1962 India China War

ajtr

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Letter from Sardar Patel to Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai

NEW DELHI
4 November 1950
My Dear Sir Girja,
Thank you for your letter of the 3rd November 1950. I am sending herewith
the note which you were good enough to send me. I need hardly say that I
have read it with a great deal of interest and profit to myself and it has
resulted in a much better understanding of the points at issue and general
though serious nature of the problem.
The Chinese advance into Tibet upsets all our security calculations. Hitherto,
the danger to India on its land frontiers has always come from the North-
West. Throughout history we have concentrated our armed might in that
region. For the first time, a serious danger is now developing on the North
and North-East side; at the same time, our danger from the West or North-
West is in no way lessened. This creates most embarrassing defense
problems and I entirely agree with you that a reconsideration of our military
position and a redisposition of our forces are inescapable.
Regarding Communists, again the position requires a great deal of thought.
Hitherto, the smuggling of arms, literature, etc. across the difficult Burmese
and Pakistan frontier on the East or along the sea was our only danger. We
shall now have to guard our Northern and North-eastern approaches also.
Unfortunately, all these approaches-Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and the tribal
areas in Assam-are weak spots both from the point of view of
communications and police protection and also established loyalty to India.
Even Darjeeling and Kalimpong area is by no means free from pro-Mongolian
prejudices. The Nagas and other hill tribes in Assam have hardly had any
contact with Indians. European missionaries and other visitors have been in
touch with them, but their influence was, by no means, friendly to India and
Indians. In Sikkim, there was political ferment some time ago. It seems to
me there is ample scope for trouble and discontent in that small State.
Bhutan is comparatively quiet, but its affinity with Tibetans would be a
handicap. Nepal (we all know too well, a weak oligarchic regime based
almost entirely on force) is in conflict with an enlightened section of the
people as well as enlightened ideas of the modern age. Added to this weak
position, there is the irredentism of the Chinese. The political ambitions of
the Chinese by themselves might not have mattered so much; but when they
are combined with discontent in these areas, absence of close contact with
Indians and Communist ideology the difficulty of the position increases
manifold. We have also to bear in mind that boundary disputes, which have
many times in history been the cause of international conflicts, can be
exploited by Communist China and its source of inspiration, Soviet Russia,
for a prolonged war of nerves, culminating at the appropriate time, in armed
conflict.
We have also so take note of a thoroughly unscrupulous, unreliable and
determined power practically at our doors. In your very illuminating survey
of what has passed between us and the Chinese Government through our
Ambassador, you have made out an unanswerable case for treating the
Chinese with the greatest suspicion. What I have said above, in my
judgment, entitles us to treat them with a certain amount of hostility, let
alone a great deal of circumspection. In these circumstances, one thing, to
my mind, is quite clear; and, that is, that we cannot be friendly with China
and must think in terms of defense against a determined, calculating,
unscrupulous, ruthless, unprincipled and prejudiced combination of powers,
of which the Chinese will be the spearhead. There might be from them
outward offers or protestations of friendship, but in that will be concealed an
ultimate hideous design of ideological and even political conquest into their
bloc. It is equally obvious to me that any friendly or appeasing approaches
from us would either be mistaken for weakness or would be exploited in
furtherance of their ultimate aim. It is this general attitude which must
determine the other specific questions which you have so admirably stated. I
am giving serious consideration to those problems and it is possible I may
discuss this matter with you once more.
Yours sincerely,
VALLABHBHAI PATEL
Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, I.C.S.,
Secretary-General, External Affairs Ministry,
New Delhi.
Sardar Patel Exhorts people to stand unitedly to see conditions in
Tibet and Nepal and defend their country
The Hindustan Times, 11 November 1950
Sardar Patel said in Delhi that the present or potential dangers arising
from what was happening in Tibet and Nepal made it incumbent on the
people to rise above party squabbles and unitedly defend their newly-won
freedom. The path shown by Mahatma Gandhi and Swami Dayanand, he
added, would help the people to tide over these none too easy times.
Sardar Patel was addressing a meeting organized by the Central Aryan
Association to commemorate the 67th death anniversary of Swami
Dayanand Saraswati, social reformer and thinker.
Referring to the recent developments in Nepal, Sardar Patel said: "In this
country, our near neighbour, the Raja has sought sanctuary in the Indian
Embassy. How could we refuse to give him refuge? We had to give it.
Those who are wielding real power today in Nepal do not accept the Raja
as the head of the State. They have installed the Raja's three-year-old
grandson on the gaddi. They want us to accept this position. How can we
do so?"
Sardar Patel emphasized that the "internal feud" in Nepal had laid India's
frontiers in the north wide open to outside dangers. It was imperative,
therefore, for Indians to be well prepared to meet any challenge that
might come from any quarter.
Sardar Patel criticized Chinese intervention in Tibet and said that to use
the `sword' against the traditionally peace-loving Tibetan people was
unjustified. No other country in the world was as peace-loving as Tibet.
India did not believe, therefore, that the Chinese Government would
actually use force in settling the Tibetan question.
"The Chinese Government," he said, "did not follow India's advice to
settle the Tibetan issue peacefully. They marched their armies into Tibet
and explained this action by talking of foreign interests intriguing in Tibet
against China. But this fear is unfounded: no outsider is interested in
Tibet. India made this very plain to the Chinese Government. If the
Chinese Government had taken India's advice, resort to arms would have
been avoided."
Continuing, Sardar Patel said that nobody could say what the outcome of
Chinese action would be. But the use of force ultimately created more
fear and tension. It was possible that when a country got drunk with its
own military strength and power, it did not think calmly over all issues.
But use of arms was wrong. In the present state of the world, such events
might easily touch off a new world war, which would mean disaster for
mankind.
In these difficult times, Sardar Patel said, the duty of the Indian people
lay not in fleeing from trouble but facing it boldly. That was the real
message of both Swami Dayanand and Mahatma Gandhi. "Do not let
cowardice cripple you. Do not run away from danger. The three-year-old
freedom of the country has to be fully protected. India today is
surrounded by all sorts of dangers and it is for the people today to
remember the teachings of the two great saints and face fearlessly all
dangers."
The Deputy Prime Minister continuing declared: "In this kalyug we shall
return ahimsa for ahimsa. But if anybody resorted to force against us we
shall meet it with force." Sardar Patel said that Swami Dayanand was one
of the two great saints Gujarat gave to the world. Although Swami
Dayanand and Mahatma Gandhi were born in Gujarat, they had dedicated
their lives to the service of mankind. Ultimately they belonged to not only
the whole of India but the world. It was for the people now to understand
the teachings of these two saints and follow them in their actual lives.
The greatest contribution of Swami Dayanand, he said, was that he saved
the country from falling deeper into the morass of helplessness. He
actually laid the foundations of India's freedom. A movement against
untouchability, later to be supported by Gandhiji, was launched, and
reconversion to Hinduism of the already forcibly converted persons was
started. Swami Dayanand put a complete stop to the tendency in those
days of preaching adharma in the name of dharma, which had made the
Hindu Dharma the laughing stock of the world. ,
"Swami Dayanand wiped off," he said, "the dirt and grime that had settled
on the Hindu Dharma. He swept aside the cloud of superstition shrouding
it and let in light."
In the Indian Constitution untouchability had been declared a crime and
Hindi accepted as the national language. It was actually Swami
Dayanand, Sardar Patel said, who first propagated that Hindi be made the
national language.
People should also remember that Swamiji did not get foreign education.
He was the product of the Indian culture. Although it was true that they in
India had to borrow whatever was good and useful from other countries,
it was right and proper that Indian culture was accorded its due place.
 

