Not a sin. But claiming that Pakistanis made their economy huge is a lie. It was aid that grew the economy. Not Pakistanis. However I accept that lying for the cause of Islam is also not a sin, as your leader Zia ul Haq told his American patrons and Pakistan is the Caliphate capital of Islam. So no problem for you. You see honour. I see lies.
Why is it called the "Islamic Republic of Pakistan". Are you lying again or is the name of Pakistan a bluff?
Firstly neither am I a Pakistani nor can I speak for that country. If you do not know how to be civil in a discussion, then first learn the art then come back to the Forum.
He's a Bangladeshi and wants Indians to "accept two-nation theory", whatever that means. These guys have taken away 40% of our country in the name of "two nation theory" and still crib about our "non-acceptance". Not only do they want us to recognize that "Muslims are a separate nation", they also want us to keep our domestic Indian Muslims within Indian borders and give them full Sharia and freedom to do whatever the fcuk they want. LOL, Bangladesh doesn't even allow Rohangiyas into their nation and lets them be killed or drives them further into India, where they have infested places as deep South as Hyderabad and Bangalore.
You certainly talk like a Paki-stani. A self proclaimed "Paki"/pure person who imagines he can recognize what is bad about others. But bluffing is not going to get you very far.
He may be a Paki, not a Bangladeshi. Can't tell for sure on the internet. In the west Pakis pretend to be Indians. On here we may have a Paki pretending to be Bangladeshi Begging Indians to "accept" the two nation theory means that the beggar feels the idea cannot work unless Indians accept it. If it was working no matter what Indians think then there is no need to beg Indians to accept it.
@bennedose , @Bangalorean He is no Bangladeshi. He is a stranded Pakistani, a full blown Jamati like rest of them clowns in peedeeeff. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stranded_Pakistanis_in_Bangladesh
A more authoritative account of 1965 war by General Harbaksh Singh be also included in these posts. He was the GOC in C of the Western Command at the time of the conflict. I do not know what is the copy right implications but it is available at Another site.
IA's own official account of '65 War is available on line. Gen Harbaksh Singh's account and comments are included in that.
Bangladesh shantir somuddur? Baap re, eta to khabar e asa uchit. eker por ek buddhijibi ke kupiye khun korche gora musalman ra, aar dhorao porche na. Hinduder mere mere ekhon nogonno sonkhaye niye eseche. Tar poreo shantir somudro, naa ki kabarsthaner shanti?
Kown buddhijibi mereseay? Key meresey? Kono Hindu keho maey nai. Yes, personal karoney tow khun hotey'ee parey. Amra oboshoiyi shantis mahasamiddar.
1965 war: How India almost lost to Pakistan Published September 1, 2015 | By admin SOURCE : DAILO.IN It is said that Indians pass off myth for history, while the Chinese mythologise their history. It is not surprising that both subcontinental cousins share the trait when it comes to the 1965 India-Pakistan war. Pakistan has long celebrated September 6 as Defence of Pakistan (Youm-e Difa) Day. This was the day when, it says, it defended itself against the Indian Army that had been launched on three axes towards Lahore. For this myth to take life, they gloss over Operation Gibraltar, the attack on Kashmir by thousands of irregulars on August 5, and Operation Grand Slam of September 1 where Pakistan’s six armoured divisions came close to cutting the highway connecting Jammu to Poonch. The Indian myths are only being unveiled now, when the government has decided on a large-scale celebration of the event. A celebration implies an achievement, but if the truth be told, the Indian performance during the 1965 war was just a shade better than that of Pakistan. And in that was our victory. This is what the commander of the main effort, Lt Gen Harbakhsh had to say about the main thrust to Lahore that faltered on day one itself, largely due to incompetent leadership of the division and its brigades. Surprise attack On September 6, XI Corps launched a surprise attack at 4am, led to the crossing of the Ichhogil canal and the capture of the Bata shoe factory on the outskirts of Lahore by 11am. But the senior commanders could not cope with the situation and ordered a withdrawal to the east bank of the canal by that evening. Despite capturing some 140sq mi of land, and crippling Pakistan’s 1st armoured division at Khem Karan, XI Corps performance, Singh says it was “a sickening repetition of command failures leading the sacrifice of a series of cheap victories.” The performance of India’s premier I Corps, built around the 1st armoured division, was no less disappointing. I Corps captured 200sq mi of territory and destroyed a great deal of Pakistani armour. But it did not deliver what it was meant to – a decisive battlefield victory. “With the exception of a few minor successes… The operational performance was virtually a catalogue of lost victories.” Singh praised the performance of units like the Poona Horse, but was harsh in his judgement of the higher commanders. Harbakhsh’s third corps – the XV Corps, which then, as now, looks after Kashmir, fared better. It gained an unambiguous victory in capturing the Haji Pir Pass and in defeating Operation Gibraltar. However, it was battered by the surprise attack launched by Pakistan in the Chamb sector on September 1. India also launched an offensive in the Rajasthan sector with a view of tying down Pakistani forces in Sind. But the plan was poorly conceived and executed. There was no joint planning, leave alone coordination, between the Air Force and the Army. This led to the Lahore fiasco when Pakistani air strikes disrupted the Indian offensive on September 6. Despite seeing action on September 1 in Chamb, the IAF was unprepared for