Post above ur's have some hints.
Following are some.
a. In war wounding is preferred than killing.
b. 5.56 being light allows more numbers carried.
c. Counter terrorists forces prefer killing a terrorists(even when they say they were trying to catch them alive) who are trained go suicidal when circled. Being close to support, numbers of bullets in hand matters less.
d. Hit from 7.62 causes instant death.
e. 7.62 can penetrate through protection.
For rest contact ever friendly GOOGLE.
What the hell is the bold part supposed to mean?
Though I know Arjun is a very good tank, the Bheeshm is no pushover. Hate to burst many Arjun lobbyists bubble here but Bheeshm armor is superior to Arjun. Both use Kanchan composite armor as base armor, and on top of that, T-90 has Kaktus ERA, which is currently the best ERA in the world (Its 3rd Gen ERA). India does not have tech to manufacture Kaktus standard ERA, and hence, Arjun armor is weaker.
I also admit that Arjun FCS is better due to a better suspension.
Number of problems faced, not dependable night fighting capability(please! give me Vit-A), unbearable cabin temperature(aah! Need a AC here), high ground pressure, prime protection from ERA(i'll dull K.E and kill my solders standing nearby,two kill in one shot, i'm best), uses Arjun's armuor and yet it's better than Arjun. Please bother to read articles posted below.
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Flaws in T 90 Main Battle Tanks troubles Indian Army
Chandigarh: Inducted to serve as India's main battle tank just over three years ago, the Army's fleet of Russian-built T-90s have run into serious trouble.
The problems include critical flaws in its fire control system, availability of ammunition and, what military officers said, was avoidable overuse during training exercises, rendering many tanks in need of overhaul.
According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, the tank’s continuing technical flaws are "adversely impinging on the Indian Army’s operational preparedness."
Confirming the Jane’s report, senior Army officers told this newspaper that the French Catherine thermal imaging (TI) camera, which gives the T-90’s Belarussian (Peling IG-46) night sight its 3 km range and higher accuracy, is not "adequately tropicalised" and hence prone to malfunctioning in the extreme heat of the Rajasthan desert region, where temperatures inside the MBT routinely average between 55ºC and 60ºC.
During repeated manoeuvres in the Thar Desert, where the T-90s will ultimately be deployed in the event of an outbreak in hostilities, prolonged use under high temperatures had already "knocked out" between 80 and 90 of the Catherine TI cameras, rendering the FCS "unserviceable." The officers said that repeated efforts to correct the problem had been without success.
The TI cameras are the crucial "eyes" of the tank’s systems. At Rs 2 crores each, the Catherine TI system comprises almost one-sixth of each T-90’s total cost of Rs 11.75 crores.
One of the options currently being explored to rectify the FCS is to locally develop an airconditioning plant for the TI camera. For this, a former director-general of mechanised forces is understood to have already held discussions with some French manufacturers, including Thales (which makes the Catherine TI cameras). However, neither this nor the local vendors called in by the DRDO have had any success in this matter.
The Army, incidentally, does not have a D-G for its mechanised forces after Lt. Gen. G.D. Singh became deputy chief of staff at Army Headquarters recently. Under the circumstances, it could take any new D-G who is appointed quite a while before he can adequately address the T-90’s problems, possibly further delaying the MBT’s operational preparedness.
The problem of successfully integrating the Catherine TI camera with the Belarussian IG-46 sight is also believed to have considerably delayed the licensed production of T-90s at the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) at Avadi. Sources said the indigenous T-90 production, as part of the transfer of technology agreement signed with Russia, which was scheduled to begin in 2006, has been deferred after problems were encountered in fitting out the FCS in assembled tanks. Of the total of 310 T-90 tanks, 124 were bought fully formed and kits were imported for the remaining 186 to be assembled at Avadi. The first locally-assembled T-90s rolled out of the HVF in January 2004, but these too have run into problems with the FCS.
According to the transfer of technology agreement, the T-90’s IG-46 sights were to be made at the Opto Electrics Factory at Dehra Dun, the gun at the Ordnance Factory Board facility at Rishikesh and its 1,000-horsepower engine by Bharat Earth Movers Ltd. All the three projects stand deferred, official sources said.
The T-90s are also facing a host of other problems, including a nearly exhausted inventory of ammunition. The tank’s 125 mm smooth-bore gun is electronically configured to fire imported Russian AMK-338 and AMK-339 shells, the supply of which has run out after innumerable exercises.
Surprisingly, the T-90’s gun has not been configured to fire the Indian-made AMK-340 shells. These shells have turned out rather dubious in quality, with over 150,000 rounds having to be destroyed, leading to the loss of over Rs 700 crores. Some AMK-340 shells have even burst inside the tanks, killing crew members, in at least one instance at Babina. Armoured Corps officers said many tank crews, who feared the shells would explode inside the barrel, had refused to use the faulty ammunition, and when forced to do so went to elaborate lengths, enabling them to fire from outside the tank.
According to the Armoured Corps officers, the ordnance factory board had triple-packed the 125 mm AMK-340 shells with propellant, but without adequate packing in between the layers to prevent leakage at high temperatures in which they are stored, often under the open sun. This had led not only to a near-complete freeze on regular firings but also "severely dented" the confidence of tank crews, sources said.
