1962 India China War

Discussion in 'Military History' started by truthfull, May 7, 2010.

  1. roma

    roma NRI in Europe Senior Member

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    THe use of IAF could have made a difference

    Let's see ? in what way - remember the PLA had already withdrawn - of what use would such a late decision have been ?
    ALso the IAF could not have changed the outcome on the western front as the planes were mostly based in the east and didnt have the range of today's fighter-bombers.

    Thirdly all the analysis and decision-making to use the IAF came far to late basically after the PLA had already overrun the eastern front.

    THe fact is that when india got independence form the british, a proper handover did NOT take place - the Brits granted it grudgingly and made it look good in appearance but not in substance.

    So infact as an addendum to my post above that th ewhole establishment was really responsible for the lask of preparedness of our armed forces i would like to add the brits to that too - the fact that they gave up empire in a most irresponsible way is IN FACT THE MAJOR REASON ! .... no proper hand over of military command and the consequences if not done properly

    once they realised they wouldnt rule any longer , they merely withdrew and to hell with the consequences.

    As a result poor Tibetans lost their ENTIRE country and dragonland dared to play deceitful games with india too.

    Meanwhile the indian estbalishment was too concerned with pak and while mouthing "bhai-bhai" were led up the garden path to total lack of preparedness to defend against attack from the eastern front as that was unthinkable - after all it was bhai.

    (PS: many thanks to colleagues shash2k2 and pmaitra for the interesting posts)
     
    Last edited: Feb 19, 2011
  2. civfanatic

    civfanatic Retired Moderator

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    It is not good to dwell too much on the past. What is done is done. We will never know if the IAF could have made a difference in 1962, but we can take into account the lessons learned.

    We have already implemented/implementing much of the military lessons, but we are yet to implement the diplomatic lessons.

    We are yet to take an assertive stance on issues like border disputes.
     
    Horushmar. likes this.
  3. sesha_maruthi27

    sesha_maruthi27 Senior Member Senior Member

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    We were being ruled by a non-violent and coward leader. If it had been SARDAR VALLABHAI PATEL as the PRIME MINISTER of INDIA then we would have won the war with some losses on our side. Now also the same situation is prevailing as far as attacking pakistan is concerned. The present GoI should have attacked all the terrorist camps on the side of PoK and destroyed all the terrorist camps and anti-INDIAN groups which prevail there. But the GoI was afraid that pakistan may make use of nuclear war-heads. This is how they have been ruling us for a long time.
     
    Last edited: Feb 19, 2011
  4. Ray

    Ray The Chairman Defence Professionals Moderator

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    I would not say coward PM.

    He is a pacifist and prone to compromise for his peace of mind.

    Ifs and buts won't change the situation.

    The moment is NOW.

    and the situation is very woolly woolly.

    Na ki athhey, na ki othey!
     
  5. Ray

    Ray The Chairman Defence Professionals Moderator

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    This is what upsets the rest of India.

    The Union Govt is total North India centric.

    Even when the onion prices were high, Pak onions were for Delhi!

    As if Delhi is India!!
     
  6. LurkerBaba

    LurkerBaba Staff Administrator

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    Comment by Colonel Ashok K Singh on 1962 War

    Found this comment on Firstpost.com. Not sure of its accuracy or even if a "Colonel Ashok K Singh" exists

    ==
    Colonel Ashok K Singh


    Having managed Chinese Threat in one of the Think Tank of the Army (now retd) let me put few things straight.
    Few facts about 1962 war (still kep secret by Govt of India)

    A Nehru played a geo political game under influence of western powers being a front line state against a communist China.

    B Nehru also spoke double language one side friendship other side unwarranted interference in Tibet.

    C Military was taken as burden. Was ignored and kept out of loop of all Govts decision making processes (still same situation) and was only asked when the decisions for military actions were already taken.

    D Borders were handled by IB under police officers and they were advising Govt on all Military Affairs.not much has changed even now.

