China and South Asia- An Indian Perspective

Ray

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China and South Asia- An Indian Perspective


The evolution of China's South Asia policy needs to be studied not in a vacuum, but in relation to that country's overall foreign policy framework; the main determinant of Beijing's external approach has always been its domestic priorities in different periods. In fact, the domestic and foreign policy linkages have continued to be a part of the statecraft of the People's Republic of China (PRC) ever since Chairman Mao Zedong proclaimed founding of the nation in October 1949, saying that 'China has stood up'.......

In the post-Deng period, President Jiang Zemin formulated national policies centering round his theory of " Three Represents", with the objective of making the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) a representative of majority of the people and codified 'three major historic tasks' for China – Modernization, National Reunification and Safeguarding World Peace and Common Development. To accomplish these tasks, an 'Independent Foreign Policy of Peace' was adopted.

The current Chinese President Hu Jintao, who succeeded Jiang, brought forth a domestic development model marking a shift in emphasis – from GDP centric growth to 'balanced development'; to be backed by his own theoretical concept of " Scientific Outlook of Development", of which creation at home of a 'Harmonious Socialist Society' and 'Sustainable development' constituted main elements. Correspondingly, Hu put in place an external strategy based on the idea of a "Harmonious World" aimed at realizing a 'win-win' solution in international relations'. The PRC Premier Wen Jiabao, tracing the links between his country's domestic goals and foreign policy objectives stated, "What China needs for its development first and foremost is an international environment of long term stability and a stable surrounding environment."

It is natural that China's perceptions of a 'peaceful periphery' as a pre-requisite for its domestic development have come to dominate the PRC's post-1978 South Asia policy. As Chinese observers viewed, since end seventies, a recalibration of Beijing's attitude towards the region has been gradually taking place in pursuance of that pre-requisite and its outcome has been a "Balanced South Asia Policy of the PRC Under a New Situation", providing for China's development of relations with South Asian nations in a parallel manner. Backing this line of thinking, have indeed been some evidence, for e.g the PRC started modifying its pro-Pakistan stand so far kept on Kashmir issue, with the state-controlled media dropping references to 'India-occupied Kashmir' and using instead the terms 'India-controlled Kashmir' and 'Pakistan-controlled Kashmir'. In December 1996, President Jiang Zemin favoured New Delhi - Islamabad 'consultations and negotiations' on Kashmir issue, during his speech to the Pakistan Senate. During the Kargil conflict in 1999, China refrained from taking sides and adopted a neutral position. China's oft-repeated stand since this time has been that the Kashmir issue is one 'left over by history' and that 'India and Pakistan should properly solve the problem through dialogue and negotiations.' Beijing no longer makes references to 'self-determination' for the Kashmiri people and does not consider the 'Kashmiri people' as a third party to the dispute.

Besides the 'peaceful periphery' factor, India's 'rise' also seems to have contributed to a change in China's regional approach. Indicative are the willingness of Beijing to stabilize ties with New Delhi through signing important agreements with India like Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity and Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for Settlement of the Boundary Question' (2005) as well as 'Shared Vision for the 21st Century (2008). China and India have stopped treating each as a threat to other and both the nations have come to recognize that Sino-Indian ties have attained a global character. China seems to realize that cooperation with India is essential for it in tackling global issues like the WTO, climate change, global financial system reform and revamping of UN Security Council. It can be seen without difficulty that congruence, to a good degree, of policy interests among China and India has emerged over the years; under its impact, in general, the comfort level in their relations has been increasing.

It will not be out of place to mention about the existence of some other factors motivating China's South Asia policy. They include neutralizing the perceived US strategy to contain China with support of regional nations, developing economies of China's border areas, cooperating with South Asian countries in exploitation of much needed energy resources, protecting oil transport security in the Indian Ocean, getting support to 'One China' policy and last but not least securing cooperation from the nations in the region in the matter of meeting terrorism threat to China's South West border coming from outside.

The Chinese claims that the PRC's South Asia policy has become balanced is open to dispute. The recalibrations noticed have only been symbolic, lacking in substance as there has been no fundamental change in China's policy of treating Pakistan as an ally, in order to neutralize the impact on the region coming from India's ascendancy. There has been no let up in Beijing's arms supply to Islamabad, despite the knowledge that Pakistan cannot guarantee the non-use of Chinese arms against India. Also, China could increase its strategic presence in other countries in India's neighborhood in the background of its increased economic aid to the latter, a development not missed by New Delhi.

A new trend prevailing since middle 2009 in the external strategy of the PRC, marked by a revision of the country's strategic focus to include "core interests" (He Xin Li Yi) is giving rise to questions whether Beijing is keen to retain its foreign policy plank based on 'harmonious world'. Strong indications are emerging that China has begun to implement an assertive foreign policy with 'core interests' as its main component. In specific terms, Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan and South China Sea Islands stand listed under the 'core interest' category. Chinese media have included strategic resources and trade routes in the list. As a result, China has come to adopt an uncompromising position on issues concerning the country's sovereignty. Pointers include China's growing naval activism in the South and East China seas, consistent hard line stand on the Sino-Indian border and the Dalai Lama issues, resistance to Yuan revaluation demand, action on Google, the stiff anti-US positions on issues like Tibet, Taiwan and climate change and efforts to expand influence abroad through the use of military and nuclear assistance. The situation has led India's Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh to observe "there is new assertiveness on the part of China; it will be difficult to say which way it will go and India should be prepared."

