China's vulnerability in Malacca Strait

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China: Balancing powers in the Malacca Strait By Bill "¦ | Piracy "¦ | Piracy Watch


Balancing powers in the Malacca Strait



Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia have stepped up sea patrols in the strait after Singapore's navy said on Thursday it had received indications a terrorist group was planning attacks on oil tankers.

A Police Coast Guard vessel patrols shipping lanes near freight ships off the coast of Singapore March 4, 2010. ( REUTERS/Vivek Prakash)

The 900-km long (550 miles) Malacca Strait, linking Europe and the Middle East with the Asia-Pacific, carries about 40 percent of the world's trade. More than 50,000 merchant ships ply the waterway every year.

About 3.3 million barrels per day (bpd) of Middle East crude passed through the strait and to Japan last year. Middle East crude accounts for 90 percent of Japan's total imports. Up to 80 percent of China's crude imports are delivered via the narrow and congested waterway.


So China and Japan have a stake in keeping the Malacca Strait secure, as does India which has a blue water navy patrolling in the Andaman Sea at the western end of the strait.

The strait is a vital sea lane for the U.S. Navy, which sent warships to Taiwan via the Malacca Strait at a time of heightened tensions between China and Taiwan in 1996.

Although the three littoral states — Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore — have asserted their sole right to maintain security in the Malacca Strait, Australia, India, Japan, the United States and China have all offered military assistance at various times.

The Malacca Strait has been infested with pirates for centuries, but since the 9/11 suicide airliner attacks the security focus has switched to terrorism. The ability of Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia to ensure security in a waterway of such geopolitical importance has been complicated by their own competing territorial claims and rivalries. All three countries, for instance, have had territorial disputes over islands and waters that have wound up in court or in naval confrontations.

Worries about territorial sovereignty have made hot pursuit in the strait problematic. The three countries conduct joint patrols under the Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrol established in July 2004. But joint patrols are not the same as combined patrols and have proven difficult to coordinate.

Crew member uses pair of binoculars as he watches for
pirates from USNS Walter S. Diehl in Malacca Strait off Malaysia
on May 14, 2008 (Reuters/Vivek Prakash)

A 2005 initiative, "The Eyes in the Sky Program" involving joint aerial surveillance with Thailand also restricts air patrols from going within threee miles of each other's borders. The same lack of trust has hampered intelligence sharing.

The United States, after pronouncing Southeast Asia a "second front in the war on terrorism" in 2002, tried to increase its naval presence in the region. Malaysia and Indonesia swiftly shot down that idea. Two years later, Washington proposed the Regional Maritime Security Initiative, which would have involved joint patrols — including putting U.S. special forces on high-speed boats. Again Indoensia and Malaysia vetoed the presence of foreign forces in
the strait and a diluted version of the idea was adopted instead.

Southeast Asian countries are, if anything, even more suspicious of a Chinese military presence in the region. One of the rationales for keeping security confined to the littoral states is to keep the strait from becoming a big power flashpoint. Indeed, the response to piracy and terrorism in the Malacca Strait can illuminate how the big power dynamics are playing out in the region. The Regional Maritime Security Initiative, for instance, also had in mind interdicting WMD cargo (think North Korea nuclear and missile materiel).

Singapore did not say what terrorist group was behind the threat to oil tankers in the strait. Security experts say the al Qaeda network has long had video footage of Malaysian police patrols. The Indonesian militant group, Jemaah Islamiah, once had strong connections to the group. The head of an Indoensian anti-terrorism task force has suggested Indoensian militants have re-established an al Qaeda connection.

The United States, China, Japan and India will continue to seek influence over Malacca Strait security — for anti-terrorism, geopolitical and commerical interests — even as China, for one, looks for alternative routes for its burgeoning energy needs.