    E In 62 Army advised Govt against war. Gen Thorat then GOC-IN C Eastern Command had given 3 critical advise to Govt 1 Army is not prepared and equipped for war. 2. Military shall not cross a line which was named Thorat Line. 3. Any deployed beyond Thorat line will be disastrous and will invite a strong Chinese reaction. Then Defence Minister was arrogant fool was advised by IB director. They treated then Army Chief Gen Thimayya so badly that He resigned. Gen Thimayya had supported Gen Thorat. Nehru played a dirty game. He could manage withdrawal of his resignation.

    D Nehru waited till both Generals retired and placed palatable people in command. Unique in Military History Gen Koul a supply Corps Officer was given command of 4 Corps. Against all advise of Gen Thorat military was odered to deploy not only beyond Thorat Line but well beyond MacMahon Line in Chinese territories.

    E As said by Mr Raman, intelligence assessments of IB failed (Army had correctly anticipated it and advised govt) to assess military intentions of China correctly. They failed to assess a strong Chinese counter reaction. The fact is IB continued working for British even after Indian independence and was taking inputs from them.

    F It is surprising (now some facts available) China too was not prepared for full scale war. They had mobilized some troops which were enough for defensive battles only. Chinese Military acted only too evict Indian Troops from well established Chinese territory against AP. Leh front was opened by them possibly to divide Indian reaction and also to exploit if opportunity presents itself.

    G Overstretched and ill prepared Indian Army couldn't stand against Chinese attacks as anticipated by Gen Thorat and told to govt and well anticipated (by army) debacle happened.

    H Chinese military too was not prepared for such battle successes (not military victory) But entrenched deep under military exploitation plans and also as an military opportunity presented itself. They knew that they are overstretched too and withdrew as they had no other option.

    I in terms of warfare it presented an unique opportunity to annihilate Chinese Military and attain military victory and also liberate Tibet. US military Generals (who had virtually taken over MOD in south block) had correctly assessed it. Wish Nehru had gone by their advise atleast. The plans were to raise 45 mountain divisions with US military equipment and with US Air Force support launch counter offensive to liberate Tibet. Indian Army was in agreement and was gearing for it when Nehru developed cold feet (I have no doubt that he was a British Agent but I also supect him to be a double agent). Or else why a sure shot victory be so dropped? Did China bought peace and avoided a military defeat? The fact is this war forced China to go for Atom Bomb. China learnt many we nothing.


    Now see present Sit ( Mr Raman please record)


    A. There is no divide between Army, Navy and Airforce on professional issues. please do not create one. Yes true integration as desired doesn't exist. I was part of a team which created possible war scenarios by 2045. Being an Army team we predicted next major showdown with Navy (can't talk more than this). You were part of team. Why didn't you recommend post of CDS to govt and then you talk of Integration? Stop this double talk

    B Indian Military in terms of capabilities is still a defensive force. It lacks offensive capabilities. As offense is the best defensive strategy indian military in fact lacks a real defensive capability too.

    C Nations go for war not the Military. As Indian nation we are just not prepared for war? Standing military world over are maintained to manage initial stages of outbreak of wars. It needs backing in terms of national war mobilization and shorter supply lines to end it favourably. Mr Raman where are these? Let us not fool around?

    D Mr Raman you made a statement once: Military gets prominence only during war. You are so grossly wrong. Military has more roles to play during peace time. It is the real military capabilities which deter wars and conflicts. Our PM also feels that military means some problem at borders ( he said so in recent speech on 15 Aug).wars today are more dynamic and deep ( next war with China may be fought in Chennai) Military is there to manage wars to ensure it ends with gross profit. It is a tool to conduct a political move militarily. Military is being treated like Chowkidars ( sentries) with confidence that wars can be managed by Police Officers). We need to get over this Chowkidar Syndrome. To start with Our NSA should always be a Military General.

    D For GOD sake, please understand having atom bombs is no surety for prevention of wars. Afghan war against Russia was fought by Allies keeping Pakistan in front. What if our enemies push us for internal conflicts (as is happening) when in any case our political masters are busy in plundering? Corruption has become our biggest security threat.

