China Pakistan relations

[bennedose]

Pak-China: Growing dilemmas of an 'all weather' friendship - Rediff.com India News

There is something not quite right about an inter-state bilateral relationship when words such as "higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, stronger than steel, dearer than eyesight and sweeter than honey" are used repeatedly to describe it. No other relationship depends so much on flowery language to underscore its significance as the China-Pakistan does.

Much like his predecessors in recent times, Nawaz Sharif also made his maiden trip as Pakistan's prime minister to China where at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Sharif said his welcome "reminds me of the saying, our friendship is higher than the Himalayas and deeper than the deepest sea in the world, and sweeter than honey." Chinese President Xi Jinping, in response, referred to Sharif as an old friend and a good brother, said strengthening strategic cooperation with Islamabad was a priority for China's diplomacy.

A number of agreements were signed between the two sides during this visit including a long term plan related to the upgradation of the Karakoram highway as part of a proposed economic corridor between the two countries, and agreements on technology, polio prevention and solar housing. A $44 million project was also agreed to by the two countries to erect a fibre optic cable from the China-Pakistan border to Rawalpindi aimed at giving Pakistan more connectivity to international networks.

Sharif, in particular, lobbied with the Chinese companies to invest in the Pakistani power sector. More interesting was an agreement for cooperation between Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League-N and the Communist Party of China underlining how nimble China can be in tilting its foreign policy to the political dispensation of the day.

The Pakistani government has suggested that Sharif's visit will be helpful in transforming traditional foreign policy into economic diplomacy to give new boost to trade and economic relations with neighbours as well as laying a foundation of new strategic economic cooperation between both the countries benefitting not only the two countries, but leading to the integration of all economic engines of the region. Whether India is part of this grand thinking, however, remains to be seen.

To show China how seriously it is taken in Islamabad, Sharif has introduced a 'China cell' in his office to speed up development projects in the country. This cell will supervise all development projects to be executed with the cooperation of Chinese companies in Pakistan. This is an attempt to address Chinese concerns about the shoddy state of their investment in Pakistan because of the lackadaisical attitude of the Pakistani government. Meanwhile, Beijing too needs political and military support of the Pakistani government to counter the cross-border movement of the Taliban forces in the border Xinjiang province.

Expected to cost around $18 billion, the Pakistan-China Economic corridor will link Pakistan's Gwadar Port on the Arabian Sea and Kashghar in Xinjiang in northwest China. India has been left protesting even as China has continues to expand its presence in Pakistan occupied Kashmir and now with plans to develop a special economic zone in Gwadar, there is a danger that India's marginalisation is only likely to grow.

At a time when Pakistan is under intense scrutiny for its role in fighting extremism and terrorism, the world has been watching with interest to see how China decides to deal with Pakistan. China was the only major power that openly voiced support for Pakistan after Osama bin Laden's assassination. Then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao affirmed that "Pakistan has made huge sacrifices and an important contribution to the international fight against terrorism, that its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity must be respected, and that the international community should understand and support Pakistan's efforts to maintain domestic stability and to realise economic and social development." Wen went on to state that China would like to be an "all-weather strategic partner" and will do its best to help the Pakistani government and people get through their difficulties.

To underscore its commitment, China agreed to immediately provide Pakistan with 50 new JF-17 Thunder multi-role jets under a co-production agreement, even as negotiations continued for more fighter aircraft including those with stealth technology. Despite this, Pakistan wanted more from China -- underscored by its expressed desire to have China take over the operation of Gwadar port.

Pakistan had suggested that the port could be upgraded to a naval base for Chinese use. China, however, immediately rejected this offer, not wanting to antagonise the US and India with the formal establishment of a base in Pakistan though earlier this year, Chinese government-owned China Overseas Port Holdings Ltd decided to purchase control of Gwadar port from Singapore's PSA International, which had won the contract in 2007 to operate the port for 40 years. And with this, operational control of the strategic deep-water Gwadar port has gone to China.

The Sino-Pakistan relationship remains fundamentally asymmetrical: Pakistan wants more out of its ties with China than China is willing to offer. Today, when Pakistan's domestic problems are gargantuan, China would be very cautious in involving itself even more. Moreover, the closer China gets to Pakistan, the faster India would move in to the American orbit. Amid worries about the potential destabilising influence of Pakistani militants on its Muslim minority in Xinjiang, China has taken a harder line against Pakistan. The flow of arms and terrorist from across the border in Pakistan remains a major headache for Chinese authorities and Pakistan's ability to control the flow of extremists to China at a time of growing domestic turmoil in Pakistan would remain a major variable.