Article source: China: Balancing powers in the Malacca Strait By Bill Tarrant | ikners.com

Article source: China: Balancing powers in the Malacca Strait By Bill Tarrant | ikners "¦ | Piracy Watch

Article source: China: Balancing powers in the Malacca Strait By Bill "¦ | Piracy Watch

Article source: China: Balancing powers in the Malacca Strait By Bill "¦ | Piracy Watch | Piracy Watch
 
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Indian Strategy towards the Strait of Malacca - South Asia Journal


Indian Strategy towards the Strait of Malacca


For decades, India has remained one of the most influential political and military powers on the Asian continent. Given the Indian population of nearly 1.2 billion, a strong and continually growing economy (GDP in terms of purchasing power parity in 2011 was four and a half trillion dollars) and the size and power of the armed forces (one million three hundred thousand soldiers and an annual military expenditure of more than thirty-six billion U.S. dollars), it is clear that New Delhi has an enormous influence on events taking place in the region.
Over the years, India has concentrated its political and military efforts towards maintaining its power projection on land. Since its independence in 1947, India has emphasized protection of its borders from both real and perceived threats from the North (China) and from the West (Pakistan). The validity of such an approach lies in the tense political and military relations with Beijing and Islamabad. Historically, unresolved issues concerning the delimitation of borderlines resulted in a series of military conflicts, as well as regular wars between India and it neighbors.
As an example, one might mention the humiliating defeat in the border conflict with China of 1962, and three full-scale wars with Pakistan in 1947, 1965 and 1971 (not to mention a smaller scale clash known as the Kargil War). The lesson from these past conflicts seemed to be that an effective protection of national interests rested in ensuring the security of the borderline through the maintenance of strong and numerous armed forces.
This view has evolved during last two decades. The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union has altered the fundamental dynamics of global security, and India is emerging as a nation willing to vigorously assert its military might beyond its borders. The specific Indian "Monroe Doctrine", understood as marginalizing naval aspects of country's security policy, has been abandoned in favor of a robust policy of maritime power projection.
Chinese dragon on the sea
A specific change in the balance of power on the waters of the Indian Ocean had been in effect for several years before India's arrival as a supranational military power. China, by building alliances and establishing a number of military outposts on the IO, has already achieved a real (though tenuous) foothold in the region. India sees Chinese incursion onto the IO as a challenge to her own strategic interests, and New Delhi has begun to take what it considers adequate countermeasures towards the growing Chinese presence.
The chief aspect of Chinese activity on the IO is a more vast and visible projection of its naval power, especially on the eastern outskirts of the Ocean. To counteract such a policy, New Delhi has increased the operational capacity of its Far East Command placed on the islands of the Andaman and Nicobar Archipelago (widely known as the Andaman and Nicobar Command, or ANC). This step has been taken in order to maintain the ability to control navigation through the strategically important Strait of Malacca which connects the IO with the waters of western Pacific. No nation can control the traffic through the Strait relying on military strength alone. Developing and maintaining a dominant position in the region also requires strong and positive relations with regional states.
In order to achieve this, India would have to use a variety of tactics, most notably the quantitative and qualitative expansion of the already mentioned ANC. This would contribute towards projecting more military strength in the region, through the so-called "presentation of the flag", in essence an assertion of suzerainty through an outsized military presence. By conducting a series of operations focused on increasing the safety of navigation throughout the Strait's waterway, and eliminating threats such as piracy and terrorism, India might be able to establish good will as a kind of regional steward. In the wider perspective, it may also be crucial towards expanding India's economic activity in the region, offering a clear perspective of future economic profits for local states willing to cooperate with Indian control of the Straits.
Due to constantly changing political and military conditions in the region, New Delhi's policy will depend on various factors, some of which will be beyond India's control. Surely, the reaction of regional states (and China) to the constant growth of India's military capabilities in the region will be a primary factor. Moreover, sustaining the stability of alliances with other countries will also be key to the case. Indian strategy towards the Malacca Strait region will not develop in a vacuum, and will be greatly influenced by what Delhi's perceptions of China's interests and commitment to the area.
Conditions
The vast growth of China's political and military activity on the IO has been recorded for many years. One may explain it as an effect of Chinese dependence on the import of energy resources, such as oil and natural gas, which are being transported through waters both of the IO and the Strait of Malacca.
The most important Chinese Sea Line of Communication (SLOC) runs from the Strait of Hormuz to the Strait of Malacca, and then falls into the waters of the South China Sea. This situation is very uncomfortable for Beijing, since most of this route has for decades been defined as India's informal sphere of influence.
To many observers it is obvious that India is the reason behind Beijing's plans to secure its own SLOCs through the expansions of naval military bases on the whole IO. This objective, however, cannot be achieved without compromising what India sees as its own vital interests. Therefore, Chinese policy towards the region has become a cause of informal (but increasingly realistic) rivalry between the two entities.
One of the major areas of this rivalry is the Bay of Bengal. China's steadily expanding military alliances with nearly all the countries in the region represents an incursion upon what India views as its natural territory of regional hegemony. New Delhi fears that the Bay may become something like an "inner sea" for further Chinese military activity. This, in turn, could lead to a reduction of Indian influence in the entire Indian Ocean and the unveiling of the eastern flank of the Indian mainland, which it would not be able to defend if an attack by Chinese naval forces ever materialized. This is why it's important from the Indian perspective to have a strong southernmost military outpost which would be able to monitor and balance the strategic advantage of China both in the Bay of Bengal and on the entire IO.
