China-US naval confrontation imminent in South China seas

[Kshatriya87]

http://news.yahoo.com/pentagon-chief-visit-u-aircraft-carrier-south-china-232955976.html

Pentagon chief to visit U.S. aircraft carrier in South China Sea

KUALA LUMPUR (Reuters) - U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter will visit a U.S. aircraft carrier transiting the South China Sea on Thursday, a move sure to raise the ire of China as tensions between Washington and Beijing simmer over the disputed waterway.

Carter will visit the USS Theodore Roosevelt with Malaysian Defense Minister Hishammuddin Hussein, U.S. officials said.

The warship is "conducting routine operations while transiting the South China Sea", Carter said on Wednesday after a meeting of defense ministers from Southeast Asia in Malaysia, a forum marred by U.S.-China disagreements over the busy sea lane.

China claims most of the South China Sea, through which more than $5 trillion in global trade passes every year. Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines and Taiwan have rival claims.

Carter's visit will come just a week after the USS Lassen, a guided-missile destroyer, challenged territorial limits around one of China's man-made islands in the Spratly archipelago with a so-called freedom-of-navigation patrol.

Beijing has rebuked Washington over the patrol while China's navy commander has warned that a minor incident could spark war in the South China Sea if the United States did not stop its "provocative acts".

The U.S. Navy plans to conduct patrols within 12 nautical miles of artificial islands in the South China Sea about twice a quarter to remind China and other countries about U.S. rights under international law, a U.S. defense official said on Monday.

U.S. defense officials have said Carter would not be on any warship carrying out such patrols.

"Teddy Roosevelt's presence there and our visit is a symbol of our commitment to our rebalance (to Asia) and the importance of the Asia-Pacific to the United States," Carter said on Wednesday.

Carter's visit will come just a week after the USS Lassen, a guided-missile destroyer, challenged territorial limits around one of China's man-made islands in the Spratly archipelago with a so-called freedom-of-navigation patrol.

Beijing has rebuked Washington over the patrol while China's navy commander has warned that a minor incident could spark war in the South China Sea if the United States did not stop its "provocative acts".

The U.S. Navy plans to conduct patrols within 12 nautical miles of artificial islands in the South China Sea about twice a quarter to remind China and other countries about U.S. rights under international law, a U.S. defense official said on Monday.

U.S. defense officials have said Carter would not be on any warship carrying out such patrols.

"Teddy Roosevelt's presence there and our visit is a symbol of our commitment to our rebalance (to Asia) and the importance of the Asia-Pacific to the United States," Carter said on Wednesday.

 

[amoy]

What China's 'Militarization' of the South China Sea Would Actually Look Like
A closer look at the specific military concerns posed by China’s artificial islands.


Much has been said about the legal and geopolitical aspects of Chinese land reclamation in the South China Sea, but U.S. PACOM Commander Admiral Harry Harris’s Congressional testimony last month gave a closer look at specific U.S. military concerns posed by China’s artificial islands. Harris detailed the military utility of deep water port facilities and 3,000 meter runways on three newly built Chinese islands, while Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs David Shear noted the threat that “higher end military upgrades, such as permanent basing of combat aviation regiments or placement of surface-to-air, anti-ship, and ballistic missile systems on reclaimed features” might pose.

What exactly is the nature of the potential Chinese military threat, and what implications does it have for the region?

What Might A Chinese Military Threat Look Like?

Each of the above military concerns merit further examination in spite of China’s vehement declarations that its new islands are for civilian purposes. China has a range of militarization options for its new South China Sea facilities, ranging from deploying intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, to missile batteries, to augmenting power projection capabilities, each with its own particular costs, benefits, and escalatory severity.

Deploying ISR assets to reclaimed land formations would significantly enhance Chinese situational awareness in the contested region. A long-range surveillance radar could detect ships and aircraft up to 320 km away from Chinese-occupied features in the South China Sea. Chinese Y-8X maritime patrol aircraft launching from a 3,000 meter runway on Fiery Cross Reef would be able to locate and track ships and aircraft operating up to1,600 km away, putting most of Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines within range of Chinese surveillance aircraft. While neither of these steps would overtly threaten other military forces, intelligence gathered by these systems could easily be used for targeting purposes.

Chinese missile systems deployed to reclaimed land formations would tangibly increase the risk and cost of military operations by other states, posing a much more concrete military threat to both regional claimants and the United States in the South China Sea. The Chinese military has expended considerable effort over the last 20 years to strengthen its missile capabilities, and is now deploying formidable surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) in large numbers in its army, navy, and air force. SAMs such as the HQ-9 and S-300 PMU-1 can destroy aircraft at ranges of 150-200km, and ground-launched YJ-62 and YJ-83 ASCMs could render large swaths of the South China Sea vulnerable to accurate, destructive fire up to 120-400kmaway from Chinese-occupied land formations. These missile threats would force regional powers to think twice about operating ships or aircraft in the region against Beijing’s wishes.

