PART 1: A CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ORDER
Much of the recent commentary on international order has focused on the issues of America's "relative decline" or the "rise of the rest." The change in the balance of economic weight is critical, but elides the context of the change. The context matters to interests and influence, and to intent.
Globalization and the Emerging Powers' Interests
The essential point of context is that China, India, Brazil and others' phenomenal growth in the past two decades was a function of their integration into a U.S.-backed system of global economics, finance and trade. As foreign policy analysts as diverse as Condoleeza Rice and G. John Ikenberry have argued, this means that these rising actors are fundamentally status quo powers: that is, they seek to profit and gain influence within the existing order, not to overturn it. This is not the first time in modern history that the established and rising powers have been financially and economically linked, and integration is no guarantee against crises between the powers. It is a firewall, though, against direct conflict.
The fact that the emerging powers' growth is dependent on globalization has security as well as economic implications. Globalization itself is dependent on a series of global networks for trade, transport, finance and information. Both trade-led growth and financial services depend on a constant flow of goods, people and data. The bad news is that these networks are vulnerable to disruption, both from terrorist and criminal organizations, and challenger states. The upside for international order is that that threat is shared. Not only do the United States, China, India, Brazil and Russia share security concerns about terrorism, they also have deeply shared economic interests in preventing a disruption to the basic operations of the global economy. This even gives the rising powers a continuing interest in the exercise of U.S. power, for example, in the use of U.S. naval assets to maintain the free flow of commercial goods and energy supplies through vital but vulnerable trade routes, like the Straits of Hormuz and the Malacca Straits. China has muttered about burden-sharing in the Malacca Straits, but no one seriously contests the shared international interest in U.S.-backed trade security.
Still, even within this system, a redistribution of influence carries risks. First, rapid growth is generating exponential increases in the demand for scarce supplies of energy and consumable resources. China's economy has trebled in the last two decades, but its energy and food consumption have risen even faster, as has India's. Vast new middle classes are driving exponential growth in demands as their consumption patterns start to reflect those of the west-with energy-hungry cars, luxury goods and high caloric diets. Tough, competitive dynamics are taking hold in the Middle East, Central Asia, Latin America and Africa in the search for energy, minerals and food- and the land and water it takes to produce them. This will make some supplier countries rich and destabilize others, but also has the potential to destabilize major power relations themselves.
Second, the emerging powers have every interest to maneuver for greater influence over the rules of the global economic game. Because it operates (by definition) across national spheres, the global economy is regulated through international negotiations-in the World Trade Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the International Telecommunications Union (which sets global standards for cellular and wireless technology), and similar bodies. These regulations are the subject of newly intense diplomacy. The good news is that countries are battling for influence in Geneva boardrooms and not on the battlefield. The bad news is that complex negotiations over the regulations that undergird global transactions can bog down cooperation; the WTO has been stalled for years, for example, because the emerging powers now have the capacity to block U.S. and European positions they view (with some justification) as injurious to their interests.
Third, the simple fact is that with rising capacity comes rising ambition. It is a tenet of realism that power redistribution is inherently destabilizing. Of course, realism got the collapse of the Soviet Union wrong, and some power shifts result in peaceable transitions rather than war. But, well short of war, the rising powers are already altering the global terrain and starting to act like every other new power-throwing their new political weight around within their regions and seeking global status to match.
There is an evident irony of it being a global financial and trade system underwritten and secured by U.S. power that has created the most important contemporary challenge to that power. The rising powers know that the United States is critical in undergirding the very system on which their power is dependent-but that will not stop them from testing U.S. leadership where it suits their interests to do so, and where they can get away with it.
Influence of the emerging powers
How much influence do the emerging "powers" actually have? The new economic weight and commensurate financial influence of China, India, Brazil and other recently developed economies are easily measured and, by now, universally acknowledged. If their role in response to the global financial crisis were not sufficient indication of their new clout, China overtaking Japan as the world's second largest economy was a potent symbol.