As the western forces move out of Afghanistan by 2014, Beijing is worried about regional stability and is recognising that close ties with Pakistan will not make it safer as recent troubles in Xinjiang have once again underscored. But officially, the two states will continue to view each other as important partners, especially as India's rise continues to aggravate Islamabad and cause anxiety in Beijing.

 

[bennedose]

Karakoram Highway: China's Treacherous Pakistan Corridor | The Diplomat

When a Chinese company took control of Pakistan's deep-sea Gwadar Port in February, much of the commentary focused on whether or not it heralded a Chinese military vanguard in the region. Though conventional wisdom seemed to be that a militarized Gwadar Port was a fretful prospect, for the moment, Gwadar is just an economic beachhead on China's "march west".

But while the port is militarily undeveloped, it is also lacking as a base for trade. As The Diplomat's James R. Holmes has pointed out, though the port occupies a prime position at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz, it harbors other serious geographic disadvantages. Most notably, the neighboring province of Baluchistan is home to an entrenched insurgency and frothing sectarianism, and makes for a perilous place to lay a trade route.

But China has bigger problems in wanting to use Gwadar port as an economic base, problems that ironically lie more than 2,000 kilometers away, high in the cloud-tipped Karakoram mountain range in northern Pakistan. The success of Gwadar as a Chinese trading post hinges on the political and geological stability of the 1,300-kilometer Karakoram Highway (KKH), China's only overland link to Pakistan. Without the KKH, which cuts an impressive path through rugged, high-altitude terrain, there is no land route to Gwadar. Without a reliable land route to the port, Gwadar's value decreases dramatically; and the KKH is anything but reliable.

Beijing knows this. On July 5, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and newly re-elected Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif signed eight memoranda of understanding agreements with an eye toward accelerating economic integration between the countries. Among these was a pact to develop an "economic corridor" from Kashgar, in northwestern China, to Gwadar. It included the establishment of a joint committee to oversee the upgrade and realignment of the KKH, which is desperately in need of improvement

...government's ability to hold on to neighboring Kashmir...The KKH was a largely Pakistani endeavor throughout its initial phases in the 1950s and 1960s. In the mid-1970s, however, the Chinese marshaled 10,000 road builders into Pakistan – almost one for every Pakistani worker at the time – to complete the highway. Beijing did so because it hoped to sweeten the relationship between the two countries and augment trade, goals the project has more or less accomplished. The highway has remained sealed in some sections, unsealed in others, with Pakistani and Chinese workers improving the most hazardous bits in piecemeal fashion over the years.

Now, the need for improvement is urgent. The July 5 pact reflects the pressing need for better access via the KKH, calling for Gwadar-Kashgar rail links and a $44 million fiber-optic cable from the Chinese border to Islamabad. China also has its eyes set on pipelines, seeing the Iran-Pakistan natural gas pipeline as a reliable source of energy. Many of these infrastructure projects are only possible with the expansion and improvement of the current road to the border. And expansion of the KKH is a challenging prospect, even for China's experienced road builders.

...wash out bridges, stranding freight...But the continued existence of the KKH remains tenuous. On January 4, 2010, an earthquake shook loose a mountainside next to the highway, which tumbled onto the road and dammed the Hunza River, 100 kilometers from the Chinese border. Half a year later the newly formed, 100-meter deep Attabad Lake had inundated 27 kilometers of highway, cutting off 30,000 Pakistanis in remote villages leading up to China and all but halting the transport of goods in either direction. Cargo transport was bottlenecked at either side of the lake for months, with massive trucks forced on to rickety barges for the protracted crossing. During wintertime, the Khunjerab Pass to China closes due to heavy snow. Ice flows on the lake provide a new natural impediment to transportation.

In late 2010, a Chinese company was chosen to restore this section of the highway in a contract worth US$275 million. The Pakistani National Highways Administration estimated the repairs would be completed in two years. When former Prime Minister Pervez Ashraf finally broke ground on the project almost two years later, new estimates predicted a road link bypassing the lake would be complete by the end of 2014.