Beijing is explaining its thrust on 'core interests' by saying that China is 'going global and its international influence is becoming more visible and assertive and the nation's diplomatic strategies accordingly need to comply with the changes in the international environment and domestic conditions'. Evolving 'multipolarity' and 'multilateralism' as well as global challenges including climate change and energy security, have marked the changes in the external conditions, according to Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi.

A careful analysis, would however show that a variety of factors are contributing to China's assertiveness – (i) Beijing's growing confidence internationally especially after its success in holding the Olympics and in maintaining high growth rates despite the global recession, (ii) China's feeling that an opportunity has arisen for itself to increase its influence globally as the world balance of power shifts from the West to East and a multi-polar world gradually emerges, (iii) the PRC's growing need to protect land and sea trade routes in the interest of the much needed import of resources from abroad and (iv) deepening Chinese fears concerning sovereignty over Tibet and Xinjiang and (v) continuing suspicions on US strategy towards Taiwan.

As far as South Asia is concerned, Beijing's assertiveness is already getting manifested in its harder positions on the issues of Sino-Indian border, Tibet and China-Pakistan nexus. The PRC is becoming more vociferous in claiming India's Arunachal Pradesh as part of its 'Southern Tibet' for e.g its objection to Indian Prime Minister's visit to Arunachal Pradesh. It is suspecting India's position on the Dalai Lama in spite of New Delhi's assurances on this count and keeping the talks between Dharamsala and Beijing deadlocked. It is further strengthening strategic ties with Pakistan. Both China and Pakistan are repeatedly laying stress to the relevance to bilateral ties of their peace treaty signed in 2005, unique in South Asia, providing for mutual support in protecting each other's national sovereignty and integrity. As late as December 2010, this treaty found a mention in the China-Pakistan Joint Statement issued at the end of Premier Wen's visit to Pakistan. It is being viewed by experts in China as a legal document providing for an 'alliance' between the two sides against any foreign threat. Is the treaty directed against India? It appears so.

Worrisome to India is the latest situation regarding China's position on Kashmir. China is taking up road and railway projects designed to link Pakistan and China via Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) where Chinese troops are reportedly deployed ostensibly for construction work. As noted analyst Mr B. Raman puts it, the reported infrastructure projects undertaken by the Chinese military and nuclear establishments in Pakistan Occupied Gilgit-Baltistan region, may become strategically important to the Chinese army in the event of another conflict with India; in particular, the Karakorum Highway could be useful for China as an overland route for moving missiles and spare parts to Pakistan. Also, there appears to be a deeper meaning to the issuing of stapled visas by Beijing to Kashmiri Indians, indicating that China is shedding its traditional neutrality on the Kashmir issue. Quoting Mr B. Raman again, this new nuanced position on Kashmir could mean a dilution of China's past stand of accepting Kashmir as a de-facto part of India, while at the same time treating POK including Gilgit-Baltistan region as de-facto and de-jure parts of Pakistan. Is China's stand a quid pro quo for Pakistan's help to Beijing in fighting against Uighur separatism in Xinjiang? Is Beijing developing future options for questioning India's locus standi to negotiate with China on the territory in Ladakh ceded by Pakistan to the PRC? The remarks of Indian Prime Minister that China "could use India's 'soft underbelly' of Kashmir to keep India in low level equilibrium", demonstrate how serious these questions are. .

With 'strategic resources' and 'trade routes', also reportedly coming under 'core interests' category (no official mention yet), China's growing profile in the Indian Ocean, the vital sea route for its energy import from the Middle East, has become more important from the point of view of South Asian situation as a whole. It is natural for India to watch for the strategic significance of China's naval modernization and its increasing focus on the Indian Ocean. In this context, the real meaning of the bold views, but without official contradiction, being expressed by influential military and strategic experts in China on setting up its overseas naval bases to protect the country's energy supply routes, should be a matter of concern for India; In particular looking justified are Indian fears over the future military potentials of China's port projects in India's neighborhood, like Gwadar (Pakistan), Hambantota (Sri Lanka), Sittwe (Myanmar) and Chittagong(Bangladesh).

China's South Asia policy could still be dominated by that nation's need for a 'peaceful periphery' in order to ensure the success of its modernisation efforts, by the projected time limit of 2050. But the PRC's concept of regional peace in South Asia appears not yet free from an anti-India bias. An assertive China seems to persist with its course of promoting Pakistan as an ally with a view to strategically limiting India's rise within the confines of South Asia. This assessment appears valid when the pro-Pakistan viewpoints being expressed by well-connected scholars in China of late, possibly reflecting official opinions, are taken into account. For e.g., an authoritative article in Chinese language (21 May 2010) captioned "South Asia's Position in the International Order and Choice Before China", written by Professor Zhao Gancheng, Director of South Asia Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies has said that India's regional 'hegemony' is prompting China to 'reassess' its South Asia policy. Giving a call, to 'redefine' India's position in South Asia in the interest of a stable and peaceful regional order, the write-up has alleged that India's current policies do not address the 'strategic autonomy' requirements of other South Asian nations. It has declared that the goal of China's South Asia policy will always be in favour of maintaining regional peace and stability and is related to the emergence of a regional balance of power and the gaining of 'strategic autonomy' by all South Asian nations. India's strategic autonomy should not be detrimental to the corresponding autonomy of other regional powers and that India must rectify its periphery policy, which can enable other regional nations to accept its dominant position.