The Secunderabad-based Bharat Dynamics Ltd (BDL), which was scheduled to start production of 9M119 Refleks missiles for the T-90 early this year, has also fallen badly behind schedule amid failed trials. BDL is believed to have sought technical assistance from the Russians in building the Refleks (Nato designation: AT-11 Sniper) missile.
It was the T-90’s missile-firing capability that had initially clinched the Army’s decision in its favour way back in 2001. But with BDL unable to supply the missiles and the endless problems with the fire control system, many officers are of the view that the tank appears little better than the already proven T-72, also currently in service with the Indian Army.
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T-72 vulnerability illustrated in Georgia
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My friend, Prasun Sengupta, has kindly sent these two photos --- two of destroyed Georgian T-72BV MBTs and the other of a destroyed Iraqi T-72M --- both all of which illustrate the vulnerability of the hull-mounted auto-loader in the Soviet/Russian MBT designs! Even when equipped with ERA tiles, the T-72M's structure is still highly vulnerable to ammunition blow-up, resulting in the turret separating from the hull. The T-90S has the same basic ammunition stowage pattern as the T-72, so it is unlikely to fare any better.
Prasun Sengupta writes: "It is probably the Indian Army’s worst-kept secret since 1979, but political imperatives have prevented it from being discussed in the open till now. The bulk of the Armoured Corps’ existing inventory of main battle tanks (MBT) — comprising 35 Regiments of T-72M/M1s (totalling 1,572 units) and six Regiments of T-90S (totaling 310 units) — all of which were acquired from Russia’s Nizhny Tagil-based Uralvagonzavod JSC — suffer from fundamental design vulnerabilities. When the former USSR gave its first detailed briefings to Army HQ in the late 1970s, the Armoured Corps had then expressed grave reservations about the T-72’s design philosophy, centred around hit avoidance. What alarmed Army HQ most was the prospect of a detonation of a mine or improved explosive device (IED) beneath the hull, which in turn would result in a secondary detonation or a catastrophic ignition of the T-72’s ammunition reserve (this being stored in a carousel autoloader on the turret’s floor), resulting in the turret being blown off. In the end, Cold War-based geo-strategic considerations and financial constraints prevailed, resulting in the large-scale induction of the T-72 since 1982. The Corps did not have to wait that long to realise its worst fears and in October 1987 a powerful IED detonated by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam beneath a T-72M en route to the Jaffna fortress resulted in the MBT’s ammo (stored in the carousel autoloader) igniting and blowing off the turret at least 15 feet high!
History repeated itself 39 months later, this time in the Middle East when Iraqi T-72s were destroyed with ease through a combination of advanced technologies such as thermal imagers and digital hunter-killer tank fire-control systems (TFCS) and kinetic-energy ammunition like the fin-stabilised armour-piercing discarding sabot (FSAPDS). In fact, Operation Desert Storm in 1991 convincingly proved two critical points:
That the traditional Soviet/Russian approach of keeping its MBTs small and low so as to profile the smallest possible target, putting more emphasis on not being hit rather than on survivable most hits, was obsolete. Until the Gulf War, it was possible to regard the Soviet and Western solutions as different approaches to the same problem, each being justifiable and logical in the light of the different requirements and operational doctrines (as well as technological levels and financial possibilities) of the countries involved. By the early 1990s, however, one was faced with the quite surprising conclusion that the Soviet/Russian MBT designers and planners were wrong all along—and dramatically so.
Basically, the overall Soviet/Russian approach to MBT design was found to be flawed on two major counts: namely, the gamble on not being hit rather than on surviving hits, and the refusal to perceive survivability of the crew as a quite distinct issue from survivability of the MBT, with the former having priority over the latter.
The combination of these two shortcomings produced design solutions such as the T-72’s and T-90’s carousel autoloader and ammunition reserve being accommodated on the turret floor. While this indeed allows for a very compact configuration and ensures that the ammunition is less likely to take a direct hit—it also entails a very high risk of ignition or sympathetic detonation should the fighting compartment be penetrated, in which case there goes the MBT and the crew with it.
This should be compared with the ammunition reserve of a hit-survivable MBT (like the Arjun Mk1) being accommodated in the turret bustle, with blow-off panels plus an armoured bulkhead separating it from the fighting compartment. Though the likelihood of the ammo reserve being hit is indeed much higher, the MBT (or at least the crew!) would survive even a catastrophic detonation. Small wonder, therefore, that when Army HQ first began drafting its General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQR) for the DRDO-developed Arjun MBT in May 1974 and redrafted it successively in 1980, 1985 and 1996, it rightly always insisted upon the indigenous MBT being able to survive hits from FSAPDS rounds, instead of trying to avoid being hit.
Thus, when the Arjun Mk1 MBT enters service, the Indian Army will have the unique distinction worldwide of being the only one to have two types of MBTs: the T-72s and T-90s on one hand that are designed to avoid, but not survive hits from FSAPDS rounds; and the Arjun Mk1 featuring a design optimised for hit survivability."
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PS. *I'm less on time i can't post every reply in detail.
*Mods sorry for going off-topic.
