Afghanistan News and Discussions

[ajtr]

here it is Ray sir .cross-posting it here.......

COUNTER INSURGENCY IN PAKISTAN

RAND REPORT

 

[anoop_mig25]

Dalrymple is right on point here.If you look as back as sept 2008 attack on Indian embassy in kabul and the 26/11 and immediately one month after 26/11 David milliband declaring right on indian soil that mumbai attacks were results of indian policies in kashmi.If you scrutinize the last 2 years of happenings in AfPAK their is well planned game played out to drag india directly/indirectly into afghan mess there by blaming the failure of west in afghan war on the so called non existence cold war between india pak and the kashmir issue.And the likewise indian govt/media is behaving it seems they have compromised on both these issues.You can call it trial balloon by Dalrymple.but he does have some knowledge of bargain by india on afghanistan and kashmir with india giving up its claim to valley POK and northern areas.And GOI is moving currently in that direction judiciously.

sorry for my late reply but Indian policy makers want to make LoC as IB which will automatically convert pok & northen areas as region of pakistan it think this has been our one of the stated solution to the problem of J&K nothing new in it. AND regarding William Dalrymple statements in the Guardian giving up presence in Afghanistan i think even if we give up our presence there Pakistan is not going to up its claim on Kashmir on ther hand it would encourage Pakistan for more so its total rubbish to think such. although my instinct says once america+nato are out we will to leave

 

[ajtr]

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/09/world/middleeast/09military.html?_r=1

. WASHINGTON — A four-star Marine general known equally for blunt speech, combat prowess and understanding counterinsurgency warfare will be nominated to command American forces across the Middle East, officials said Thursday. If confirmed by the Senate as the top officer of the military's Central Command, General Mattis would be in charge of American military forces in a strategic area from Egypt through Pakistan, and from Central Asia past the Persian Gulf.
His area of responsibility would include Iraq and Afghanistan, but most of his focus would be on other trouble spots in the region, as each of those two conflicts have a four-star officer specifically in command. General Mattis would replace Gen. David H. Petraeus, whose tour at Central Command was cut short when President Obama asked him to take over the allied mission in Afghanistan after Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal was relieved for comments he made to Rolling Stone magazine. For his part, General Mattis has gotten in trouble for past observations on a life of combat. In 2005, he received an official rebuke for comments that included "it's a lot of fun to fight."
"You go into Afghanistan, you got guys who slap around women for five years because they didn't wear a veil," he said while speaking at a forum in San Diego. "You know guys like that ain't got no manhood left anyway, so it's a hell of a lot of fun to shoot them."

 

[anoop_mig25]

"You go into Afghanistan, you got guys who slap around women for five years because they didn't wear a veil," he said while speaking at a forum in San Diego. "You know guys like that ain't got no manhood left anyway, so it's a hell of a lot of fun to shoot them."

:emot112::emot112:
WELL SAID

 

[ajtr]

Challenge for Petraeus​

The Pioneer Edit Desk

Winning a war in spite of his President

General David Petraeus has arrived in Afghanistan with a sterling reputation. The new chief of the United States Forces and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan is recognised as among the world's most cerebral military commanders. He is the man who turned around Iraq, converting a bleeding occupation to a successful counter-insurgency. In Afghanistan, however, he faces two challenges. First, he takes over in circumstances he would much rather have avoided, effectively accepting a demotion. Gen Petraeus has replaced Gen Stanley McChrystal, who resigned after a magazine article quoted him as criticising the civilian leadership in Washington, DC. Gen Petraeus was meant to have overseen Gen McChrystal's counter-insurgency offensive. He was to have been a sounding board to another capable General. Instead, Gen McChrystal has walked into the sunset and Gen Petraeus is on his own. The second, more lethal challenge is the lack of clarity as to the political goals of the campaign. Is it defeating Al Qaeda and eliminating the Taliban? Or is it simply effacing the jihadi threat to the West? Is it stabilising Afghanistan as some sort of a workable if semi-anarchic society? Or is it to do enough military damage to dictate a settlement that keeps Islamist terrorists out of the West's hair? To be fair, these are not questions military Generals can answer. However, these are questions military Generals certainly need answered by their political leaderships if they are to strategise optimally as well adopt the right tactics for an immediate armed conflict. Such clear-headed thinking has been entirely absent in the Obama Administration's approach to Afghanistan, or rather to the Afghanistan-Pakistan — AfPak — region. It is a point that Gen McChrystal sought to make in a thoroughly unsophisticated manner that breached the barriers of discipline. Yet, the core argument Gen McChrystal pointed to — that US President Barack Obama and his retinue of wise men and civilian advisers on AfPak are as clueless as the proverbial 'six blind men of Hindoostan' — is excruciatingly valid. It will return to haunt Gen Petraeus.

Obama sceptics in the US — and their number is growing by the nanosecond — have repeatedly pointed to the pitfalls and even the sheer stupidity of asking an Army to wage a counter-insurgency campaign and get out, or substantially withdraw, by July 2011. If Mr Obama is to be held to that date, Gen Petraeus has exactly a year to win a war that has resisted closure for a decade, or three decades, if the Afghan crisis be dated to the Soviet invasion of 1979. Obviously, this is an impossible task. Sooner or later the narrow focus attempt at counter-insurgency and some sort of Potemkin-style nation-building operation will have to be abandoned for old-fashioned containment of the Islamist armies, pending a long-term victory at a time when America has greater resources, stronger will and a more capable and courageous leader in the White House. This is a harsh verdict but, bluntly, it is the only correct one.

What then does Gen Petraeus do in this situation? He wages the counter-insurgency, of course, but he also needs to formulate a Plan B very quickly. This could be strengthening the Afghan political and spiritual citadels of Kabul and Kandahar at the cost of the countryside, and consolidating non-Pasthun capacities in north Afghanistan. In effect, the de facto partition of Afghanistan, as suggested by such analysts as Mr Robert Blackwill, may be inevitable.

 

[nandu]

Five U.S. troops killed in Afghanistan

Kabul, July 10, 2010

Five American service members and at least a dozen civilians died in attacks on Saturday in Afghanistan's volatile east and south, adding to a summer of escalating violence as Taliban militants push back against stepped—up operations by international and Afghan forces.

NATO said one U.S. service member died as a result of small—arms fire, another was killed by a roadside bombing and a third died during an insurgent attack in separate incidents in eastern Afghanistan. Two other U.S. troops died in separate roadside bombings in southern Afghanistan. Their deaths raised to 22 the number of American troops killed so far this month in the war.

Also, unknown gunmen killed 11 Pakistani Shia tribesmen in the east and at least one person died when a bomb planted on a motorbike exploded in Kandahar city in the south, officials said.

Explosions also hit two convoys of international troops in different parts of the country, with Germany saying two of its troops were wounded by a roadside bomb in the northern province of Kunduz. Another explosion targeted NATO troops in Khost in the east, but the alliance said there were no casualties.

Afghan and international forces also said a combined commando unit killed a Taliban operative and captured eight others in an overnight raid in Paktia province in the east, though local villagers claimed the men were innocent civilians. In the northern city of Mazar—i—Sharif, thousands of Afghan's staged an anti—U.S. protest over another night raid that killed two security guards.

Insurgent attacks have intensified across the country and the international coalition has been stepping up raids to root out militant leaders as 30,000 more American troops arrive to try to turn around the war and build a stable Afghan government nine years after U.S.—backed forces toppled the Taliban's hard—line Islamist regime.

Last month was the deadliest of the war for the multinational force, with 103 international troops killed, 60 of them Americans.

A remotely detonated motorcycle bomb killed one person Saturday in Kandahar city, the spiritual birthplace of the Taliban, authorities said.

The blast set cars ablaze and shattered windows at a popular shopping center. One man was killed as he drove by in a car just as the bomb exploded, the provincial government said in a statement.

The province is the site of a U.S.—led military operation to strengthen government control.

In the eastern border province of Paktia, unidentified gunmen killed 11 Pakistanis who had crossed into Afghanistan to buy supplies, according to Rohullah Samon, spokesman for the provincial governor.

Mr. Samon said 11 Shia minority Muslim tribesmen died and three people, including a child, were wounded in the ambush of their minibus in Chamkani district.

Elsewhere in Paktia, a combined Afghan—coalition commando force raided a compound in Ahmad Abad district overnight, killing one person and arresting nine others, officials said.

The Ministry of Defence said the elite force killed an insurgent operative and captured eight others with weapons. The ninth person arrested was determined to be a civilian and turned over to local authorities, it said in a statement.

Mr. Samon complained that local authorities were not informed of the raid. He said villagers protested outside government offices on Saturday, saying the dead man and those captured were innocent civilians. They promised a larger demonstration the next day if the eight prisoners were not released.

Combined coalition and Afghan forces have been stepping up night raids across the country trying to break up Taliban leadership and operations capability.

In the northern city of Mazar—i—Sharif, more than 1,000 people protested on Saturday against the deaths of two security guards in another night raid near a market.

The crowd chanted "Death to America! Long live Islam!" Protesters said the security guards were unjustly killed when combined Afghan and international forces landed by helicopter at the bazaar before dawn on Wednesday.

NATO spokesman Col. Wayne Shanks said the two guards were shot when they raised their weapons at the commandos and refused orders to put them down. He said the raid succeeding in capturing a Taliban operative who supplied bomb—making material.

The coalition says the new wave of raids has captured more than 100 senior— and midlevel Taliban figures since April and killed dozens more. But the success rate has not made much of a dent in insurgent attacks.

On Saturday, an explosion tore through a NATO convoy travelling in the eastern province of Khost, though no one was killed. The German army later said two of its soldiers were slightly wounded by a roadside bomb in the northern province of Kunduz, the second homemade explosive attack on German troops in the area that day.

NATO's International Security Assistance Force has been in Afghanistan since shortly after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, when U.S.—backed forces toppled the regime that sheltered the al—Qaeda terrorist leadership following the September 11 attacks in the United States.

http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article509657.ece

 

[nandu]

District governor, 11 police troops killed in northern Afghanistan

A district governor was killed by a roadside bomb in northern Afghanistan, where two separate insurgent attacks killed at least 11 policemen, officials said on Sunday.

Maalem Aziz, administrative chief of Qaleh Zal district in Kunduz province, was killed Saturday night when his vehicle was struck by a bomb in Pangark area, Mohammad Omar, the provincial governor, said.

Aziz's driver was also killed in the blast, while his son and his bodyguard were injured, Omar said.

Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid took responsibility for the attack.

Taliban militants also attacked a police post in Kunduz's Emam Saheb district near Tajikistan on Saturday night, killing six police troops, Mohammad Ayoub Haqyar, the district governor, said.

A border police official who did not want to be named said that nine policemen were killed in the attack.

Kunduz is the most dangerous province in the relatively peaceful northern region. Insurgents are active in several districts.

In another incident, a police vehicle was hit by a roadside bomb in Keshem district of Badakhshan province on Saturday night, killing five policemen, provincial police chief Agha Noor Kentooz said.

The Taliban spokesman also claimed responsibility for that attack.

There are about 4,500 German troops based in northern Afghanistan.

Thousands of US troops were also deployed to the region earlier this year to confront a growing insurgency in the region far from Taliban's traditional power bases in the south and east.

http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article510886.ece

 

[ajtr]

Severed Trees in Orchards Mirror Afghan History​

BATI KOT DISTRICT, Afghanistan — The main road into Afghanistan from the east traverses a flat, parched countryside, past flimsy roadside bazaars and squalid villages. Then, the terrain abruptly changes: arid land gives way to vast olive groves that spread for miles, as if a giant dropped a Mediterranean island into Central Asia.Gul Abbas, 66, a white-bearded farmer, walked recently among the rows of olive trees, occasionally reaching up to pat a branch as if it were an old friend, and spoke like someone lost in a dream: "We used to have visitors; people came from India, from Pakistan, from Bangladesh, to see our farms."