the strike on September 6 when the Pakistan air force (PAF) destroyed 13 aircrafts in a raid on Pathankot, including two new MiG-21s. Similar raids found the IAF station Kalaikunda in the east unawares leading to the destruction of eight aircraft on the ground. Shoddy intelligence Intelligence was equally shoddy. India failed to pick up the fact that the Pakistanis had surreptitiously raised an additional armoured division and the IAF could not locate the PAF aircraft in East Pakistan. There are of course, bigger questions. Indian accounts claim that there was no plan to capture Lahore. If not, then why were three divisions thrown at it? And if the plan was to just carry out shallow attrition attacks, it nearly came a cropper in Khem Karan when Pakistan launched its 1st armoured division in a bid to reach the Beas bridge that would have cut off Amritsar. Fortunately, they were trapped at Asal Uttar and defeated. Biggest blunder Perhaps the biggest blunder India made was to terminate the war when it did by accepting the UN mandated ceasefire on September 22, which also happened to be the date in which the Chinese ultimatum expired. While these were important considerations, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri wanted to know from Army chief JN Chaudhuri whether India could gain any great victory if it continued to fight. In his typically offhand style, the general declared that India had run out of ammunition and it would be okay to accept the ceasefire. But later it was found out that only 14 per cent of the front line ammunition had been used and the number of tanks India still had was double that of Pakistan. We can still be proud of the bravery and grit of our fighting men in 1965, but we can only pray that the higher management of our armed forces has improved. http://idrw.org/1965-war-how-india-almost-lost-to-pakistan/
^^ Don't worry. Nothing important was said. Was just checking if the guy is actually a bengali or not. Turns out he is!
New Delhi, Sep.1 : The Pakistan Army, which launched an attack in the Chamb- Jaurian sector on September 1, 1965, was on the verge of capturing Akhnoor. The force was commanded by General Akhtar Malik, an Ahmadiya. There were some in the Pakistan Army, who did not want General Malik to get credit for the ‘victory’, and overnight, he was transferred and the command was taken over by General Yahya Khan. The change of command resulted in delay of the attempt to capture Akhnoor. Meanwhile, the Indian Army, which was taken by surprise, asked the Indian Air Force for assistance. There was an immediate response from the Indian Air Force, though it lost four Vampires on the first day of the war. Farooq Bajwa, a Pakistani research scholar, has authored the book after studying the declassified Brirish and American documents and memoirs and unpublished reviews of the war. The thrust of the message that runs through the book was that Pakistan was concerned that the Indian Army was strengthening itself after the humiliating defeat that it suffered in 1962, had gained the support of the United States , which was engaged in its own war in Vietnam, and was keen to bring India to the negotiating table to discuss the future of Jammu and Kashmir. It was gradually losing the advantage it had of being allied with SEATO and CENTO. The first step was the attack in Kutch. Pakistan occupied the Kanjarkot Fort and on February 1965, the Indian Army was authorised to get it evacuated. India ordered a general mobilisation in the area. Read more: Pakistan lost the war with India in 1965, new documents reveal
I believe the the Vampires were launched against the rushing Pakistani tanks on September 1, 1965 at about 4.00pm when the highest level political leadership concluded that these Pakistani tanks could only be stopped from capturing the Akhnoor by letting the IAF have a go at it. Ten vampires were launched, four did not return but ten Pakistani tanks were burnt and the said Pakistani attack just stopped dead on its feet. All these stories of General Akhtar Malik was relieved of the command etc. were after he lost the momentum. I was on GT road going to Delhi from Chandigarh and was listening to the AIR news bulletin at every stop on way to Delhi on September 1. The news of IAF going in action were front page news at about 10.00pm. Next day stories of Keeler brothers in GNAT fighters shooting down Sabres were in all the newspapers in Delhi.
Some interesting pictures w/ captions from the war; in case they haven't been posted already. It's a good thread.
KARGIL: AFTER TWO DECADES, ARE WE PREPARED? A brilliant assessment by Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch : - For the full article:- https://saluteindia.org/kargil-after-two-decades-are-we-prepared/ On 19th February 1999, India’s then Prime Minister, Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee undertook a journey across the Attari-Wagah border. It was a historic visit to Lahore, undertaken to break the impasse in the India-Pakistan relationship and to give peace a chance. Speaking at Lahore, Vajpayee’s words resonated across the world when he said “Hum Jung na hone denge … Teen bar lad chuke ladayi, kitna mehnga sauda… Hum jung na hone denge…” (We will not let war occur…we have fought three times…what an expensive transaction…we will not let war occur again.) Pakistan’s Deceptive Plan: The Kargil Infiltration In hindsight, it appears that India was once again taken in by Pakistani perfidy. The Pakistan military had already set in motion plans to capture the Kargil heights while the Indian premier was treading the path for peace. The preparations for it were on in full swing in the Gilgit-Baltistan region of Pakistan Occupied J&K (POJ&K). Listening in on the speech, the then Pakistan Army Chief, General Pervez Musharraf must have been chuckling silently to himself. The proof of Pakistan’s deception was the Indian premier talking of peace in Lahore.