The big worry for China is that the earthquake and subsequent landslide that created Attabad Lake is not an isolated incident. The KKH winds through a tangle of high peaks where the three highest mountain chains in the world – the Karakoram, the Hindu Kush and the Himalayas – meet. The region is webbed with fault lines, making seismic activity a frequent and deadily reality. The epicenter of the 1974 Hunza earthquake that killed over 5,000 people was located less than 10 kilometers from the highway. In 2005, the Kashmir earthquake killed over 100,000 people; its epicenter was only a few dozen kilometers from the highway. These earthquakes demolished infrastructure and blocked parts of the highway for weeks at a time.

Landslides are also common occurrence even without the precipitating effect of earthquake tremors, and the road is regularly obstructed by boulders and rubble. Since much of the KKH is narrow, even a small landslide will immobilize traffic in both directions until the debris can be cleared.

Floods are another natural hazard plaguing the highway. Glacial runoff during the summer will wash out bridges, stranding freight and passenger traffic occasionally for more than a month at a time.

Other infrastructure is destroyed by coursing runoff as well: floods in 2010 severely damaged Chinese-built hydroelectric facilities and swept away transmission towers and power lines. Access to power in the northern regions is now tenuous in the best of times. In the winter, grid electricity may be unavailable for days to weeks on end as crippled hydroelectric facilities struggle to cope with lower rivers and heating demands. Often, electricity is rationed to the largest cities for a couple of hours in the evening.

The perceived lack of response to these frequent disasters has resulted in protest blockades by unhappy local residents. Protesting via roadblock remains the most expedient way for locals to have their demands heard. In June, a town blockaded the highway after their water supply was shut off by striking workers. These protests are often backed by local jirgas, assemblies of elders who command significant respect in the community. Any heavy-handed move to sweep human blockades aside is asking for trouble. Demonstrations are not limited to disgruntled residents. In May, the district governments of Gilgit and Diamer blocked the highway to protest a change in national governance structure they felt would hurt the government's ability to hold on to neighboring Kashmir.

In other words, Chinese project managers will not only have to grapple with natural disasters but also with the fallout of inept local response.

However, local irascibility is largely benign when compared with escalating sectarian violence in the region. Gilgit-Baltistan, the last Pakistani administrative district on the way to China, is the only region in the country that hosts a Shia majority. For decades now Pakistani Shias, facing persecution, have fled to remote mountainous areas of the country. These areas were rendered accessible when the KKH was completed in 1979. That same year, the Iranian Revolution ignited sectarian violence across Pakistan, and Shias in Pakistan's northern mountains have been under attack ever since. In two separate incidents in 2012, militants forced 47 Shia Muslims off buses and executed them on the side of the Karakoram Highway.

Chinese projects in the mountains are well-guarded. They even have their own security detail: the Karakoram Security Force, which was incorporated into the regular police force earlier this year. Project officials are escorted around by a phalanx of armed guards and photos are forbidden. Still, China enjoys remarkable popularity throughout Pakistan: 90% of Pakistanis view the country favorably by some measures – and this popularity is even more pronounced in the north where so much infrastructure is Chinese-built. Ask most people in the north about China and you will get an enthusiastic "China zindabad!' in response.

Recent developments have caused concern, however. On June 23, a faction of the Taliban stormed into the Nanga Parbat base camp and shot dead 10 foreign climbers. The KKH runs alongside the mountain, the ninth highest in the world. This was the first such attack on foreigners in an area of the country popular with tourists and widely considered safe to travel. Beijing was clearly perturbed that three of the climbers killed were Chinese, and called on Pakistan to safeguard Chinese citizens in the country.

Realistically, with an approval rating as high as it is already, China can do little more to ingratiate itself with Pakistanis. Building badly needed infrastructure in the north is sure to keep residents happy and the highway blockade-free. And if Pakistan does its part to reign in random acts of violence, sectarian or otherwise, Chinese engineers need only to manage the implacable crush of nature, something they certainly have experience with.

But these are big "ifs". Deep in a rugged knot of the highest mountains in the world, nature is volatile and the same can be said for militants operating in the region.

Any grand Chinese plan for Gwadar Port will undoubtedly play out in the long term. As a short-term trading post, though, the key to its success lies among the formidable and unpredictable tangle of mountains on the other side of the country.

 

[bennedose]

Here folks - China is going to pay 18 billion for a 200 km tunnel -
Pakistan, China sign deal to build 200-km-long tunnel through PoK

Beijing: China and Pakistan on Friday signed eight agreements, including a whopping USD 18 billion deal to build a 200 km-long strategic tunnel through the rugged PoK, as the two all-weather allies sought to boost economic ties and supply critical oil to the energy-hungry Communist giant.