death.by.chocolate

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India had no chance to win a war against China in 1962 at all.

With the soviet helt, CHina set up a consolidated industry base with full indutry chains during 1953-1958. In 1959, CHina already had most of its weapons indeginized completely ,from cannon,gun,tank,trucks to jet plane..

If india-sino war took place in mid 1950 before CHinese industry base was completed,India should have more chance to win.
Then why did China turn tail and run, conceding 60 miles of territory? And please don't give me the processed baloney about China making concessions for peace. Don't get me wrong I think it was a brilliant move, it did immense damage to Indian psyche, to this day many Indians think China actually won the war of 1962.
 
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ajtr

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ajtr

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Thanks ramna for this.

ramana said:
Book Review, Pioneer, 3 Jan., 2007

When Nehru 'hated' his Defence Minister

MV Kamath

1965 War: The Inside Story: Defence Minister YB Chavan's Diary of India-Pakistan War
Author: RD Pradhan
Publisher: Atlantic
Price: Rs 275

The 22-day India-Pakistan war of 1965 has almost been forgotten. YB Chavan was India's Defence Minister then, who was inducted following the country's humiliating defeat at the hands of China three years earlier. Chavan, not the favourite of Nehru, took over from VK Krishna Menon, who was removed following huge popular protests.

As RD Pradhan reveals, the new Defence Minister's selection "was a matter of compulsion and expediency". Reportedly when things settled down, Nehru "allowed certain senior politicians" to administer 'pin-pricks' to him. Pradhan reports that within the first six months in office, Chavan twice felt forced to submit his resignation to the Prime Minister, though Nehru wouldn't accept them. Chavan had become popular and that wasn't liked by Nehru. According to Pradhan, "That was Nehru's way of showing Chavan that his presence in Delhi was at the PM's will".

In 1965, Pakistan was ruled by Ayub Khan, who had once said that one Muslim soldier was equal to 10 Hindu jawans. Following the beating India received at the hands of China, Ayub Khan -- in early 1965 -- worked out a plan to make an attempt to bring down India to Pakistan's knees.

The strategy was four-fold. Phase one was to make a "probing encounter" to test India's will to fight. It didn't work the way Ayub Khan had hoped. Phase two was a disguised invasion of Kashmir under Operation Gibralter. That, too, did not give the desired results. So came the Third Phase: A full-scale Army assault in India's Chhamb sector. If that worked out well, Ayub Khan hoped to make a massive lightening armoured attack to capture Amritsar and as much of other Indian territory as possible, to be exchanged eventually for Kashmir.

By then, of course, Nehru had died and Lal Bahadur Shastri had become India's Prime Minister. The entire plan was based on Ayub Khan's favourite theory -- as he told his Army Chief Gen Musa -- "As a general rule, Hindu morale would not stand for more that a couple of hard blows delivered at the right time and the right place." Poor man, he got it all wrong. But what this book shows is that there were occasions when Indian Army Commanders showed cowardice and panic -- Maj-Gen Niranjan Prasad, for example, was forced to resign rather than face court martial; and, personnel of the 161 Artillery Regiment deserted en masse, leaving their guns, ammunition and vehicles behind.

This book is both a story of cowardice and heroism. Chavan luckily maintained a diary and wrote down his thoughts in English and not in Marathi. As Chavan's Private Secretary, Pradhan managed to have access to it and what he, therefore, has written carries conviction. It describes "events, behaviour of key personalities political and military and their attitude during the military operations", though Pradhan states that his book "is not an account of the 1965 India-Pakistan War".

The book is divided into three sections. Section I describes the background to the event. Section II deals with military operations, while Section III is a commentary on the Defence Minister and his Chiefs, the higher direction of war and Chavan's reflections on the future of India-Pakistan relations.

During the war, the Navy was asked not to take any offensive action. Had it done so and bombed Karachi, for instance, the Pakistanis could have retaliated, but they would have learnt a lesson not to play with fire. Even the Air Force was not thrown into battle against Pakistan till the latter attacked air bases on September 6.

India should have taken Lahore, but Chavan had two silly excuses to give: One, following the fiasco on the Ichogil Canal, any idea to capture Lahore had to be given up; and, two, it would not have been wise to tie down a large part of the Indian Army inside any city when the Chinese had already started belligerent moves in the North-East.

The book is a treat to read.
 

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Independent India: Dynastic blunders (nehru gandhi dynasty)


Independent India: Dynastic blunders
For over forty years after independence, India was ruled directly or
indirectly by the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty. As a result, national interest
was often sacrificed for personal dynastic interests. On at least three
occasions, Nehru sacrificed India's interests for the sake of
international glory for himself. First is his well-known blunder of
referring Kashmir to the United Nations when Indian troops were on the
verge of driving the Pakistanis out of Kashmir. The next was his
betrayal of Tibet to please China and gain glory for himself in Korea.
The third was his failure to settle the border with China because of
his preoccupation with his fantasy of Pancha Sheel. Nehru's colossal
blunder in Kashmir is well known, so I will briefly discuss his fiasco
in dealing with Tibet and China.

But first I want to highlight an important but often overlooked point.
It was not Pakistan that created the Kashmir problem. Nehru created the
problem with his two blunders: referring Kashmir to the United Nations
and agreeing to the present cease fire line or the LOC. At the very
least Nehru should have asked for the Indus River as the Line of
Control. Similarly, what I want to next is explain that it was not
China but again Nehru that created the border problem with China with
his multiple blunders. With his blunder upon blunder Nehru sacrificed
thousands of lives- both soldiers and civilians. His grandson Rajiv
Gandhi contributed his own share of blunders by sending Indian troops
into Sri Lanka unprepared. Let me next examine the Chinese scene.
..