At the most costly end of the spectrum, China could use its newly reclaimed islands to augment its power projection capabilities throughout the region. Airstrips and deep water ports on Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs could serve as diversion and resupply points for Chinese military ships and aircraft that otherwise wouldn’t have the range to operate safely in the South China Sea. Basing aerial refueling tankers on these land features could materially extend the range of Chinese military aircraft patrolling in the region, while basing H-6K strategic bombers would put countries as far as Australia within striking distance of the Chinese air force. Regularly basing military assets upon Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs would be expensive and logistically challenging but would confer tangible benefits to a Chinese military still honing its power projection capability.

The Impact of Chinese Militarization

The nature and type of Chinese militarization would visibly illustrate China relative military superiority over other South China Sea claimants. Rival claimant states possess neither the advanced standoff strike capability nor the robust ISR assets required to challenge a hypothetical Chinese missile buildup on its new islands. The Vietnamese Navy’s most capable anti-ship cruise missile has a maximum range of 300km – still within the 280-400km range of a land-based Chinese YJ-62. Air-launched air-to-surface missiles such as the U.S.-suppliedAGM-84 Harpoon would be similarly outranged by Chinese anti-aircraft systems, forcing non-stealthy aircraft to fire their missiles well inside the kill radius of Chinese S-300 series SAMs.

More importantly, even if regional military planners had standoff range missiles at their disposal, their utility would be hindered by a lack of survivable and persistent ISR assets to provide targeting information. Malaysia’s handful of Beech 200 maritime patrol aircraft and RF-5E Tigereye reconnaissance fighters are the most capable ISR platforms in the area, but these would prove easy targets for even rudimentary Chinese air defenses, to say nothing of advanced HQ-9 and S-300 series SAMs. Vietnam’s improved Kilo-class submarines could safely strike Chinese positions with 300km-range 3M14E Klub land attack cruise missiles, but counterforce accuracy would be suspect without sufficient ISR for targeting. In short, no claimant state has the operational maritime awareness and the standoff munitions needed to attack hypothetical Chinese defenses without putting the launching aircraft, surface ships, and personnel at risk from Chinese SAMs and ASCMs.

Two of the three hypothetical Chinese militarization paths appear to be comparatively cost-effective. Building islands from coral reefs and paving runways may have been the most expensive part of the project – deploying surveillance radars and aircraft or anti-air and anti-ship missiles may not incur nearly as much financial expenditure. In contrast, any military effort to neutralize Chinese defenses may incur significantly higher financial and human costs. Chinese cruise missiles out=range all but the most expensive standoff munitions, and recent simulations have indicated that concentrated, integrated Chinese SAM systems could hold off all but the most capable air forces. Though American air forces and standoff weapons could likely make short work of nascent Chinese island outposts in a conflict, the tyranny of distance the U.S. faces deploying from home or forward bases helps bring a potential Chinese military challenge from the South China Sea into greater focus.

China’s land reclamation represents a significant but limited potential increase in Chinese regional military capability, regardless of the specific militarization path adopted by Beijing. China has new airstrips where it had none before, along with defensive structures on islands that simply did not exist two years prior. Chinese denial of militarization rings hollow – these airstrips strengthen Chinese presence in peacetime and provide redundant military bases that could increase resiliency in wartime. A cursory examination of militarization options helps justify the concern of American officials over further Chinese military actions that have yet to occur. Any Chinese militarization would have limited military utility vis-a-vis the United States, but militarization would manifestly establish Chinese military superiority over its neighbors and heighten the potential for conflict that would draw in the United States – an outcome the United States would like to avoid.

 

[amoy]

Why the US Navy's First South China Sea FONOP Wasn't a FONOP
The USS Lassen may not have actually asserted high seas freedoms around Subi Reef.

The eagerly-anticipated freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) by the United States Navy (USN) in the South China Sea was initially viewed as a strong demonstration of the United States’ resolve that the waters surrounding China’s artificial islands and claimed reefs are high seas. China’s attempt to establish a de facto12 nautical mile territorial sea around these features is, as most readers of CIMSEC will know, in direct contravention of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS clearly specifies that man-made islands and underwater features like reefs are not eligible for the 12 nm zone granted to more robust geographic features, such as rocks or naturally-formed islands capable of sustaining human habitation or economic life; the latter of these are also eligible for the prized 200 nm Exclusive Economic Zone.