    E China today can finish war with India in 3-4 months to achieve her Military as well as political objectives. Indian Military knows it and has already told Govt. Political leadership need to realise it if they have some time left from plunder. By the time our over confident diplomatic genius in Foriegn Ministry move war will be over.

    F Our PM has no time to meet our Military Chiefs. Do you think situation is any more different than 62?

    China is really well prepared? We are not? As India can not manage her own security and military ( history and present situation is their to support me) it is better we outsource our security like Japan if we really want India safe?

    Can China repeat its 1962 military humiliation of India? | Firstpost
     
  7. Singh

    Singh Phat Cat Administrator

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    1962: Face to Face with the PLA


    Lt Gen Baljit Singh

    [​IMG]

    Come October 2012, the fiftieth anniversary of Independent India’s first and decisive politico-military defeat at the hands of China in the Namka Chhu valley, the detractors of Mr Nehru’s China Policy will be out with sharpened knives. Be that as it may, could the Indian Army have done better to implement Mr Nehru’s above quoted policy intent? With the hide-sight of five decades and especially not forgetting the fact that the Army comprised eleven Infantry Divisions in all, I find that on balance they had risen to the call of duty manfully and with alacrity, from the Kara-Koram Pass in the West to Longju in the East. Perhaps I can best illustrate that fact, by recounting the events which unfolded in the Central Sector of the India-China boundary, where I was principally involved on the ground.

    He placed his index finger over a map and said (words to the effect), “this is BGG which the Chinese intend to usurp from India.
    In the backdrop of brazen Chinese intransigence all along the Himalayan water-shed, in mid March 1962 I was ordered to proceed forthwith to Head Quarters, 9 Infantry Brigade Group at Lucknow. Two days later, as I sat facing Brigadier Bireshwar Nath (a burly and blustering six foot plus), he handed me a signal from Army Headquarters marked, “Top Secret and Personal for the Commander,” directing the Brigadier to establish an Army post at the Rim-Kin ridge which dominated the Bara Hoti Grazing Ground (BGG), the soonest but not later than 15 May, 1962. And that Captain Baljit Singh was to command the BGG Special Task Force (STF) till the Rim-Kin perimeter defence was effectively established.
    The Brigadier then led me to an adjoining room, one wall of which was covered with maps of BGG and Tibet. He placed his index finger over a map and said (words to the effect), “this is BGG which the Chinese intend to usurp from India. I have personally picked 120 of the fittest and highly motivated soldiers from the 14 Rajput Battalion, to constitute the Rim-Kin STF. Your task lies in inducting them from Ghamsali onwards either en-block or in driblets across the Chor Hoti Pass, approximately 16,000ft ASL. You have a Carte Blanche sanction from the Army Headquarters to hire/purchase specialized equipment and mountain guides and travel any-where in the Country, to do so. Any questions?” I hadn’t quite grasped what had been placed in my lap and so said, “I would like to meet you tomorrow, Sir, with my tentative plan and meanwhile would your staff kindly book me on a flight to Bagdogra ex Delhi, the day after. And concurrently, could the 120 brave-hearts of the STF be flown to Srinagar to imbibe the fundamentals of the physiological and psychological challenges of living and soldiering above 12,000ft ASL, at our Ski Warfare School, Gulmarg.” The Brigadier looked distinctly uncomfortable to be “ordered around”, by a six year old green horn!
    In truth, I must admit that they were so exhausted that they could have been taken hostages without a murmur, at the mere asking.
    Now why did the Army Headquarters pick on me to command the BGG STF? Well, in 1959-60 I was exposed to snow, rock and ice craft techniques under the tutelage of Tenzing Norgay at the Himalayan Mountaineering Institute, Darjeeling. With this BGG STF challenge thrown at me, I was intuitively driven to seek out Mr Tenzing for technical counseling. Mr Tenzing heard me out and reminded me that just as I and my fellow students were led across the Zongri Pass (14,000 ft) to the Base Camp, the BGG STF should be handled by me on the same lines. Period! And he made available four High Altitude Sherpa Guides who would procure adequate equipment for getting the STF up to and across the Chor Hoti Pass. For the first time in days, I felt reassured to handle the assigned task.

