China's Nuclear Strike Force
- Thread starter Martian
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Oh, you do have one. It is called JL-1 and it sits on an unusable Xia class submarine. Of which her sister ship sank in 1985. I imagine they never send it to sea out of fear they will lose that as well.
vikramrana_1812
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China deploys new CCS-5 missiles on border with India
Read more: China deploys new CCS-5 missiles on border with India - India - The Times of India http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...h-India/articleshow/6324105.cms#ixzz0wr4YfKt0
WASHINGTON: China has moved new advanced longer range CSS-5 missiles close to the borders with India and developed contingency plans to shift airborne forces at short notice to the region, according to Pentagon.
Despite increased political and economic relationship between India and China, the Pentagon in a report to the US Congress said, tensions remain along the Sino-India borders with rising instances of border violation and aggressive border patrolling by Chinese soldiers.
However, a senior Defense Departmentofficial told reporters that the US has not observed any anomalous increase in military capabilities along the Sino-India border.
Noting that China continues to maintain its position on what its territorial claim is, the official said, the two capitals - Beijing and New Delhi - have been able to manage this dispute, in a way, using confidence-building measures and diplomatic mechanisms to be able to maintain relative stability in that border area.
"But it's something that China continues to watch; but I wouldn't say that there's anything in this report that demonstrates a spike or an anomalous increase in military capabilities along the border.
"It's something that China's paying very careful attention to. It's obviously something that India is paying careful attention to as well," the Senior Defense Department official said.
In its annual report, the US Defence department said, to improve regional deterrence, the PLA has replaced older liquid-fueled, nuclear capable CCS-3 intermediate range missiles with more advanced and survivable fueled CSS-5 MRBMs.
"China is currently engaged in massive road and rail infrastructure development along the Sino-India border primarily to facilitate economic development in western China: improved roads also support PLA operations," the Pentagon said.
The report presented to the Congress said despite increased political and economic relations over the years between China and India, tensions remain along their shared 4,057 km border, most notably over Arunachal Pradesh, which China asserts as part of Tibet and therefore of China, and over the Aksai Chin region at the western end of the Tibetan Plateau.
"Both countries, in 2009, stepped up efforts to assert their claims. China tried to block a USD 2.9 billion loan to India from the Asian Development Bank, claiming part of the loan would have been used for water projects in Arunachal Pradesh. This represented the first time China sought to influence this dispute through a multilateral institution," the Pentagon said.
Read more: China deploys new CCS-5 missiles on border with India - India - The Times of India http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...h-India/articleshow/6324105.cms#ixzz0wr4kVkay
Read more: China deploys new CCS-5 missiles on border with India - India - The Times of India http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...h-India/articleshow/6324105.cms#ixzz0wr4YfKt0
WASHINGTON: China has moved new advanced longer range CSS-5 missiles close to the borders with India and developed contingency plans to shift airborne forces at short notice to the region, according to Pentagon.
Despite increased political and economic relationship between India and China, the Pentagon in a report to the US Congress said, tensions remain along the Sino-India borders with rising instances of border violation and aggressive border patrolling by Chinese soldiers.
However, a senior Defense Departmentofficial told reporters that the US has not observed any anomalous increase in military capabilities along the Sino-India border.
Noting that China continues to maintain its position on what its territorial claim is, the official said, the two capitals - Beijing and New Delhi - have been able to manage this dispute, in a way, using confidence-building measures and diplomatic mechanisms to be able to maintain relative stability in that border area.
"But it's something that China continues to watch; but I wouldn't say that there's anything in this report that demonstrates a spike or an anomalous increase in military capabilities along the border.
"It's something that China's paying very careful attention to. It's obviously something that India is paying careful attention to as well," the Senior Defense Department official said.
In its annual report, the US Defence department said, to improve regional deterrence, the PLA has replaced older liquid-fueled, nuclear capable CCS-3 intermediate range missiles with more advanced and survivable fueled CSS-5 MRBMs.
"China is currently engaged in massive road and rail infrastructure development along the Sino-India border primarily to facilitate economic development in western China: improved roads also support PLA operations," the Pentagon said.
The report presented to the Congress said despite increased political and economic relations over the years between China and India, tensions remain along their shared 4,057 km border, most notably over Arunachal Pradesh, which China asserts as part of Tibet and therefore of China, and over the Aksai Chin region at the western end of the Tibetan Plateau.