The second important factor of Indian policy towards the Strait of Malacca is the functioning of the ANC itself. Since it connects the Indian and Pacific Oceans, it has become one of the major hubs for international maritime trade. It is estimated that about sixty thousand transport ships use the Strait's nine hundred kilometers long waterways every year. The U.S. Energy Information Administration implies that the scale of the energy consumption of all Southeast and Eastern Asian countries is so large that the amount of energy resources which are being transported through the Strait totals around fourteen million barrels of oil daily.
The issue of maritime trade, which takes place through the Strait, is related to the problem of piracy. Groups of marauding bandits operating on poorly controlled waters surrounding the coast of Indonesia, Malaysia, and also the Philippines, present a major threat to the security of energy resource transit and other goods to and from Southeast Asia and Europe. In this context, one cannot forget about the threat from local terrorist groups, which also can effectively destabilize naval navigation in the region.
To ensure at least partial protection for transport ships through the Strait is therefore of paramount importance. It seems necessary that the region should experience not only a vast growth in the military presence of regional states, but also stronger multinational military cooperation.
Objectives
Due to its geographical location, the Andaman and Nicobar archipelago is ideal for surveilling shipping along the Straits of Malacca. Thus, a lot of emphasis is placed on the extension and modernization of the observation infrastructure located on these islands. Numerous strategic points, listening stations, supplemented by air surveillance units and soundproof submarines, allow the Indian state to monitor most if not all the maritime traffic in the region.
This surveillance of maritime traffic includes the Chinese naval components as well. It allows New Delhi not only to analyze its rival's movements, but also complicates Beijing's attempts to enter the IO waters unnoticed with a larger number of combat units. The expansion of ANC's operational capability is also linked with other, lesser-known obstacles in the future.
Because of the confrontational nature of Indian-Chinese relations, ANC may be used as a vital leverage point. In times of danger India may decide to exploit China's previously mentioned dependence on the bandwidth of the Straits of Malacca and block the maritime traffic going through it.
Any blockage of the Strait, regardless of the circumstances accompanying it, could put China in a very difficult position. A plug in the flow of energy resources would affect not only its national economy but could also contribute to an increasing internal unrest on the Chinese mainland. In this scenario, Indian strategy would require at least the silent acquiescence of regional states such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand.
To achieve this objective, India would need to develop a dominant political position in the region. This could be accomplished by organizing, under the auspices of New Delhi, a common set of initiatives in: navigational safety, combating piracy, environmental protection, and the development of defense capabilities in the region. In contrast to China, India has thus far not excelled at the so-called "soft power" initiatives of coalition building and mutual state cooperation needed to win solvent and lasting regional alliances.
Military infrastructure
Implementation of both hard and soft power objectives would be based on the use of a wide range of measures, the most important one being the expansion of ANC's operational capability. Currently it looks mediocre. Until recently, the Command had only fifteen light and medium ships, a small number of Dornier-228 patrol aircrafts, Mi-8 and Shetak helicopters and a brigade of soldiers consisting of three infantry battalions (two of the National army and one of the Territorial Army). These units were supported by a squadron of Su-30MKI planes, temporarily stationed on the islands.
Given the growing Chinese presence, ANC is now going through a vast and intensive process of modernization and expansion of its military hardware. Every ANC component stationed on the island is undergoing technological improvements or is in an advanced planning stage. ANC's largest airports are set to undergo a metamorphosis. The final aim is to have four fully equipped sites, able to accept any type of aircraft, any time of day or night.
Resources in Shipur and Camp Bell are undergoing advanced renovations as well, including the extension of runways. In addition, the landing sites for helicopters, radar stations and facilities for landing and taking off at night are also being modernized. This will complement the operational facilities in Port Blair and Car Nicobar as well as the ones planned to be built in Katchul and Hut Bay.
New airports, supplemented by the provisional ones (in Nyoma, Daulat Beg Oldie and Fuk Che), will be able to receive various aircraft types. Su-30MKIs will probably form the core of ANC's aviation. Currently there are plans of setting up a permanent squadron of these jets. In addition, the Command will be also be using fighter-bomber Jaguars, hunting Dassault Mirage-2000, MiG family fighter jets, unmanned airborne vehicles (UAV)and An-32 transport and reconnaissance aircrafts. The improvement of radar systems is also being taken into consideration.
However the modernization plans of the naval component are not yet clearly specified. Theoretically it could be reinforced by units such as cruisers or destroyers. The decision in this matter has not yet been taken. There are also plans to assign a number of quiet conventional submarines. What is known is that ANC's amphibious capabilities will be improved through the deployment of a series of landing ships LST (Landing Ship Tank) and LCU (Landing Craft Utility).
Land Forces are being reinforced by an additional three infantry battalions, including a motorized battalion and an artillery regiment. New Delhi will probably also send an air support unit in the form of specialized UAV. There are also plans (not specified) of strengthening the special forces units stationed on navy ships.
Presentation of the flag
Another factor which may decide the final success of Indian policy towards the region is the so-called "presentation of the flag". It is based on an assumption that marking India's military presence on the Archipelago's waters should make regional states more willing to cooperate with New Delhi. This kind of activity is mostly conducted in the form of multinational (but also internal) war games at sea. In fact, India has been using this tool for many years, organizing annual simulations of naval skirmishes, to which individual regional states are invited. There were two such events in 2010. One was conducted together with the naval forces of Singapore; the second with the representatives of the maritime components of twelve regional states including all the countries lying along the Strait of Malacca.