Nehru and the China-Tibet blunder

In the year 1950, two momentous events shook Asia and the world. One
was the Chinese invasion of Tibet, and the other, Chinese intervention
in the Korean War. The first was near, on India's borders, the other,
far away in the Korean Peninsula where India had little at stake. By
all canons of logic, India should have devoted utmost attention to the
immediate situation in Tibet, and let interested parties like China and
the U.S. sort it out in Korea. But Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Prime
Minister, did exactly the opposite. He treated the Tibetan crisis in a
haphazard fashion, while getting heavily involved in Korea. India today
is paying for this folly by being the only country of its size in the
world without an official boundary with its giant neighbor. Tibet soon
disappeared from the map. As in Kashmir, Nehru sacrificed national
interest at home in pursuit of international glory abroad.

India at the time maintained missions in Lhasa and Gyangtse. Due to the
close relations that existed between India and Tibet going back
centuries and also because of the unsettled conditions in China,
Tibet's transactions with the outside world were conducted mainly
through India. Well into 1950, the Indian Government regarded Tibet as
a free country.

The Chinese announced their invasion of Tibet on 25 October 1950.
According to them, it was to 'free Tibet from imperialist forces',
and consolidate its border with India. Nehru announced that he and the
Indian Government were "extremely perplexed and disappointed with the
Chinese Government's action..." Nehru also complained that he had
been "led to believe by the Chinese Foreign Office that the Chinese
would settle the future of Tibet in a peaceful manner by direct
negotiation with the representatives of Tibet..."

This was not true, for in September 1949, more than a year before the
Chinese invasion, Nehru himself had written: "Chinese communists are
likely to invade Tibet." The point to note is that Nehru, by sending
mixed signals, showing more interest in Korea than in Tibet, had
encouraged the Chinese invasion; the Chinese had made no secret of
their desire to invade Tibet. In spite of this, Nehru's main interest
was to sponsor China as a member of the UN Security Council instead of
safeguarding Indian interests in Tibet.

Because of this, when the Chinese were moving troops into Tibet, there
was little concern in Indian official circles. Panikkar, the Indian
Ambassador in Beijing, went so far as to pretend that there was 'lack
of confirmation' of the presence of Chinese troops in Tibet and that
to protest the Chinese invasion of Tibet would be an "interference to
India's efforts on behalf of China in the UN". So Panikkar was more
interested in protecting Chinese interests in the UN than India's own
interests on the Tibetan border! Nehru agreed with his Ambassador. He
wrote, "our primary consideration is maintenance of world peace...
Recent developments in Korea have not strengthened China's position,
which will be further weakened by any aggressive action [by India] in
Tibet." So Nehru was ready to sacrifice India's national security
interests in Tibet so as not to weaken China's case in the UN!

It is nothing short of tragedy that the two greatest influences on
Nehru at this crucial juncture in history were Krishna Menon and K.M.
Panikkar, both communists. Panikkar, while nominally serving as Indian
ambassador in China, became practically a spokesman for Chinese
interests in Tibet. Sardar Patel remarked that Panikkar "has been at
great pains to find an explanation or justification for Chinese policy
and actions." India eventually gave up its right to have a diplomatic
mission in Lhasa on the ground that it was an 'imperialist legacy'.
This led to Nehru's discredited 'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai'. Mao had
no reciprocal affection for India and never spoke of 'Chini-Hindi
Bhai Bhai' - or its Chinese equivalent. Far from it, he had only
contempt for India and its leaders. Mao respected only the strong who
would oppose him, and not the weak who bent over backwards to please
him.

Sardar Patel warned Nehru: "Even though we regard ourselves as friends
of China, the Chinese do not regard us as friends." He wrote a famous
letter in which he expressed deep concern over developments in Tibet,
raising several important points. In particular, he noted that a free
and friendly Tibet was vital for India's security, and everything
including military measures should be considered to ensure it. On
November 9, 1950, two days after he wrote the letter to Nehru, he
announced in Delhi: "In Kali Yuga, we shall return ahimsa for ahimsa.
If anybody resorts to force against us, we shall meet it with force."
But Nehru ignored Patel's letter. The truth is that India was in a
strong position to defend its interests in Tibet, but gave up the
opportunity for the sake of pleasing China. It is not widely known in
India that in 1950, China could have been prevented from taking over
Tibet.

Patel on the other hand recognized that in 1950, China was in a
vulnerable position, fully committed in Korea and by no means secure in
its hold over the mainland. For months General MacArthur had been
urging President Truman to "unleash Chiang Kai Shek" lying in wait in
Formosa (Taiwan) with full American support. China had not yet acquired
the atom bomb, which was more than ten years in the future. India had
little to lose and everything to gain by a determined show of force
when China was struggling to consolidate its hold.

In addition, India had international support, with world opinion
strongly against Chinese aggression in Tibet. The world in fact was
looking to India to take the lead. The highly influential English
journal The Economist echoed the Western viewpoint when it wrote:
"Having maintained complete independence of China since 1912, Tibet has
a strong claim to be regarded as an independent state. But it is for
India to take a lead in this matter. If India decides to support
independence of Tibet as a buffer state between itself and China,
Britain and U.S.A. will do well to extend formal diplomatic recognition
to it."

So China could have been stopped. But this was not to be. Nehru ignored
Patel's letter as well as international opinion and gave up this
golden opportunity to turn Tibet into a friendly buffer state. With
such a principled stand, India would also have acquired the status of a
great power while Pakistan would have disappeared from the radar screen
of world attention. Much has been made of Nehru's blunder in Kashmir,
but it pales in comparison with his folly in Tibet. As a result of this
monumental failure of vision - and nerve - India soon came to be
treated as a third rate power, acquiring 'parity' with Pakistan.
Two months later Patel was dead.

Even after the loss of Tibet, Nehru gave up opportunities to settle the
border with China. To understand this, it is necessary to appreciate
the fact that what China desired most was a stable border with India.
With this in view, the Chinese Premier Zhou-en-Lai visited India
several times to fix the boundary between the two countries. In short,
the Chinese proposal amounted to the following: they were prepared to
accept the McMahon Line as the boundary in the east - with possibly
some minor adjustments and a new name - and then negotiate the
unmarked boundary in the west between Ladakh and Tibet. In effect, what
Zhou-en-Lai proposed was a phased settlement, beginning with the
eastern boundary. Nehru, however, wanted the whole thing settled at
once. The practical minded Zhou-en-Lai found this politically
impossible. And on each visit, the Chinese Premier in search of a
boundary settlement, heard more about the principles of Pancha Sheela
than India's stand on the boundary. He interpreted this as
intransigence on India's part.