He grew up with the trees and spent his life nurturing them. The farm's history is his history, and the country's as well. The olive trees, he explained, were not only trees, but also a promise, not so long ago, that in this troubled and impoverished country anything could happen, even peace and plenty. Such hopes are almost, but not quite, gone.

Mr. Abbas started working on the farm nearly 50 years ago as a teenager, even before the trees were planted. "We were illiterate people," he said. "Those who had a skill could work in the towns, but I studied these trees my whole life, and growing became my profession."

At the time, Afghanistan was fast becoming a beacon in the region and the groves, like much of the country's progress in that period, were the brainchild of a forward-looking king, Mohammad Zahir Shah. In search of employment for the citizens of his water-starved country, he turned to two great farming powers that had turned their deserts green: the Soviets and the Americans.

In a modern version of the 19th-century competition between Britain and Russia for dominance in Afghanistan, the two powers each started irrigation projects: the United States in Helmand Province in the now insurgent-afflicted area around Marja, and the Soviet Union here, near Jalalabad.

The Soviet goal was to reclaim about 224,000 acres of scrub, turning it into as many as six fertile farms, channeling the snowmelt from the Hindu Kush mountains and water from the Kabul River into irrigation canals, according to Nancy Dupree, an Afghan expert who wrote about the project when it was in its heyday. The farms today cover about 55,000 acres.

The original purpose was to grow olives and oranges, Mr. Abbas said, but the plan took off and the Soviets built a model farm cooperative — with housing for workers, schools and much more. It took 15 years to complete, enough time for the trees to produce fruit. Orange trees take 4 years to become productive in this soil, he said, and olive trees do not yield their harvest for at least 12.

Because there was no custom of eating olives among Afghans, almost the entire crop, 2,600 tons a year, was shipped to Russia in the late 1970s, along with 7,000 tons of oranges, according to an engineer named Hakim who now leads the Nangarhar Valley Development Authority, which has responsibility for the farms. There were so many olives that the Russians built a factory with Italian machinery to turn some of the harvest into oil.

Mr. Hakim, who is 51 and like many Afghans has only one name, witnessed the farms' growth as a college student here and was inspired, but never imagined that he would have the chance to direct the farms. The orchards and modern farms seemed to him a kind of utopian dream that had come to life in the rocky Afghan soil.

"I went to visit a relative living on the farm; it had its own houses, schools, theater, cinema, hospital, it had well-organized parks and a bakery, and the dairy produced cream and yogurt," he said. "It was one of the projects that changed people's lives."

Then, in the early 1980s, disaster struck. The mujahedeen movement to oust the Soviets, who by then were controlling the government, started in neighboring Kunar Province, and the regiment of Afghan troops guarding the farms was sent to fight the Afghan rebels.

Security deteriorated and vandals began to maraud at night, stealing farm equipment and even the steel rods used to stabilize the cooperatives' concrete buildings, said Hajji Hanifullah Khan, the manager of one of the farms that is only now beginning to work again.When mujahedeen and displaced people began to camp on the land, they chopped down the young orange trees and hacked at the olive groves. "The citrus are like children, they are very fragile, very thin and they need lots of attention and effort," Mr. Khan said. "But the olive tree is a tough thing, it survives by its own strength."As the communist government of Mohammed Najibullah fell in 1992, the remaining farm workers fled to Pakistan. Mr. Abbas, the farmer, who had never been more than five miles from the farms he tended, fled as well.

Even before Western forces ousted the Taliban in 2001, Mr. Abbas, returned and found a ravaged land. Of the thousands of orange trees, not a single one was left. The olive trees had grown tall and wild and stopped producing fruit.

"It was like a forest," he said, shaking his head.

Mr. Hakim, the head of the Nangarhar Valley Development Authority, longing to see the farms flourish again, turned to the American-run provincial reconstruction team in Jalalabad. He told it that rehabilitating the farms would put young men to work and keep them from turning to radical ways. The reconstruction team gave him $1.8 million to reconstruct the irrigation canals, as well as money to start replanting the olive and orange groves, he said.

Today, large stretches of the farms have yet to be reclaimed and some olive trees still grow with abandon. However, the reconstruction money has allowed the Afghans to begin to rehabilitate about 500 acres of olive groves, plant new citrus trees and employ at least 1,050 people full time, according to Mr. Hakim. While that was barely 10 percent of the work force when the farms were fully functioning in the 1970s, it is 10 times the number who were here under the Taliban.

Mr. Hakim estimates that he will need foreign support for at least five more years to get the farms on track to be fully productive again. The Agriculture Ministry has begun sending modest amounts of money, but is expected to increase the budget as millions of dollars in foreign donor funds become available.

As Mr. Abbas walked through the groves in the pale spring sun, he pointed to one tree infested with whitefly, another whose lower branches had been hacked off. A third tree had been uprooted; all that remained was a hole in the ground.

"Thieves," he said shaking his fist at the invisible intruders. "I know each tree. I look at each branch. They dig up the new saplings and plant them on their own lands. We are here only during working hours; after that there is no government, there is only the word 'government.' "

Mr. Hakim was more resigned: "In the past 30 years of war, people were isolated and became used to living in a lawless way."

"People don't understand how difficult it is to plant a tree, to make it grow and produce fruit. All they know is how to cut it down in five minutes and burn it for warmth."

 

[ajtr]

More Taliban 'need to die' before fighting ends: Musa Qala police chief​

The interview with District Police Chief Haji Abdul "Koka" Wali follows.

The Long War Journal: How has security been trending in Musa Qala for the past year, and since the Marines have taken over in March?

District Police Chief Haji Abdul Wali, also known as Koka: Security is better, the best it's been in some time.

LWJ: It's my understanding that you have about 200 police officers. Is that force sufficient to secure the area?

Koka: Well, security is good, but if we had 200 more, security would be better in Musa Qala.

[Note: The ANP in Musa Qala are approved for up to 300 officers total, and a recruiting campaign is underway.]

LWJ: Do you get enough support from the Afghan government?

Koka: We don't have any problems getting pay and equipment for the police force from the provincial government in Lashkar Gah. We don't have any problems.

LWJ: Can you explain who the people are who are fighting? Who is planting the bombs, attacking Marines and your police officers?

Koka: There are Taliban in Musa Qala. They come in and contract people in the area to put in bombs in the ground and fight with Marines, police, and the Afghan Army. There are people who work with the Taliban in this whole area. [For example], some guy has two sons. One may be a shopkeeper, another might work with the Taliban. Musa Qala is different from other districts that have borders with other provinces, which have [foreign Taliban] coming from other provinces, and from Pakistan. The Taliban here belong to this district, they are mostly local Taliban.

LWJ: Do these locals do it for money, or do they believe in the ideology? Why do they work with the Taliban?

Koka: Well, I don't know who the top leader is, and if they support [the Taliban] in Pakistan. But the Pakistanis send money, and the people here take it to plant bombs and conduct suicide bombings. It's for money, because it's not according to Islam. True Muslim people do not do this.

LWJ: So to clarify: the motivation for joining the Taliban in Musa Qala is money and not religious ideology?

Koka: I do not understand their goal, because there is no permission in the Koran to fight with innocent people. It is also caused by politics, because some local people don't like foreign people, British, Americans, who are not Muslim, coming to this area. They have incorrect ideas that foreigners are here to take this area, and their behavior is not good, it is not in the Koran and it is not Muslim.

LWJ: What do most of the people around here think of the Taliban?

Koka: Local people have different opinions on the Taliban. Some people like them, and do business with them, and want them to take control of this area again. Some people –like those whose son or brother works with the police – like the police instead. And some people have no ties to the Taliban and no ties to the government, and they just want security, and a good place to live and work.

LWJ: And so how do you get to a point where more people support your police than the Taliban?

Koka: The local people like government, they like the police, they like the Afghan Army.

LWJ: But you said there are three kinds of people. Why do a lot of those people like the Taliban?

Koka: Well, some people want them to come back and take control again. Because the Taliban had control for seven years here, and some people want the Taliban back because they make less money now that there is a fight with the Taliban [instability]. And other bad things like drugs are coming back now that there is a fight with the Taliban.

[Note: poppy cultivation increased 663% in Musa Qala District between 2005-2008, according to the UN.]

LWJ: I understand the opium trade has gotten very big in Musa Qala, what is the government's official position on the opium trade?

Koka: The government has made it illegal.

LWJ: But it's so much a part of the culture and economy here. How do you change that?

Koka: Drugs and opium are not permitted under Islam. Since this is the case, why do the Taliban engage in the drug trade? Drugs are Taliban activity, not government activity or Islamic activity.

LWJ: But the farmers who have to put food on their table and make money – they might not want to help the Taliban, but they have to make money. How do you get them to stop growing poppy?

Koka: [Long term], drugs are not good for our economy. We need to find another way to build the economy. The international community needs to come here and help the farmers grow other crops, like wheat and other things.

[Note: ISAF and international development organizations have alternate seed programs that distribute large amounts of seed for crops other than poppy. Unfortunately, the farmers lack a distribution network as well as the ability to process or store some of these crops for sale, and don't have easy access to the start-up credit available through the opium economy. These challenges make shifting farmers away from poppy more complex than simply distributing seed.]

LWJ: What do you think of the US Marines, and what do you think of their predecessors, the British?

Koka: I like both the British and the Marines, they are both good people. I spent two years with the British. They both have money, equipment and everything, and that is good. The Americans have more influence because they have more troops in Afghanistan. Both are good for me and my country, because they help us. I like the Marines because they are better fighters than the British, who don't like to fight and attack the Taliban as much. But the British were better at getting me a flight to Lashkar Gah (the Provincial Capital) when I needed one.

LWJ: Any hard feelings about the Americans [ISAF forces] putting you in jail for so long?

[Koka slightly bristled at this question, and later complained to other Americans that 'all the reporter wanted to ask me about was my time in jail.']

Koka: A lot of people were arrested back then. By the time I was released, I had no problem with the people who arrested me, I forgave them. They thought I worked with the Taliban, but I did not. The people who arrested me did not have experience with this area.

LWJ: How long do you think the Americans will stay and how long would you like them to stay?

Koka: The Afghan government needs the Americans and people of other nations to stay for a longer time, because Afghanistan will be better when the Taliban is gone. But the Taliban are not our only problem – when they are gone we will still need the American people. We need to have more electricity, good roads, better farms, and reconstruction teams to stay here and help the Afghan people.

LWJ: How strong is the influence of the tribes?

Koka: When the Taliban controlled things, the tribes fought each other more, but now they work together. They all work with the government. Like my guys (the police), they are from different tribes but they help all people, not just their tribe.

LWJ: What's the long term solution to securing Musa Qala and securing Helmand Province as a whole?

Koka: We need a lot more troops and outposts. We need to send more troops north and south to secure the borders of Helmand Province to keep the Taliban out. That is really important for us, because the insurgent [ringleaders] are coming from outside.

LWJ: What do you think of the Taliban? Your personal opinion?

Koka: We need the Taliban to go far away from Musa Qala, and far away from Helmand. Because when local people try to help build the government, the Taliban threatens them and kills them. This is not good, and it is not Muslim.

LWJ: How much Taliban intimidation is going on Musa Qala and how can it be stopped?