In January of 2012 a new edition of the multinational maritime war games code-named "Milan" took place. Organized since 1995, the event groups together elements of marine components of many South and South-Eastern Asian countries. This year, fourteen countries have designated their representatives to take part in these wargames, including Australia, Bangladesh, Thailand, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Malaysia and the Maldives. Significantly, Pakistan and China were in the group of countries not invited.
Furthermore ANC continually strives to develop its own operational capabilities, which also serve to highlight their involvement in the security situation in the region. Units of all components stationed at the Archipelago islands, including the Coast Guard, carry out this type of exercise regularly in the annual and biennial intervals.
The special forces also constantly try to develop their own operational potential by organizing a series of wargames. A large emphasis is being put on the simulation of seizing hostile port infrastructure or landing on enemy ships and freeing hostages. Sometimes, special forces simulate together with marine units missions like storming enemy beaches, establishing footholds and further encroaching deep into enemy-controlled areas.
Regional security
India seems relatively adept at leveraging the common security issues along the Strait for their own strategic advantage. Marauding bands of pirates, regional terrorist organizations, and dealers in arms, drugs and people have become too strong for regional security forces to handle by themselves. This is why ANC has been undertaking a series of initiatives, the objective of which is to help to change the current situation.
A good example of such a policy was a 2005 initiative called the Malacca Strait Security Initiative (MSSI), whose most obvious manifestation was the operation "Eye in the Sky". Its main aim was to patrol the airspace along the Strait with Indian Air Force participation. This contributed to the acceptance of India as a subject of vital security issues concerning the region and ready to engage in these types of collective initiatives.
In addition to MSSI, India tries to work with its neighbors to improve their own surveillance and patrol capabilities. Thus, several initiatives have been undertaken, some of them involving cooperation of regional navies using offshore combat units. In addition, joint patrols are being organized whose task is to catch marauding pirate groups and if needed, eliminate them ensuring the safety of ships passing nearby.
By taking such steps India gains a huge advantage. Presenting itself as a country involved in security issues around the Strait, it wins the favor of regional states. What is also important and worth noticing, is that in all the multinational initiatives ANC is involved in, India does not play a decisive role. This allows New Delhi to project the image of an entity which does not impose on others its own solutions, based on its clear political or military dominance.
Minerals
The archipelago of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands are rich in valuable minerals. Harnessing these deposits could be a major financial boon, as they are sure to become an important element of the islands' economy. Lately, the waters surrounding the Archipelago have undergone a series of advanced research, with the focus being undersea oil and gas fields exploration. If eventually discovered, they may not only benefit the region's population, but will also have an impact on the raw materials policy of the Indian government, whose energy demands are increasing every year.
Exploitation of these deposits will not only allow the economic development of the region, but also affect its importance from the standpoint of Indian national security policy. This might create yet further incentive to increase the operational capability of ANC, with the task of preserving the mining installations and convoys of shipments flowing in the direction of continental India.
The increase in financial activity on the islands will also intensify economic cooperation with other countries in the region. This in turn could bring the region more under Delhi's control.
Raw materials are also important in the context of the South China Sea. Potentially rich reserves of oil, estimated at twenty to thirty billion barrels (seven billion already confirmed) and the equally large deposits of natural gas, makes this a coveted area for the region's major players. China is one of the most active players in this group. By trying to impose its own solutions on the other players, PRC claims the right to control (as a service) the largest areas of the Sea. These efforts are contrary to the interests of other states such as Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines, all of whom will seek their own pieces of the "energy pie".
Chinese policy in the region has been concentrated, in recent years, towards thwarting India's growing influence in the region. India, however, has continued to make diplomatic progress in Southeast Asia, and with nations along the South China Sea. The best example of this is India's relations with Vietnam, which have been recently improved. Surely, in some part this improvement was motivated by a multi-million dollar investment of Indian state energy company ONGC (Oil and Natural Gas Corporation) company in Vietnam. There has also been a vast expansion of military cooperation between those two states. Currently Indian Navy ships have the right to dock and use some of the Vietnamese sea ports located on the southern and south-eastern coasts of the country. In addition, New Delhi plans to extend and improve the political and military relations with other entities of the region, developing a privileged position in the future resource-concentrated rivalry with Beijing.
India's policy towards the South China Sea is geared towards achieving three basic objectives. The first is to gain access to rich deposits of raw materials and cheap energy. The second is to reduce the PRC's access to the same deposits. The third is to develop positive relations with other countries in the region. While implementing Indian regional strategy it would be prudent to use all the advantages which are given to New Delhi in the ANC. Regional cooperation in the field of maritime safety, the constant "presentation" of the Indian flag, and assisting in the development of quantitative and qualitative components of regional states should and will give New Delhi a chance to develop the clout it seeks in the South China Sea area.
Conclusions
The realization of the main goals of the Indian regional policy will depend on several factors. The basics are to complete the expansion of infrastructural facilities on the Archipelago and to quantitatively strengthen units subordinated to ANC. This will allow India to maintain a greater presence than ever on regional waters and to intensify patrol missions, especially around the key waterways of the Strait of Malacca. This will also boost the level of cooperation between India and regional states and improve the level of security around areas which are of great importance from Indian strategic point of view. â– 
Michal Jarocki is a defense analyst and journalist. He specializes in the topic of Arctic territorial claims and Indian-Chinese maritime rivalry on the Indian Ocean.
 

