Discussion of CAG reports on armed forces

[PaliwalWarrior]

i am starting this thread to Discuss CAG reports on Armed Forces

why ?

because CAG reports are published by auditing armed forces own documents and are based on hard facts and not on reporters / newpapers / blogs/defensece experets opinions / articles

they provide a true picture

@Kunal Biswas sir pl make this a pinned thread - a request

 

[PaliwalWarrior]

major portions relating to delay of Arjun by army has already been highlighted by various members in Arjun MBT thread so now 1st i will put up the latest CAG report in IAF and then CAG report on Army

 

[PaliwalWarrior]

The Latest CAG report on IAF & IN is

CAG report no 34 of 2014 on Inadian AirForce and Indian NAvy and the link to report is here

https://www.google.co.in/search?q=a...fe_rd=cr&ei=gp7PVPOPL-jA8gfGvoHgBA&gws_rd=ssl

 

[PaliwalWarrior]

lets see what CAG says on accidents in IAF

below is the direct extract of CAGreport on IAF



due to human error (HE), technical defects (TD), and bird
strike (BS) as provided (August/October 2013) to audit by the DAS is
tabulated below:
Year
Cause-wise Accidents/Incidents
Accidents Incidents
HE TD BS HE TD BS
2010-11 06 08 00 61 217 96
2011-12 10 06 00 56 254 121
2012-13 03 04 00 39 308 140
Total 19 18 00 156 779 357
(Data on accidents/Incidents furnished by DAS to audit in August/October 2013)
As is evident from the Table above that 19 (i.e 51 per cent) of the flying
accidents had occurred due to human error whereas 18 (i.e 49 per cent) of
these flying accidents were due to technical defects. Further, though TD was
the major contributor with 779 (i.e 60 per cent) of the Incidents, the Incidents
due to bird strike were also significant with 357 (28 per cent) Incidents during
the review period. Thus during the period 2010-13 all the flying accidents
were due to human error and technical defects. Further analysis of cause wise
accidents is discussed below:-
I Technical Defects
During scrutiny of Court of Inquiry (CoI) and connected records, we observed
(October 2013) that 18 (out of 37) flying accidents had occurred due to
technical defects out of which finalisation of CoI of three accidents was
pending (October 2013). We noticed (October 2013) from the finalised 15
CoIs that one fighter aircraft crashed due to system failure on the part of gas
supply vendor and quality assurance agencies in IAF, seven accidents were
due to engine material failure, two accidents were due to engine flameout and
five accidents were due to airframe material failure.
Report No. 34 of 2014 (Air Force and Navy)
______________________________________________________________
93
We further observed (March 2014) that 667 (40 per cent) out of 15 finalised
CoIs remained inconclusive as the IAF could not establish the exact cause of
technical defect that had led to the accident. Details of these cases are given in
Annexure II. In one of these six accidents where cause of accident could not
be established, IAF lost 11 personnel (2 officers, and 9 PBOR). We therefore
suggested in the paragraph issued (June 2014) to the Ministry that IAF should
include a technical expert from other Government agency as a member of CoI
to conclusively establish the exact cause of accident.
In response to the paragraph, Air HQ stated (August 2014) that
recommendation of the Audit regarding inclusion of outside representative in
the CoI has been addressed in Air Force Order (AFO 8/14) issued in May
2014 wherein member of CoI are being taken from Government and public
sector agency like HAL/ National Aeronautical Lab (NAL) etc. Air HQ further
stated that the number of unresolved cases would decrease with the future
induction plan of aircraft where in advance Flight Data Recorder (FDR)
systems and other recording facilities would be available with the investigators
to find out the root cause of accident. Air HQ also stated that with the
advancement of technology and availability of investigation tools in Indian
labs, the unresolved cases would decrease drastically.
The fact, however, remains that despite being pointed out in Audit in 1998 and
assurance given by the Ministry in September 2008 to the PAC regarding
minimizing the accidents; the accidents due to technical defects had increased
from then 44 to 49 per cent. The mechanism for constant interaction with