Koka: There are maybe 600 Taliban north and south of Musa Qala. More of them need to die before the fighting and intimidation stops.

LWJ: Why did you decide to serve your country and fight the Taliban?

Koka: I wanted to help the people and build my country.

LWJ: What needs to happen in order to finally secure and stabilize Afghanistan? And what do you think will happen?

Koka: I think the Coalition forces need to stay longer in Afghanistan to help the people. It's good for everyone.

LWJ: So what happens if the Coalition forces begin to leave in 2011?

Koka: If they leave in a year the Taliban will be strong and it will be like before – the Taliban will take control again. If the Americans leave it will not be good. I am happy to have the Americans in my country. Look at Japan, the Marines are still there. It is very important for the Marines to stay here for a long time like that, otherwise the Taliban will become strong.

 

[ajtr]

US military begins to link Afghan Taliban to Pakistani terror groups​

By BILL ROGGIOJuly 11, 2010

Within the past several days, the US military has begun to publicly identify the Lashkar-e-Taiba and other foreign fighters based in Pakistan as being a direct threat to Coalition and Afghan forces in Afghanistan.

In what may be a dramatic shift, the official press releases from the US-led International Security Assistance Force and other Department of Defense websites published on US military websites are starting to mention specific links between insurgents in Afghanistan and their sponsors in Pakistan.

The shift began on July 3, when ISAF announced that it captured a Taliban commander, a Taliban facilitator, and two fighters during a raid in the eastern province of Nangarhar. "The commander is directly linked to the Taliban emir of Khugyani district and assisted with the recent influx of Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT) insurgents into the province," ISAF stated in the press release.

Four days later, ISAF reported the capture of another Taliban commander who is tied to Lashkar-e-Taiba operations in Khugyani district in Nangarhar province. "The commander had direct contact with a Taliban commander detained by the security force July 3," ISAF reported on July 7. "He was also directly linked to the overall Taliban emir of Khugyani District and associated with the recent influx of Lashkar-e Tayyiba operatives into the province," ISAF reported on July 7.

In all, two initial press releases and four related stories from ISAF and the Office of the Secretary of Defense Public Affairs discussed the capture of the two Taliban commanders linked to the Lashkar-e-Taiba.

Prior to these six recent press releases, there have been only three official releases that discussed the Lashkar-e-Taiba, according to the archives of official military press releases stored at the DVIDS website. Two were issued in December 2008 and one in January 2010. All three releases discussed Lashkar-e-Taiba in relation to the threat to India, however, and not Afghanistan.

Just one day after the US military issued its latest press release on the Lashkar-e-Taiba, it issued another unprecedented press release, this time mentioning a Taliban commander in Ghazni province linked to Pakistani, Arab, and Chechen fighters.

"An Afghan-international security force detained two suspected insurgents in Ghazni province this morning while pursuing a Taliban commander who is responsible for smuggling Pakistani, Chechen and Arab fighters and improvised explosive device materials into Shah Joy District from Pakistan," ISAF stated in a press release.

In the past, the US military has occasionally mentioned Pakistani links to Taliban fighters in Afghanistan. For instance, in early 2009, there was a big push to directly name top Afghan Taliban leaders based in Pakistan. But up until today, the US military had yet to officially acknowledge the presence of Chechens in Afghanistan in its press releases. There has been only one mention of Chechens in the military's press releases prior to July 10, and that was related to Chechens in Pakistan's tribal areas.

Although the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Chechen fighters have been operating against Coalition and Afghan forces in Afghanistan for years, the US military has been hesitant to directly identify these groups. The Lashkar-e-Taiba, which is supported by Pakistan's military and intelligence services, and Chechen fighters are known to have carried out multiple attacks against Coalition and Afghan forces in northern and eastern Afghanistan for years. In addition, Chechen fighters have been identified in Taliban propaganda videos as carrying out attacks against US combat outposts in Kunar and Nuristan.

While US military and civilian leaders previously have publicly identified Pakistan-based terror groups, such as the Haqqani Network, the Quetta Shura Taliban, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami faction as being direct threats to Afghanistan's security, the recent identification of the Lashkar-e-Taiba and other groups in the official military press releases is significant because it indicates that the military views these groups as a direct threat and have now begun to openly target them.



Read more: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/07/us_military_begins_t.php#ixzz0tNIQBUSz

 

[ajtr]

The Strategic Ramifications of a US-Led Withdrawal from Afghanistan Already Becoming Evident From Nagorno-Karabakh and Kyrgyzstan to Europe​

The United States and the NATO allies are preparing to disengage and soon withdraw from Afghanistan and even the most vocal advocates of the "long-term commitment" do not anticipate more than five years of active US and NATO involvement. All the local key players -- in Kabul, Islamabad, and countless tribal and localized foci of power -- are cognizant and are already maneuvering and posturing to deal with the new reality.

Irrespective of the political solution and/or compromise which will emerge in Kabul, the US is leaving behind a huge powder keg of global and regional significance with a short fuse burning profusely: namely, the impact of Afghanistan's growing, expanding and thriving heroin economy.

The issue at hand is not just the significant impact which the easily available and relatively cheap heroin has on the addiction rates in Russia, Europe, Central Asia, Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and the consequent public health, social stability and mortality-rate issues.

In global terms, the key threat is the impact that the vast sums of drug money has on the long-term regional stability of vast tracks of Eurasia: namely, the funding of a myriad of "causes" ranging from jihadist terrorism and subversion to violent and destabilizing secessionism and separatism.

Russia is most concerned with these developments because most of them occur on Russia's own doorstep and soft underbelly. Moreover, Russia has always been cognizant of the potential dangers emanating from chaos at the Heart of Asia and the Greater Black Sea Basin. As a result, the Kremlin embarked on a major initiative to secure long-term international commitment to resolving Afghanistan's endemic narcotics problem, which means consolidating a stable form of governance and thus eliminating the consequences of the region-wide narco-funded terrorism and destabilization.

On June 9-10, 2010, the Kremlin convened in Moscow an international forum entitled Afghan Drug Production: A Challenge to the International Community as the launch of the international drive to resolve Afghanistan's long-term challenges where Russian Pres. Dmitry Medvedev delivered the opening speech.

"We consider drug addiction the most serious threat to the development of our country and the health of our people," he said. Medvedev urged the international community to curtail the global spread of drug crimes which fuel terrorism. This would be possible, Medvedev argued, if the international community did not politicize the fight against drugs, narco-criminality, and narco-terrorism.

"The fight against the drug threat should be removed from any kind of politicization," Medvedev stressed. He warned that any "political games" on such crucial issues are inadmissible for they "undermine our joint international efforts and weaken our anti-drugs coalition."

Viktor Ivanov, the Director of Russia's Federal Service for the Control of Narcotics, articulated the Kremlin's case why the Afghan drug production is an international rather than a local or regional threat. "The time has come to qualify the status of Afghan drug production as a threat to world peace and security," Ivanov said.

"This is a key postulate of the action plan that was proposed by Russia to the international community and voiced at NATO headquarters, the European Parliament and Beijing." The Kremlin considers global drug trafficking to be far more destructive than terrorism alone because drug money is the primary facilitator of numerous threats including terrorism.

The long-term resolution of the crisis in Afghanistan is a precondition, Ivanov explained, because "it was drug production that had given rise to rife political and economic instability in Afghanistan...It is Afghan drug traffic that fuels terrorists in the North Caucasus; we need to work together to fight it." Ivanov stressed the Kremlin's conviction that Afghan drug trafficking "is a global problem" because it "feeds transnational crime and terrorism all over the world" and thus merits international solution.

Heroin production in Afghanistan has vastly expanded since the US-led forces entered in the Autumn of 2001. Initially, poppy cultivation centered in the southern and, to a lesser extent, north-eastern provinces - all focus of US and NATO military activities. Presently, poppy cultivation and drug-related activities have spread throughout most of Afghanistan. For example, a large number of heroin-processing labs -- presently estimated at about 200 -- were built as well.

However, ISAF [the International Security Assistance Force, in Afghanistan] prefers to largely ignore the growing narcotics problems for fear of alienating the farmer population that might resent losing its livelihood. However, the US main concern has always been alienating the Kabul-centric political élite, the very same élite which is, at the very core of, and key to, the US-led effort to establish a centralized government in Kabul and a functioning state in Afghanistan. With drug money fueling the political machine which is crucial to the US nation-building efforts, the US has no interest in undermining Afghanistan's narco-economy.

In the Moscow forum, US senior officials acknowledged the US reluctance to commit to the eradication of Afghanistan's poppy cultivation and narco-economy. Patrick Ward, the Acting Deputy Director for Supply Reduction at the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, warned that intense anti-narcotics operations "will further undermine the rule of law and reinforce the nexus between drugs and terrorism". He stated that US and ISAF forces must not find themselves in a position where they were perceived as the instrument of eradicating "the only source of income of people who live in the second poorest country of the world".

The US Ambassador to Russia, John Beyrle, reiterated that the US would not take Russia's advice about eradicating Afghanistan's opium harvests anytime soon for fear of engendering popular alienation. UNODC Director Antonio Maria Costa agreed that "there is no rôle for NATO forces in eradication at the farm level" because this will push the population into the arms of the Taliban. However, he urged the US and NATO to embark on a comprehensive program to solve Afghanistan's drugs menace at the national-political level; alluding to the centrality of narco-funds in Afghanistan's politics and power élite.

But the problem of Afghanistan's drugs cannot be ignored by the West because the primary strategic long-term impact of Afghanistan's drugs is the use of the drug money along the distribution routes from Afghanistan-Pakistan through the energy-rich Central Asia to the western Balkans, mainly Kosovo.

The intimate relationships and close cooperation between the drug trade, international terrorism and separatism are not new phenomena.

In the early-1990s, the Sunni jihadist leadership assumed leadership over a thriving joint action. Specific fatwas from Islamist luminaries authorize these highly irregular, seemingly un-Islamic activities because they also contribute to the destruction of Western society and civilization. The Sunni Islamist fatwas are based on and derived from earlier rulings of the higher Shiite courts issued in connection with operations of HizbAllah and Iranian intelligence. The logic of these activities was elucidated in the mid-1980s in the HizbAllah's original fatwa on the distribution of drugs: "We are making these drugs for Satan: America and the Jews. If we cannot kill them with guns so we will kill them with drugs."

The main reason, however, for the Sunni jihadist embracing of the drug-trade was practicality. In the early-1990s, the fledgling jihadist leadership concluded that an intricate system of funding activities in the West was needed. By then, Gulbaddin Hekmatyar was getting ready to ship drugs from Afghanistan to the West and was willing to divert profits from this drug trade to support the fledgling terrorist networks in return for the arrangement of a viable system of money laundering.

An up-and-coming young activist -- Osama bin Laden -- used his knowledge of the Western financial system and his family's connections with the European banking system in order to organize the new financial system for jihad. At that time, the net worth of the Islamist network was estimated at $600-million in the West alone.

Another founding father of the narco-jihadist alliance was Shamil Basayev. Between April and June 1994, Basayev led a high-level Chechen delegation on a visit to an ISI-sponsored terrorist training infrastructure in both Pakistan and Afghanistan in order to arrange for advanced training and expert help, funding for the Chechen Jihad, and acquisition of weapons.

In Afghanistan, the Chechens visited the ISI's training facilities in the Khowst area, then run under the banner of Gulbaddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami. In Pakistan, the Chechens had a series of high level meetings with the Pakistani leaders who for a period became the patrons of the Chechen Jihad, arranging for the establishment of a comprehensive training and arming program for the Chechens in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

As a primary source of funds for their jihad, the Chechens were offered a major rôle in the expanding push of heroin from Afghanistan-Pakistan into Europe. The Chechen jihad would be handsomely rewarded for facilitating forward distribution facilities at the gates of Europe. Toward this end, Basayev met with individuals identified as "former ISI senior officials", who provided contacts for the drugs and weapons smuggling operations.