How India can respond to the evolving China's policy towards South Asia? New Delhi's strategy should be based on the premise that India's strategic interests will continue to be affected by China's policy to befriend India's neighbours in order to protect its economic and security interests and counter a 'rising' India. It will be important for India to realise that China's new assertiveness could be meant to redefine its boundaries of its economic and diplomatic clout and military influence in the present international scenario. As signs that India is already thinking on the same lines, the country's Prime Minister has himself acknowledged that "China would like to have a foothold in South Asia and that India has to reflect this reality". Under the circumstances, it will be desirable for India to get closer to its neighbours through measures like extending economic aid. As late Mr R.Swaminathan puts it, countries like Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have developed proximity- induced mistrust of India and intend to hedge their ties with India with some kind of balancing act with China. New Delhi's aim should be to eradicate such mistrust and that will be possible if India is prepared to share its new prosperity with its weaker neighbours. Recent instances like Indian high level visits to Sri Lanka revealing New Delhi's intentions to reach out to Colombo economically augur well in this connection. At the same time, it would be necessary for India to continue its 'engagement' policy towards China on the basis of its sound assessment that 'there is enough space for both to pursue their ambitions of economic development'. No doubt, while doing so, New Delhi should evolve an effective regional strategy to neutralise, as the Indian Prime Minister calls it, China's policy of " seeking to expand its influence in South Asia at India's expense".

China and South Asia- An Indian Perspective
The important facet of China is that it lays great emphasis in doing things the Chinese way or Yongxiabianyi where things are done in an unobtrusive manner.

China's rise from a Mao devastated nation to a powerful one is an example of this Yongxiabianyi, wherein China disarmed all by stating that it was only concerned was with its 'Peaceful Rise'.

During the period of "peaceful rise", China emphasised on trade and under the cover of trade and lulling the world with cheap goods and making it dependant, China slowly and unobtrusively 'collected' strategic technologies and manufacturing processes that they quietly used to enhance their military industry as also its core industries.

Now that the 'Peaceful Rise' is adequate to challenge and because the world has understood her gameplan, China is openly displaying her intent, though as is wont, she is still couching the intent in 'peaceful' designs and where there is a tricky knot, obfuscating it with hoary history that are mostly fables and myths.

China is busy building rail network to connect CAR, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran.

China is aware that unless it has adequate 'hold' over natural resources and food and energy security, it cannot be a world power which is her aim and as has been enunciated with veiled references and also at time openly as thus:

Does China Want to Be Top Superpower?

"China's grand goal in the 21st century is to become the world's No. 1 power."

These words were written by Liu Mingfu, a senior colonel in the People's Liberation Army, in a new book titled "China's Dream." .....

"To become the world's No. 1 has been China's century-old dream. It was this dream that inspired three generations of great Chinese leaders, from Sun Yat Sen to Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping," Liu wrote in a passage reflecting a growing nationalist sentiment shared by many Chinese. ......

"The competition between China and the United States will not take the form of a world war or a cold war. It will not be like a 'shooting duel' or a 'boxing match' but more like a 'track and field' competition. It will be like a protracted 'marathon.'"......
Does China Want to Replace the U.S. as Top Superpower? - ABC News
China has now, as it had earlier made ingress into all continents, in quest of natural resources and improving her strategic reach influence. Machiavellian that China is, she has projected herself as a pillar of support to all failed and rogue states, starting with Pakistan, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Libya, Venezuela and so on. Each such state is in confrontation with the US and the West and hence, is an unassailable ally and each has strategic resources/ locations that China can exploit to increase her strategic presence.

China is on the way to replace the US as the No 1 in the world and the dispenser of the fate of the world.

Is there any way to stop this Juggernaut?

What are the ways that India can ensure that China is kept within limits of its hegemonic aspirations?

And what should US and Russia do so that their interests are not abandoned and China allowed to run a riot?
 
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Ray

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China's Strategic Eggs in South Asia

By B. Raman


China is not a South Asian power, but it has been seeking to build up for itself a strong South Asian presence which could cater to its strategic needs in the long term.

2. It has made inroads in the South Asian countries in recent years by taking advantage of their hunger for the development of their infrastructure and their requirement of financial assistance for major infrastructure projects and for the exploitation of their natural resources.

3. While India too has been helping these countries in these fields, China has definitely had an advantage over India due to its large cash reserve built up from its huge trade surpluses and the reservoir of excellent construction engineers with experience in infrastructure building which it has built up over the years.

4. The fact that China has no contentious issues affecting its bilateral relations with these countries --- as against many contentious issues in the relations of India with its neighbours--- has also worked to its advantage.

5. The Chinese policy in the South Asian region has a mix of the strategic and the opportunistic dimensions--- that is, working for carefully calculated long-term strategic objectives while not missing short and medium term opportunities that come its way. One sees the strategic dimension in the case of its relations with Pakistan. One sees a mix of the two in its relations with other South Asian countries.

6. Its relations with Pakistan, which continue to enjoy the highest priority, are driven by a strong strategic calculus. That calculus arises from its perceived need for a second front to keep India preoccupied.

7. In its strategic calculation, its ability to prevent a military conflict with India would depend on a strong military-related capability in Tibet and a strong Pakistani military capability in the nuclear and conventional fields.