HAL, OEM etc. representative, promised by the Ministry to PAC in 2008 as a
method to overcome the accidents due to technical defects was formalized
only in the year 2014 after being reiterated by Audit. In addition, six
(40 per cent) out of 15 finalised CoI had remained inconclusive as IAF was
unable to identify the actual cause of TD and by Air HQ own admission
(August 2014) the uncertainty having implication on flight safety would
continue to persist till such time the advanced technology was made available
to the investigators.
67 MiG-21 (02), MiG-27 (02), Kiran and Mi-17
Report No. 34 of 2014 (Air Force and Navy)
______________________________________________________________
94
II. Human Error
Human Error (HE) comprises error on the part of aircrew on flying duty or
ground duty or both. We had pointed out in Audit Report in 1998 that majority
of HE accidents ( 41 per cent) were caused as a result of inadequate flying
skill, error of judgement etc. based on findings of CoI. The PAC in its report
(March 2002) on the Audit Report of 1998 had pointed out that the increasing
trend of HE accidents indicated that the remedial steps taken were grossly
inadequate. In ATN, Ministry assured PAC (September 2008) that measures
to enhance quality of training to improve skill levels, ability to exercise sound
judgement and improved situational awareness were constantly being
reviewed and implemented. Besides, renewed thrust on acquiring simulators
and the Advance Jet Trainer (AJT) was a step towards improving the quality
of the man behind the machine.
We noticed (October 2013) from the findings of CoI of aircraft accidents
(2010-13) that 19 (51 per cent) flying accidents had been attributed to human
errors caused as a result of inadequate flying skill, error of judgment, poor
supervision, lack of situational awareness, disorientation of the pilots,
mishandling of controls and incorrect decision. Details of such flying
accidents are mentioned in Annexure III. Our scrutiny (October 2013) further
revealed that in these nineteen accidents IAF had lost 16 personnel
(10 Officer and 06 PBOR). Two such major accidents are discussed below
based on findings of respective CoIs:
Chetak helicopter after taking off from Kalaikunda was to route to
Bagdogra via Pannagarh and Purnea overflying the Singharsi Valley.
But while taxing, the captain changed the route and announced his
destination to Singharsi helipad which was cleared by Deputy air
traffic controller (DATCO) without understanding the implication of
change in destination. Since there was nil visibility at Singharsi
helipad, the helicopter crashed (September 2010) killing all three
Report No. 34 of 2014 (Air Force and Navy)
______________________________________________________________
95
personnel (2 officers and 1 PBOR) on board. Ground safety staff was
held responsible for this accident.
The tail rotor blades of two MI-17 helicopters collided, caught fire and
crashed (August 2012) killing nine crew members (05 officers and 04
PBOR) on board. The mid air collision took place because the
procedure of maintaining a minimum distance between the rotor disc
was violated.
Thus accidents due to human error during the period 2010-13 continued to be
caused by the same factors as were observed by audit in 1998 for accidents
occurred during the period 1991-97. Further the rate of percentage of
accidents due to these reasons had increased from then 41 per cent to
51 per cent of the total accidents during the stated period. Evidently the
assurance given by the Ministry has not been fulfilled.
Our further scrutiny of Quarterly Flying Training Return relating to training
provided by IAF also revealed that there was acute shortage of flying aids for
basic training (Stage I), follow-on flying training (Stage II) and advanced
training (Stage III). Details are discussed below:-

So in IAF HE - Human Eror is a bifger cause of accident is bigger than TD - technical defects -

 

[PaliwalWarrior]

pilot safety is important - and yes it is and also says that IAF top brass are doing their duty very well and concerned about pilot safety

but the CAG report busts that myth

lets see what CAG report has to say about top brass concern for pilot safety

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. the IAF is so much concerned about crew safety that they buy Substandard & Unsuitable clothing putting crew life to danger