"Both countries, in 2009, stepped up efforts to assert their claims. China tried to block a USD 2.9 billion loan to India from the Asian Development Bank, claiming part of the loan would have been used for water projects in Arunachal Pradesh. This represented the first time China sought to influence this dispute through a multilateral institution," the Pentagon said.
Read more: China deploys new CCS-5 missiles on border with India - India - The Times of India http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...h-India/articleshow/6324105.cms#ixzz0wr4kVkay
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Armand misrepresented picture of Julang 1, which is irrelevant to JL-2 discussion
Furthermore, Armand had better not claim that the well-known professional China-military-analyst Richard Fisher can't tell the difference between a MIRVed SLBM and a pop-up canister. Such an assertion would be laughable.
http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/missile/jl1.asp
"JuLang 1 (CSS-N-3) Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
Official name: JuLang 1 (JL-1)
NATO reporting name: CSS-N-3
Contractor: CASIC 4th Academy
Service status: In service
The JuLang 1 (NATO reporting name: CSS-N-3) is a two-stage, solid-propellant submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) developed for the PLA Navy's nuclear-powered missile submarine (SSBN). 12 missiles have been deployed by a single Type 092 (NATO reporting name: Xia class) SSBN since the late 1980s. An improved variant, possibly designated JuLang 1A, was introduced in the late 1990s. The land-launched version of the missile is DongFeng 21.
The JuLang 1 missile provides the PRC with the capability to strike back after enemy's first attack using nuclear weapons. The deployment of the missiles on a submarine significantly increases their survivability, as even today finding a missile submarine prior to launch is proven to be very difficult. However, the JuLang 1's limited range (1,700km) requires the submarine to leave Chinese waters to conduct a strike, which would significantly increase the possibility of being detected and intercepted by enemy anti-submarine forces. The PRC reportedly developed an improved model JuLang 1A featuring increased range of 2,500km. An ongoing SLBM development programme known as JuLang 2 with 8,000km range will replace the JuLang 1 in the future."
It is important that I try to convince Armand to go somewhere else and stop spreading misinformation in my threads. The picture that Armand posted is identical to the picture in SinoDefence on the Julang 1. The Julang 1 and the picture are not relevant to the discussion on the MIRVed Julang 2. Where is the button to enable me to prohibit Armand from posting in my threads for repeated offenses of posting drivel and misleading information?It is the cold launch canister used for pop-up tests. It isn't a missile at all. No one would be that close to a missile launch filled with combustible fuel.
Furthermore, Armand had better not claim that the well-known professional China-military-analyst Richard Fisher can't tell the difference between a MIRVed SLBM and a pop-up canister. Such an assertion would be laughable.
http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/missile/jl1.asp
"JuLang 1 (CSS-N-3) Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
Official name: JuLang 1 (JL-1)
NATO reporting name: CSS-N-3
Contractor: CASIC 4th Academy
Service status: In service
The JuLang 1 (NATO reporting name: CSS-N-3) is a two-stage, solid-propellant submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) developed for the PLA Navy's nuclear-powered missile submarine (SSBN). 12 missiles have been deployed by a single Type 092 (NATO reporting name: Xia class) SSBN since the late 1980s. An improved variant, possibly designated JuLang 1A, was introduced in the late 1990s. The land-launched version of the missile is DongFeng 21.
The JuLang 1 missile provides the PRC with the capability to strike back after enemy's first attack using nuclear weapons. The deployment of the missiles on a submarine significantly increases their survivability, as even today finding a missile submarine prior to launch is proven to be very difficult. However, the JuLang 1's limited range (1,700km) requires the submarine to leave Chinese waters to conduct a strike, which would significantly increase the possibility of being detected and intercepted by enemy anti-submarine forces. The PRC reportedly developed an improved model JuLang 1A featuring increased range of 2,500km. An ongoing SLBM development programme known as JuLang 2 with 8,000km range will replace the JuLang 1 in the future."
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Well-respected military analyst Richard Fisher
"Richard Fisher, Jr.