    In the meanwhile, Lieut Colonel K M Pandalai of the 14 Rajput, had had the basic rations of the STF for a period of 10 days, moved on ponies from Joshimath to Ghamsali, beyond which there were foot paths only. The final launch pad to get across the Chor Hoti was Kala Zabar (KZ), 14,500ft ASL, a day long tough assent especially for men laden with 25 kg of personal kit and food stuffs. I felt that KZ ought to have at least 3 days food stocks which had to be humped by soldiers; tough going but paid dividends in acquiring a measure of acclimatization to high altitude duties.

    The four Sherpas and I had preceded the STF by four days. The Chor Hoti ridge was a narrow horse shoe, with 10 to 15 feet of snow deposit. Once the sun touched the area, the assent was very exhausting, even for seasoned climbers. The descent from Chor Hoti was down a near vertical rock face and we set to fix two Manila-hemp ropes of 150 ft length each. The going beyond for about three km was over an almost level, snowed up plateau, ending at another rock step. Here again, two rope hand-rails were fixed for 250 ft, ending close to the spine of the Rim-Kin ridge, our ultimate goal post! We bivouacked for the night, unarmed and taking comfort that the Brigadier did not expect the PLA to show up before mid May! On the return journey, we marked the entire route (bamboo sticks with red cloth streamers), right up to KZ. By 17 April, Capt R S Taragi with 30 STF soldiers had concentrated at KZ. We decided to make the first push, leaving KZ at 2300 hrs, on April 19. The snow on the approaches to Chor Hoti was firm and compacted by night and by 0400 hrs on 20 April, all of us were atop the Chor Hoti saddle. The descent using fixed ropes was a new experience for the soldiers and almost all of them had to be led, one by one, by myself and the Sherpas. In the event, the last man reached Rim-Kin at 1845 hrs on 20 April, 1962 and in so doing consolidated India’s claim on BGG. In truth, I must admit that they were so exhausted that they could have been taken hostages without a murmur, at the mere asking.

    The PLA detachment of ten soldiers with 30 laden ponies arrived on 12 May, 1962 and attempted to bypass the RCP.

    We had one radio set of American origin, somewhat dated, with an independent power source which had to be cranked manually for the duration of the transmission. But it worked! I communicated the news to the control at Joshimath and Lucknow using the Morse-key and requested for air-drop of tentage and basic food as per an agreed plan. There was no acknowledgement but on 22 April, we were awoken by the drone of air-craft over Rim-Kin. In the next twenty minutes, the two Dakotas dropped their cargo creating a cloud of floating white parachutes over Rim-Kin. And creating special history for many of us. Unfortunately, on touch down the white parachutes spread up to 2 km all around, merged with the snow and we could detect and retrieve only about 20 % of the cargo.

    On 24 April, the Sherpas and I guided the second batch of 30 STF soldiers to Rim-Kin. Accompanying this batch were also 15 Constables of the UP Armed Constabulary who on 26 April set up a Revenue Collection Post (RCP), for monitoring the graziers’ pasturing in the BGG. The RCP was sited about 800 meters ahead of Rim-Kin, within effective fire-coverage of MMGs, if need be.

    The BGG is a gigantic amphitheater of 13,500ft ASL mean elevation. On its NW and SW rim, are ridges one to three thousand feet higher than the BGG plateau-floor. But its NE rim which forms the International boundary with Tibet (China) is barely 500 ft higher than the surroundings, a gateway to BGG over the Tun Jan La (!4,500 ft ASL) for the PLA. Tun Jan La is also the origin of a stream which goes past the NE tip of the Rim-Kin ridge and ultimately flows into the Dhauli Ganga, near Malari; thus leaving no doubt that Tun Jan La is the water-shed ridge, per se. The Sherpas and I walked down the stream for about 4 km and felt that a mule track (ultimately a motor able road) from Malari to Rim-Kin may be possible and provide an all year access to Rim-kin by avoiding the Chor Hoti obstacle in the future, altogether.
    P M Nehru’s China-border policy-construct flowed more from the ground realities rather than his oft insinuated proclivity for, Hindi Chini Bhai Bahi bonhomie.