3.7.7 Provisioning of unsuitable and substandard stores and delay
in provisioning.
Importance and criticality of Flying Clothing towards aircrew safety and
mission accomplishment calls for introduction of products of a very high
quality duly cleared after a structured testing, certification and inspection
process and timely provisioning thereof.
Audit, however, noticed the following instances of provisioning of
substandard, unsuitable, untested and uncertified flying clothing and delays in
provisioning thereof.
Substandard Flame Retardant Overall - `8.06 crore
Air HQ placed (July 2008) a supply order on M/s Aeronav Industrial Safety
Appliances, New Delhi for supply of 9200 units of Flame Retardant (FR)
Overall (sizes-6, 7, 8 and 9) at a total cost of `8.06 crore, to be supplied within
six months of bulk production clearance.
Audit noticed (September 2013) that consequent upon receipt of several
complaints from the users, Director General (Inspection & Safety) (DG (I&S))
had requested (September 2011) DEBEL40 to carry out detailed technical
analysis of used and brand new FR Overalls. This revealed (March 2012) that
the firm had supplied substandard FR Overalls, endangering the lives of the
Aircrew. Accordingly, DG (I&S), asked (April 2012) CEMILAC to withdraw
the 'Type Approval41' awarded to M/s Aeronav Industrial Safety Appliances,
New Delhi, which CEMILAC did (April 2012).
Since the 'Type Approval' was soon reinstated (July 2012), Audit took up
(September 2013) the case of procurement of substandard FR Overalls with
the Directorate of Stores and sought, inter alia, the exact justification for the
reinstatement of the 'Type Approval'.
40 Defence Bioengineering & Electromedical Laboratory
41 Means approval of the vendor by CEMILAC for supply of the particular store
Report No. 34 of 2014 (Air Force and Navy)
______________________________________________________________
69
From part reply/documents received (July 2014) from Air HQ, Audit noticed
(July 2014) that DG (I&S) had recommended (June 2012) to CEMILAC to
reinstate the 'Type approval' of M/s Aeronav Industrial Safety Appliances,
Noida, on the plea of the past supply record and passing of random FR
materials sample during subsequent testing (June 2012) by DEBEL, stating at
the same time that the batch of FR Overalls found to be substandard had been
recalled from the field.
The reinstatement of 'Type Approval' on the plea of the past supply record
and passing of random FR materials sample despite the recall of substandard
overalls from field units is not justified. The case reveals that Air
Headquarters had not only procured substandard quality of FR overalls which
had an effect of endangering the lives of ground staff but also failed to take
any concrete action against the defaulting vendor, for such substandard supply.
Audit further called for (August 2014) the details of substandard Flame
Retardant overalls recalled from field units together with their final disposal;
the information was awaited (September 2014).

 

[PaliwalWarrior]

2. Buying untested & Uncertified Helmets for Pilots

Untested and uncertified helmets
During the period from October 2007 to September 2010, Air HQ procured
Qty 1225 helmets from M/s Tan Enterprises, New Delhi (Qty 396) and M/s
Shakti Enterprises, Faridabad (Qty 829). These were received at various stock
holding Depots/Parks between December 2008 and January 2011.
Audit noticed (September 2013) that eight helmets had flown off during
ejection on MiG-21 and MiG-27 aircraft during the years 2010 and 2011,
which was a matter of grave concern to the IAF. These were indigenous
helmets which were inducted into the service without requisite testing and
certification. As an immediate measure, an interactive session among various
air force authorities42 had been held in September 2011 in which users brought
out various problems such as availability of helmets only in two sizes, ill fit of
70
indigenous helmets to many aircrew resulting in flying off during ejection, and
necessary improvement on helmets for comfort and safety etc.
Accordingly, Director General (Inspection & Safety) suggested (November,
2011) both 'short term measures'43 and 'long term measures'44 to effectively
eliminate the problem of helmets flying off during ejection to ensure utmost
safety of the aircrew, stating that subsequently these helmets would be
replaced by 'Common Helmets & Masks' which would be tested and certified
product.
Audit observed (September 2013) the issue of procurement and induction of
these helmets without requisite testing and certification and sought
clarifications on their modification as a short-term measure and expenditure
incurred on modification.
In reply the Directorate of Stores stated (October 2013) that 157 helmets were
modified at `21.81 lakh and another lot of 94 helmets at `13.06 lakh was then
under modification.
In response to the paragraph issued to Ministry (June 2014), Air HQ on the
directions (August 2014) of Ministry of Defence(Fin/Budget) stated (August
2014) that once the issues concerning helmets were noticed, 'short term
measures' as well as 'long term measures' were taken at the highest level and
the helmets were made usable. However, they did not respond to the Audit
observation regarding authorisation given for induction of indigenous helmets
without the requisite testing and certification.
Therefore, procurement of untested and uncertified flying clothing items
reveals flaws in the provisioning and procurement of critical items, as
procurement of untested and uncertified flying clothing items has adverse
flight safety implications.