Senior Fellow, Asian Military Affairs
Rick Fisher is a Senior Fellow on Asian Military Affairs. Fisher is a recognized authority on the PRC military and the Asian military balance and their implications for Asia and the United States. Fisher has worked on Asian security matters for over 20 years in a range of critical positions -- as Asian Studies Director at the Heritage Foundation, Senior Analyst for Chairman Chris Cox's Policy Committee in support of the report of the Select Committee for US National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, and a consultant on PLA issues for the Congressionally chartered US China Security & Economic Review Commission. The author of nearly 200 studies on challenges to American security, economic and foreign policy in Asia, Fisher is a frequent commentator on Asian issues for radio and television and has testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House International Relations Committee, the House Armed Services Committee, and the U.S. China Security Commission, on the modernization of China's military. Fisher has been Editor of the Jamestown Foundation's China Brief, and a regular contributor to publications such as the Wall Street Journal, Far Eastern Economic Review, Jane's Intelligence Review, National Interest, Air Forces Monthly, and World Airpower Journal. He has served as an election observer in Cambodia, the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan, and performed field research in China, Taiwan, Russia, India and Pakistan. Fisher studied at Georgetown University and at Eisenhower College where he received his BA with honors. He is currently President of Pacific Strategies, Inc.
Top Publications
A Fighter Essential to Air Superiority
Military Sales to China: Going to Pieces
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http://www.strategycenter.net/scholars/scholarID.4/scholar_detail.asp
"Richard Fisher, Jr.
Senior Fellow, Asian Military Affairs
Rick Fisher is a Senior Fellow on Asian Military Affairs. Fisher is a recognized authority on the PRC military and the Asian military balance and their implications for Asia and the United States. Fisher has worked on Asian security matters for over 20 years in a range of critical positions -- as Asian Studies Director at the Heritage Foundation, Senior Analyst for Chairman Chris Cox's Policy Committee in support of the report of the Select Committee for US National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, and a consultant on PLA issues for the Congressionally chartered US China Security & Economic Review Commission. The author of nearly 200 studies on challenges to American security, economic and foreign policy in Asia, Fisher is a frequent commentator on Asian issues for radio and television and has testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House International Relations Committee, the House Armed Services Committee, and the U.S. China Security Commission, on the modernization of China's military. Fisher has been Editor of the Jamestown Foundation's China Brief, and a regular contributor to publications such as the Wall Street Journal, Far Eastern Economic Review, Jane's Intelligence Review, National Interest, Air Forces Monthly, and World Airpower Journal. He has served as an election observer in Cambodia, the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan, and performed field research in China, Taiwan, Russia, India and Pakistan. Fisher studied at Georgetown University and at Eisenhower College where he received his BA with honors. He is currently President of Pacific Strategies, Inc.
Top Publications
A Fighter Essential to Air Superiority
Military Sales to China: Going to Pieces
Evolving Ground Force Threat to Taiwan
[ List All ]
Related Programs
Asian Security & Democracy Project"
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Martian, you just wasted an hour of your life. Of course it is JL-1, it is an example to show you what that "thing" is. It is a an empty 1st stage canister used for pop-up tests. If it was the complete missile, it would have a smaller second stage on top of it as every DH-31 variant has. JL-2 is not one stage. You would also have a picture of a its exhaust if it was a real launch, of which you don't.
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Julang 2 launch on China's state-run television CCTV-7
China's state-run television CCTV-7 had broadcast a series of photographs on the Julang 2 SLBM launch in May 2009. Here is the complete set of sequential images.
China's state-run television CCTV-7 had broadcast a series of photographs on the Julang 2 SLBM launch in May 2009. Here is the complete set of sequential images.
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Two different sets of pictures. Where did all the people go? Cannot even see the actual missile. Where is the video this came from?
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The Jamestown Foundation states the Underground Great Wall is for nuclear deterrence
single - The Jamestown Foundation[tt_news]=35846
"China's "Underground Great Wall" and Nuclear Deterrence
Publication: China Brief Volume: 9 Issue: 25
December 16, 2009 05:38 PM Age: 244 days
By: Russell Hsiao
China's "underground Great Wall"
In early December, the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) publication, China Defense Daily (Zhongguo Guofang Bao), published a report that provided a rare glimpse into an underground tunnel that is being built by the Second Artillery Corps (SAC)—the PLA's strategic missile forces—in the mountainous regions of Hebei Province in northern China. The network of tunnels reportedly stretches for more than 3,107 miles (Ta Kung Pao, December 11; Xinhua News Agency, December 14). The revelation of the semi-underground tunnel highlights the strides being made by China's nuclear modernization efforts, and underscores a changing deterrent relationship between the United States and China.
