Chinese Military Capable of Jamming U.S. Communications System

[W.G.Ewald]

Chinese Military Capable of Jamming U.S. Communications System | Washington Free Beacon

U.S. spy's secrets assist Chinese electronic warfare against U.S. military data links

China's military is using stolen U.S. military secrets obtained from a convicted spy to defeat a high-technology communications system used in joint warfighting, combined arms warfare, and missile defenses, according to U.S. officials.

The disclosure that China has the capability of jamming the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System, or JTIDS, was revealed in a Chinese military technical article published in July.

JTIDS is part of a group of military communications systems called Link 16 that gives U.S. military forces jam-resistant communications, a key strategic advantage used in joint warfighting, a specialty of the American military.

But Snowden said he stole secrets "for the American people."

 

[W.G.Ewald]

The article, "Anti-Jamming Performance of JTIDS-Type Waveform," was published July 10 in the journal Aerospace Electronic Warfare, a publication of Institute 8511, a unit of the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC).

Can a Chinese DFI member find link to this article, possibly with English translation?

 

[Ray]

Can a Chinese DFI member find link to this article, possibly with English translation?

It will be a miracle!

 

[drkrn]

you say snowden sold these to china??

 

[drkrn]

It will be a miracle!

.................

 

[W.G.Ewald]

you say snowden sold these to china??

I am quite certain he did, and believe he conspired with Chinese while he was still at NSA.

 

[W.G.Ewald]

Structure Analysis of JITDS Information--《Friend of Science Amateurs》2010年04期

An earlier publication on the subject, I believe.

 

[t_co]

I am quite certain he did, and believe he conspired with Chinese while he was still at NSA.

Why? What's your theory?

 

[t_co]

Also, Link 16 is not so much a technology as it is a protocol; a set of agreed-upon signal sets, frequencies, code-hopping patterns etc. that let different devices talk to each other across cable and the wireless spectrum. Given the nature of a protocol (namely, everyone who builds a device for it has to know how it works) - it's not surprising this would happen.

What's more, with MADL coming out soon, Link 16 will slowly become obsolete. China knows this; the vast majority of Chinese cyberattacks were not directed at the F-35's flight or stealth characteristics, but its EW suite, computerized maintenance system, radar, and communications set. China wants to replicate MADL and the AN/APG-81, not the F-35 or F-22.

Those electronic, or intangible assets are what gives the USAF real advantages in tactical air combat. Stealth coatings and maneuverability are less important. This is why I'm not a big fan of the PAK FA, because Russia's EW expertise has historically been pretty bad compared to their Western counterparts. If things had gotten hot in the 80s, the Red Army would have found itself deaf, dumb, blind, and mute as NATO jammed everything and selectively destroyed their C4ISR nodes for free, while NATO's armies danced and coordinated with the SINGARS frequency hopping radio, synthetic aperture radars, and E-3 AEW&C aircraft.

 

[W.G.Ewald]

Why? What's your theory?

Where did Snowden flee before he ended up in Moscow?

 

[t_co]

Where did Snowden flee before he ended up in Moscow?

That's circumstantial, and furthermore the NSA wouldn't be the ones with the easiest access to Link 16. And you must be naive if you think that one analyst could cart off an entire military communications protocol.

The article you cited contradicts you - there were other leaks (and leakers) involved that compromised the solution set.

 

[W.G.Ewald]

That's circumstantial, and furthermore the NSA wouldn't be the ones with the easiest access to Link 16. And you must be naive if you think that one analyst could cart off an entire military communications protocol.

The article you cited contradicts you - there were other leaks (and leakers) involved that compromised the solution set.

The other leakers were also turned by Chinese agents.

An FBI affidavit in the case revealed that Bergersen "discussed Po Sheng and communications security" during a dinner meeting on March 3, 2007 with a Chinese agent identified as Tai Shenkuo. The affidavit said the talks involved disclosure of classified information

.

 

[t_co]

The other leakers were also turned by Chinese agents.
.

So? Where's your proof that Snowden was turned by a Chinese agent? We could just as easily say he went to Hong Kong because that was the only city both "Western" and a safe harbor against any rendition teams.

 

[s002wjh]

Where did Snowden flee before he ended up in Moscow?

so any US citizen goto china automatically become spy. just because he went to hongkong, doesn't mean he sold all to china. beside teh stuff he access has nothing to do with US tech, but document on US policies.

 

[drkrn]

I am quite certain he did, and believe he conspired with Chinese while he was still at NSA.

what kind of project is he doing while with nsa.
was his rank enough to get through classified data of such levels?

 

[W.G.Ewald]

what kind of project is he doing while with nsa.
was his rank enough to get through classified data of such levels?

That 2nd question was a major concern in the investigation. There is much room for more controls on NSA employees and especially contractors. In the end, we can't blame foreign intelligence services for our slackness.

 

[W.G.Ewald]

so any US citizen goto china automatically become spy. just because he went to hongkong, doesn't mean he sold all to china. beside teh stuff he access has nothing to do with US tech, but document on US policies.

No, Snowden in fact revealed methods, not just policies.

 

[W.G.Ewald]

So? Where's your proof that Snowden was turned by a Chinese agent? We could just as easily say he went to Hong Kong because that was the only city both "Western" and a safe harbor against any rendition teams.

Yes, we can say anything. The facts may never be known.

 

[t_co]

That 2nd question was a major concern in the investigation. There is much room for more controls on NSA employees and especially contractors. In the end, we can't blame foreign intelligence services for our slackness.

The biggest concern, though, is the combination of fat consulting contracts operating without proper oversight or accountability due to security clearances. That will be a rot that impacts the dollar-for-dollar efficiency of American intelligence far more than a leak or two. The American people should not let the Pentagon's penchant for pork creep into the intelligence community.