 

[PaliwalWarrior]

3. Non-compatibility and shortage Oxygen Masks

Non-compatibility and shortage Oxygen Masks
MI-17V5 helicopter fleet operating at Wing 'A' (unit) assigned with extensive
flying with minimum of flight altitude of 10,000 feet, requires every helicopter
to be equipped with oxygen system comprising oxygen regulators,
disconnectors and oxygen masks forbeing used by aircrew as well as
passenger.
Audit noticed (September 2013) shortage of all these items vis-à-vis posted
pilots, the availability being only 87 per cent. Since, 50 per cent of the
available 87 per cent oxygen masks were unserviceable, the available quantity
of serviceable masks was grossly insufficient to meet the requirement of
posted aircrew. Consequently, aircrew were using passenger oxygen masks
which did not have built-in microphone forcing them to resort to non-standard
practice of wearing the mask over the headset microphone entailing a flight
safety hazard. Also, the aircrew were not able to use helmets during sorties
entailing flying above 10,000 feet due to non-compatibility of oxygen mask
and helmet.
In response to the paragraph issued to Ministry (June 2014), Air HQ on the
directions (August 2014) of Ministry of Defence (Fin/Budget) informed
(August 2014) that the case had been referred to the Directorate of Ops (T&H)
for furnishing clarification to Audit.
The fact remains that non-compatibility of oxygen mask and helmet coupled
with shortage and un-serviceability of oxygen masks has adverse flight safety
implications for aircrews of the unit.

 

[PaliwalWarrior]