8. That is what it has been trying to do. It has been trying to see that Pakistan has an edge over India in its military nuclear capability, including the delivery vehicles. It has been strengthening Pakistan's offensive and defensive air and naval capabilities. After the recent raid by the US naval commandos in Abbottabad to kill Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011, it has promised to expedite the delivery of aircraft needed by the PAF to strengthen its air defence capability.

9. Simultaneously, it has also been helping Pakistan in repairing and upgrading the Karakoram Highway and has promised to help in the construction of other roads. A feasibility study for the construction of a railway line from Xinjiang through Gilgit-Baltistan has been undertaken.

10. Of the various proposals received from Pakistan for the development of its infrastructure, China has given high priority to those relating to Gilgit-Baltistan and low priority to those relating to Balochistan. It has not shown an interest in taking up for the time being Pakistan's proposals for the upgradation of the Gwadar commercial port built earlier with Chinese assistance into a naval base. Similarly, it has been going slow in follow-up action on other pending Pakistani proposals for the construction of a petro-chemical complex in Gwadar and oil-gas pipelines from Gwadar to Xinjiang.

11. The priority given by China to infrastructure projects in the Gilgit-Baltistan area is meant to enable Pakistan protect this area from any future Indian threats and give the Pakistani armed forces the capability to pose a credible threat to India, which would serve China's strategic objective too.

12. There have been unconfirmed reports from a US journalist about the presence of a little over 10,000 Chinese troops in the Gilgit-Baltistan area. If true, these reports would further underline China's strategic objectives in Pakistan.

13. A significant development post-Abbottabad was the strong defence of Pakistan's counter-terrorism record by Beijing and its attempts to see that no harm came to Pakistan as a result of US suspicions regarding possible Pakistani complicity--- governmental or non-governmental--- in sheltering OBL for a little over five years in Abbottabad.

14. Thus, China's strategic interest in protecting Pakistan, strengthening its capabilities and maintaining the effectiveness of the threat that it could pose to India in times of need remains as strong as ever. It will remain so even if there is an improvement in India's relations with China and Pakistan.

15. The Sino-Pakistan axis means not only the need for our being able to fight on two fronts simultaneously in times of war, but also a two-front capability for the collection of intelligence in times of peace. Collection of intelligence ---human and technical-- from China requires capabilities totally different from those required for the collection of intelligence from Pakistan. Our strategic planning has to cater to requirements in times of war as well as peace.

16. Next to Pakistan, Nepal enjoys the second priority in China's strategic calculation. The importance of Nepal to China's strategic thinkers and planners arises not only because of its potential for being used against India in times of peace as well as war, but also because of its potential to India for being used to create instability in Tibet if there are disturbances there after the death of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. In China's calculation, Nepal can be a double-edged sword.

17. How to strengthen the potential of Nepal for being used against India? It is for this purpose that the Chinese have been trying to extend their road and rail network from Tibet to Nepal and to develop close relations with the Maoists headed by Prachanda and their cadres who are likely to be integrated into the Nepal army. Strengthening China's political, economic and military influence in Nepal by taking advantage of the presence of the Maoists in power is an important objective of Beijing.

18. Military-military relationship has been given increasing attention since 1998, when the Nepal Army started sending officers and soldiers to study in Chinese military universities. In the academic year 2006/2007, 21 officers and soldiers of the Nepal Army went to China for training. China has sent military officers to participate in the adventure trainings organized by the Nepal Army since 2002.

19. Addressing the Nepal Council of World Affairs at Kathmandu on August 5, 2008, the then Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Zheng Xianglin said: "Nepal is situated in a favorable geographical position in South Asia, and is a passage linking China and South Asia."

20. That is the principal reason for the Chinese interest in Nepal----as a passage to South Asia and as an instrument for strengthening the Chinese presence in South Asia. China has a Look South policy to counter our Look East policy. As we try to move Eastwards to cultivate the countries of South-East Asia, it is trying to move southwards to outflank us.

21. China has already given indications of its interest in strengthening the value of Nepal as a passage to South Asia by connecting the road network in Tibet with that in Nepal and by extending the railway line to Lhasa to Kathmandu. If China succeeds in concretising the seide as, the threats to our security will be enhanced.

22. China has other reasons to welcome the rise of the Maoists to power in Nepal. It is hoping with reason that Nepal would stop the anti-China activities of the 1000-strong community of Tibetan refugees in Nepal. They have been in the forefront of the agitation against the Han colonisation of Tibet. Some of them are being used by the US Govt. funded Radio Free Asia for producing programmes directed to the Tibetans. China apprehends that if there is unrest in Tibet after the death of the Dalai Lama, these refugees might be utilised by the US----with the complicity of India--- to destabilise the Chinese presence in Tibet. It is hoping to pre-empt this with the co-operation of a Maoist-dominated Government in Kathmandu.

23. India finds itself in Nepal in a situation not dissimilar to the situation in Myanmar----all the time having to compete with China for political influence and economic benefits. Till now, India almost monopolised the strategic playing field in Nepal. Now, there is a second player in China. In Myanmar, whenever the former military Government had to choose between Indian and Chinese interests, it always chose the Chinese interests because of its fear of China and its gratitude to China for the support extended by it to the former military junta in international for a such as the UN Security Council. In Nepal whenever there is a conflict between Indian and Chinese interests, a Maoist-dominated Govt. may choose Chinese interests not out of fear or gratitude but out of considerations of ideological affinity.