Moreover, in early 1994, senior Pakistani officials were reported to have intervened with the Taliban leadership to ensure the uninterrupted flow of heroin from the Helmand valley via Qandahar and Jalalabad. Under the new arrangements, the heroin would now be shipped northwards to an airfield near Chitral, Pakistan, from where the drugs, as well as a growing number of Chechens and Arab-Afghan volunteers, were flown to Chechnya. As the volume of heroin increased, truck convoys were dispatched across Central Asia.

By the late-1990s, as the sums of money available from the drug trade increased, bin Laden and the "Russian Mafiya" (in both Russia and several former-Soviet states) established a complex sophisticated money-laundering operation described by an insider as "an extended and octopus-like network that uses political names in Asia and Africa in return for commissions." The funds were used to finance the Taliban movement and a host of jihadist terrorist operations worldwide. Bin Laden made a commission on these transactions and used this resource to fund his favorite jihadist networks and spectacular terrorism.

By now, the annual income of the Taliban from the drug trade was estimated at $8-billion. Bin Laden was administering and managing these funds -- laundering them through his Mafiya connection -- in return for a commission of between 10 and 15 percent, which provided an annual income of about a billion dollars for the jihad.

All of this was rattled around the turn of the century. First, the Taliban leadership offered to stop the poppy growing as part of its desperate effort to gain legitimacy and support from the West. Although the Taliban eradicated virtually all poppy cultivation in southern Afghanistan, they permitted the jihadists to continue selling heroin from cached stockpiles.

By the time US forces entered Afghanistan in the Autumn of 2001, there was virtually no poppy cultivation. However, the US and NATO demonstrated benign neglect of the country-wide poverty and chaos. Meanwhile, Islamist leaders realized that the best way to ensure grassroots presence and even support would be through the provision of easy cash to the impoverished population.

The jihadist leadership used its supporter networks in the Persian Gulf States in order to clandestinely purchase virtually all the arable land in southern Afghanistan. Islamist emissaries now offered the population economic security in the form of loans and seeds for poppy cultivation on behalf of the mysterious landlords, and secure payment from buyers who would pick-up the harvest directly from the farmers, thus alleviating the dangers of traveling to the market. As well, tribal and local leaders were handsomely rewarded for their cooperation and endorsement of these arrangements.

By the time Washington committed to the establishment of a centralized government in Kabul, the entire power-political system was dependent on narco-funding for its existence and system of patronage. The US realized that it would be impossible to sustain the semblance of pro-Western system of governance in Kabul and the countryside without looking the other way on the rapidly growing and increasingly addictive narco-funding of Afghanistan's upper-most leadership.

Indeed, the poppy cultivation area in Afghanistan rose from 8,000 hectares in 2001 to 74,000 in 2002, peaking at 193,000 in 2007 but going down to 123,000 hectares in 2009. Although the loss is mainly the result of blight attacking the crops rather than eradication by police, the Taliban are effectively capitalizing on the plight of the affected farmers by claiming the farmers were victims of ISAF poisonous spraying and offering financial help in return for the farmers' support of the Taliban.

Presently, some 80 percent of the total amount of Afghanistan's opium is grown in Kandahar, Helmand, and Uruzgan provinces, where the presence and activities of US and ISAF forces is most intense. There are strong indications that farmers throughout Afghanistan are already preparing for a record-breaking opium poppy planting season beginning in mid-September 2010 in hopes of a bumper crop next year.

Slightly more than half the Afghan heroin is smuggled via the northern route: Central Asia, Russia and the GBSB (Greater Black Sea Basin). Secondary is the southern route which carries slightly over a third of the heroin via Iran, Turkey and the Middle East to the GBSB.

Presently, the overall annual income from the Afghan heroin traveling along the northern route alone is more than $17-billion, out of which, the jihadist movement and its localized (separatist/secessionist) allies are making about $15-billion. There is no reliable estimate of the total income of the southern route, but the best guesstimates put it at more than $10-billion, most of which also goes to funding jihadist and secessionist causes (including the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban).

The annual cost of doing business in Afghanistan is below $100-million. The organized-crime networks running the labs and patronage system have a gross income of a couple of billion dollars, a small portion of which is spent on the Kabul power structure. This disparity raises the question of the cost-effectiveness of tolerating the narco-funded leadership in Kabul.

The narco-profits are thus the financial engine of key elements of the current government in Kabul and its regional cronies, as aptly demonstrated in the most recent Aftghan presidential elections. They will not permit their financial life-line to simply go away in the name of democracy or good governance. And having committed to Pres. Hamid Karzai and his patronage system as the key to the future of a modern state in Afghanistan, the US Barack Obama Administration cannot afford to see the administration in Kabul collapsing, no matter who they are or what they do.

Furthermore, the Afghan narcotics system is the key to the funding and sustenance of numerous regional and global dynamics which will not give up easily. The drug smuggling networks across Central Asia and into Russia and Europe are an integral part of a comprehensive narco-terrorist dynamics/system. Drug-trade funds jihadist terrorism and subversion from Tajikistan to Chechnya to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Moreover, the various separatist and secessionist movements -- that is, minorities feeling pressure of regional dynamics while having sense of alienation and victimization/victimhood -- are easy prey to the lure of easily available large sums of money from the drugs and smuggling trade.

Most dangerous are the minuscule states and state-like entities. Since these states and entities are too small and under-developed to be able to sustain themselves economically and socially in a proper and legal way, their local leaderships tend to look the other way as narco-funded organized crime establishes footholds in their midst. The drug-trade and/or money laundering bring money in and thus financially sustain the mini-enclaves and the chimera of self-determination attained.

Consequently, the various separatist and secessionist "causes" from Central Asia to the Caucasus (not just Chechnya and the rest of the North Caucasus) and to the Balkans have become safe-havens for the drug-trade. These include, for example, the financial and money-laundering centers in Stepanakert and Tiraspol, as well as Kosovo being the primary forward distribution point of Afghan-origin drugs into Western Europe.

And once they gained control over lucrative choke-points, these localized leaders, their cronies and their "causes", will not give up without fierce fight irrespective of their declared ideologies. The on-going fierce struggle for the control over the Fergana Valley by an alliance of jihadists and drug smugglers is indicative of this trend.

The latest round of fighting which started in early June 2010 already resulted in the death of more than 2,000 civilians and the dislocation of a few hundreds of thousands, mainly Uzbeks. The struggle for the Fergana Valley started in March 2005 when Kurmanbek Bakiyev, at the head of a coalition sponsored by organized crime, exploited the US-sponsored "Tulip Revolution" in order to seize power in Bishkek so that the southern coalition could ensure state patronage to their undertaking.

The combination of subversion of Kyrgyzstan's internal power dynamics and horrendous corruption could not be sustained for long. Indeed, it took five years for a coalition of traditional and radical power holders to overthrow Bakiyev. However, soon after Bakiyev was forced out of Bishkek in mid-April 2010, he and his allies started exacerbating the south in order to ensure their control over the Fergana Valley and the lucrative local drug-trade routes.

Hence, the ensuing riots and Kyrgyz-Uzbek fighting were neither spontaneous nor unanticipated.

The toppling of the Bakiyev administration -- which was based on the support of the southern clans and their allies and partners among the organized crime and jihadist circles -- heralded a struggle for power and control over the lucrative drug-smuggling routes via the Fergana Valley.

Indeed, local jihadists rallied to the cause starting late April as a coalition of jihadists and pro-Bakiyev groups began distributing pamphlets and CDs throughout southern Kyrgyzstan urging the establishment of a separate South Kyrgyzstan Democratic Republic under the ousted Bakiyev.

The incitement stressed the discrimination and disenfranchisement of the Kyrgyz southern clans by an alleged coalition of the Kyrgyz northern clans and the local Uzbek population. It did not take long for hatred and violence to erupt, destroying Bishkek's control over the area. The jihadists and drug runners already benefit from the de facto dismemberment of Kyrgyzstan for the separate entity in the south encompassing the Fergana Valley already significantly expedite their operations.

A similar trend is emerging in the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan. For as long as the economic situation was tenuous and there was near complete dependence on the largess of the West delivered via Yerevan (the capital of Armenia), Stepanakert (the capital of the Nagorno-Karabakh region) was ready for a political compromise which was going even beyond the hard-line position of Yerevan in the Minsk Group's negotiations with Baku.

However, as the economic situation in Nagorno-Karabakh began improving mainly due to the trickle-down effect of transmitted and laundered narco-funds, the position of the Stepanakert authorities regarding the future of the enclave has hardened.

In mid-June 2010, Stepanakert objected to a renewed mediation effort by the Kremlin. Stepanakert is apprehensive that a negotiated solution could be reached as Pres. Medvedev convinced Azerbaijan Pres. Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Pres. Serzh Sarkisian to meet in Saint Petersburg for the first time in more than four months and without the pressure of the Minsk Group's mediators. Consequently, the Kremlin reported that the two presidents narrowed their differences on some of the lingering thorny issues.

In response, the Stepanakert Armenian leadership announced that the meeting between Aliyev and Sarkisian "will not help find a resolution" for the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. Moreover, Stepanakert renewed its demand for a full state status in a new tripartite format -- of Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Azerbaijan -- along with the Minsk Group mediators (Russia, France and the United States).

Concurrently, Stepanakert's renewed political push is given a sense of urgency by exacerbating the security situation along the ceasefire line of contact. Starting mid-June 2010, there has been a growing tension and escalation of fighting along the line of contact. Karabakhi-Armenian troops intensified provocations and exchanges of fire with the Azerbaijani military facing them.

The first major incident took place on June 16, 2010 when Karabakhi-Armenian troops ambushed an Azerbaijani patrol and an Azerbaijani soldier was killed in the fighting. This and a few smaller incidents led to growing tension and intensified military activities along the entire cease-fire line.

The number of clashes, ambushes, cross-border raids and brief exchanges of fire grew. On the night of June 18/19, 2010, Azerbaijani military noted preparations by Karabakhi-Armenian forces in north-eastern Nagorno-Karabakh where an Azerbaijani raiding party attacked the Karabakhi-Armenian positions, killing four soldiers and wounding four others before returning into Azerbaijani-controlled territory. Baku confirmed that one Azerbaijani soldier was killed and his body remained in the Karabakhi-Armenian position. Sporadic clashes and exchanges of fire continued.

Southern Kyrgyzstan and Nagorno-Karabakh are but the two most recent examples of the security manifestations of fringe and extremist policies made possible by narco-funding.

There are countless cases of unwarranted separatist and secessionist causes where the legitimate quest of minorities for self-determination could have long been resolved in a form of distinct region or autonomy within the borders of recognized states. However, the mere existence of virtually unlimited narco-funds -- a byproduct of the Afghanistan-origin drug trade -- enables the separatist and secessionist leaderships to sustain their respective struggles and extreme and unrealistic demands no matter how impractical they might be.

And when the international community refuses to go along with these quests, there emerges the penchant for armed struggle and terrorism if only because weapons and narco-funds are aplenty.

Thus, just starving the poppy cultivation and heroin processing labs in Afghanistan will create a security backlash throughout the Heart of Asia and the Greater Black Sea Basin. Hence, it is imperative to have a systemic approach to resolving not only the Afghan narco-challenges but also the entire regional security challenges aggravated and exacerbated by the mere availability of narco-funds and narco-terrorist groups.