    The Armed Constabulary were fully established by 27 April and the Indian National Flag was hoisted with full military symbolism, including a bugle-call. Henceforth, this ceremony was performed daily. The PLA detachment of ten soldiers with 30 laden ponies arrived on 12 May, 1962 and attempted to bypass the RCP. We obstructed their attempts, physically blocking their maneuvering and all the while drawing their attention to the fluttering Tri-Colour. After a few minute of heated gesticulations, the PLA pitched their tents about 20 meters away from the RCP. We offered them a kettle of hot tea but they turned their backs and got inside a disused, graziers stone-walled enclosure. Sadly for the RCP, the 30 ponies of the PLA were the only live stock that pastured in the BGG and they refused to pay the revenue!

    In mid June 1962, I handed my report at the Military Operations Directorate at the Army Headquarters. A week later I was summoned by Brigadier D K Palit, Vr C, the Director Military Operations. He asked me whether Rim-Kin could be a permanent military presence and how? I pitched for an immediate survey of the Tun Jan La stream from its confluence near Malari, up to Rim-Kin, by the Army Engineers detachment at Joshimath to check the road building feasibility. This indeed turned out to be do-able and track construction began in right earnest, the same year. Another recommendation which the DMO accepted was, that for air-drops in snow bound areas, we must manufacture parachutes of Red and Orange colours. This too was implemented by 1963.

    The above narrative suggests that P M Nehru’s China-border policy-construct flowed more from the ground realities rather than his oft insinuated proclivity for, Hindi Chini Bhai Bahi bonhomie. The Chinese perfidy in BGG had come to light in 1958-59 when taking advantage of the Border Trade Agreement (over eight mutually nominated Passes), the PLA simply took possession of the un-held Tun Jan La, named it Hu Ji and set up a PLA post at the site where we ultimately confronted them on 12 May, 1962. By hoisting the Tri-Colour at the chosen RCP, did India compromise its claim to the water-shed at Tun Jan La, about 3 km ahead of Rim-Kin? Perhaps yes, but considering what it took to deploy at and hold Rim-Kin, and the inadequacy of our numerical presence, reliable logistics and fire-power, there is no way that we could have hoisted and retained the Tri-Colour at Tun Jan La. However, today we could think on those lines as indeed the Late General Sunderji had demonstrated in the Sumdorung Chhu valley in 1987, where he forced the Chinese to back-off. The General was able to deploy a better part of an entire Army Corps North of the Se La massif, in less than a month, with attendant logistics and fire power and showed us the way forward. It is time to shake off sloth, raise the additional Field Formations for a possible contingency in the trans-Himalayas and be counted among the comity of Nations, as a truly emerged power in South Asia.

    “ Captain Baljit Singh was awarded The Chief of Army Staff Commendation Card for gallantry and distinguished service for his excellent route-charting work at Bara Hoti, 17,000 ft…..” Major General D K Palit, Vr C, May 1971.

    Courtesy : IDR
     
  8. Singh

    Singh Phat Cat Administrator

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    Who attacked whom?

    Fiftieth Anniversary Of The Sino-Indian War​


    THE scene is an Indian prisoners of war camp in Tibet.

    One morning in early 1963, Lt. Tong, a Chinese translator takes four senior Indian officers out for a walk. They are allowed to sit near a mud wall on the outskirts of the ancient monastery where they have been kept under confinement.

    Tong does not let them peep over the wall, though they can hear voices speaking on the other side. A Hindi-speaking Chinese is addressing some Indian jawans. They debate the People’s Liberation Army’s pet subject since the capture of the Indians on the Thagla ridge a few months earlier; ‘admit that India attacked China first on October 20’, says the Chinese voice.