24. It is in India's interest to see that China does not succeed in its objectives in Nepal. In Pakistan, India has no cards which it can use to counter the Chinese objectives. In Nepal, India has more cards than China and it should not hesitate to use them intelligently to counter the Chinese designs. India continues to have a much stronger economic presence in Nepal than China. India still has many objective allies in the non-Maoist segment of the population and administration. It should not hesitate to use these cards to maintain its influence in Nepal and to counter the Chinese designs.

25. Bangladesh has the third priority for China. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, despite her strong friendship for India, has continued with the look East policy of her predecessor Begum Khalida Zia and strengthened the links with China. During her visit to China, an agreement was signed with a Chinese company for oil/gas exploration in Bangladesh. She also sought Chinese help for the upgradation of Chittagong into a modern deep sea port. Her Government has sought to calm Indian concerns by reassuring India that India will also be allowed to use the Chittagong port modernized with Chinese help.

26. At least, Sri Lanka and Myanmar sought to treat India on par with China by granting it equal rights of oil/gas exploration, but Bangladesh has not given any such contracts to India due to strong local opposition to India playing any role in the development of its energy resources.

27. SheikhHasina also reportedly discussed with the Chinese plans for linking Yunnan with Bangladesh through Myanmar by a modern road. If the Chinese company finds oil or gas in Bangladesh it is only a question of time before the Chinese production facilities in Bangladesh are connected with those in the Arakan area of Myanmar so that oil and gas from Bangladesh can flow direct to Yunnan through the pipeline connecting Arakan with Yunnan now being constructed. There has also been talk of a Chinese-aided railway line from Yunnan to Bangladesh via Myanmar

28. Bangladesh news agencies reported that during the visit of Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping to Dhaka on June 13 and 14, 2010, Mr.Xi "proposed to give assistance to Bangladesh for building a deep seaport in Chittagong and installing the country's first space satellite". Briefing reporters on the outcome of the talks, Foreign Minister Dipu Moni said the Chinese side assured more investment in Bangladesh, and promised to reduce the bilateral trade imbalance by allowing more Bangladeshi products to have duty-free access to the Chinese market. She added that the Chinese agreed to help Bangladesh in ensuring food security and in combating militancy and terrorism.

29. Sri Lanka occupies the fourth place in Chinese strategic planning in South Asia. More than 50 per cent of the funding received by Sri Lanka from abroad for construction and development projects since President Mahinda Rajapaksa came to power came from China. China has been assisting Sri Lanka in the construction of the Hambantota port, the Maththala international airport at Hambantota, a new container terminal in Colombo and the Colombo--Katunayake Expressway. It has also agreed to help in the modernisation of the railways.

30. There are no indications so far that China is going to help Sri Lanka in upgrading the commercial port at Hambantota the first stage of which has already been commissioned into a naval base for use by the Chinese or the Sri Lankan Navy or both. Hambantota is a good example of the opportunistic dimension of China's strategic thinking and planning. The idea for the construction of an international port of modern standards comparable to if not better than Colombo at Hambantota was reportedly initially broached by the Sri Lankan Government with the Government of India. When New Delhi did not react positively, Colombo turned to Beijing which pounced on the opportunity to get a foothold in the port sector in Sri Lanka.

31. The indications are that China's interest in helping the countries of the South Asian region in the development of their port infrastructure is related to its need to ensure the security of its energy supplies from West Asia and Africa. It has no naval power projection dimension at present.

32. Till now, the main driver of China's strategic interest in Gwadar, Hambantota and Chittagong has been the perceived need for refuelling, re-stocking and rest and recreation facilities for its oil/gas tankers and naval ships deputed for anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden area. China is not yet interested in an overseas naval base, but is interested in overseas logistic facilities for its oil/gas tankers and for its naval vessels.

33. Individual retired officers of the People's Liberation Army (Navy) have been talking of the likely long-term need for an overseas naval base in the Indian Ocean area, but the Communist Party of China (CPC) has been discouraging such talk. Presently, the Chinese interest in playing a role in the development of the port infrastructure is not designed to place its Navy in a position as to be able to challenge the primacy presently enjoyed by the Navies of the US and India in the Indian Ocean region.

34. China has seen as to how the over-assertiveness of its Navy in the South China Sea has had a negative impact on the comfort level of its relations with the ASEAN countries. The Indian Ocean is not comparable to the South China Sea. China has no territorial claims to islands in the Indian Ocean area. It has no disputes relating to fishing and exploration of oil and gas with any of the countries of the Indian Ocean region. China and its Navy are, therefore, welcomed by the countries of the region. This comfortable position could change if China graduates from energy security to power projection in its strategic planning for the Indian Ocean region.

35. I do not expect this to happen in the short and medium terms (five to 10 years). However, if the Chinese strategic thinking changes in the long-term, what could be the new threats to India and what will be the options for our Navy? We have to start thinking on this.

36. After Pakistan, Sri Lanka provides a good example of the use of a military supply relationship by China to advance its strategic interests. Over the years, we had seen how China uses its military supply relationship with Pakistan in the nuclear and conventional fields for keeping Pakistan closely tied to it and for countering India. In recent years, we have been seeing the use of a military supply relationship with Sri Lanka for increasing the Chinese influence in Sri Lanka. The Chinese readiness to supply modern and heavy arms and ammunition to the Sri Lankan Armed Forces without worrying about the moral implications of its actions played an important role in helping the Sri Lankan Army crush the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ruthlessly. Next to an infrastructure development relationship, a military supply relationship has become an important addition to China's basket of strategic eggs.