Lastly, there is the issue of state-sponsorship of both terrorism and narco-criminality. These cannot be ignored if tangible long-term eradication of drug problem is sought. At the same time, there is no substitute to the eradication of poppy cultivation and heroin processing labs in Afghanistan. However, the mere physical destruction of crops or labs is only the beginning of a comprehensive process.

Presently the Afghan narco-system has enough built-in redundancy and has enough money to replace interim losses without a tangible systemic loss. One-time or even periodic destruction of assets is therefore an exercise in futility. Therefore, for any attempt to destroy Afghanistan's narco-system to have prospects of success, the foreign forces involved must stay for a protracted period in order to ensure the long-term impact on the affected society.

Moreover, a long-term military presence is first and foremost a question of ensuring the legitimacy of the central and local authorities, so that the people cooperate with them. As well, there is no point in attempting long-term presence by force if the quality and legitimacy of the civilian governance cannot be ascertained.

Simply put: reversing the criminalization of segments of society is an integral part of resolving the core-problems of that society. In the case of Afghanistan this means the legitimacy of the Kabul Government, establishing viable regionally-based governance, and resolving the endemic tribes-vs-local authorities' disputes.

Furthermore, the mere eradication of crops and destruction of labs will only create vacuum and domino effect which breed instability, additional terrorism, etc. Therefore, it is imperative to approach the Afghan drugs challenge in the context of a comprehensive political and security solution on a regional level. The Afghan narco-system is an integral part of a larger problem; and so is the solution. Similarly, no political and security solution is possible throughout the Heart of Asia and the Greater Black Sea Basin for as long as the narco-economy keeps funding the opposition and encouraging violence.

The entire narco-terrorist system constitutes a viable threat to the vital interests of Russia. It is a huge time-bomb at Russia's soft underbelly, therefore, the Kremlin considers the flow of drugs from Afghanistan to be an issue of vital importance - from the undermining of Russian society to destabilizing regional security.

Although Afghanistan is the primary source of illegal drugs in Europe, the Europeans are reluctant to confront the issue of recreational drug use effectively and this attitude diminishes Europe's willingness to address the real challenges.

The narco-terrorism of Eurasia has a minuscule impact on the US and is thus not a priority for Washington, particularly at a time the Obama Administration is yearning to disengage from Afghanistan virtually at all cost. Hence, it is up to Russia -- whose vital interests are at stake -- to lead the struggle against the rising tide of narco-terrorism at the Heart of Asia and the Greater Black Sea Basin.

Virtually all experts in the Moscow forum agreed that the current situation in Afghanistan-Pakistan-Central Asia was not only untenable, but was rapidly deteriorating. The US/ISAF efforts are considered better than nothing, but the near-unanimous expert opinion is that the security effort barely scratches the surface while the most endemic problems are deep-rooted.

The Kremlin wants NATO to stay in Afghanistan but the US is leading NATO into abandoning Afghanistan. Therefore, the Kremlin plans on convincing the Europeans -- specific capitals and the EU -- that the collapse of Afghanistan and the rise of drugs and narco-terrorism are detrimental to Europe's vital interests. The Kremlin hopes to get the EU/Europe to pressure the US to sustain NATO's efforts in Afghanistan because Russia is eager for ISAF to remain as a viable force for the duration.

Overall, the highest authorities in the Kremlin -- led by Medvedev who delivered a very strong opening statement at the international Afghan Drug Production: a Challenge to the International Community forum -- are committed to the Afghan drug-eradication policy in its comprehensive scope/connotation. The Kremlin is petrified by the spread of drugs and narco-funded terrorism, insurgency, violence and instability from Afghanistan via Central Asia into the heart of Russia.

The Kremlin is embarking on an international campaign -- first focusing on the EU and NATO -- to formulate a joint long-term program to eradicate the Afghan narco-system and byproducts. This is a comprehensive plan which recognizes the imperative to first resolve Afghanistan's security and governance problems, but also address the issue of drug-funded separatism, secessionism, and narco-terrorism at the Heart of Asia and the Greater Black Sea Basin as a major policy issue.

What remains to be seen, though, is the extent of cooperation Russia was likely to get from Europe and particularly the United States.

Analysis By Yossef Bodansky, Senior Editor, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs.

(c) 2010 International Strategic Studies Association, http://www.StrategicStudies.org

 

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Three US troops die in attack on Kandahar police HQ​

KANDAHAR: A car bomb and gunfight outside the headquarters of an elite police force killed three US troops and five Afghan civilians in the southern city of Kandahar, officials said Wednesday.

An Afghan police officer also died in the late Tuesday night attack on the compound, which houses the elite Afghan National Civil Order Police, a provincial spokesman said.

The Taliban claimed responsibility.

A suicide attacker slammed a car bomb into the entrance of the compound, then insurgents opened fire with machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, a Nato statement said. A combined force of international troops and police kept the attackers from entering the compound and eventually fought them off, but three American troops died along with five civilian workers, Nato said.

The dead civilians included three Afghan translators and two security guards, Kandahar provincial police chief Sardar Mohammad Zazai said.

Taliban spokesman Qari Yousef Ahmadi telephoned reporters Wednesday to claim responsibility for the attack. The insurgents, which are prone to exaggerate death tolls inflicted on Afghan and international security forces, claimed 13 international troops and eight Afghan security forces died in the raid.

Kandahar is the spiritual birthplace of the Taliban. The insurgents have intensified attacks on government targets as Afghan and international reinforcements move in.

The Civil Order Police compound in Mirwais Miani district was near one of the 11 new checkpoints set up in recent weeks around the city, Kandahar provincial spokesman Zulmi Ayubi said. He said it was unclear whether the dead police officer was from the Civil Order Police, an elite force within the national police, or the local Kandahar city police.

The new checkpoints are manned by the elite Afghan unit along with international forces in a push to increase security in the south's largest city, where Taliban operatives have long operated.

At the same time, thousands of Nato and Afghan troops are fanning out elsewhere in Kandahar province to pressure insurgents in rural areas. The strategy is to secure the population with the additional trained police and troops so that capable governance and development projects designed to build capacity can win the loyalty of the city's half-million residents.

Last month was the deadliest of the nearly 9-year-old war for international forces, with 103 coalition troops killed. So far in July, 40 international troops have died in Afghanistan, 28 of them Americans.

In other attacks around the country, nine Afghan civilians died in the south when their vehicle hit a roadside bomb in the volatile district of Marjah in Helmand province, the Ministry of Interior said. Another homemade bomb killed two security guards traveling on a road in eastern Paktika province.

Two suspected Taliban also died in Helmand's Lashkar Gar district when the roadside bomb they were trying to plant exploded prematurely, the ministry said.

Homemade explosives planted in roads and pathways are a leading killer of international forces and also kill hundreds of civilians each year. – AP

 

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Rules of engagement bear fruit​

By Philip Smucker

WASHINGTON - The numbers are in and they are both ugly and unacceptable. At least, 1,074 Afghan civilians were killed in armed violence and security incidents in the first six months of 2010, according to the respected Afghanistan Rights Monitor.

Crucially, however, the number of people killed in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and United States air strikes in the same period fell by half. An earlier tightening of allied rules of engagement - overseen by former NATO commander General


Stanley McChrystal - helped to reduce that figure, according to the Afghan authors of the report.

In the six months between the start of January and the end of June, insurgents were responsible for killing some 661 civilians and of those 282 were killed in improvised roadside bombs. The numbers show that, despite fighting from behind a human shield and melting away, the Taliban and related insurgents are killing far more innocents than NATO and Afghan forces. That cannot be good for their own "hearts and minds" campaign.

By comparison, NATO and other international forces were responsible for 210 Afghan civilian deaths. Afghan security forces also appear to be improving their aim, killing 108 civilians this year, down from 386 in the previous six months. This suggests that NATO can begin to provide more airlift and firepower assets to the Afghans as they move closer to the tip of spear in the war against the Taliban. (Memo to the Pentagon: Don't forget to train Afghan helicopter pilots.)

As US commanders debate the military's restrictions on the use of firepower in Afghanistan, these numbers are worth keeping close at hand. Any loosening of NATO's current "rules of engagement" and reversal of the trend towards fewer killings by NATO and Afghan forces could undermine American efforts both in Afghanistan and across the more important theater of the Islamic world.

Heightened pleas in Washington and on the ground from US fighters to be given leeway to significantly increase lethality also miss the central focus of counter-insurgency, which is the protection of the Afghan population.

Citizen groups with an interest in war and peace are already pushing back. "Winning the population isn't just a cliche," wrote Sarah Holewinski, executive director of the Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC,) in a recent letter to The Washington Post. "Those soldiers now condemning the restraint they must use in this war fail to see that what's good for the Afghans is good for them."

The Afghan war with all its current troubles is an apt metaphor for America's larger struggle against a clever foe who seeks to draw US forces into myriad fights around the world.

Indeed, it is no secret that al-Qaeda and its affiliates want to tie the United States down like Gulliver and condemn America with a long war of attrition while the US military flails around trying to swat small and often invisible threats. The Barack Obama administration has displayed adequate circumspection, thus far, towards these global designs.

Similarly, in Afghanistan it is essential that policymakers continue to distinguish the forest - peace - from the trees - terrorists.

In extended stays with small US units in Afghanistan over the past three years, I discovered that the most successful American counter-insurgents are those who remain disciplined - even reluctant - in their application of force.

These young officers recognize, as Australian David Kilcullen, formerly a top counter-insurgency advisor to McChrystal, writes in a new book on the subject: "Killing the enemy is easy. Finding him is nearly impossible."

In Pashtun areas, which embody the heart of the Afghan insurgency, guerrillas closely monitor NATO tactics and local opinion. If American forces are doing their best to avoid civilian casualties, tribal elders are more likely to embrace their American colleagues. Intelligence flows over candy and cups of green tea. When the environment is soured by unexpected civilian deaths, however, these same elders retreat behind mud walls - brooding and aloof.

When US forces kill civilians by accident, as I've witnessed, a vicious cycle of killing ensues. This, in turn, creates a stalemate and a lockdown in development resources that undermines the Obama administration's planned-for exit.

Destroying a village to "save it", works no better in Afghanistan than it did in Vietnam. The current Pentagon civilian leadership and top brass, schooled in the lessons of that much-bloodier conflict, are all too aware of this. They are paying far more attention to groups like Holewinski's CIVIC, which has been instrumental in persuading the US military in the past decade to step up direct financial amends for accidental civilian injuries and deaths in the field.

It is worth recalling - as do most Afghans - that in the first four years of the war, US forces carried out standard damage assessments then simply turned their backs on the Afghans.

Make no mistake, though, the next year in Afghanistan will be a bloody one. When NATO fighters risk their necks on patrol in ideal guerrilla terrain, the Taliban will either emerge from the shadows or fire wildly from behind a civilian shield. New evidence that the Taliban fighters are relying more and more on improvised explosives to attack NATO and Afghan forces, including civilians, suggests that they are really not as keen as some of their admirers would have it to fight toe-to-toe with US and allied patrols. Afghan civilians see this first hand.

If the United States were to step up the zero-sum hunt for individual Taliban fighters and markedly intensify the lethality of its own firepower - including more Apache and Warthog attacks - Washington would merely be reverting to strategy that failed between 2001 and 2008.

The Taliban and their al-Qaeda mentors in Pakistan are anxious that US forces step up the fight, but also want to see their foe commit targeting errors. They are poised to deploy many scores of jihadis to troubled corners of Afghanistan where increased civilian casualties increase due to errant US attacks. More death and civilian angst makes villagers more pliable and likely to respond to insurgent requests to embed new gun posts and fighters.