    A jawan speaks. He tells the Chinese that his company was sleeping when the Chinese poured down the ridge. How could India have started the war while sleeping? The Chinese officer calmly explains once again to the jawan that he only thinks of his own unit; everywhere else India attacked and China had no choice but to retaliate in self-defence. But the jawan is fearless and outspoken, he tells his interlocutor: “I do not know what you are talking about, but I know that the whole of my ‘buregade’ (Punjabi for ‘brigade’) was sleeping when you attacked us.”
    Indeed, everyone was sleeping when the Chinese mortars began shelling the bunkers on the Namkha Chu (river) on that fateful morning. Worse, the leadership in Delhi had also been sleeping (and dreaming of throwing out the Chinese).

    The Chinese have been repeating ad nauseam to the world that it was Nehru who attacked them.

    In the introduction of his Himalayan Blunder, Brig. John Dalvi, the Commander of the ill-fated 7 Infantry Brigade writes: “On 21 November 1962, I was woken up by the Chinese Major in charge of my solitary confinement with shouts of ‘good news, good news’. He told me that the Sino-Indian War was over and that the Chinese Government had decided to withdraw. When I asked the reason for this decision he gave me this (Beijing) inspired answer: “India and China have been friends for thousands of years and have never fought before. China does not want war. It is the reactionary Indian Government that was bent on war. So the Chinese counter-attacked in self-defence and liberated all our territories in NEFA and Ladakh, in just one month.”

    He added: “We have proved that you are no match for mighty China”.

    But where was the question of the Indian Army ‘attacking China’ with no food, no clothes, no armament or ammunition supply? Other sources have also confirmed that the Chinese leadership believed that India attacked.

    On 8 November 1962, Dr Malcolm MacDonald, a former British High Commissioner to India, met Robert Donhauser, the US Consul-General in Singapore, to brief him about his visit to China and his lengthy discussions with Zhou Enlai and Marshal Chen Yi.

    The US official later cabled Washington: “Chou (Zhou) took exception to UK position that Peiping (Beijing) was aggressor in border dispute. (Zhou) stated he realized UK must support India as member of Commonwealth but did not have to charge Chinese (of) aggression. (Zhou) wished to go to conference table but India had made impossible demands prior to discussions, particularly since territory under dispute was not Indian, but Chinese. MacDonald, of course, upheld UK position.”

    This raises two questions. Did the Chinese really believe that India had attacked China in the West Kameng district? Why pretend that it was Nehru who attacked when it is so obviously not true?

    The answer is the Chinese probably knew that India was not prepared, further they wanted to teach ‘arrogant’ India a lesson for granting refuge to the Dalai Lama three years earlier.

    On 6 October 1962, Mao Zedong addressed several senior Chinese generals in Beijing: “It seems like armed co-existence won’t work. It’s just as we expected. Nehru really wants to use force. This isn’t strange. He has always wanted to seize Aksai Chin and Thagla Ridge. He thinks he can get everything he desires.”

    The Chairman continued: “Now the Indians want to fight a war with us. Naturally, we don’t have fear. (But) we cannot lose ground; once we lose ground it would be tantamount to letting them seize a big piece of land equivalent to Fujian province. …Since Nehru sticks his head out and
    insists on us fighting him, for us not to fight with him would not be proper. Courtesy emphasizes reciprocity.”

    Why? One of the reasons might be Operation Leghorn planned by a flamboyant new Corps Commander.

    On 3 October, Lt Gen Kaul took over Corps IV, a Corps especially created ‘to throw the Chinese out’. On his arrival in Tezpur, Kaul addressed the senior officers: “The Prime Minister himself had ordered these posts (near the Thagla ridge) to be set up and he had based his decision on the highest Intelligence advice.” The ‘intelligence’ inputs turned out to be a bad joke.
    Niranjan Prasad commented: “Explicit… was a warning that failure or dragging of feet in completing the task could result in serious consequences for those responsible.”

    It appears that the Chinese military intelligence had gathered that Indian forces were planning to start Operation Leghorn to occupy the Thagla Ridge on 10 October (the information was absolutely correct).

    As today Beijing can enter any computer system, in Mao’s days, the Chinese intelligence knew everything about Kaul’s and his acolytes’ plans.
    In his memoirs, Prasad recalls: “I had received reports of a pirate radio operating somewhere in our area, but when we referred this to higher authorities the matter was dismissed: we were curtly told that there was no pirate radio transmitter on our side of the border. Subsequently it was confirmed that the Chinese had indeed sneaked in a pirate transmitter (near Bomdila) in the Tibetan labour camp. The aerial of their transmitter was concealed as a tall prayer-flagstaff.”