China in fact went on to settle its boundary with Mayammar (Burma)
roughly along the McMahon Line following similar principles. Contrary
to what the Indian public was told, the border between Ladakh (in the
Princely State of Kashmir) and Tibet was never clearly demarcated. As
late as 1960, the Indian Government had to send survey teams to Ladakh
to locate the boundary and prepare maps. But the Government kept
telling the people that there was a clearly defined boundary, which the
Chinese were refusing to accept.

What the situation demanded was a creative approach, especially from
the Indian side. There were several practical issues on which
negotiations could have been conducted - especially in the 1950s when
India was in a strong position. China needed Aksai Chin because it had
plans to construct an access road from Tibet to Xinjiang province
(Sinkiang) in the west. Aksai Chin was of far greater strategic
significance to China than to India. (It may be a strategic liability
for India - being expensive to maintain and hard to supply, even more
than the Siachen Glacier.) Had Nehru recognized this he might have
proposed a creative solution like asking for access to Mount Kailash
and Manasarovar in return for Chinese access to Aksai Chin. The issue
is not whether such an agreement was possible, but no solutions were
proposed. The upshot of all this was that China ignored India -
including Pancha Sheel - and went ahead with its plan to build the
road through Aksai Chin.

This is still not the full story. On the heels of this twin blunder -
abandonment of Tibet and sponsorship of China, with nothing to show in
return - Nehru deceived the Indian public in his pursuit of
international glory through Pancha Sheel. Pancha Sheel, which was the
principal 'policy' of Nehru towards China from the betrayal of
Tibet to the expulsion of Dalai Lama in 1959, is generally regarded as
a demonstration of good faith by Nehru that was exploited by the
Chinese who 'stabbed him in the back'. This is not quite correct,
for Nehru (and Krishna Menon) knew about the Chinese incursions in
Ladakh and Aksai Chin but kept it secret for years to keep the illusion
of Pancha Sheel alive.

General Thimayya had brought the Chinese activities in Aksai Chin to
the notice of Nehru and Krishna Menon several years before that. An
English mountaineer by name Sydney Wignall was deputed by Thimayya to
verify reports that the Chinese were building a road through Aksai
Chin. He was captured by the Chinese but released and made his way back
to India after incredible difficulties, surviving several snowstorms.
Now Thimayya had proof of Chinese incursion. When the Army presented
this to the Government, Menon blew up. In Nehru's presence, he told
the senior officer making the presentation that he was "lapping up CIA
propaganda."

Wignall was not Thimayya's only source. Shortly after the Chinese
attack in 1962, I heard from General Thimayya that he had deputed a
young officer of the Madras Sappers (MEG) to Aksai Chin to investigate
reports of Chinese intrusion who brought back reports of the Chinese
incursion. But the public was not told of it simply to cover up
Nehru's blunders. He was still trying to sell his Pancha Sheel and
Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai to the Indian public. Even today, Nehru's
family members exercise dictatorial control over the documents
pertaining to this crucial period. Even documents in the National
Archives are not available to scholars without permission from the
Nehru-Gandhi family heirs. This is to protect his reputation from being
damaged by the truth.

The sorry catalog of blunders continued after Nehru's death. In the
Bangladesh war, India achieved one of the most decisive victories in
modern history. More than 90,000 Pakistani soldiers were in Indian
custody. The newly independent Bangladesh wanted to try these men as
war criminals for their atrocities against the people of East Bengal.
The Indian Government could have used this as a bargaining chip with
Pakistan and settled the Kashmir problem once and for all. Instead,
Indira Gandhi threw away this golden opportunity in exchange for a
scrap of paper called the Shimla Agreement. Thanks to this folly,
Pakistan is more active than ever in Kashmir.


Kargil and its lessons: brush with disaster

This sad string of failures holds an important lesson in history. The
Congress has always been a party held together by a personality -
first the Mahatma, later Nehru, and now Sonia Gandhi. It is inevitable
therefore that force of personality rather than concern of national
interest should have influenced major decisions even at crucial points
in history. This was so in Kashmir, in Tibet, over the border dispute
with China, the Shimla Agreement, and most recently, the misadventure
in Sri Lanka. It is India's misfortune that this personality
dominated entity should have controlled the fate of the nation for the
better part of half a century since independence. The question for the
future is - will history repeat itself or have the people of India
learnt their lesson. The Congress apparently has not. This is clear
from its behavior preceding the brief war with Pakistan over Kargil,
when Sonia Gandhi tried to takeover the Government in a coup under
false pretences.

It is unnecessary to go into the details of this sordid episode, but a
basic question needs to be asked. There are complaints all around that
Sonia Gandhi is destroying the Congress party because of her
inexperience and her style of functioning. But the same Congressmen
were willing to bring down the Government and install her as Prime
Minister - just as Pakistani soldiers were infiltrating across the
LOC in Kashmir. The question is - what would have been the fate of
Kashmir and India, had the coup attempt succeeded, with the immature
not to say irresponsible Sonia Gandhi in the place of Vajpayee as Prime
Minister, with the likes of Jayalalitha and Subramanian Swamy in
control? It does not take much intelligence to see that Kashmir would
have been lost, giving Sonia Gandhi an excellent excuse to declare
Emergency leading to dynastic dictatorship. This would bring back
European rule with a vengeance.

At the very least, the episode involving the infamous tea party and the
coup attempt showed that there are people at the highest level who have
no conception of national security. Anyone who indulges in such a
reckless adventure, treating the nation and its interests in such a
lighthearted manner is unfit for high office.

This is what India escaped in April 1999 - no thanks to the Congress
party. Nehru may no longer be on the scene but his legacy of
sacrificing national interest for personal gain - or what N.R.
Waradpande in a forthcoming book on Nehru has called 'assault on
nationhood' - continues unabated. By no stretch of the imagination
can the dynasty or its party be called nationalistic. The behavior of
the Congress party in mindlessly supporting Sonia Gandhi's coup
attempt at the cost of national interest shows both Nehru and his party
in their true colors.


Corruption of national institutions

As I just noted, even some documents in the National Archives are not
available to scholars if the Nehru family members feel that they might
contain any damaging information. But the Congress, joined by the
Communists, went much further, especially when Indira Gandhi became
Prime Minister. Just as Nehru sought control of the 'commanding heights
of the economy' with his socialistic planning, he and his successors
built a centralized educational establishment that would perpetuate his
anti-Hindu view of Indian history and civilization. This led to
anti-Hindu forces dominating education for nearly fifty years.

