Negotiating with India
Abdul Hannan
Gowher Rizvi, the prime minister's international affairs adviser, in an interview with the Daily Star, waxed eloquent over what he described as unprecedented gains by Bangladesh during the recent visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in resolving the outstanding disputes with India. Apparently, his appraisal is contrary to the groundswell of criticism, anger, shock and dismay about the failed outcome of the summit, expressed across a wide spectrum of public opinion.
The summit was a flop and ended not with a bang but with a humiliating whimper for Bangladesh. There was nothing new in the eleventh hour volte face by India. It is consistent with its track record of breach of trust, back-tracking and intransigence in resolving its disputes with Bangladesh. Let me briefly revisit, by way of providing intelligence to the learned adviser, the chronicle of hypocrisy, deceit and dissimulation resorted to by India in its dealings with Bangladesh.
Bangladesh has conceded to India's agenda and shopping list one after another. First India received Dhaka-Calcutta bus service followed by Agartarla-Calcutta bus service, inaugurated by the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. The latest concession was to allow the use of land transport, even without a formal transit agreement, from Ashuganj to Agartala to carry heavy machinery for setting up of a power plant in Tripura. Bangladesh cooperation to meet India's security concern, particularly about long-running separatist insurgency in its northeastern states, was a major concession.
But, in return, Bangladesh has received nothing. India, far from promoting good neighbourly relation with Bangladesh, has consistently adopted a hostile attitude. India has upheld an obstructionist policy since 1974 by preventing Bangladesh from exploring for oil well within Bangladesh territory in the Bay of Bengal. India served notice of swift dispatch to four foreign companies preparing for oil exploration in the Bay of Bengal in 1974, and ever since it has shown least interest in joint survey and delineation of maritime boundary. Bangladesh was left with no other choice but to refer the matter to UN for arbitration. India has captured, by threat of force, Talpatty island near the Sundarbans and well within Bangladesh territory. The India map has renamed the island as New More Island.
India has flouted the Indira-Mujib 1974 land boundary agreement by not implementing it by exchange of adverse possessed enclaves and demarcation of 6.5 km land boundary. It has constructed 896 km long barbed wire fence along its border to stop what it alleges as infiltration from Bangladesh. The killing of innocent Bangladeshis in the border areas by BSF is a regular affair.
Indira-Mujib agreement provided for lease in perpetuity of the Tin Bigha corridor in return for handing over Berubari to India. But India dragged its feet on one pretext or another. The agreement with Manmohan for round-the-clock access through Tin Bigha is a poor substitute of the stipulated lease in perpetuity of Tin Bigha.
Prime Minister Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, under joint Indo-Bangladesh declaration in 1974, allowed a trial run of Farakka barrage on condition that India ensured water sharing of 55 thousand cusecs. In 1975, Bangladesh and India signed a water sharing agreement. India opted out of the agreement when relations between the two countries soured after the assassination of Bangabandhu. Without water from the Ganges, desertification, salinity and navigation difficulties raised a specter of economic and ecological disaster.
Bangladesh, out of desperation, sought UN intervention. The UN asked India and Bangladesh to come to a mutually satisfactory resolution of the dispute in a spirit of good neighbourliness. But it was not until 1977, during Morarji Desai's government, that a new 5-year water sharing agreement was signed. In1982, an MOU was signed for 2 years. An MOU for 3 years was signed in 1985 during the government of I.K. Gujral, under which Bangladesh was assured of 34 thousand cusec. India signed a 30-year Ganges water treaty during the government of Prime Minister Dev Gowda
In the intervening period, Bangladesh's share of water was reduced to less than 10 thousand cusecs. It is significant that Bangladesh suffered most in matters of water sharing during the rule of Congress governments in India.
The recent agreements during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit are short on substance and long on rhetoric. Triumphalism is premature and misplaced as we fully know how India reneged and soft-pedaled on its commitment to the 1974 Indira-Mujib agreement. Much depends on implementation inasmuch as most of these are a repeat of the Indira-Mujib agreement of 1974.
The latest agreement is not charity, but should be seen as a ploy to get Bangladesh on board for transit facility, the last and most important item in India's shopping list. Transit to Nepal and Bhutan is of minimal importance as our volume of trade with these two countries is peanuts when compared with well over $3 billion trade imbalance with India. The threat of para-tariff apart, the duty free export of 46 Bangladesh items will not make substantial difference. Observers suspect that the Mamata factor was a stage-managed stratagem to wriggle out of the Teesta deal at the eleventh hour.
The performance of 2 advisers in matters of negotiating the deals with India, apparently sidelining the ministry of foreign affairs and other line ministries, has been widely criticised. As reported by newspapers, Manmohan Singh is replacing his adviser Shiv Shankar Menon, former Indian foreign secretary, with a political leader.
Our prime minister may likewise think of entrusting the task of future negotiations on transit and water sharing of remaining 53 rivers including Teesta to foreign ministry professionals, who are trained in the art of negotiating with foreign countries.
Alternatively, the assignment may be given to a retired seasoned and astute career diplomat, who has the experience of both serving in our Delhi Mission and in top positions in the foreign office, assisted by a core team of experts on water and transit.
Reticence and reserve are an essential preserve of diplomacy. The press and academic circles, however, were critical of the persistent optimism and exuberance of the incumbent foreign minister about the Indian conduct and what they described as her "apologetic" assessment of the success of Manmohan's visit.
It remains to be seen if Gowher Rizvi can be persuaded to abandon his futile exercise to defend the indefensible.
Abdul Hannan is a former diplomat.
Negotiating with India