4. Incorrect assessment in provisioning of Oxygen Regulator for
Jaguar aircrew– `16.8 crore


Oxygen Regulator is a critical item which has a direct bearing on cockpit
availability45 for Jaguar aircrew. The Maximum Potential Establishment
(MPE) of the item is 57 months.
Audit noticed (October 2013) that the Directorate of Stores had initiated (May
2009) a proposal for procurement of 65 Oxygen Regulators at a total cost of
`16.80 crore @ `25.84 lakh each, taking into consideration MPE of only 36
months instead of the prescribed 57 months, without giving any justification
for their doing so. Reduction of MPE from 57 months to 36 months, however,
kept the sanction for the proposal within the delegated financial powers of Air
HQ (`20 crore with IFA's concurrence).
IFA concurred with the proposal in July 2009 and Air Officer in-charge
Maintenance approved the same in July 2009. Accordingly, the Directorate of
Stores forwarded (July 2009) 'Schedule of Requirement' along with draft
'Request for Proposal' duly vetted by IFA to the Directorate of Procurement
for initiating procurement action. The lowest price `30.98 crore offered
(December 2009) by M/s Aviation Defence Spares Ltd., U.K. was, however,
found to be beyond Air Headquarters' financial powers, and, thus, required
Ministry's approval.
Instead of going for Ministry's approval, an internal meeting was held (March
2010) under the Chairmanship of Assistant Chief of Air Staff (ACAS)
(Logistics) to discuss on the procurement of Oxygen Regulators for Jaguar
Aircrew, in which proposed Qty 65 of Oxygen Regulators was reduced to Qty
35 on the following grounds:
Keeping in view the critical requirement of Oxygen Regulators and the
gestation period for supply of new ones being at least 15 months,
45 Each fighter aircraft has one Oxygen Regulator and two Oxygen Regulators for trainer
aircraft
Report No. 34 of 2014 (Air Force and Navy)
______________________________________________________________
74
immediate requirement was to be met through repaired/overhauled
ones.
The overhauled regulators would be available with one year OEM
warranty and the cost of overhaul would be less than one-third the cost
of new ones.
Considering an ideal yield repair of 75 per cent, 30 repairable Oxygen
Regulators would be recovered.
Accordingly, it was decided (April 2010) by ACAS (Logistics) in the CNC
Meeting to restrict the requirement of the Oxygen Regulators to 35 only. The
Directorate of Procurement, therefore, placed (May 2010) a supply order on
M/s Aviation Defence & Spares Ltd UK for supply of 35 Oxygen Regulators
at a cost of `15.85 crore, which were received at 24 ED AF between May
2011 and December 2011.
Audit observed (October 2013) the following irregularities in the provisioning
of Oxygen Regulators:
Reduction of MPE from 57 to 36 months without any justification,
kept the proposal within the delegated powers of Air HQ, resulting in
reduced availability of a critical item.
Subsequent reduction in the provisioning of Qty 65 of Oxygen
Regulators - assessed on the basis of already reduced MPE - further
reduced the availability of a critical item.
In response to the paragraph issued to Ministry (June 2014), Air HQ on the
directions (August 2014) of Ministry of Defence (Fin/Budget) submitted their
reply and stated (August 2014) that the reduction in quantity be looked in the
correct perspective, which resulted in savings to the exchequer and reduction
in inventory carrying cost, as Oxygen Regulator is a very costly item that can
Report No. 34 of 2014 (Air Force and Navy)
______________________________________________________________
75
be repaired and reused. However, reasons for reduction MPE from 57 to 36
months were not explained.
Their reply is not acceptable for the following reason:
Out of 23 repairable Oxygen Regulators sent for repair, only 12
(i.e. 52.17 per cent) Regulators were repaired (June 2014) and the
remaining 11 (i.e. 47.83 per cent) Regulators were rendered nonrepairable.
As opening of Letter of Credit was under process, no
repaired Regulator has been received till August 2014. Thus, in effect,
no repaired Regulator has been received even after a lapse of more
than four years. This only shows that the reduction of Qty 65 of
Oxygen Regulators to Qty 35 was not based on realistic and genuine
grounds.
Thus, the case reveals that initial unjustified reduction in MPE from
57 months to 36 months coupled with subsequent reduction in the assessed
Qty 65 of Oxygen Regulators to 35 on the basis of unrealistic and
unconfirmed grounds only to keep the procurement proposal within the
delegated financial powers of Air HQ impacted adversely on the availability
of this critical item.
While delay in provisioning of flying clothing was resulting in nonaccomplishment
of envisaged mission, introduction of substandard and
unsuitable flying clothing without mandatory testing, certification and
inspection by the designated agencies was the cause for low satisfaction level
and serious flight safety ramifications flagged by the field units across IAF.

 

[PaliwalWarrior]