The first minister of education was Maulana Azad - said to be a
'nationalist' Muslim and a close friend and open admirer of Nehru -
at least in public. Azad was an indolent man and an ineffective
administrator, but with a strong commitment to exalting the glory of
Islamic rule in India. (He had also a hand in sabotaging R.C.
Majumdar's multi-volume work on the Indian Freedom Movement, which at
times was critical of the Congress.) So the official rewriting of
Indian history had begun - with its whitewashing of the horrors of
Islamic rule accompanied by the introduction of anti-Hindu propaganda
- describing Hinduism as full of inequities and Islam as egalitarian.
Nehru himself had set the trend with his glorification of Muhammad of
Ghazni and Babar.

Under this program of de-Hinduisation, vandals and terrorists like
Ghazni, Babar and Aurangazeb were treated as bringers of civilization
and equality, while portraying such freedom fighters as Shivaji, Rana
Pratap, Chandrashekar Azad and others as obstructionists standing in
the way of progress. But thanks to the official hospitality extended to
such historical revisions, the influential National Council for
Educational Research and Training (NCERT) came to be dominated by
scholars who pursued the Nehruvian agenda or were willing to cater to
it. The same was true of another influential educational body -
National Institute for Educational Planning and Administration (NIEPA).
Independent minded historians and other scholars who were not prepared
to toe this official line were removed or made ineffective.

A fateful event that played into the hands of the Secularists was the
appointment of Nurul Hassan as education minister in the Indira Gandhi
regime. He claimed to be a Marxist, but he pursued an anti-Hindu agenda
like a Muslim Fundamentalist. (After the creation of Pakistan, many
Muslim Fundamentalists pretended to be Marxists, and kept attacking
Hinduism for its 'inequality'.) As a result, anti-Hinduism acquired
a stranglehold on education. NIEPA is a particularly influential body
that administers and oversees educational policy in India. NCERT
controls textbooks and other materials that are used in schools and
colleges in India. Both were now under the firm control of anti-Hindu
forces.

Through his control of these two powerful bodies, Nurul Hassan became
education Czar in India. He extended patronage to the Marxist dominated
Jawaharlal Nehru University and Muslim separatist Aligarh Muslim
University. They were allowed to provide consultants and experts on all
educational matters. As a result, these two academically
undistinguished but politically opportunistic universities have come to
command resources and influence out of all proportion to their merit.

A single example should help give an idea of the dangers of this
centralized feudal educational policy. For over 20 years, H.S. Khan
headed the history and sociology division of the NCERT. He is known to
hold the view that India became civilized only through the introduction
of Islam. This incidentally is also the official Pakistani line. This
was also the view of Nurul Hassan who was of course the patron of H.S.
Khan. This is taking the Aryan invasion idea a giant step forward (or
backward).

In 1986, on Khan's initiative, textbook writers in all the states were
directed to change the version of history to accord with the anti-Hindu
model. Specific guidelines were issued to all the states instructing
them not to glorify any period of history - meaning any Hindu period
- as a Golden Age; the Gupta period therefore was not to be glorified
despite its great achievements. As a further step in de-Hinduisation
and rehabilitation of tyrannical Muslim rulers, Hindu leaders like
Shivaji, Chandrashekara Azad and Rana Pratap were not to be described
as freedom fighters against alien rule, but treated as terrorists who
opposed 'civilized and civilizing' rulers like Aurangazeb. As a result,
the anti-Hindu agenda, which had been gaining strength since the early
1950s, accelerated dramatically under the feudal regime of Nurul
Hassan. Only now, following the rout of the Congress party in the 1999
elections, their monopoly has come under threat. This has made these
men and women resort to desperate measures like what is coming out in
the ICHR scandals.

What should be done?

>>From all this two points become clear. First, the history being taught
in Indian schools and colleges was created by colonial masters and
their willing servants to serve anti-national interests and damage
India's heritage and culture. Second, institutions created to serve
national educational goals were dominated by self-serving individuals
who are hostile to national aspirations. The result is that
institutions like the ICHR fell into the hands of mediocre scholars
with political influence. They have contributed little of significance
because of their worship of the West and their inferiority complex.
They have built no Indian schools of thought, especially in history.
This had been foreseen by Sri Aurobindo long ago when he wrote:


"[That] Indian scholars have not been able to form themselves into a
great and independent school of learning is due to two causes: the
miserable scantiness of the mastery of Sanskrit provided by our
universities, crippling to all but born scholars, and our lack of
sturdy independence which makes us over-ready to defer to European [and
Western] authority."


There is another problem. In the fifty years after independence, the
Government and its agencies like the ICHR, NCERT and NIEPA have
supported only such scholars who are weak in scholarship and afraid of
thinking independently, but willing to toe the official line. They are
products of the Macaulayite education system, which was created to
produce colonial servants and not independent thinkers. When we look at
scholars doing independent work like Natwar Jha, David Frawley, R.C.
Majumdar, Shriakant Talageri, Sita Ram Goel and others, none of them
has received support from the Government. (I too have received no
support though I have worked closely with several distinguished
scholars including Jha and Frawley on important problems like the
decipherment of the Indus script.)

This shows that the Government has been supporting political favorites
rather than capable scholars. When we look at Government sponsored
scholars the picture is dismal. The only time anyone hears about them
is when there is a scandal or a political dispute like the ICHR
scandal. They have no important contributions that can be compared to,
say, the decipherment of the Indus Script. They are political
hangers-on rather than historians. They are able to get away with it
because of their monopoly hold over the establishment.

It is clear that a self-respecting nation like India cannot allow this
disgraceful state of affairs to continue. It cannot have its
children's education controlled by men and women with slavish minds
and a hostile attitude towards the nation and its history and culture.
The first step is to break the monopoly of these people, which has
already begun to happen to some extent. But this is only because there
is a Government in power that is more nationalistic in orientation than
previous Governments. A more permanent solution should be found so that
history and education are not subject to the whims of politicians and
special interests.

So both the causes and the consequences of this domination by
anti-national interests are clear. The question now is how to remedy
the situation? The first step would be to rewrite history books based
on the latest findings and the primary sources. But this is not enough,
for history can change as more discoveries are made. To ensure a
free-spirited inquiry and unfettered research, there should be no
Government organizations that tell educators and scholars how to write
and teach history. This means disbanding organizations like NIEPA and
NCERT. They have become little more than centers for thought control
and political propaganda. The ICHR should be reorganized strictly as a
funding agency that invites and funds proposals. For any major research
program, several scholars and/or groups of scholars should be funded so
that independent schools of thoughts can flourish. It should never be
allowed to become the monopoly of a single ideological advocacy group
as happened under the Congress regime.