    This is probably how Mao was aware of Operation Leghorn.

    But there was something else. The Indian officers on the ground had some doubts about the exact location of the boundary. When on 14 August 1962, Brigadier DK Palit, Director of Military Operations visited the Corps Headquarters in Tezpur, he was asked about the Thagla ridge. He said that the Army headquarters in Delhi had only received it the day before he left for Tezpur. He promised to look into this and send an answer ‘as soon as he could’.

    In his insider’s assessment of the conflict, War in the High Himalayas, Brigadier Palit recalls: “On my return to Delhi I referred the Thagla dilemma to the Director of Military Survey. The latter commented that as the existing maps of the area were ‘sketchy and inaccurate, having been compiled from unreliable sources’, the map coordinates of the new post quoted by the patrol leader were of doubtful accuracy.”
    Later Palit went to meet Dr S Gopal, the Director of the Historical Section, who told him that after the boundary talks with the Chinese in 1960, the Government of India had been aware that the actual terrain in the area of the trijunction was different from that depicted on the quarter-inch scale map of the Simla sheet.

    But Palit added: “What Gopal had not told me ~ and I found out only later ~ was that the Chinese had not accepted our arguments.”
    If Mao was aware of these doubts, he would have used it as a pretext to say that India walked ‘into China’, but the fact remains that the entire ‘buregade’, not to speak of the 4 Infantry Division, was sleeping that morning. In any case, who attacked in the eastern sector of NEFA (Walong) and Ladakh (Chushul), if not China?

    http://www.thestatesman.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=425274&catid=38
     
  9. LurkerBaba

    LurkerBaba Staff Administrator

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    1962 war would have been different had IAF been on the offence: ACM

    The outcome of the 1962 war with China would have been different had the Air Force been used in an offensive role, Air Chief Marshal N A K Browne said here today on the conflict in which India suffered a humiliating defeat.

    He said the Kargil conflict of 1999 would have dragged for another three months had the IAF not been used.

    "Yes, no doubts about that. If air power was used at that time, the outcome would have been totally different," he said when asked if the result of the 1962 war would have been different had air power been used.


    The IAF chief was addressing the annual Air Force Day press conference.

    The issue of IAF not being used in the 1962 war is still debated by military historians and experts and there is no clarity as to why the air force was not used in that war.

    Browne said IAF was not allowed to be used in an offensive role and confined only to provide transport support to the Army and said "these are open and glaring lessons we should have imbibed".

    "But this time, I can assure you there will be no such limitation. The IAF will play a leading role in not just against that or any other sector but anywhere," the IAF chief


    said.

    He said a seminar will be held on October 26 to discuss if the result of the 1962 war would have been different had the IAF been used and "we are convinced that that it would have been different."

    Taking credit for ending the Kargil war, Browne said, "If IAF had not got into the war at right point of time offensively, the Kargil conflict would have continued for another three months at those impossible heights for our young jawans and officers to be climbing up and losing lives.

    "It is air power, which concluded that war."

    Asked if it was "a blunder on part of the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to not use the air force", Browne said, "It seems you have read the book 'Himalayan Blunder' and I don't want to add to the confusion to that."

    "In the hindsight, one can learn lessons from the history and these are open and glaring lessons we should have imbibed," the IAF chief said.

    1962 war would have been different had IAF been on the offence: ACM - Indian Express
     
  10. p2prada

    p2prada Stars and Ambassadors Stars and Ambassadors

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  11. Sridhar

    Sridhar House keeper Moderator

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    Lack of preparedness, intelligence failure led to 1962 war defeat: Gen

    Dealing with China

    Lack of war preparedness and failure to gather intelligence about Chinese troops' movement led to India's defeat in 1962 war, former Army chief Gen V K Singh said today.

    Addressing a seminar 'Dealing with China', he also said India had lacked correct political assessment at that time and there were no diplomatic measures to engage with the neighbour to know its intention.