The agreements were signed after visiting Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif held talks with his Chinese counterpart Li Keqiang here at the Great Hall of the People.

China has strategic interest in the Pak-China Economic Corridor, Li said on the 200 km-long tunnel which will connect Pakistan's Gwadar Port on the Arabian Sea and Kashghar in Xinjiang in northwest China.

 

[bennedose]

AQ Khan talking about what Pakistan got from China
AQ Khan on Pakistan: Bastards first used us and now playing dirty games with us - Times Of India

The C-130 military transport planes were given to Pakistan by the United States under a military aid program; Washington has continued to lavish Islamabad with such aid even after reports of its misuse. In fact, documents relating to Pakistan's proliferation through much of the 1990s suggest Washington was asleep on the watch through much of the nuclear exchanges involving Pakistan, China, North Korea, Iran, and Libya, or simply chose to close its eyes.

Khan also reveals that "the Chinese gave us drawings of the nuclear weapon, gave us kg50 enriched uranium, gave us 10 tons of UF6 (natural) and 5 tons of UF6 (3%). Chinese helped PAEC [Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, the rival organisation to the Khan Research Laboratories] in setting up UF6 plant, production reactor for plutonium and reprocessing plant."

Further, Khan discloses that Gen Jehangir Karamat [chief of army staff 1996-8, sent by Musharraf as ambassador to US 2004-2006] "took $3 million through me from the N Koreans and asked me to give them some drawings and machines."

 

[bennedose]

About Chinese Nuclear reactors in Karachi
Mark Hibbs "¢ Pakistan’s Next Chinese Reactor

Chinese potential owners of a nuclear power plant in Pakistan will make a hardnose calculation of estimated long-term return on investment. That would take into account a host of factors which would play out in any nuclear plant project anywhere in the world: management and engineering quality, infrastructure, regulation, political risk. But also the state of the power grid. And that is a touchy subject in Pakistan.

The existing Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (Kanupp-1) is connected to the grid system operated by the Karachi Electricity Supply Co (KESC). If Kanupp-2 is built, it will also connect to KESC.

In 2009, the World Bank estimated KESC's grid losses to be a whopping 30%. A lot of this loss was due to theft. One year before, the company was privatized on the basis of a $1-billion equity investment by shareholders. Now, if you are going to invest in Pakistan's power sector, you had better have deep pockets, and KESC's prime shareholder, Abraaj Capital, a Dubai-based private equity firm, apparently has them. KESC says it is now profitable, and foreign investment in Karachi's grid, most recently this year by the Asian Development Bank, is continuing. Here's one narrative which compares the situation at KESC to the rest of Pakistan. Why the confidence in KESC, you might ask. The answer in part is that KESC is today the only vertically integrated power company left in Pakistan, selling to a captive market in an urban agglomeration–the world's 11th biggest–of about 15-million people. That looks like shooting fish in a barrel. But for how long? And will customers pay their electric bills? According to this account, as much as 35% of KESC's power is still being stolen, and the company's restive workforce is yet another source of uncertainty. Given that it might take 20 years to amortize an investment in a nuclear power plant, it can be assumed that if potential Chinese investors are on the horizon, they will want an answer to those questions.

 

[rock127]

Here folks - China is going to pay 18 billion for a 200 km tunnel -
Pakistan, China sign deal to build 200-km-long tunnel through PoK

So Paki Terrorists can easily join the Jehad in Uyghuristan and take part in freedom struggle from Chinese oppressors.

 

[BangersAndMash]

China

pakiland

 

[amoy]

Most recent joint exercise of PAF+PLAAF in Hotan Xinjiang

All-weather friendship :thumb:

 

[Ray]

Joint exercise of PAF+PLAAF in Hotan Xinjiang.

This indicates the Chinese ingenuity and an eye for political details.

It will indicate to the restive Uyghurs, how close China is to the Muslims!

 

[Blackwater]

Majboori ka rishta,


relation based on maajboori

 

[AVERAGE INDIAN]

 

[no smoking]

So Paki Terrorists can easily join the Jehad in Uyghuristan and take part in freedom struggle from Chinese oppressors.

Or Chinese products will easily come into Pakistan market and Mide east, which means more job for Uyghur!

 

[bennedose]

Joint exercise of PAF+PLAAF in Hotan Xinjiang.

This indicates the Chinese ingenuity and an eye for political details.

It will indicate to the restive Uyghurs, how close China is to the Muslims!