Adux

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China is literally ----ed unless it has a difference of military power between Indian Navy and USN over Indian Navy. They are not going to achieve that with a rapidly advancing Indian Navy, who are currently stronger than them as well as not going to happen with USN and IN prowling in IOR. Chinese rise to power is too late and too arrogant for other nations to take it lying down. Without a collapse of US and India in the scale of Soviet Union, China's is going to be stuck a regional power.
 
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Known_Unknown

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As someone else polinted our earlier, the Strait of Malacca is not the only way to get from the IOR to the South China Sea. There are 4 other routes available. According to wiki:

Over 50,000 (94,000?)[2] vessels pass through the strait per year,[3] carrying about one-quarter of the world's traded goods including oil, Chinese manufactures, and Indonesian coffee.
That's ~4000 ships per month or ~130 ships per day. Does the IN have the resources to stop each and every ship to check documentation, verify shipments and conduct manual checks? Not likely, considering in wartime, they also have to allocate resources to defend India's coastline from Chinese subs or SSN's.

Even if they did, many ships would just avoid the Malacca Strait and take one of the other 4 routes instead. The strategic importance of the Malacca Strait is overestimated.
 

Adux

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As someone else polinted our earlier, the Strait of Malacca is not the only way to get from the IOR to the South China Sea. There are 4 other routes available. According to wiki:



That's ~4000 ships per month or ~130 ships per day. Does the IN have the resources to stop each and every ship to check documentation, verify shipments and conduct manual checks? Not likely, considering in wartime, they also have to allocate resources to defend India's coastline from Chinese subs or SSN's.