On the other hand, where restraint is evident and where tribal elders cooperate openly with US forces in exchange for development, the Taliban and their associates have far less mobility. This is also enhanced when US compensation for innocent victims works quickly and systematically.

Parallels between the fight in Afghanistan and the Obama administration's struggles to pacify the broader Islamic realm are many. As I discovered in research for my book, My Brother, My Enemy, Islamic militants with a global agenda are trying to disrupt local politics from placid fishing villages in the Spice Islands of Indonesia to the mosques of Sahelian Africa.

Osama bin Laden has long made known his adamant desire to draw US forces into protracted struggles in order to drain off American resources and point his long, boney finger at America's so-called "imperialist designs".

America should be wise enough by now, in this its longest war ever, to work more through Islamic allies and not to fall for his ploys.

And while there is still plenty of room to criticize Obama's anti-terrorism strategy, it remains in striking contrast to the excesses of that of his predecessor. The new US chief in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, and his officer's corps are rightfully war-weary and despite conspiracy theories to the contrary, do not relish a long stay in Afghanistan.

They understand that a highly militarized America abroad - as it remains today - is less capable of doing the business of America, which is, after all, business and not imperialism or occupation.

It is the Obama administration's apparent long-term goal to try to drain the sea of recruits that Bin Laden and company tap into daily. For that to happen any time soon, however, the stars would have to align perfectly.

In the meantime, let's hope good sense prevails and that NATO forces fire off only as many rounds as are required to protect Afghan civilians. That's the best and only hope for getting out and moving on.

 

[ajtr]

U.S. and Afghanistan Debate More Village Forces​

KABUL, Afghanistan — With American commanders pushing to expand the number of armed village forces in areas where their troops and the local police are scarce, the Afghan president is signaling that he has serious concerns that such a program could return the country to warlordism, challenging the power of the central government.The village forces have been one of the top subjects under discussion in frenetic daily meetings for the past week between Gen. David H. Petraeus, the American military commander in Afghanistan, and Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president. The two are scheduled to meet again on Tuesday, according to senior NATO military officials here.

They will discuss a modified version of the plan that tries to assuage Mr. Karzai's doubts by agreeing to his request that the Afghan government be involved at every stage of the program. Officials close to both the Afghans and the Americans sound cautiously optimistic that they will reach an agreement in the next few days.

"We have to make sure that we don't develop militias or any other kinds of forces that might undermine the government and become another kind of instability," said the president's spokesman, Waheed Omar.

Among Mr. Karzai's demands are that any local force be under the control of the local Afghan police commander, wear uniforms, be paid through the Ministry of Interior, and be under the ministry's command, Mr. Omar said.

"Our concern comes from what we experienced in our history where governments in the 1980s developed local militias that then became a source of problems for law and order in the country," he said, noting that the Soviets, who then ruled Afghanistan through local proxies, created armed local forces that provoked anti-Soviet forces to rebel against them.

For the American military and especially General Petraeus — who witnessed a widespread Sunni insurgency in Iraq rapidly dwindle after the creation of local protection forces, many of whose members had previously been insurgents — it is important to see if there is a way to change the balance of power, especially in remote local communities, where the Taliban might otherwise gain ground.

"It could be a real game changer, but only if done very carefully, correctly and with proper oversight and supervision," said a senior military official in Kabul.

American military officials say that they are prepared to accede to Mr. Karzai's demands and that there will be procedures to vet members of the forces and track their weapons.

The debate between Mr. Karzai and General Petraeus picks up the thread of a running disagreement between the Afghan government and the Americans over the sustainability of backing local groups outside of the government, even if they offer to join the Americans in fighting the Taliban.

The discussion also takes place against a backdrop of a growing number of shadowy, often semiofficial armed forces that operate under an array of titles, but that ultimately have only tenuous ties to the central government. These groups are the latest iteration of militias that have plagued the country for much of the past 30 years.

"Essentially, the use of militias has been a bitter experience in Afghanistan," said Nasrullah Stanekzai, a law professor at Kabul University and Mr. Karzai's legal adviser, who said he was not speaking on behalf of the government.

"It will be a disaster to form militias, because the government will not be able to control them," Mr. Stanekzai said. "The United States should know that Afghanistan is different from Iraq, that we are in a frail state coming out of years of civil war caused by militias."

The village defense forces, which General Petraeus and his predecessor, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, wanted to expand, and the new version that is now under discussion, were first set up in a test form by Special Operations forces in a handful of communities. They were intended to act as local protection in areas where there were neither Afghan police officers nor army units nor many American forces.

In addition, there are a number of other militia-type organizations, including many security companies, some of whom wear police uniforms but do not answer to the local police chief. There are also armed groups with darker intentions, like ones that sprang up in Kunduz to fight the Taliban but that soon began to prey on locals. And there are tribal groups that have the blessing of the Americans to keep the Taliban out of their communities.

With such a legacy, Mr. Karzai's government, while willing to accept the need for local protection forces, wants to be sure that their numbers are kept to a minimum, Mr. Omar said.

Defense analysts think the program is unlikely to grow in the way the Sunni Awakening did in Iraq, where it eventually had more than 100,000 members, said Stephen Biddle, a senior defense analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations.

"A very significant fraction of former Sons of Iraq were former insurgents who switched sides," Mr. Biddle said, referring to the Awakening. "This is not a situation where the local Taliban are going to come over to a local village security program and work with a local American brigade."

However the program develops, Mr. Karzai's government wants to be sure that it can dismantle it if need be, Mr. Omar said.

"If they become a problem," he said, "the president wants to be sure the national security forces can deal with them."

 

[ajtr]

Nato chief: Afghanistan timetable puts British troops at risk​

David Cameron's signal of a five-year timetable for withdrawing British troops from Afghanistan risks encouraging the Taliban to step up their attacks on Western forces, the head of Nato has said.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Nato secretary-general, delivered the blunt message after the Prime Minister said he wanted most British troops to leave Afghanistan by 2015.
He also warned that cuts in defence spending could harm the Transatlantic relationship with the US and leave countries like Britain lacking the cutting-edge military technology needed to work with American forces.Mr Rasmussen met Mr Cameron and other senior ministers yesterday in London for the first time since the Coalition government took office.
Amid a mounting British death toll, polls say most voters want an end to the nine-year-old war, and Mr Cameron and his allies have been talking up the prospect of a British withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Warning that the Taliban follow political debates in Nato countries "closely", Mr Rasmussen insisted that Western nations must keep troops in Afghanistan "as long as necessary" and not set clear timelines for withdrawal.
"The Taliban follow the political debate in troop-contributing countries closely. They do believe that if we set artificial timetables for our withdrawal, they can just sit down and wait us out and they will return when we have left," he told the Daily Telegraph.
"If they discover that through their attacks, they can weaken the support for our presence in Afghanistan, they will just be encouraged to step up their attacks on foreign troops."
Mr Cameron insists he is not setting a hard timetable for withdrawal, but last week, the Prime Minister told MPs: "The plan that we have envisages our ensuring that we will not be in Afghanistan in 2015." Barack Obama has said US forces will start withdrawing next July, and other Nato countries have also set out plans to leave.
Mr Rasmussen, a former Danish prime minister, said he "understood" the pressures on elected leaders to seek a quick exit from Afghanistan, and said: "I share the impatience."
But he insisted that whatever the "hopes and expectations" expressed by politicians like Mr Cameron, Nato must only leave Afghanistan when the conditions allow.
"We can have our hopes, we can have our expectations, but I cannot give any guarantee as far as an exact date or year is concerned," he said. "All statements from all politicians have been based on the condition that the Afghans can actually take responsibility themselves."
Leaving Afghanistan too quickly would leave the West facing both a renewed terrorist threat from al-Qaeda and the risk of instability in nuclear-armed Pakistan.
He said: "If we were to leave Afghanistan prematurely, the Taliban would return to Afghanistan and Afghanistan would once again become a safe have for terrorist groups who would use it as a launch pad for terrorist attacks on North America and Europe.
"There would also be a risk of destabilising a neighbouring country, Pakistan, a nuclear power. That would be very dangerous."
Despite his warning on timetables, Mr Rasmussen said he hoped that some of Afghanistan's more peaceful provinces will start the "transition" to Afghan control early next year.
Many of those provinces are currently overseen by countries like Germany and Italy. Liam Fox, the defence secretary, has expressed fears that those countries will withdraw quickly, leaving Britain and the US alone to deal with more violent areas like Helmand.
Mr Rasmussen backed Dr Fox, saying other Nato members must keep their forces in Afghanistan as long as British and American forces are deployed.
"The transition dividend must be invested in other parts of Afghanistan," he said. "Even when we transition, it will not be withdrawal."
A total of 314 British service personnel have died in Afghanistan since 2001, and Mr Rasmussen warned more will follow as the Taliban fight harder to hold their "heartlands" in the south.
"When you send in more fighting, you will see more fighting. When you attack the Taliban heartlands, that implies more fighting," he said. "If they lose Helmand and Kandahar, they lose everything, so they will fight hard to prevent that happening.
International forces first entered Afghanistan to topple the Taliban regime in 2001, and the alliance chief admitted that they have been there longer than expected.
"We would not have expected in 2001 that fighting would still be going in eight, nine years later," he said. "Retrospectively, we underestimated the challenge."
Dr Fox is drawing up plans to cut the defence budget by between 10 and 20 per cent over four years, raising doubts about major military projects like new aircraft carriers and fighter jets.
The US already accounts for almost three-quarters of total Nato defence spending, and Mr Rasmussen said he was "concerned" that European defence cuts will widen that gap.
"Militarily, in the case that we would like to co-operate with the Americans, we might end up in the absurd situation where we can't because of an extreme technology gap," he said.
"Politically, we might end up with a situation where the Americans find the Transatlantic relationship less relevant."

 

[ajtr]

Special Briefing On Upcoming Kabul Conference​

QUESTION: Lalit Jha. I have two questions. One, what is Kabul Conference all about? This – is it a pledging conference of what – some donations, money, have been given to Afghanistan? And secondly, this week in Islamabad, foreign ministers of India and Pakistan are meeting there after longtime revival of Indo-Pakistan peace dialogue. How helpful is it for you to achieve your goals in Afghanistan and Pakistan?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: On the second part of your question, anything that reduces tensions and increases confidence and understanding between Pakistan and India is something we would encourage and support. But we are not directly involved in those talks. I did have a very good discussion this morning with the Indian Ambassador to the United States who came and at my invitation so that I could brief her on the things we're talking about here.

In regard to the first part of your question, our – this is not a pledging conference. It's not a pledging conference. It is a follow-on to the January 28th Conference held in London and it was called at the invitation of President Karzai. I am told it's the largest gathering of foreign leaders in Afghanistan since the 1970s. It will be an Afghan-led conference, and in it, the Afghan Government has told us that they will present their renewed commitments on security, governance, development, and they will put heavy emphasis on their programs on reintegration. This is a – I can't give you the exact number of foreign ministers who are coming because I really don't know it, but we know that the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon will be there, the NATO Secretary General Rasmussen will be there, and many other foreign ministers.

QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador, thank you. Let me ask you, one, what will this Kabul conference will make a difference? And second, as far as change in the command at the highest level from General McChrystal to General Petraeus will make any difference? And finally, as you said that you have briefed the Indian Ambassador here. What role you think India will play in this Kabul Conference?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: First of all, the Kabul Conference will be a very important international demonstration of support for the Government of Afghanistan and they will outline their programs.