37. I will make a passing reference to the incipient Chinese interest in the Maldives, which has emerged as a favourite tourist destination of Chinese tourists. China has been helping the Maldives in the fields of house construction and modernising some aspects of its banking infrastructure such as the installation and operation of Automatic Teller Machines for the benefit of foreign tourists. We have to closely monitor the evolution of its interest in the Maldives.

38. It is important for India to challenge China's monopoly in the infrastructure development sector in the South Asian region. Presence in the infrastructure sector has a strategic importance. We must be able to find the funds and the required number of construction engineers for this.

39. India has three advantages over China which it must exploit vigorously to increase its strategic presence in the region and to counter the Chinese presence.

a. Firstly, India provides a huge market next door for the products of these countries. Their traders value the Indian market more than the Chinese market. We should be generous in our trade concessions in order to keep them attracted to India and prevent them from drifting towards China.

b. Secondly, India could play an important role in helping these countries develop their educational facilities such as institutions for technology studies.

c. Thirdly, culturally, the people of these countries still look up to India and not to China. India's soft power has to be effectively utilised for strengthening our presence and influence in these countries. China is not in a position to compete with us in soft power.

40.Whether India should compete with China in selling arms and ammunition and nuclear technology to these countries has to be carefully considered keeping in view the implications of the likely use of Indian arms and ammunition by these countries against their dissident elements, which often look up to India for moral support. As regards the supply of nuclear technology, India may not be in a position to provide the kind of financial back-up that China provides.
China’s Strategic Eggs in South Asia
An excellent analysis that should get us all thinking!

It does indicate the way China is slowly entering into areas where the world will change.

What do you feel is India's future in this mosaic?
 

Ray

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China's Strategic Eggs in South Asia

By B. Raman


China is not a South Asian power, but it has been seeking to build up for itself a strong South Asian presence which could cater to its strategic needs in the long term.

2. It has made inroads in the South Asian countries in recent years by taking advantage of their hunger for the development of their infrastructure and their requirement of financial assistance for major infrastructure projects and for the exploitation of their natural resources.

3. While India too has been helping these countries in these fields, China has definitely had an advantage over India due to its large cash reserve built up from its huge trade surpluses and the reservoir of excellent construction engineers with experience in infrastructure building which it has built up over the years.

4. The fact that China has no contentious issues affecting its bilateral relations with these countries --- as against many contentious issues in the relations of India with its neighbours--- has also worked to its advantage.

5. The Chinese policy in the South Asian region has a mix of the strategic and the opportunistic dimensions--- that is, working for carefully calculated long-term strategic objectives while not missing short and medium term opportunities that come its way. One sees the strategic dimension in the case of its relations with Pakistan. One sees a mix of the two in its relations with other South Asian countries.

6. Its relations with Pakistan, which continue to enjoy the highest priority, are driven by a strong strategic calculus. That calculus arises from its perceived need for a second front to keep India preoccupied.

7. In its strategic calculation, its ability to prevent a military conflict with India would depend on a strong military-related capability in Tibet and a strong Pakistani military capability in the nuclear and conventional fields.

8. That is what it has been trying to do. It has been trying to see that Pakistan has an edge over India in its military nuclear capability, including the delivery vehicles. It has been strengthening Pakistan's offensive and defensive air and naval capabilities. After the recent raid by the US naval commandos in Abbottabad to kill Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011, it has promised to expedite the delivery of aircraft needed by the PAF to strengthen its air defence capability.

9. Simultaneously, it has also been helping Pakistan in repairing and upgrading the Karakoram Highway and has promised to help in the construction of other roads. A feasibility study for the construction of a railway line from Xinjiang through Gilgit-Baltistan has been undertaken.

10. Of the various proposals received from Pakistan for the development of its infrastructure, China has given high priority to those relating to Gilgit-Baltistan and low priority to those relating to Balochistan. It has not shown an interest in taking up for the time being Pakistan's proposals for the upgradation of the Gwadar commercial port built earlier with Chinese assistance into a naval base. Similarly, it has been going slow in follow-up action on other pending Pakistani proposals for the construction of a petro-chemical complex in Gwadar and oil-gas pipelines from Gwadar to Xinjiang.

11. The priority given by China to infrastructure projects in the Gilgit-Baltistan area is meant to enable Pakistan protect this area from any future Indian threats and give the Pakistani armed forces the capability to pose a credible threat to India, which would serve China's strategic objective too.

12. There have been unconfirmed reports from a US journalist about the presence of a little over 10,000 Chinese troops in the Gilgit-Baltistan area. If true, these reports would further underline China's strategic objectives in Pakistan.

13. A significant development post-Abbottabad was the strong defence of Pakistan's counter-terrorism record by Beijing and its attempts to see that no harm came to Pakistan as a result of US suspicions regarding possible Pakistani complicity--- governmental or non-governmental--- in sheltering OBL for a little over five years in Abbottabad.

14. Thus, China's strategic interest in protecting Pakistan, strengthening its capabilities and maintaining the effectiveness of the threat that it could pose to India in times of need remains as strong as ever. It will remain so even if there is an improvement in India's relations with China and Pakistan.