The labyrinthine tunnel system, dubbed by the Chinese-media as the "Underground Great Wall" (Dixia Changcheng), was built for concealing, mobilizing and deploying China's growing arsenal of nuclear weapons. According to military experts cited by various reports, the main purpose of the underground tunnel is to provide the SAC with a credible second-strike capability. The building of an underground tunnel for this purpose is consistent with China's evolving nuclear doctrine from its traditional posture of "minimum deterrence" to a doctrine of "limited deterrence," since the subterranean bunkers strengthen the survivability of China's nuclear forces and bolster its nuclear deterrence posture.
Analysts have long speculated that the SAC' most important underground missile positions were located in the mountainous area in northern China. The geography of this region is cut by steep cliffs and canyons, and therefore suited for use in covering the network of tunnels that is 3,017 miles and can feed a web of underground launch silos. According to a military analyst cited by Hong Kong-based Ta Kung Pao, "the outermost layer is 1,000 meters [3,280 feet] deep and covered with soil that does not include any artificial reinforcements" (Ta Kung Pao, December 11; Xinhua News Agency, December 14). Moreover, the Chinese reports described the tunnel system in terms of "hard and deeply buried targets" (HDBTs), which typically refers to facilities a few hundred feet deep in "underground installations." In the case of strategic nuclear missiles, it would mean that all preparations can be completed underground, and the transportation of missiles, equipments and personnel through a network of underground corridors by rail cars or heavy-duty trailers to fixed launch sites can not be detected from observations on the ground (Ta Kung Pao, December 11; News.sina.com, December 13; Xinhua News Agency, December 14).
The SAC arsenal of land-based nuclear warheads is believed to include the DF-3A, DF-4, DF-5 (CSS-4), DF-21, DF-31 and the DF-31A. These land-based ballistic missiles have a range of 200 to 5,000 kilometers. According to one U.S.-estimate, "China has approximately 176 deployed warheads, plus an unknown number of stored warheads, for a total stockpile of approximately 240 warheads" (Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 64, No. 3).
This report is not the first time that the existence of a tunnel of such magnitude was revealed. As early as 1995, according to a report in the Liberation Army Daily cited by Ta Kung Pao, a SAC project called the "Great Wall" was completed after 10 years of construction through the labor of "tens of thousands" of army engineers. Furthermore, the Chinese-television program, "Documentary for Military," aired by Chinese-state run television network CCTV on March 24, 2008, also revealed the status of an underground nuclear counter-strike project called the "great wall project" (Ta Kung Pao, December 11; News.sina.com, December 13).
An article published in the Taiwan-based Asia-Pacific Defense Magazine, entitled "A Destructive Projection Power: PLA Second Artillery Corps' Long-range Guided Missiles," by former Taiwanese Vice Admiral Lan Ning-li, included an analysis that also discussed underground installations of the Second Artillery Corps. According to Vice Admiral Lan's assessment: "The early version of China's mid-to long-range missiles had all been deployed above ground and were vulnerable to detection by spy satellites and attacks by interceptor missiles. That prompted the Chinese military to move all of their missiles hundreds of meters underground" (Ta Kung Pao, December 11; Chosun Ilbo, December 14). Moreover, a Hong Kong-based military analyst cited by Ta Kung Pao suggested that the timing of the open declaration about China's nuclear modernization before negotiations on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty may be meant to draw attention to China's nuclear stature (Ta Kung Pao, December 11; News.sina.com, December 13).
Yet, while deterrence assumes that a more secure second-strike capability could enhance stability by causing adversaries to act more cautiously, some analysts have pointed out that strategic stability may not be the necessary outcome of China's deployment of a secure second-strike capability (See "The Future of Chinese Deterrence Strategy," China Brief, March 4). Since China continues to conceal details about the size and composition of its nuclear stockpile, this may lead to more concerns from China's regional neighbors over Beijing's nuclear modernization."
single - The Jamestown Foundation[tt_news]=35846
"China's "Underground Great Wall" and Nuclear Deterrence
Publication: China Brief Volume: 9 Issue: 25
December 16, 2009 05:38 PM Age: 244 days
By: Russell Hsiao
China's "underground Great Wall"
In early December, the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) publication, China Defense Daily (Zhongguo Guofang Bao), published a report that provided a rare glimpse into an underground tunnel that is being built by the Second Artillery Corps (SAC)—the PLA's strategic missile forces—in the mountainous regions of Hebei Province in northern China. The network of tunnels reportedly stretches for more than 3,107 miles (Ta Kung Pao, December 11; Xinhua News Agency, December 14). The revelation of the semi-underground tunnel highlights the strides being made by China's nuclear modernization efforts, and underscores a changing deterrent relationship between the United States and China.