Second – let me take your third question and go back to your second. Secondly, in regard to the Indians, you have to address the ambassador here and her government as to who will represent India and how that will be done. But on your larger question, India has a very real role in the region for historic and strategic reasons, and they can play an important role in resolving these issues, going down the – looking forward into the middle distance.

In regard to the change of command at ISAF, I think a lot's been said on this already. I don't need to add much. I was in Kabul with General McChrystal when the article appeared. He called me to apologize personally. I – of course, I wasn't personally upset by what was said. Worse things have been said about me. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Remind us what was said about you? (Laughter.)

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Don't you have to be accredited to be here? (Laughter.)

 

[nandu]

Karzai agrees to creation of village defence force

Kabul, July 15 : The Afghan government has approved a program to establish local defense forces that American military officials hope will help the country's remote areas thwart attacks by Taliban insurgents.

Though details of the plan are sketchy, but Americans have been insisting that such a force needs to be established to combat rising violence.

The Afghan government has agreed to the proposal after over 12 days of talks.

Gen. David H. Petraeus, the new NATO commander, is reported to have overcome the objections of President Hamid Karzai, who was worried that the presence of such forces could harden into militias that his weak government could not control.

In the end, the two sides agreed that the forces would be under the supervision of the Afghan Interior Ministry, which will also be their paymaster.

"They would not be militias. These would be government-formed, government-paid, government-uniformed local police units who would keep any eye out for bad guys — in their neighborhoods, in their communities — and who would, in turn, work with the Afghan police forces and the Afghan Army, to keep them out of their towns. It is, he added, "a temporary solution to a very real, near-term problem," said Geoff Morrell, the Pentagon spokesman, at a briefing in Washington on Wednesday.

The program borrows from the largely successful Awakening groups that General Petraeus created in Iraq, though the two programs would not be identical, the New York Times reports.

Unlike the Iraqi units, the Afghan forces would not be composed of insurgents who had switched sides. They would be similar as a lightly armed, trained and, significantly, paid force in a nation starving for jobs.

In fact, the program runs the risk of becoming too popular — it will create a demand in poor communities around the nation that could turn it into an unwieldy and ineffective job creation program.

While some American officials said the forces could have as many as 10,000 people enrolled, Afghan officials indicated that they wanted to keep them small, especially in the beginning.

American military officials said they would be intimately involved, and that United States Special Forces units, which have created smaller-scale programs locally, especially in southern Afghanistan, would continue to set up and train the forces.

http://www.dailytimesindia.com/2010/07/141484.htm

 

[ajtr]

Afghanistan: The National Security Council agreed in principle on a proposal to establish local defense forces in some parts of the country -- a measure NATO has long advocated, The Associated Press reported 14 July. Afghan President Hamid Karzai's office said the local forces would operate separately from the Afghan National Police under the authority of the Interior Ministry. The Interior Ministry will provide more details of the proposal at the next National Security Council meeting.

A plan for local security forces in Afghanistan is a "stop-gap measure" because there are not enough police forces to provide security, a Pentagon spokesman said today. He also said the program would create "local community policing units," not militias.

Comment: One of the significant problems with such schemes in Iraq was that the Sunni militias were loyal to and dependent on the US Army, not to the government in Baghdad. The militia program was poorly planned in the sense that it did not anticipate the problems of integration with the national armed forces; problems of pay for those not assimilated and enduring questions of loyalty by Sunni militiamen to a Shiite-led government. Those problems did not loom large until the Americans drew down and they are not solved yet.

Karzai and his advisors seem to have a good understanding of the flaws in the Iraq program plus they know that issues of loyalty in Afghanistan are exponentially more complex than in Iraq.

They also have first hand experience in witnessing what happened to the Northern Alliance tribal militias that helped overthrow the Taliban in 2001. Many were disarmed, supposedly. Most fighters were found unfit for integration in a modern military force - most could not read or write. They were sent home, but had hidden their weapons.

For the Northerners -- the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras -- who stood against the Pashtun Taliban for years, the idea that the Americans would organize, train and arm Pashtun village militias risks returning the Northerners to subservience to the Pashtuns"¦ again. They will not accept that.

Karzai is wise to be skeptical about a program that is not necessarily based on loyalty to the government in Kabul over loyalty to the Americans; cannot guarantee that the militias/policing units will not join the Taliban; operates outside the government's control or financing and could threaten the local agents of the government after the Americans leave. This program easily could reinforce the longstanding rule of insurgency that the government usually supports both sides of the fight.


http://www.kforcegov.com/Services/IS/NightWatch/NightWatch_10000201.aspx

 

[ajtr]

'Terror' threat to Karzai's Taliban plan​

By Abubakar Siddique

The administration of United States President Barack Obama is reportedly considering blacklisting major Taliban factions, a move aimed at undermining groups linked closely to al-Qaeda, but which could also jeopardize Afghan President Hamid Karzai's efforts to reconcile with Afghan insurgent leaders based in neighboring Pakistan.

General David Petraeus, commander of US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Afghanistan, discussed the idea of blacklisting the Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin Haqqani network with senior administration officials last week, according to The New York Times. Senator Carl Levin (Democrat, Michigan), meanwhile, called on the State Department on July 13 to also



place the Quetta shura, the Taliban's leadership council led by Mullah Mohammad Omar, on its list of terrorist organizations.

Sirajuddin Haqqani currently leads the network founded by his father, Jalaluddin Haqqani, a former Taliban minister and anti-Soviet commander in the 1980s. The network has a reputation for being ruthless, and is accused of being behind many of the most high-profile attacks in the Afghan capital, Kabul.

The Haqqani network is also seen as having ties to the Quetta shura, which is based in the southwestern Pakistani city of Quetta and made up of remnants of the former Taliban regime loyal to Mullah Omar.

Both Sirajuddin Haqqani and Mullah Omar have long been on the US blacklist of fugitive terrorists, with a State Department program offering US$5 million and $10 million, respectively, for information leading to their capture.

But while expanding the US blacklist is intended to strike deeper into the core of organizations affiliated with the two men, with the aim of undermining the insurgency being waged in Afghanistan, doubts have been raised about the effectiveness of the move.

Kabul-based Afghan analyst Wahid Muzda argues that designating Taliban groups, in particular the Haqqani network, as terrorists would do little to persuade its followers to give up fighting.

"I don't think that the Haqqani network can ever break away from the Taliban ranks and come here [to join the government]," Muzda says. "On the other hand, blacklisting is nothing new for them, and the Americans will gain little from this. If they want to pressure or threaten Sirajuddin Haqqani it won't work and the fighting will continue."

End to rapprochement
Some suggest a move to expand the blacklist could also undermine the Afghan president's reconciliation efforts.

International media recently reported that the Pakistani military brokered direct negotiations between Karzai and Sirajuddin Haqqani, reports both Islamabad and Kabul denied.

If the reports are true, however, a terrorist designation could make it even harder for Karzai to explore rapprochement with the Taliban. It could also push Washington to consistently pressure Islamabad to move against the group in North Waziristan. For years Pakistan has resisted going after the network because its sees the Haqqanis as potential future allies after an eventual US withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The network is widely believed to be based in Pakistan's North Waziristan tribal district along the Afghan border, which is also believed to shelter Arab jihadis from al-Qaeda and militants affiliated with Central Asian extremist groups.

Who to talk to
The move comes as Karzai has apparently persuaded Washington to push for de-listing certain Taliban leaders from a United Nations sanctions list first established in 1999.

Kabul-based Afghan analyst Ahmad Sayedi tells RFE/RL's Radio Free Afghanistan that the move indicates that Washington wants to make a clear distinction between reconcilable and irreconcilable elements among the Afghan insurgents, "to understand who is being talked to and where [and on what terms]."

Sayedi adds that Washington has "information that Jalaluddin Haqqani and some of Mullah Omar's followers have close ties with al-Qaeda or they are part of al-Qaeda. The Americans do not want to negotiate with elements closely tied to al-Qaeda."

Karzai has pursued reconciliation with the Quetta shura for years through informal contacts. But this February's arrest of its military leader, Abdul Ghani Baradar, disrupted the process. Analysts suggest that move pushed Karzai to pursue reconciliation with the Taliban though Pakistan's powerful military, which Kabul has accused of harboring Taliban leaders in the past. Karzai apparently sought new regional alliances after developing critical differences with Washington.

The Obama administration has pushed for reintegrating Taliban foot soldiers and field commanders into Afghan society, but has resisted rapprochement with its fugitive leaders.

US 'red lines'
The Quetta shura and the insurgent networks controlled by its leaders are mostly active in the southern Afghan provinces of Kandahar and Helmand. United States and NATO troops are expected to launch a major stabilization operation in Kandahar in an effort to weaken the Taliban considerably.

Richard Holbrooke, Obama's special regional envoy, told journalists on July 13 that Washington is keen on helping Kabul to succeed with reintegration programs worth $280 million.

Holbrooke said that Washington was even pushing for a revision of the UN blacklist in the Security Council, but that crossing certain red lines won't be acceptable. "Both the president and the secretary of state have laid out the red lines on this issue many, many times, he said.

He said that Washington supports "Afghan-led reconciliation. We are not in direct contact with the Taliban. There may be other indirect contacts going on, track-2 diplomacy, individuals who contact each other, other things, but they don't involve the United States. And that's our position. "People who are willing to lay down their arms, renounce al-Qaeda, participate in the political process, are always ready to be - we're always ready to reconcile them - groups or in - as individuals."

Reconciliation with the insurgents is expected to figure high on the agenda at the international donors conference scheduled for July 20 in Kabul. The Afghan government is touting the gathering as the largest gathering of international leaders in the country since the 1970s.

 

[ajtr]

Death on your doorstep ​

Restrepo directed by Tim Hetherington and Sebastian Junger

Reviewed by Nick Turse

I've never heard a shot fired in anger. But I might know a little bit more about war than Sebastian Junger.

Previously best known as the author of The Perfect Storm, Junger, a New York-based reporter who has covered African wars and the Kosovo killing fields, and Tim Hetherington, an acclaimed film-maker and photographer with extensive experience in conflict zones, heard many such shots, fired by Americans and Afghans, as they made their new documentary film Restrepo.

This is about an isolated combat outpost named after a beloved medic killed in a firefight. There, they chronicled the lives of US



soldiers from Battle Company, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, during a tour of duty in eastern Afghanistan's Korengal Valley.

The film has been almost universally praised by mainstream reviewers and was awarded the Grand Jury Prize at this year's Sundance film festival. A New York Times "critics' pick", Restrepo moved the newspaper's A O Scott to end his glowing review by telling readers: "As the war in Afghanistan returns to the front pages and the national debate, we owe the men in Restrepo, at the very least, 90 minutes or so of our attention."

In the Los Angeles Times, reviewer Betsy Sharkey concluded in similar fashion: "What Restrepo does so dramatically, so convincingly, is make the abstract concrete, giving the soldiers on the front lines faces and voices."

Along with Hetherington, Junger, who has also recently experienced great success with his companion book War, shot about 150 hours of footage in the Korengal Valley in 2007 and 2008 during a combined 10 trips to the country. "This is war, full stop," reads website prose above their directors' statement about the film.

It isn't.

Junger and Hetherington may know something about Afghanistan, a good deal about combat, and even more about modern American troops, but there's precious little evidence in Restrepo that - despite the title of Junger's book - they know the true face of war.