15. The Sino-Pakistan axis means not only the need for our being able to fight on two fronts simultaneously in times of war, but also a two-front capability for the collection of intelligence in times of peace. Collection of intelligence ---human and technical-- from China requires capabilities totally different from those required for the collection of intelligence from Pakistan. Our strategic planning has to cater to requirements in times of war as well as peace.

16. Next to Pakistan, Nepal enjoys the second priority in China's strategic calculation. The importance of Nepal to China's strategic thinkers and planners arises not only because of its potential for being used against India in times of peace as well as war, but also because of its potential to India for being used to create instability in Tibet if there are disturbances there after the death of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. In China's calculation, Nepal can be a double-edged sword.

17. How to strengthen the potential of Nepal for being used against India? It is for this purpose that the Chinese have been trying to extend their road and rail network from Tibet to Nepal and to develop close relations with the Maoists headed by Prachanda and their cadres who are likely to be integrated into the Nepal army. Strengthening China's political, economic and military influence in Nepal by taking advantage of the presence of the Maoists in power is an important objective of Beijing.

18. Military-military relationship has been given increasing attention since 1998, when the Nepal Army started sending officers and soldiers to study in Chinese military universities. In the academic year 2006/2007, 21 officers and soldiers of the Nepal Army went to China for training. China has sent military officers to participate in the adventure trainings organized by the Nepal Army since 2002.

19. Addressing the Nepal Council of World Affairs at Kathmandu on August 5, 2008, the then Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Zheng Xianglin said: "Nepal is situated in a favorable geographical position in South Asia, and is a passage linking China and South Asia."

20. That is the principal reason for the Chinese interest in Nepal----as a passage to South Asia and as an instrument for strengthening the Chinese presence in South Asia. China has a Look South policy to counter our Look East policy. As we try to move Eastwards to cultivate the countries of South-East Asia, it is trying to move southwards to outflank us.

21. China has already given indications of its interest in strengthening the value of Nepal as a passage to South Asia by connecting the road network in Tibet with that in Nepal and by extending the railway line to Lhasa to Kathmandu. If China succeeds in concretising the seide as, the threats to our security will be enhanced.

22. China has other reasons to welcome the rise of the Maoists to power in Nepal. It is hoping with reason that Nepal would stop the anti-China activities of the 1000-strong community of Tibetan refugees in Nepal. They have been in the forefront of the agitation against the Han colonisation of Tibet. Some of them are being used by the US Govt. funded Radio Free Asia for producing programmes directed to the Tibetans. China apprehends that if there is unrest in Tibet after the death of the Dalai Lama, these refugees might be utilised by the US----with the complicity of India--- to destabilise the Chinese presence in Tibet. It is hoping to pre-empt this with the co-operation of a Maoist-dominated Government in Kathmandu.

23. India finds itself in Nepal in a situation not dissimilar to the situation in Myanmar----all the time having to compete with China for political influence and economic benefits. Till now, India almost monopolised the strategic playing field in Nepal. Now, there is a second player in China. In Myanmar, whenever the former military Government had to choose between Indian and Chinese interests, it always chose the Chinese interests because of its fear of China and its gratitude to China for the support extended by it to the former military junta in international for a such as the UN Security Council. In Nepal whenever there is a conflict between Indian and Chinese interests, a Maoist-dominated Govt. may choose Chinese interests not out of fear or gratitude but out of considerations of ideological affinity.

24. It is in India's interest to see that China does not succeed in its objectives in Nepal. In Pakistan, India has no cards which it can use to counter the Chinese objectives. In Nepal, India has more cards than China and it should not hesitate to use them intelligently to counter the Chinese designs. India continues to have a much stronger economic presence in Nepal than China. India still has many objective allies in the non-Maoist segment of the population and administration. It should not hesitate to use these cards to maintain its influence in Nepal and to counter the Chinese designs.

25. Bangladesh has the third priority for China. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, despite her strong friendship for India, has continued with the look East policy of her predecessor Begum Khalida Zia and strengthened the links with China. During her visit to China, an agreement was signed with a Chinese company for oil/gas exploration in Bangladesh. She also sought Chinese help for the upgradation of Chittagong into a modern deep sea port. Her Government has sought to calm Indian concerns by reassuring India that India will also be allowed to use the Chittagong port modernized with Chinese help.

26. At least, Sri Lanka and Myanmar sought to treat India on par with China by granting it equal rights of oil/gas exploration, but Bangladesh has not given any such contracts to India due to strong local opposition to India playing any role in the development of its energy resources.

27. SheikhHasina also reportedly discussed with the Chinese plans for linking Yunnan with Bangladesh through Myanmar by a modern road. If the Chinese company finds oil or gas in Bangladesh it is only a question of time before the Chinese production facilities in Bangladesh are connected with those in the Arakan area of Myanmar so that oil and gas from Bangladesh can flow direct to Yunnan through the pipeline connecting Arakan with Yunnan now being constructed. There has also been talk of a Chinese-aided railway line from Yunnan to Bangladesh via Myanmar

28. Bangladesh news agencies reported that during the visit of Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping to Dhaka on June 13 and 14, 2010, Mr.Xi "proposed to give assistance to Bangladesh for building a deep seaport in Chittagong and installing the country's first space satellite". Briefing reporters on the outcome of the talks, Foreign Minister Dipu Moni said the Chinese side assured more investment in Bangladesh, and promised to reduce the bilateral trade imbalance by allowing more Bangladeshi products to have duty-free access to the Chinese market. She added that the Chinese agreed to help Bangladesh in ensuring food security and in combating militancy and terrorism.