CAG report annexures

Report No. 34 of 2014 (Air Force and Navy)
______________________________________________________________
210
ANNEXURE-III
(Referred to in Para No.3.8.7.2.2)
Causes of Human Error (HE)
Sl.No. Name of aircraft Exact Cause of Human Error
1. MiG-21 Due to situational overload
2. MiG-21 Error of Skill, Inexperience and inaccurate appreciation of approach
3. Kiran MK-I Due to delayed take over and improper transfer of controls
4. Hawk Delayed flare out while landing the air craft
5. MiG-21 Incorrect actions by the pilot starting with incorrect approach management
6. MiG-21 Delayed emergency action by the pilot
7. Kiran Incorrect procedure followed by Flight Commander . The pilot posture during the ejection was incorrect
8. MiG-21 Error of skill, inexperience of the pilot
9. MiG-21 Type-I disorientation
10. SU-30 MK-I Incorrect maintenance practice followed by technicians during servicing
11. Kiran MK-I Not holding the correct touchdown attitude by pilot
12. Jaguar Disorientation of the pilot
13. Chetak Incorrect decision of the pilot to continue flight in adverse weather in clear violation of laid downSOPs
14. ALH Mishandling of controls at Low Height by the Pilot
15. MI-17 Due to error of judgment ,procedural and decision making errors
16. MiG-29 Incorrect retraction by the pilot before the aircraft had lifted off the RW
17. Jaguar JS-201 Disorientation of the pilot
18 Chetak Z1417 Lack of situational awareness
19 MI-26 Z-3076 Incorrect carrying of load.


LOL

look at the reasons of Mig 21 Su30 MKI and Dhruv ALH crash causes

 

[PaliwalWarrior]

Finally, CAG to audit profits earned by Army's unit run canteens
TNN | Nov 9, 2012, 01.13AM IST
inShare
CAG to audit profits earned by Army's unit run canteens
Ending years of resistance by the military establishment against any external audit of its unit run canteens (URCs), the ministry of defence (MoD) and military leadership have agreed to CAG audits of profits earned by URCs.
NEW DELHI: Ending years of resistance by the military establishment against any external audit of its unit run canteens (URCs), the ministry of defence (MoD) and military leadership have agreed to CAG audits of profits earned by URCs.

A senior official said the profit earned by the 3,730 URCs under the quantitative discount would be audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India. "The military has also agreed to the suggestion. The MoD has now conveyed the decision to the Public Accounts Committee (PAC)," a senior official said.

Sources explained that the profit earned by the CSD ( Canteen Stores Department) is utilized under two heads. The first part is given by the MoD proportionately to the three Services for welfare activities, which are, in turn, passed on to various station commanders. "There is a clear laid down procedure on how to use this money. After CAG recently pointed out some concerns regarding the CSD canteens we have reaffirmed the guidelines. There is no concern on this part of the profit," an official said.

The other part of the profit is the quantitative discount that has been earned by the URCs. These canteens get their supplies at wholesale price from CSDs and sell them at retail rates, earning for themselves on an average about 4%-5% profit, another official said. The sum is at the discretion of the local unit commanders, and a part of it is used to pay salaries of URCs' employees and also upkeep of the canteens' premises. The remaining amount is used mostly for common unit welfare activities, and in many instances there have been allegations of misuse of this sum.

Sources said the willingness to open up the URC's account books was conveyed to the PAC recently.

There has been a running feud over the issue for the past several years, with the military top brass refusing to let the URCs be audited by external agencies, claiming they were running on non-public funds. In fact, the URCs give money in advance and procure goods from the CSD, they argued. The military leadership at one time offered not to take any money from government's consolidated fund for even the CSD procurement in order to avoid audit intrusions.

In 2010-11, the CAG in its performance audit of CSD had recommended that the URCs should be recognised as retail outlets integral to the former and be subjected to audit by the state-run auditor. During that audit, CAG was denied records of URCs.

After analysing the CAG report, PAC slammed the military for denying access to auditors to the URCs' accounts.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...ys-unit-run-canteens/articleshow/17149155.cms

 

[A chauhan]

Sorry for little OT but, do we had/have any project like MKULTRA for IB or RAW @pmaitra

 

[Srinivas_K]

it allows users to port identity, personal information, and service between devices. All cell phones are expected to incorporate some type of identity module eventually, in part because of this useful property.For More visit.....

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<a href="http://www.pantagonesatellite.com/embedded-products/sim-card-holder/">Dealer ofSIM CARD HOLDER </a>

Welcome to DFI !
It would be nice if you introduce yourself by creating a new thread in "members section".

 

[jonAlaan93]

Thank you for the info, very interresting