Economic weight is one thing; military power is another. For all of the media hype surrounding China's new weapons systems, the fact remains that not only is the United States still vastly the dominant military power, it will retain both a technological and capability lead in global terms for at least a decade, and probably two. Yes, at present, much of that capacity is bogged down. But that is a temporary reality. The U.S. nuclear guarantee remains a central part of a stable security order in North Asia, Europe and the Gulf.
The difference between the rising powers' economic weight and their still modest military power mirrors the debate between those who argue that the United States is in relative decline and those who posit continued American leadership in the international system. This is partially a debate about semantics. Few in the "America still leads" camp would deny that there has been a relative shift in the balance of economic influence; and few in the "relative decline" camp would deny American military dominance. But that semantic debate obscures a deeper question about the nature of the U.S. position in the world today and the extent to which it still commands a leadership role in the international system.
Part of the confusion arises from the term "balance of power," which lends itself to a sense of metrics and hard power. In the real world of international economics and politics, influence is a more accurate term, though harder to measure. In the space between finance and war, three realities shape emerging powers' influence.
First, the emerging powers' relative political and military weight within regions is far greater than global rankings suggest. This enables them to block or constrain U.S. initiatives on major geopolitical questions. Our military capacity dwarfs India's, but their influence in Myanmar and Iran rivals or exceeds ours, as does China's on North Korea. Brazil's deployable military capacity is miniscule, but it carries substantial clout in Argentina and Venezuela. This new influence is not uncomplicated though. One of the most interesting dynamics in contemporary international politics is the extent to which some actors, traditionally resistant to U.S. presence in their regions, now see it as balancing that of the regional power. In South East Asia, Vietnam has called for sustained U.S. engagement in the South China seas. India's neighbors look at its rise with trepidation. A Brazilian diplomat acknowledged, in his terms, that trading "the imperial yoke of America for that of sub-imperial Brazil" was not exactly a step up for Brazil's neighbors. Still, that some neighbors are smarting under the new weight of the regional powers is illustration of the fact of it. This would matter less to U.S. interests and international order if their home regions were less significant in commercial and security terms.
Emerging power influence is amplified, second, by multilateral institutions. China already has a veto in the UN Security Council, and it, along with India, has long wielded substantial influence in global bodies like the General Assembly, given each country's ability to muster support from the G-77 group of developing countries. As these powers assert themselves at the global level, and in such power clubs as the G-20, they are bumping into resistance in their continued efforts to lead the G-77; the erosion of G-77 unity in UN debates since the start of the G-20 has been striking. But for now, China, India and Brazil get to have it both ways. The United States has paid less attention to the diplomacy of global bodies. In an era when traditional geopolitical issues were all that mattered to U.S. foreign policy, this would matter little. But not only are key aspects of globalization managed in substantial part through inclusive multilateral fora-including trade and aviation, intellectual property-so too are climate, infectious disease and fragile states.
Third, the emerging powers profit from the phenomenon of the "shadow of the future." States calculating the costs of various strategies assess not only the present, but also the future influence of the United States and putative rivals. Accurate or not, the dominant international perception is of an America past its prime, and of emerging powers whose time is coming. The scramble is on to get into their good books and investment strategies. This is not only true of regional actors, but even of core U.S. allies, like Germany and the United Kingdom. Prime Minister Cameron's early post-election trip to Delhi was illustrative of a new focus for UK policy, and several of his European colleagues are following suit.
All this is amplified by the fact that priority security threats for the United States, like terrorism, operate in transnational spaces that diminish the influence of traditional modes of hard power. U.S. drone capacity has been an important (if probably counterproductive in the long run) tool of the U.S. war against al Qaeda in Pakistan, but is of little use in combating al Qaeda-inspired movements based in Toronto, Djakarta or Cairo. Hard power can contain fragile states, but not rebuild them. In short, U.S. foreign policy priorities play against our comparative advantages.