But ultimately, the nation's education system should be changed to
encourage to independent and critical thinking. No subject or
personality should be placed beyond review and criticism. As Karl
Popper once observed: "If our civilization is to survive, we must break
with the habit of deference to great men. Great men make great
mistakes." This means that no one - be he Mahatma, Prophet or
anything else - can be put beyond the pale of review and criticism.

Popper of course was speaking in the context of the Western
Civilization. Indian sages have also expressed similar views. In his
Vishnu-tattva-vinirnaya, Sri Madhvacharya said:


"Never accept as authority the word of any human. Humans are subject to
error and deception. One deludes oneself in believing that there was a
man who was free of error and beyond deception, and he alone was the
author of any text."


And Bhagavan Buddha said: "Accept nothing on my authority. Think, and
be a lamp unto thyself."

This should be the guiding principle of education and intellectual
life.


Additional reading

This is only a brief summary of the distortions deliberately introduced
into Indian history, first by the British and then by their followers
in the Government and the intelligentsia. I have written this section
as a guide for readers who want to follow up on the topics discussed in
this essay. The literature on the subjects discussed in this essay is
huge, but I will point to a few easily available works.

On ancient India, there have been so many new discoveries that most
books written before 1985 or so are more or less obsolete. The book
Vedic Aryans and the Origins of Civilization by N.S. Rajaram and David
Frawley (Voice of India, New Delhi) gives a picture of Vedic India
based on primary sources and scientific evidence. The two volumes by
Shrikant Talageri, Aryan Invasion Theory, A Reappraisal and Rigveda-
A Historical Analysis (Aditya Prakashan, Delhi) provide a comprehensive
study of the Vedic and Puranic sources. The Myth of the Aryan Invasion
of India by David Frawley (Voice of India) is a popular account of the
subject. The Politics of History by N.S. Rajaram (Voice of India) is a
systematic study of the colonial and missionary background to the Aryan
invasion theory. Missionaries in India by Arun Shourie (Harper Collins,
New Delhi) discusses in detail the Christian missionary background to
the British colonial politics.

For a detailed discussion of the decipherment of the Indus script and
its ramifications see The Deciphered Indus Script by N. Jha and N.S.
Rajaram (Aditya Prakashan, Delhi). For a popular account of the new
picture of ancient India based on the latest discoveries including the
decipherment, see From Sarasvati River to the Indus Script by N.S.
Rajaram (Mitra Madhyama, Bangalore).

When we come to the medieval period, there is no single work that is
satisfactory. The most comprehensive account is the eight-volume
History of India as Told by Its Own Historians translated by Elliot and
Dowson, recently reissued by DK Publishers of Delhi. Several works by
K.S. Lal, including The Legacy of Muslim Rule in India, Twilight of the
Sultanate, Theory and Practice of Muslim State in India and Muslim
Slave System in Medieval India (Aditya Prakashan, Delhi) are highly
informative. Jihad: The Islamic Concept of Permanent War by Suhas
Majumdar (Voice of India) is a brilliant study of the subject. The best
source for understanding the ideology of Islam (and Jihad) and its
application in India is The Calcutta Quran Petition by Sita Ram Goel
(Voice of India, Delhi). Sita Ram Goel has also written the two-volume
Hindu Temples, What Happened to Them? (Voice of India), which is a
monumental compilation relating to the temples destroyed in Medieval
India. His book The Story of Islamic Imperialism in India (Voice of
India) is a highly readable summary. Voice of India has also published
several volumes on the Ayodhya dispute. See for example Profiles in
Deception: Ayodhya and the Dead Sea Scrolls by N.S. Rajaram (Voice of
India). See Negationism in India by Koenraad Elst (Voice of India) for
a brilliant account of the falsification of history by secularist
historians.

For the modern period also there are few satisfactory books that view
the freedom movement objectively. The best by far is the three-volume
History of the Freedom Movement in India by R.C. Majumdar (Firma-KLM,
Calcutta). The Tragic Story of Partition by H.V. Seshadri (Jagarana
Prakashan) is an excellent account of the Congress blunders that led to
the tragedy. Muslim Separatism, Causes and Consequences by Sita Ram
Goel (Voice of India) is a valuable summary of the same topic but with
some new insights. Gandhi, Khilafat and the National Movement by N.S.
Rajaram (Sahitya Sindhu, Bangalore) offers a revisionist view as well
as eyewitness accounts of the sadly neglected Mopla Rebellion. For the
betrayal of Tibet and the India-China relations, The Fate of Tibet by
Claude Arpi (Har-Anand, New Delhi) is the best source. India Betrayed:
Role of Nehru by Brigadier B.N. Sharma (Manas, New Delhi) is a valuable
source on the India-China relations including the border problem.

For a thorough expose of the corruption of national institutions, see
Eminent Historians by Arun Shourie (Harper-Collins, New Delhi) and also
Profiles in Deception by N.S. Rajaram (Voice of India, New Delhi).

On the subject of spirituality as the foundation of nationalism, there
are several works, from Sri Aurobindo and Swami Vivekananda to our own
times. A collection of essays on the Sri Aurobindo's sayings on
nationalism called India's Rebirth (Mira-Aditi Centre of Mysore) is
indispensable for understanding the spiritual foundation of
nationalism. These are further explored and expanded in A Hindu View of
the World by N.S. Rajaram (Voice of India, New Delhi). The two books by
David Frawley Arise Arjuna and Awaken Bharata (Voice of India, New
Delhi) expand on these themes as well as analyzing the contemporary
Indian scene.
 

ajtr

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Nehru, Sinosceptic


His foreign policy and strategic motives laid bare, Nehru surprisingly emerges as an out-and-out realist


War And Peace In Modern India: A Strategic History Of The Nehru Years
For far too long, Jawaharlal Nehru has been condemned as a woolly-eyed idealist, whose worldview is held responsible for the festering Indo-Pak dispute and the unresolved boundary issue with China. While traditionalist historians have found him guilty of sacrificing India's core interests in the pursuit of his ideals, revisionist scholars have viewed him as arrogant and blamed him for his propensity to use force at the slightest provocation to get his way.

