Today, virtually all of the IAF's ESM fit is localized - with all onboard RWR/ESM fits from DRDO. The jammer segment is going the same way. In radars, starting from scratch, the IAF now has local alternatives and has placed sufficient orders for 2D Gapfillers, 3D LLTRs, 3D LLLWRs and FCRs. The ongoing programmes for MPR, AESA LLTR & AEW&C round off that segment.
In the Navy, the IN has gone for an all Indian sonar fit with the HUMSA series which are the bread and butter sonars. The ESM sit is now completely indigenized with Ajanta, Ellora and advanced variants on all ships, supplanting even the interim Israeli fits. The advanced variants eg Varuna, capable of detecting and classifying exotic signals eg LPI are also ready and on order. Constant upgrades are done without fuss, eg radar fingerprinting for further fine grain analysis. In advanced systems, Nagin is now under final trials & due this year (despite assorted gasbag bloggers assuming it got cancelled due to lack of in your face publicity). For submarines, the Navy is now using USHUS variants & local ESM as well.
For the Army, the DRDO's 2D LLLWR & 3D TCR are both ready and on significant order. Both projects completed without fuss & without delay.
The futuristic radars developed for the IAF and in advanced prototyping today will clearly have IA applications as well, when suitably repackaged for higher mobility vehicles and smaller footprint even at marginal reduction in performance. The Army's first sector level EW system, the Samyukta has elicited very positive reviews and its classified follow on is well under development.
What you & most other chaps who don't dig beyond the simplistic media reports fail to understand is that product development always depends on having a basis of tried and tested tech., which you can then iteratively build on. As such first-in-class systems are always the tough ones and take time with attendant cost issues. In India, most of our initial programs were budgeted for without taking any sanctions or cartels into account. As such whenever products were developed, sanctions or deliberate delays were introduced to kill projects. The much ballyhooed WLR for the Army, held up as an example of incompetence and delay was one such. Its critical phase shifter was unavailable in India, and just like other radar manufacturers DRDO hoped to bid for series versions from the handful of manufacturers in the west. It was denied & the DRDO developed better versions working with CEL & IIT Delhi.
The point is this sort of deliberate targeting of Indian defence industry, has been all too common. While it has introduced time & cost delay into many projects, along with the technical challenges of even system level development, overall India is stronger for it.
The IA & IAF are often unenthusiastic about local efforts because they simply lack a product development culture. The average officer wants quick imports based on 5 year plans. In contrast, an average weapons program can run somewhere between 5-10 years, with complex ones hitting 15-20 plus. Let alone system of systems programs like combat aircraft etc. To achieve such programs, the perspective planning for such products has to be perfect or near so, with clear requirements, limited mission and requirements creep, and asking for achievable requirements based on industrial assessment. Lacking the ability to do this, IA & IAF staff requirements are often reactive and poorly made out and then develop further over time, which leads to developmental delay on top of technology issues. In contrast, Navy has multiple design houses- WEESE, Naval Architects/Designers each with specific ownership of specific programs. They ensure products are "owned" by the Navy from day 1 and ensure a proper developmental path is made available even with MK1 to MK2 to MK3 transitions. They have done this despite working with arguably the most trenchant of Indian DPSUs, the shipyards. They have gone so far as to identify and convince specific companies working in different fields to take up marine engineering and production projects. Naval project managers are part of a rigorous system, which rotates them to ensure honesty and minimize bias, and well aware of their roles and responsibilities to ensure product/program success. They also have a viable career path.
In contrast, IA and IAF orphan officers in defence R&D, and if the former take their job too passionately, then they are oft treated with disdain, and are said to have forgotten the olive green (an actual comment made by a general in the Army, which just shows how deep the attitude problem is). People like Rajkumar who headed the LCA team were deliberately passed over for promotion as the IAF regarded the LCA as an unwanted step child standing in the way of the easy imports.
This sort of disdain for the involved process of product development is the real problem. Way back in the 70's, the Naval Chief that time, decided with his staff that future sailors needed to be multifunctional, so specific trades were created to keep apace with technology, beyond just sailing the platform. In contrast, the IA & IAF have only moved to maintainance and support of the frontline units and have completely abdicated their responsibility to the industry.
What they don't understand is that winning products are developed on time and on budget when they follow concurrent engineering and compressed test and verification methods, without sacrificing quality. By not having a product development and test team that works with DRDO etc in the product development lifecyle, the results come in only when the final product is ready or a prototype is, is sent back for rectification and then is ready for tests only a year thence at the right weather, place etc where again staff have to be found to evaluate it. What makes the situation tragicomical, is that by then the original evaluators jump ship, moving to new positions of command or leave the service. The new evaluators come in and do an entirely new assessment.
Today, after realizing that they too have culpability, the IA/IAF depute senior staff with support staff to such roles. But again, there is no formal organization that these people are part of and their careers/roles are in flux. In many cases, they'll have to join DRDO itself. While this is good for DRDO, it totally takes out the project ownership angle. In business, for high value add programs, senior staff is deputed to not just monitor but also to aid the program through development, by supporting it as required. This is a fundamental concept called mentorship. This is still lacking in the services beyond an ad hoc arrangement, run program by program where say the VCAS monitors the LCA. Problem is by the time this has occurred, the delays were already baked in. Such as not telling the designers which advanced missile to put in - wing redesign, asking for newer avionics after the LSP started (and to their credit they managed the new systems)...
This ad hocism is a huge challenge.
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