War on your doorstep
Earlier this year, Junger reviewed a new Vietnam War novel, veteran Karl Marlantes' Matterhorn, for the New York Times Book Review. In a glowing front-page appraisal, he wrote, "Combat is not really what Matterhorn is about; it is about war. And in Marlantes' hands, war is a confusing and rich world where some men die heroically, others die because of bureaucratic stupidity, and a few are deliberately killed by platoon mates bearing a grudge."

Analyzing Junger's misreading of Matterhorn helps to unlock his misconceptions about war and explains the problems that dog his otherwise cinematically-pleasing, and in some ways useful, film.

Millions of Vietnamese were killed and wounded over the course of what the Vietnamese call the "American War" in Southeast Asia. About two million of those dead were Vietnamese civilians. They were blown to pieces by artillery, blasted by bombs and massacred in hamlets and villages like My Lai, Son Thang, Thanh Phong and Le Bac, in huge swaths of the Mekong Delta, and in little unnamed enclaves like one in Quang Nam province.

Matterhorn touches on none of this. Marlantes focuses tightly on a small unit of Americans in a remote location surrounded by armed enemy troops - an episode that, while pitch-perfect in depiction, represents only a sliver of a fraction of the conflict that was the Vietnam War.

It's not surprising that this view of war appealed to Junger. In Restrepo, it's his vision of war, too.

Restrepo's repeated tight shots on the faces of earnest young American soldiers are the perfect metaphor for what's lacking in the film and what makes it almost useless for telling us anything of note about the real war in Afghanistan. Only during wide shots in Restrepo do we catch fleeting glimpses of that real war.

In the opening scenes, shot from an armored vehicle (before an improvised explosive device halts a US Army convoy), we catch sight of Afghan families in a village. When the camera pans across the Korengal Valley, we see simple homes on the hillsides.

When men from Battle Company head to a house they targeted for an air strike and see dead locals and wounded children, when we see grainy footage of a farm family or watch a young lieutenant, a foreigner in a foreign land, intimidating and interrogating an even younger goat-herder (whose hands he deems to be too clean to really belong to a goat-herder) - here is the real war. And here are the people Junger and Hetherington should have embedded with if they wanted to learn - and wanted to teach us - what American war is really all about.

Few Americans born after the Civil War know much about war. Real war. War that seeks you out. War that arrives on your doorstep - not once in a blue moon, but once a month or a week or a day. The ever-present fear that just when you're at the furthest point in your fields, just when you're most exposed, most alone, most vulnerable, it will come roaring into your world.

Those Americans who have gone to war since the 1870s - soldiers or civilians - have been mostly combat tourists, even those who spent many tours under arms or with pen (or computer) in hand reporting from war zones. The troops among them, even the draftees or not-so-volunteers of past wars, always had a choice - be it fleeing the country or going to prison.

They never had to contemplate living out a significant part of their life in a basement bomb shelter or worry about scrambling out of it before a foreign soldier tossed in a grenade. They never had to go through the daily dance with doom, the sense of fear and powerlessness that comes when foreign troops and foreign technology hold the power of life and death over your village, your home, each and every day.

The ordinary people whom US troops have exposed to decades of war and occupation, death and destruction, uncertainty, fear, and suffering - in places like Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Iraq and Afghanistan - have had no such choice.

They had no place else to go and no way to get there, unless as exiles and refugees in their own land or neighboring ones. They have instead been forced to live with the ever-present uncertainty that comes from having culturally strange, oddly attired, heavily armed American teenagers roaming their country, killing their countrymen, invading their homes, arresting their sons, and shouting incomprehensible commands laced with the word "f**k" or derivations thereof.

Since World War I, it's been civilians who have most often born the disproportionate brunt of modern warfare. It's been ordinary people who have lived with war day after day. In Restrepo such people - Afghan elders seeking information on someone the Americans detained, villagers seeking compensation for an injured cow the Americans butchered into fresh steaks, and a man who angrily asks the Americans and their translator to point out the Taliban among civilians killed by a US air strike - are just supporting characters or extras.

"[W]e did not interview Afghans," Junger and Hetherington write in their directors' statement. These are, however, precisely the people who know the most about war. And somehow I can't believe Junger doesn't intuitively know this.

Surely it stands to reason that Afghan civilians in the Korengal Valley and elsewhere - some of whom have lived through the Soviet occupation, the bloody civil war of the early 1990s that saw the Taliban take power, and now almost a decade of American and allied foreign occupation - have a better understanding of war than any of Junger's corn-fed twenty-somethings who are combat tourists for about a year at a time (even if they serve multiple tours of duty).

War in the dark
This critical local knowledge, all but missing from Restrepo, is driven home in footage from a PBS Frontline report in which one of Restrepo's "stars", Captain Dan Kearney, speaks to an Afghan elder, Haji Zalwar Khan, in the Korengal Valley in July 2008. It's around the time Restrepo ends, just as Kearney is about to hand-off his command to another American officer-cum-war-tourist.

"You people shoot at least one house a day. Last night you shot a house in Kandalay," says Khan. In response, Kearney offers a visibly skeptical smile and predictable excuses.

"You people are like lightning when you strike a house, you kill everything inside," Khan continues. Later, when Frontline correspondent Elizabeth Rubin is able to talk to him alone, the elder tells her that the conflict will end when the Americans depart. "When they leave there will be no fighting," he assures her. "The insurgents exist to fight the Americans."

Perhaps it's only natural that Junger is focused (or perhaps the more appropriate word would be fixated) not on Afghans wounded or killed in their own homes, or even guerillas seeking to expel the foreign occupiers from the valley, but on the young volunteers fighting the US war there.

They are a tiny, self-selected minority of Americans whom the government has called on again and again to serve in its long-festering post-9/11 occupations. And presumably for reasons ranging from patriotism to a lack of other prospects, these mostly baby-faced young men - there are no female troops in the unit - volunteered to kill on someone else's orders for yet others' reasons. Such people are not uninteresting.

For an American audience, they, and their suffering, provide the easiest entree into the Afghan war zone. They also offer the easiest access for Junger and Hetherington. The young troops naturally elicit sympathy because they are besieged in the Korengal Valley and suffer hardships. (Albeit normally not hardships approaching the severity of those Afghans experience.) In addition, of course, Junger speaks their language, hails from their country, and understands their cultural references. He gets them.

Even in an American context, what he doesn't get, the soldiers he can't understand, are those who made up the working-class force that the US fielded in Vietnam. That military was not a would-be warrior elite for whom "expeditionary" soldiering was just another job choice.

It was instead a melange of earnest volunteers, not unlike the men in Restrepo, along with large numbers of draftees and draft-induced enlistees most of whom weren't actively seeking the life of foreign occupiers and weren't particularly interested in endlessly garrisoning far-off lands where locals sought to kill them.

In his review of Marlantes's Matterhorn, Junger confesses:
For a reporter who has covered the military in its current incarnation, the events recounted in this book are so brutal and costly that they seem to belong not just to another time but to anญother country. Soldiers openly contemplate killing their commanders. They die by the dozen on useless missions designed primarily to help the careers of those above them. The wounded are unhooked from IV bags and left to die because others, required for battle, are growing woozy from dehydration and have been ordered to drink the precious fluid.

Almost every page contains some example of military callousness or incompetence that would be virtually inconceivable today, and I found myself wondering whether the book was intended as an indictment of war in general or a demonstration of just how far this nation has come in the last 40 years.
As the American War in Vietnam staggered to a close, US troops were in an open state of rebellion. Fraggings - attacks on commanders (often by fragmentation grenade) - were rising, so was the escape into drug use. Troops bucked orders, mutinied, and regularly undertook "search and evade" missions, holing up in safe spots while calling in false coordinates.

Absences without leave (AWOL) and desertions went through the roof. During World War II, US Marine Corps desertion rates peaked at 8.8 per 1,000 in 1943. In 1972, the last full year of US combat in Vietnam, the marines had a desertion rate of 65.3 per 1,000. And precious few marines were even in Vietnam at that point.

AWOL rates were also staggering - 166.4 per 1,000 for the much more numerous army and 170 per 1,000 for the marines. In a widely-read 1971 Armed Forces Journal article, retired Colonel Robert D Heinl Jr, wrote, "By every conceivable indicator, our army that now remains in Vietnam is in a state of approaching collapse, with individual units avoiding or having refused combat, murdering their officers and noncommissioned officers, drug-ridden, and dispirited where not near-mutinous."

It didn't take rocket scientists to figure out that you couldn't conduct long-term, wheel-spinning occupations in distant lands with a military like that. And so the long-occupation-friendly all-volunteer force that Junger has come to know was born.

That he has such a hard time understanding the citizen-soldier response to the American lost cause in Vietnam essentially ensures that the civilian story of war, especially that of alien civilians in a distant land, would evade his understanding. This is what makes the relative isolation of the unit he deals with in Restrepo so useful, even comfortable for him as he assesses a very American version of what war is all about.

By 1969, it was apparent where the Vietnam War was going and, increasingly, soldiers balked at the prospect of being the last man to die for their country in a disastrous war. While it turned out that about 15,000 Americans would die in Vietnam from 1969 to 1971 (almost as many as had died from 1965 to 1967), the troops were increasingly angry about it.

Body armor, drone warfare, ultra-rapid medevacs, and a host of other technological innovations, not to mention battling tiny numbers of relatively weak, ill-armed, and generally unpopular guerillas, has meant that Junger's new model military can fight its wars with minimal American casualties and, so far, less upset at home (or even perhaps in the field). Today, the numbers of dead Americans like Juan S. Restrepo, the medic for whom the outpost in Junger's film was named, remain relatively few compared, at least, to Vietnam. Just over 1,100 US troops have died in and around Afghanistan since 2001.

On the other hand, who knows how many Afghan civilians have died over that span, thanks to everything from insurgent improvised explosive devices, suicide attacks, and beheadings to US air strikes, special operations forces' night raids, and road checkpoint shootings, not to speak of every other hardship the American war in Afghanistan has unleashed, exacerbated, or intensified? Who knows their stories? Who has documented their unending suffering? Few have bothered.

Few, if any, have risked their own lives to chronicle day-to-day life for months on end in embattled Afghan villages. Yet it's there, not in some isolated American outpost, that you would find the real story of war to film. In the place of such a work, we have Restrepo.

Even an all-volunteer army will eventually collapse if pushed too far for too long. Soldiers will eventually slip, if not explode, into revolt or at least will begin to evade orders, but the prospect looks unlikely any time soon for the US military. Unlike Afghan civilians, US troops go home or at least leave the combat zone after their tours of duty. And if most Americans don't necessarily give them much thought much of the time, they evidently have no problem paying them to make war, or engaging in effortless tributes to them, like rising at baseball games for a seventh-inning stretch salute.

In what passes for a poignant scene in Restrepo, Captain Kearney addresses his troops after a sister unit takes uncharacteristically heavy casualties. He says that they can take a few moments to mourn, but then it's time to get back into the fight. It's time for pay-back, time to make the enemy feel the way they're feeling. He then gives his men time for prayer.

If Kearney ever called his troops together and set aside a moment for prayer in memory of the civilians they killed or wounded, Junger and Hetherington missed it, or chose not to include it. Most likely, it never happened. And most likely, Americans who see Restrepo won't find that odd at all. Nor will they think it cold, insensitive, or prejudiced to privilege American lives over those of Afghans. After all, according to Junger, "military callousness" has gone the way of America's Vietnam-vintage F-4 Phantom fighter-bomber.

If Americans care only sparingly for their paid, professional soldiers - the ones A O Scott says deserve 90 minutes of our time - they care even less about Afghan civilians. That's why they don't understand war. And that's why they'll think that the essence of war is what they're seeing as they sit in the dark and watch Restrepo.