Even if they did, many ships would just avoid the Malacca Strait and take one of the other 4 routes instead. The strategic importance of the Malacca Strait is overestimated.
Why should India stop all the 130 ships? Off the 130 ships who many are headed to china or china flagged? Off the china flagged or china headed, how many are Oil tankers or similar ships of interest for IN? Why should IN do it for 365 days or even months? Do this for 2 weeks, the PLAN will come out of their hiding spots. Then we can see the fireworks.

It will be stupid for anybody to think in the event of Indo-Chinese confrontation, that there will be only these two parties and nobody else. The way it looks now, none of the major players are going to support the chinese in IOR

Chinese subs, lol
 

Known_Unknown

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^^Interesting. But my guess is that this information is being broadcast by those ships who WANT to do so (in the event that they get stranded for reasons of mechanical failure, pirate attack etc). In war time, can this information be relied upon? As a defence professional, you know much better than I do that a ship headed for China could deliberately fly the flag of another country, forge documents or just not report it's location so freely at all. For communication with the home port, the ship may be using an encrypted channel and satellite (Chinese, not GPS) routing.

Another option is that the Chinese Navy could provide armed escort for its high-value merchant ships, like a sub escorted tanker for example. In that case, the IN will have to enter into direct conflict with PLAN.

Lastly, let us not forget that if India tries to choke China's oil supply, China can use Pak to open a two front land and naval war against India. Considering the pathetic state of the Indian Army at present (2 days worth of ammunition available in case of war and no artillery purchases made since the early 1990's), if that does happen, India has no hope of a win unless the US or Russia intervene on India's behalf.
 

Known_Unknown

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Why should India stop all the 130 ships? Off the 130 ships who many are headed to china or china flagged? Off the china flagged or china headed, how many are Oil tankers or similar ships of interest for IN?.......
You really think in the event of war, ships headed to China will be carrying Chinese flags or documentation?
 

W.G.Ewald

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^^Interesting. But my guess is that this information is being broadcast by those ships who WANT to do so (in the event that they get stranded for reasons of mechanical failure, pirate attack etc). In war time, can this information be relied upon? As a defence professional, you know much better than I do that a ship headed for China could deliberately fly the flag of another country, forge documents or just not report it's location so freely at all. For communication with the home port, the ship may be using an encrypted channel and satellite (Chinese, not GPS) routing.

Another option is that the Chinese Navy could provide armed escort for its high-value merchant ships, like a sub escorted tanker for example. In that case, the IN will have to enter into direct conflict with PLAN.

Lastly, let us not forget that if India tries to choke China's oil supply, China can use Pak to open a two front land and naval war against India. Considering the pathetic state of the Indian Army at present (2 days worth of ammunition available in case of war and no artillery purchases made since the early 1990's), if that does happen, India has no hope of a win unless the US or Russia intervene on India's behalf.
Those are good points. However, as I see it, since so many ships can be identified by automated systems, the relatively few that are not become more conspicuous and subject to interdiction.
 
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You really think in the event of war, ships headed to China will be carrying Chinese flags or documentation?
We have atleast 3 satellites that can track ships and intelligence sharing agreements with other countries with the
Same capability.
 

Ray

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You really think in the event of war, ships headed to China will be carrying Chinese flags or documentation?
In the event of a war, if a ship that does not fly the flag of China but is carrying goods for China, it can be stopped and the goods impounded.
 

Ray

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The Lombok Strait (Indonesian: Selat Lombok) is a strait connecting the Java Sea to the Indian Ocean, located between the islands of Bali and Lombok in Indonesia. The Gili Islands are on the Lombok side.

Its narrowest point is at its southern opening, with a width of only 18 km, but at the northern opening it is 40 km across. Total length is about 60 km. Because it is 250 m deep[1] — much deeper than the Strait of Malacca — ships that draw too much water to pass through Malacca (so-called "post Malaccamax" vessels) often use the Lombok Strait, instead.

 

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The campbell bay Air base is situated at the Mouth of Mallaca !! Not to forget we have berthing right's in vietnam's naval port
 

Adux

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You really think in the event of war, ships headed to China will be carrying Chinese flags or documentation?
Nobody cares about those one of ships, but the prime ships, such as mega oil tankers will be stopped. China will be choked. In this day and age, that is far more easier than what it has been before.
 

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About 10 tankers pass everyday through the Malaccas. I don't see how we would not able to handle that.

IF it was not a major issue for the Chinese to get choked at the Malaccas, why the strong of pearls, why the pipeline from Myanmar?
 