Acknowledging implicitly that their features are not legally entitled to any kind of territorial sea, the Chinese instead have attempted to establish a normative regime aiming to make other actors treat the waters surrounding their features as though it were a territorial sea. Under customary international law, consistent behavior toward a particular issue can result in the practice becoming legally binding, either through generally agreed norms of behavior or a gradual solidification it into written law. Thus, for countries wishing to prevent the high seas around the Chinese features from becoming a territorial reality, it is crucial for interested parties to halt the norm-creation process before it can gather steam.

To do this, the USN thus carried out its first FONOP, sending the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS Lassen within 12 nm of the Chinese build-up on Subi Reef. However, simply sailing within 12 nm is not sufficient to demonstrate American resolve that the waters are high seas.

Rather, the Lassen had to have behaved within those 12 nm in the same manner allowed on high seas. Under UNCLOS, a warship on the high seas may carry out its whole array of activities including launching helicopters, turning on fire-control radars, and carrying out arms exercises. However, these and other activities (including fishing and research) are all prohibited when sailing in another country’s 12 nm territorial waters – a condition known as “innocent passage,” detailed under UNCLOS Part II, Article 19.

Thus, in order for the USN to send the unequivocal message that it saw the 12 nm around Subi Reef as high seas, it had to have carried out at least one of those activities. Otherwise, its transit would have been identical in form to that of an innocent passage, which is only required for territorial waters. Carrying out such a transit would therefore legitimize, or at least be viewed as legitimizing, the Chinese claim that Subi Reef has a 12 nm territorial sea. In so doing, Lassen’s voyage, far from contesting the Chinese position, would actually reinforce it by behaving in the same way it would have to in an actual territorial sea.

So how did Lassen actually behave during its transit? It appears more and more likely that Lassen in fact behaved exactly as she would in territorial waters. Sam LaGrone’s post on USNI News quotes U.S. defense officials and sources as stating that Lassen carried out an innocent passage, though claiming it did not mean a recognition of the Chinese position. Lassen’s transit, then, was not any more a FONOP than any regular transit through another state’s territorial waters under the articles of UNCLOS.

If the United States wants to demonstrate its resolve on the issue, its FONOPs need to not only sail within 12 nm of a Chinese feature, but also involve activities prohibited under “innocent passage” conditions while in the area. Such activities can be as mundane as lowering a fishing lure over the side, or as visually impressive as launching a Seahawk or UAV.

As the U.S. plans for further, more regular FONOPs in the South China Sea, America’s willingness to challenge China on the issue will manifest not in dramatic debates at the United Nations or stern press releases, but in the minute activities of the ships and sailors involved. Photographs and videos of such activities would go far to prove the United States’ unwillingness to compromise on freedom of navigation and gain the confidence of its regional allies. A strong and unambiguous message now can nip a problem in the bud before it can fester to point where actual violence may break out. To paraphrase Sun Tzu, it is much better to defeat an enemy’s strategy than to defeat them in battle. Heading off the Chinese at their own norm-creation game now will decrease the opportunities for misunderstandings leading to violence in the future – but only if the message cannot be misinterpreted.

 

[Kshatriya87]

US B-52 bombers fly near islands claimed by China

http://www.dawn.com/news/1219435/us-b-52-bombers-fly-near-islands-claimed-by-china

WASHINGTON: Two US B-52 bombers flew close to disputed islands in the South China Sea claimed by Beijing and were given verbal warnings from a Chinese air traffic controller, the Pentagon said Thursday.

It is just the latest challenge from Washington to Beijing over the fate of the Spratly Islands, after the guided missile destroyer the USS Lassen last month sailed past a series of islets in Subi Reef in the Spratly chain.

It also comes ahead of a visit to Asia next week by President Barack Obama that will see territorial disputes at the fore of discussions with regional leaders, several of whom have claims in the resource-rich South China Sea.

"On a flight that took off and returned to Guam on November 8 and 9 respectively, two B-52s flying a routine mission in international airspace in the vicinity of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea received two verbal warnings from a Chinese ground controller despite never venturing within 15 nautical miles of any feature," said Commander Bill Urban, a Pentagon spokesman.

"Both aircraft continued their mission without incident, and at all times operated fully in accordance with international law."

Washington has said that China's transformation of geographical features in the Spratlys into artificial islands capable of supporting military facilities poses a threat to freedom of navigation in the critical area.

Beijing has repeatedly insisted that it protects such freedoms, while claiming sovereignty over almost the whole of the South China Sea, even areas close to the coasts of other states.

Speaking to reporters Friday, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei said Beijing opposes "the action of undermining China's sovereignty and security under the pretext of freedom of navigation and overflight."

 

[salute]

........................................................................