    "It was a kick which woke us up. It was something which shook us as to what would happens to us if we are not prepared. It was a like a lesson which made us to face 1965 and 1971 (when the country fought the wars with Pakistan)," he said.

    On training of troops, he said it was then restricted to training methods adopted during the Second World War and it was not looking at the future.

    Before 1962, he said, military was not prepared for a war and was more into other activities.

    On dealing with China he said, India have to show firmness and determination on the border issues.

    More here Lack of preparedness, intelligence failure led to 1962 war defeat: Gen V K Singh - Indian Express
     
  12. Yusuf

    Yusuf GUARDIAN Administrator

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    Re: Lack of preparedness, intelligence failure led to 1962 war defeat:

    I beg to differ with the General with regards to Intel failure. Gen Thorat had warned about an impending Chinese attack and had also conducted a huge exercise to examine possible defence against the Chinese.

    Gen Thorats voice and opinion was snuffed by Menon. Gen Kaul became chief and screwed up the whole thing.
    Lack of preparedness too has to be blamed on the political class which did not heed to Gen Thorats warning and prepared for war. Worse, we didn't use all our equipment that was ready at our disposal primarily the IAF.
     
  13. Sridhar

    Sridhar House keeper Moderator

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    Re: Lack of preparedness, intelligence failure led to 1962 war defeat:

    On the Political class, from the link.

    "We did not make a correct political assessment. Our diplomatic measures to engage China to know its intention and what it was doing were not there," he said.
     
  14. Ray

    Ray The Chairman Defence Professionals Moderator

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    Re: Lack of preparedness, intelligence failure led to 1962 war defeat:

    Nehru was comfortable with people who was likeminded.

    He suffered!
     
  15. asianobserve

    asianobserve Elite Member Elite Member

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    Re: Lack of preparedness, intelligence failure led to 1962 war defeat:

    Maybe too much political correctness? The blame squarely rests on Mr. Nehru...but mind you there is still a large dose of left-over Nehruvian political correctness around in India, some of them are quiet so often spilled here in this forum...
     
  16. mayfair

    mayfair Elite Member Elite Member

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    Re: Lack of preparedness, intelligence failure led to 1962 war defeat:

    I wish Godse had shot him instead...
     
  17. arnabmit

    arnabmit Homo Communis Indus Senior Member

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    Re: 1962 India China War, Role of Indian political and military leader

    [video=youtube_share;S4390QXdYF4]http://youtu.be/S4390QXdYF4[/video]
     
  18. Razor

    Razor STABLE GENIUS Moderator

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    Re: 1962 India China War, Role of Indian political and military leader

    I wonder how much of this is true.

    For starters he talks about Mt. Kailash, when the fact is Kailash is nowhere near Aksai Chin. That is outright misinformation. Kailash is in Tibet, near the Tibet, Nepal, Uttarakhand tri-border region.

    Also regarding VKK Menon: some of the info he gives seems to contradict stuff in the open source.
    For eg. I found this on wiki. Granted wiki can't be fully trusted but still something to consider.
    Regarding rape by Chinese army (hopefully I got that right, Hindi not my first language): not able to find info on that. I would like to know if there is any truth behind that or if it is more misinformation like kailash. But I'm not an expert on the 1962 war, so I could have missed it.

    Also his analysis of tensions between Indians in NE and the rest of the country seems simplistic.
    @arnabmit : Thoughts ?
     
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  19. arnabmit

    arnabmit Homo Communis Indus Senior Member

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    Re: 1962 India China War, Role of Indian political and military leader

    Apologies.

    After watching a few other videos by this guy, I realized that all he does is to peddle conspiracy theories and spread misinformation.

    @Mods, please delete the video.

     
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  20. SajeevJino

    SajeevJino Long walk Elite Member

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    Agreed, except the bolder part

    hmm

    we heard, any sources for confirming your claim..?

    then, who started air lifting advanced weaponry to NEFA, whose air force cargo planes landed in far eastern air strips..

    They had some misunderstand, for that one can't blindly believe the split game
     

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