29. Sri Lanka occupies the fourth place in Chinese strategic planning in South Asia. More than 50 per cent of the funding received by Sri Lanka from abroad for construction and development projects since President Mahinda Rajapaksa came to power came from China. China has been assisting Sri Lanka in the construction of the Hambantota port, the Maththala international airport at Hambantota, a new container terminal in Colombo and the Colombo--Katunayake Expressway. It has also agreed to help in the modernisation of the railways.

30. There are no indications so far that China is going to help Sri Lanka in upgrading the commercial port at Hambantota the first stage of which has already been commissioned into a naval base for use by the Chinese or the Sri Lankan Navy or both. Hambantota is a good example of the opportunistic dimension of China's strategic thinking and planning. The idea for the construction of an international port of modern standards comparable to if not better than Colombo at Hambantota was reportedly initially broached by the Sri Lankan Government with the Government of India. When New Delhi did not react positively, Colombo turned to Beijing which pounced on the opportunity to get a foothold in the port sector in Sri Lanka.

31. The indications are that China's interest in helping the countries of the South Asian region in the development of their port infrastructure is related to its need to ensure the security of its energy supplies from West Asia and Africa. It has no naval power projection dimension at present.

32. Till now, the main driver of China's strategic interest in Gwadar, Hambantota and Chittagong has been the perceived need for refuelling, re-stocking and rest and recreation facilities for its oil/gas tankers and naval ships deputed for anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden area. China is not yet interested in an overseas naval base, but is interested in overseas logistic facilities for its oil/gas tankers and for its naval vessels.

33. Individual retired officers of the People's Liberation Army (Navy) have been talking of the likely long-term need for an overseas naval base in the Indian Ocean area, but the Communist Party of China (CPC) has been discouraging such talk. Presently, the Chinese interest in playing a role in the development of the port infrastructure is not designed to place its Navy in a position as to be able to challenge the primacy presently enjoyed by the Navies of the US and India in the Indian Ocean region.

34. China has seen as to how the over-assertiveness of its Navy in the South China Sea has had a negative impact on the comfort level of its relations with the ASEAN countries. The Indian Ocean is not comparable to the South China Sea. China has no territorial claims to islands in the Indian Ocean area. It has no disputes relating to fishing and exploration of oil and gas with any of the countries of the Indian Ocean region. China and its Navy are, therefore, welcomed by the countries of the region. This comfortable position could change if China graduates from energy security to power projection in its strategic planning for the Indian Ocean region.

35. I do not expect this to happen in the short and medium terms (five to 10 years). However, if the Chinese strategic thinking changes in the long-term, what could be the new threats to India and what will be the options for our Navy? We have to start thinking on this.

36. After Pakistan, Sri Lanka provides a good example of the use of a military supply relationship by China to advance its strategic interests. Over the years, we had seen how China uses its military supply relationship with Pakistan in the nuclear and conventional fields for keeping Pakistan closely tied to it and for countering India. In recent years, we have been seeing the use of a military supply relationship with Sri Lanka for increasing the Chinese influence in Sri Lanka. The Chinese readiness to supply modern and heavy arms and ammunition to the Sri Lankan Armed Forces without worrying about the moral implications of its actions played an important role in helping the Sri Lankan Army crush the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ruthlessly. Next to an infrastructure development relationship, a military supply relationship has become an important addition to China's basket of strategic eggs.

37. I will make a passing reference to the incipient Chinese interest in the Maldives, which has emerged as a favourite tourist destination of Chinese tourists. China has been helping the Maldives in the fields of house construction and modernising some aspects of its banking infrastructure such as the installation and operation of Automatic Teller Machines for the benefit of foreign tourists. We have to closely monitor the evolution of its interest in the Maldives.

38. It is important for India to challenge China's monopoly in the infrastructure development sector in the South Asian region. Presence in the infrastructure sector has a strategic importance. We must be able to find the funds and the required number of construction engineers for this.

39. India has three advantages over China which it must exploit vigorously to increase its strategic presence in the region and to counter the Chinese presence.

a. Firstly, India provides a huge market next door for the products of these countries. Their traders value the Indian market more than the Chinese market. We should be generous in our trade concessions in order to keep them attracted to India and prevent them from drifting towards China.

b. Secondly, India could play an important role in helping these countries develop their educational facilities such as institutions for technology studies.

c. Thirdly, culturally, the people of these countries still look up to India and not to China. India's soft power has to be effectively utilised for strengthening our presence and influence in these countries. China is not in a position to compete with us in soft power.

40.Whether India should compete with China in selling arms and ammunition and nuclear technology to these countries has to be carefully considered keeping in view the implications of the likely use of Indian arms and ammunition by these countries against their dissident elements, which often look up to India for moral support. As regards the supply of nuclear technology, India may not be in a position to provide the kind of financial back-up that China provides.
China�s Strategic Eggs in South Asia
An excellent analysis that should get us all thinking!

It does indicate the way China is slowly entering into areas where the world will change.

What do you feel is India's future in this mosaic?

If China wants to build a strong presence in our area of interest, what should India do to counter the same as also extend India's interest where China feels it is her backyard?
 

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