Kunal Biswas

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yes the airbase is there, india air force gonna sink ALL the civilian ship that pass through the strait? indian navy gonna search every ship that pass through the strait, do you know how many ships pass through there each day!
most of the oil or other ship go to china are not even chinese, but belong to opec, europe etc. furthermore, its almost impossible to distinguish a ship destination if china decide to blend in their ship along with other foreign ships, documentation, route, transport location everything can be forge, make impossible to stop only certain ships in the area. the only way to stop the transport is seal it off and stop any ship attempt to pass through the strait, and i can guranntee you that US won't allow that to happen. this is the same reason why US won't allow china to have south china sea. freedom of navigation is ong the most important thing for US. also you think other country will just ignore india take over of malacca. ;) its not just affecting china but all the other countries as well. it won't be long before US intervane
In that case study how IN stop Shipping trades in Bay of Bengal and Arabian sea 65 & 71, there are many ships even US, Arab even Russian..
 

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About 10 tankers pass everyday through the Malaccas. I don't see how we would not able to handle that.

IF it was not a major issue for the Chinese to get choked at the Malaccas, why the strong of pearls, why the pipeline from Myanmar?
Hi Yusuf,

Put yourself in their (PLAN) shoes, and think about what can they do in the event the Indian Navy decided to "choke" the Strait of Malacca. The answer couldn't be more simple. Go the other ways; and there are plenty of routes that the Indian Navy could not possibly have the resources or political will to "choke". To "choke" the Chinese, you also have to ask what are you trying to "choke" in the first place. Oil? raw materials like iron (example)? Their access to their export market?

Let's say oil for simplicity sake. The Indian Navy cannot possibly "choke" oil to China by blocking the Strait of Malacca. The best chance of success (and not much to speak of to begin with) is to "control" the Strait of Hormuz (instead of the Strait of Malacca). Needless to say, that's not even within the realm of possibility for the Indian Navy; you'll have to get the USN to step aside to start with, and allow you unrestricted access to and control over "their" tankers! (how on Earth will that happen?) Even if the Indian Navy can "choke" the Strait of Malacca, what about friendly nations like Malaysia and Singapore? How would the Indian government explain cutting off their economic life line in any event? ("Oh that! We are in a little bit of a war with the Chinese, sorry about that, really!") Needless to say, the entire theory of "choking" the Chinese by closing the Strait of Malacca is little more than a popularist invention by some government official or newpaper men in India, for domestic consumption.

The "string of pear" is probably little more than the Chinese attempt to create an economic trade route that will enable them to free themselves from over dependent on foreign operated trade route. Will it work? Only time will tell. Does it have any military use? Who knows? May be? Probably? May be not? Are there any publicly avaliable information on these "strings of pear" ports? If so why wasn't it reported in the media? If not, how is that possible (for the PLAN to withheld information in multiple foreign countries)? Lazy reporting? Selective reporting? Who are reporting them in the first place?

If we are talking about an arms race between the Chinese and Indian, it appears there is only one nation is this "arms race" after all. The other one is busy building their nation. My advice is this. Don't waste your time and resources on a useless arms race. A nation's first and last line of defence should always be diplomacy; if you have to fight a way, you have already lost. The military should only be build to a level that is enough for diplomacy to work. How much is enough? Well, take the People's Republic of China (in the 1980s) as an example. Their military was, well, OOOOoooooold! However no one dare to attack them; they even got their butt kicked by Vietnam (please don't go there). However, they spend just enough and the rest on their economy to build up to where they are today.

If they are now starting to waste their hard earn money on military hardware, do you really want to follow that without even taking the time to build you road, street, bridges, rail, and all the things that will give your childrens a better chance in the future? India is in an enviable location; in the middle of the trade route between the East and West. She has much natural resources, and no shortage of human resources (if probably managed). Unfortunately at the moment, her people appears to be pre occupied with the wrong thing; an arm race for that has absolutely no benefit.

Yusuf (or anyone from India), if you are proud of your nation being a democracy, then act on it. Don't let your lazy politicians tell you that it is easier to build a bigger military then to play a "great game" on the international stage. PUT THEM TO WORK INSTEAD! Get them to cover your back while you are busy building the roads and streets and bridges and schools.

"Choking" the Chinese? What for? You should think about teaching yourself how to really "ROAR" instead.
 

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