Challenging these two schools is Srinath Raghavan's book, War and Peace in Modern India, which presents the thesis that Nehru was an out-and-out realist. For instance, about India's defeat in the 1962 war with China, for which Nehru continues to draw flak, Raghavan writes, "Contrary to received wisdom, the problem with Nehru's China policy was not his idealism but his realism".

It was Nehru's belief, Raghavan shows, that the ussr wouldn't allow China to attack India as that could compel India to move closer to the Americans. Subsequent events showed Nehru had miscalculated. The realist in him had correctly read the situation, but he failed to grasp the role of nationalist ideology in Communist China's foreign policy—that it would not refrain from military action to reinforce its territorial claims.

Raghavan says Nehru's failure on China shouldn't make one oblivious to the sophistication of his approach to strategy and crisis management. Though he "initiated military measures (forward deployment), without risking a full-scale war", he continued to "pursue diplomatic settlements to the extent possible" to contain domestic opposition.

Contrary to the view held by many scholars, Nehru showed willingness to communicate with adversaries in search of "acceptable compromises". For instance, when faced with difficulties in going ahead with a plebiscite in three regions of Kashmir, Nehru toyed with a variety of other ideas—partition with or without plebiscite, a limited plebiscite and election to a constituent assembly. A few months before his death in May 1964, he even discussed the idea of a possible confederation involving India, Pakistan and Kashmir with Sheikh Abdullah to find a solution to this vexed problemRaghavan's book isn't a biography. It is a historical study of his foreign policy, "concentrating on matters most related to the fundamental questions of war and peace". His attempt is to explain the context of each crisis India faced in the early years of independence, and the options both Nehru as well as his adversaries had before them. Through skilful use of archival material located both within and outside India, Raghavan manages to recreate the context of crises involving the princely states of Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir, demonstrating their inter-linkages rather than treating each as separate events.
Raghavan shows us the array of tools available to Nehru, and the reasons for his choice to resolve each crisis, though at times he opted for a combination of these. This analytical method also provides us a glimpse into Nehru's understanding of power and its limits. Though a disciple of Gandhi and a key member of the non-violent movement that gained India its independence, Nehru knew that "life is full of conflict and violence".

The book's most original chapter is on the 1950 refugee crisis that pushed India and Pakistan to the brink of a war. When Hindu refugees started pouring into West Bengal from East Pakistan, Hindu hardliners began to take retributory action against Muslims in India. Raghavan shows how Nehru opted for "coercive diplomacy"—a method Atal Behari Vajpayee employed against Islamabad after the Parliament attack—compelling Pakistan to stem the flow of refugees.

Raghavan, though, fails to explain why, in the mid-1950s, when a settlement could be found with China on the boundary issue, neither Nehru nor any of the other Indian leaders pressed for it. Had that happened, India's relations with China could have been remarkably different from what they are today.

This apart, Raghavan should be congratulated for a brilliant historical account of India's strategy and foreign policy in the initial years after independence. This book is a must-read, and needs to be used as reference by those studying, teaching and writing on history.
 

ajtr

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The sacrifice of Tibet: Extraordinary delusions and temporary insanity


On November 18 every year, I silently salute the brave souls of C Company, 13th Kumaon Regiment, who in 1962 died practically to the last man and the last bullet defending Ladakh against the invading Chinese Army. These brave 114 inflicted heavy casualties and prevented the Chinese from overrunning Leh, much like Spartans at Thermopylae held the line against the invading Persians many moons ago.

But have you ever wondered why these brave men had to sacrifice themselves? One answer seems to be that is because of the extraordinary delusions that affected a number of the dramatis personae on the Indian side: notably Jawaharlal Nehru [ Images ], KM Panikkar and VK Krishna Menon.

A deadly combination of blind faith, gross megalomania, and groupthink led to the debacle in the war in1962; but its genesis lay in the unbelievable naivete that led these worthies to simply sacrifice a defenseless sister civilisation to brutal barbarians.

Furthermore, they were far more concerned about China's interests than about India's! Generations to come will scarcely believe that such criminal negligence was tolerated in the foreign policy of a major nation.

In a well-researched book, timed for the one hundredth anniversary of the opening of Tibet [ Images ] by the British, Claude Arpi, born in France [ Images ] but a long-term resident of India, and one of India's leading Tibet and China experts, argues that India's acquiescence to the enslavement of Tibet has had disastrous consequences. The book is Born in Sin: The Panchsheel Agreement subtitled The Sacrifice of Tibet, published by Mittal Publications, New Delhi [ Images ], 2004, pp. 241, Rs. 495, ISBN 81-7099-974-X. Unless otherwise noted, all of the quotations here are from this book.

Arpi also touches upon the difficulty scholars face with piecing together what actually happened in those momentous years leading to the extinction of Tibet and the India-China war of 1962, because the majority of the source materials are held as classified documents in the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund or the Ministry of External Affairs.

The historian is forced to depend on the sanitised Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru and the restricted Official Report of the 1962 War. If the relevant documents were made public at the very least we might learn something from them. Where is Aruna Roy, crusading champion of the people's right to know who has now accepted a sinecure under the UPA? Why are the Nehru Papers controlled by Sonia Gandhi [ Images ]?

The story really begins exactly one hundred years ago, in September 1904, when the British Colonel Francis Younghusband entered Tibet and forced the hitherto insular kingdom open at the point of a gun. The Lhasa Convention of 1904, signed by the British and the Tibetans, put the seal of British overlordship over Tibet. The parallels with Commodore Perry of the US and his black ships opening up Japan [ Images ] are obvious. However, unlike Japan, which under the Meiji Restoration took vigorously to westernisation, Tibet continued to distance itself from the outside world, much to its later disadvantage.

Perhaps we need to look further in history, as Arpi did in his earlier book, The Fate of Tibet: When Big Insects Eat Small Insects. The Tibetans were a feared, martial and warlike race that had always, in its impregnable mountain fastnesses, held the expansionist Han Chinese at bay. However, in the 7th century CE, Buddhism came to Tibet, and they became a pacifist nation. Says Arpi: 'Tibet's conversion had another consequence on its political history: a nonviolent Tibet could no longer defend itself. It had to look outside for military support to safeguard its frontiers and for the protection of its Dharma. This help came first from the Mongol Khans and later the Manchu Emperors when they became themselves followers of the Buddha's doctrine.'

The sum and substance of China's alleged historical claim to Tibet is this: that the Mongol Khans had conquered both China and Tibet at the same time. This is patently absurd, because by the same token India should claim Australia [ Images ], New Zealand [ Images ] and Hong Kong as its own, because India and these territories were under British rule at the same time.