The labyrinthine tunnel system, dubbed by the Chinese-media as the "Underground Great Wall" (Dixia Changcheng), was built for concealing, mobilizing and deploying China's growing arsenal of nuclear weapons. According to military experts cited by various reports, the main purpose of the underground tunnel is to provide the SAC with a credible second-strike capability. The building of an underground tunnel for this purpose is consistent with China's evolving nuclear doctrine from its traditional posture of "minimum deterrence" to a doctrine of "limited deterrence," since the subterranean bunkers strengthen the survivability of China's nuclear forces and bolster its nuclear deterrence posture.
Analysts have long speculated that the SAC' most important underground missile positions were located in the mountainous area in northern China. The geography of this region is cut by steep cliffs and canyons, and therefore suited for use in covering the network of tunnels that is 3,017 miles and can feed a web of underground launch silos. According to a military analyst cited by Hong Kong-based Ta Kung Pao, "the outermost layer is 1,000 meters [3,280 feet] deep and covered with soil that does not include any artificial reinforcements" (Ta Kung Pao, December 11; Xinhua News Agency, December 14). Moreover, the Chinese reports described the tunnel system in terms of "hard and deeply buried targets" (HDBTs), which typically refers to facilities a few hundred feet deep in "underground installations." In the case of strategic nuclear missiles, it would mean that all preparations can be completed underground, and the transportation of missiles, equipments and personnel through a network of underground corridors by rail cars or heavy-duty trailers to fixed launch sites can not be detected from observations on the ground (Ta Kung Pao, December 11; News.sina.com, December 13; Xinhua News Agency, December 14).
The SAC arsenal of land-based nuclear warheads is believed to include the DF-3A, DF-4, DF-5 (CSS-4), DF-21, DF-31 and the DF-31A. These land-based ballistic missiles have a range of 200 to 5,000 kilometers. According to one U.S.-estimate, "China has approximately 176 deployed warheads, plus an unknown number of stored warheads, for a total stockpile of approximately 240 warheads" (Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 64, No. 3).
This report is not the first time that the existence of a tunnel of such magnitude was revealed. As early as 1995, according to a report in the Liberation Army Daily cited by Ta Kung Pao, a SAC project called the "Great Wall" was completed after 10 years of construction through the labor of "tens of thousands" of army engineers. Furthermore, the Chinese-television program, "Documentary for Military," aired by Chinese-state run television network CCTV on March 24, 2008, also revealed the status of an underground nuclear counter-strike project called the "great wall project" (Ta Kung Pao, December 11; News.sina.com, December 13).
An article published in the Taiwan-based Asia-Pacific Defense Magazine, entitled "A Destructive Projection Power: PLA Second Artillery Corps' Long-range Guided Missiles," by former Taiwanese Vice Admiral Lan Ning-li, included an analysis that also discussed underground installations of the Second Artillery Corps. According to Vice Admiral Lan's assessment: "The early version of China's mid-to long-range missiles had all been deployed above ground and were vulnerable to detection by spy satellites and attacks by interceptor missiles. That prompted the Chinese military to move all of their missiles hundreds of meters underground" (Ta Kung Pao, December 11; Chosun Ilbo, December 14). Moreover, a Hong Kong-based military analyst cited by Ta Kung Pao suggested that the timing of the open declaration about China's nuclear modernization before negotiations on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty may be meant to draw attention to China's nuclear stature (Ta Kung Pao, December 11; News.sina.com, December 13).
Yet, while deterrence assumes that a more secure second-strike capability could enhance stability by causing adversaries to act more cautiously, some analysts have pointed out that strategic stability may not be the necessary outcome of China's deployment of a secure second-strike capability (See "The Future of Chinese Deterrence Strategy," China Brief, March 4). Since China continues to conceal details about the size and composition of its nuclear stockpile, this may lead to more concerns from China's regional neighbors over Beijing's nuclear modernization."
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Well, well... it looks like China's nuclear forces are not doing as well as we have been led to believe.
DF-31 = stuck
Sounds like China's entire IC arsenal is one big propaganda.
JL-2 = failure
DF-31 = stuck
Sounds like China's entire IC arsenal is one big propaganda.
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well, in fact, all chinese nuke are vision
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Apparently, it is just a dream. You don't even store them with the warheads. By the time you get ready to launch, they will be wiped out.
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