The young heroic pilots of the PAF are teaching the old men of the PLAAF how to fly their planes.

 

[bennedose]

Or Chinese products will easily come into Pakistan market and Mide east, which means more job for Uyghur!

Yesss! And more Pakistanis will be able to travel to China! Nice. Good for China. Good for Pakistan. Good for Uighurs. But Chinese projects are completed very quickly and I wonder why China has not quickly completed the road projects to connect Pakistan with Xinjiang.

 

[bennedose]

TSG IntelBrief: Suicide Attack In Beijing: Uighur Extremists Fuse Jihad In Pakistan and Xinjiang Grievances | The Soufan Group

FORECAST

"¢ China's idea of promoting economic development in Xinjiang, including labeling Kashgar as the "New Shenzhen," will fail to reduce Uighur-Han tensions; rather tensions will continue to escalate because little is being done to address Uighur grievances

"¢ The TIP and other Central Asian extremists will continue to exploit new transportation routes into Xinjiang in order to smuggle anti-Chinese propaganda and inspire additional attacks, and they will train Uighurs in Pakistan to carry out attacks in Xinjiang, eastern China, and potentially on Chinese interests or personnel abroad

"¢ Although Pakistan will be unable to eliminate Uighur and Central Asian extremists safe havens on its territory, the Chinese-Pakistan "all-weather friendship" will persevere, although China may pressure Pakistan to allow increased access to bases in northern Pakistan and at the strategic Gwadar Port near Karachi.

.

 

[bennedose]

China concerned about Uyghur rebels operating in Pakistan

Pakistan and China have enjoyed friendly ties for six decades, but Beijing has recently expressed reservations over alleged links between Pakistani militants and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Chinese authorities are said to be concerned about presence of the ETIM militants in Pakistani territory, where they say the fighters are being trained before they cross into Xinjiang to carry out militant attacks. But they did not discuss the issue publicly to ensure they don't embarrass Pakistan. The ETIM is also described as the Turkistani Islamic Party (TIP).

In an April 5 statement, Chinese Ministry of Public Security published a list of six terrorists with their profiles, saying they were operating in South Asia, without naming Pakistan. According to the Chinese list, Nurmemet Memetmin, who was described as the "commander of the ETIM", was sentenced to 10 years in prison in a "South Asian country", but he escaped in 2006 and has been planning new attacks against China, including the late July attacks on civilians in Kashgar. After the Kashgar attacks, Chinese authorities had invited then Inter-Services Intelligence chief Lt Gen (r) Ahmed Shuja Pasha to Beijing in August and told him the militants had allegedly been trained in Pakistan's tribal areas. - See more at: China concerned about Uyghur rebels operating in Pakistan

 

[Ray]

The economic development in Xinjaing is to benefit the Han immigrants who control the economy and bureaucracy.

The Uyghurs sell kebobs.

That is hardly for export!

 

[amoy]

China shall pursue a membership in SAARC since China is also a South Asian country. Pakistan as China's fulcrum in the southern bloc is certainly willing to champion this aspiration. Other stakeholders such as Afghanistan （security concerns）, Nepal (more attched with extension of Tibet railway) hopefully will welcome Chinese. SAFTA vision which seems to have long lost steam can be reinvigorated with advent of Chinese entrenched presence like China's boost for ASEAN.

The set-up of Chinese National Security Council will be able to orchestrate synergies fm economic, military and diplomatic fronts for power projection to the warm waters.

Sent from my 5910 using Tapatalk 2

 

[bose]

China shall pursue a membership in SAARC since China is also a South Asian country. Pakistan as China's fulcrum in the southern bloc is certainly willing to champion this aspiration. Other stakeholders such as Afghanistan （security concerns）, Nepal (more attched with extension of Tibet railway) hopefully will welcome Chinese. SAFTA vision which seems to have long lost steam can be reinvigorated with advent of Chinese entrenched presence like China's boost for ASEAN.

The set-up of Chinese National Security Council will be able to orchestrate synergies fm economic, military and diplomatic fronts for power projection to the warm waters.

Sent from my 5910 using Tapatalk 2

First Save your back side in South China Sea... than open your big mouth...

 

[amoy]

First Save your back side in South China Sea... than open your big mouth...

I wish u'd realized thats no longer a big mouth thing - pls check whats going on in SL, NP "¦ many irons in the fire. and u know what ? advancement to the south actually helps with China Seas embroglio! like the cliche goes: offence is the best defence (also one of 36 stratagems)

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