site in Kazakhstan, and now permits US drone strikes against Taliban targets from the Jacobabad air base in Pakistani Punjab. An LSA once signed will be used by the US for its own purposes which may not always resonate with Indian policies and interest. It will, moreover, mean the US carving out parts of Indian ports and air bases for exclusive use to service their fighting assets deployed in this region. This was not acceptable to the Manmohan Singh government. The nationalist BJP government will be even less amenable to such demands.

India's requirement of American capital and technology will automatically follow once the Modi government removes the structural and procedural impediments erected by the socialist state of Nehruvian provenance that Indira Gandhi consolidated. This dismantling is what the Indian people and the US are waiting to see happen. Advanced military technology transfer, likewise, should be left to the commercially-minded US defence companies to manage. All the Manohar Parrikar-led defence ministry needs to do is lay down the iron rule that all procurement by the armed services will hereafter only be sourced to Indian companies producing weapons systems and other hardware in toto in-country, as has been decided in flagship programmes such as Project 75i conventional submarine and the Avro 748 airlifter replacement.

The American companies will then fight with their government to release them from technology transfer constraints to enable them to better compete with other foreign firms to partner Indian companies, in the initial stage, to produce the desired items—design to delivery—in India. That's the way to progress self-reliance in armaments, Modi's "Make in India" policy and the manufacturing sector, vastly increase opportunities for the youthful demographic bulge to be upskilled and gainfully employed, and cement India-US relations (in that order).

The author is professor at the Centre for Policy Research and blogs at Security Wise | Bharat Karnad – India's Foremost Conservative Strategist
 

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