In fact, since the Mongol Khans and the Manchu Emperors accepted the Dalai Lama [ Images ] as their spiritual preceptor, it is clear that it was China that was giving tribute to Tibet, not vice versa: so Tibet could claim Han China as its vassal.

The Lhasa Convention was followed by the Simla Convention in 1914 that laid out the McMahon Line defining both the Indo-Tibetan border, and the division of Tibet into 'Outer Tibet' (which lies along the border with India) and 'Inner Tibet' which includes Amdo Province and part of Kham Province. It is worthwhile to note that the Chinese were not invited to discuss the McMahon line, nor was their acceptance of this line sought. Tibetans signed this treaty as an independent nation. The British government emphasised this in a note to the Chinese as late as 1943: 'Since the Chinese Revolution of 1911,... Tibet has enjoyed de facto independence.'

When India became independent, K M Panikkar wrote: 'A China [organised as a Communist regime annexing Mongol, Muslim and Tibetan areas] will be in an extremely powerful position to claim its historic role of authority over Tibet, Burma, Indo-China and Siam. The historic claims in regard to these are vague and hazyÂ…' Yet soon thereafter Panikkar became the principal spokesperson for China's interests, even though his job was Indian Ambassador to China!

As soon as the Communists came to power, in 1950, they started asserting their claims: 'The tasks for the People's Liberation Army for 1950 are to liberate [sic] Taiwan, Hainan and Tibet.' A Scottish missionary in Tibet said the PLA officers told him that once Tibet was in their hands, they would go to India.

On October 7, 1950, Mao Tse-Tung's storm troopers invaded Tibet. But under Panikkar's influence, Nehru felt that the loss of Tibet was worth the price of liberating Asia from 'western dominance'. Panikkar said: 'I do not think there is anything wrong in the troops of Red China moving about in their own country.'

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel was one of the few in the Indian government who recognised the menace from China. He wrote:
'We also have to take note of a thoroughly unscrupulous, unreliable and determined power practically at our doorsÂ… [It is clear that] we cannot be friendly with China and must think in terms of defense against a determined, calculating, unscrupulous, ruthless, unprincipled and prejudiced combination of powers, of which the Chinese will be the spearheadÂ… [It is obvious to me that] any friendly or appeasing approaches from us would either be mistaken for weakness or would be exploited in furtherance of their ultimate aim.'

How prophetic Patel was! Unfortunately, he died soon after he wrote this. Interestingly, the very same words apply in their entirety to India's dithering over Pakistan today, 54 years later. The Pakistanis are also exploiting India's appeasement and friendliness.

But Nehru, it appears, had decided to sacrifice Tibet, partly in order to appease China, partly because of his distaste for what he considered 'imperialist treaties' (in this case the Lhasa Convention that gave enormous rights in Tibet to the British, and, as their successor, to the Indian government) and partly in order to act as mediator between China and the West over the Korean War.

Observers could see what was going to happen. The American ambassador Henderson noted: 'The UK High Commission would like to be able to argue with Indian officials that if GoI bows to Communist China's blackmail re Tibet, India will eventually be confronted with similar blackmail not only re Burma but re such areas as Assam, Bhutan, Sikkim, Kashmir, Nepal.' Absolutely correct, for this is exactly what is happening today.

Nehru and Panikkar simply did not see the threat from China, so enamoured were they of the great Communist Revolution there. Nehru said: 'The biggest event since the last War is the rise of Communist China'. Part of his admiration arose from his distaste for the Buddhist culture of Tibet: 'We cannot support feudal elements in Tibet, indeed we cannot interfere in Tibet'. Now doesn't that sound exactly like Xinhua propaganda, which Nehru seems to have internalised?

A Canadian high commissioner had a different theory: '[Panikkar] had no illusions about the policies of the Chinese government and he had not been misled by it. He considered, however, that the future, at least in his lifetime, lay with the communists, and he therefore did his best to get on well with them by misleading Nehru'. That might be considered treason in certain circles.

Whatever the reason, we can see why Zhou-en Lai is rumored to have referred to the Indians in general and Nehru in particular as 'useful idiots'. (There is no reference to this in the Arpi book). In every discussion with Panikkar, the Chinese hosts smilingly avoided the question of settling the border, but they made sure that India acknowledged Chinese hegemony over Tibet. The Indians were thoroughly outsmarted, partly because they were willing victims dazzled by the idea of Communism.

When confronted with the question of the undefined border, Nehru said, "All these are high mountains. Nobody lives there. It is not very necessary to define these things." And in the context of whether the Chinese might invade India, here's Nehru again: "What might happen is some petty trouble in the borders and unarmed infiltration. To some extent this can be stopped by checkpostsÂ… Ultimately, however, armies do not stop communist infiltration or communist ideasÂ… Any large expenditure on the army will starve the development of the country and social progress."

The naivete leaves the neutral observer speechless. What might be even more alarming is that there are supposedly serious Old Left analysts today, in 2004, who mouth these same inanities about not spending money on the Indian Army [ Images ]. Why they do not take their cue from China, with its enormous Army, is mysterious, because in all other respects they expect India to emulate China. Except that is, no nukes, no military might for India.

By not asserting India's treaty rights in Tibet, which would have helped Tibet remain as a neutral buffer zone, Nehru has hurt India very badly. For, look at what is happening today. Nepal is under relentless attack by Maoists, almost certainly supported by Chinese money. Large parts of India are infested with violent Maoists. Much of West Bengal [ Images ] is under the iron grip of Marxists, who clearly take orders from Beijing [ Images ].

It is in this context that the so-called Panchsheel Agreement was written. Given that the Indian side had a priori decided to surrender all its rights to the Chinese, in return for vague promises of brotherhood, it is perhaps the most vacuous treaty ever signed. However, Nehru opined: "in my opinion, we have done no better thing than this since we became independent. I have no doubt about thisÂ…I think it is right for our country, for Asia and for the world."

Famous last words.

Nehru believed that the five principles which are referred to as Panchsheel were his personal, and major, contribution to world peace. Based on his impression of his stature in the world, he thought that the Panchsheel model could be used for treaties all over the world, and that it would lead to a tremendous breaking out of peace everywhere.

Nehru was sadly mistaken. There was nothing particularly remarkable about the principles themselves: they were not his invention, but were merely common-sense provisions used widely. And he had a megalomaniac idea of his own influence around the world: he did not realise that he cut a slightly comical figure. In his own mind, and in the minds of his toadies, he was the Emperor Ashoka returned, to bring about World Peace.

Here are the Five Principles:
1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty
2. Mutual non-aggression
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs
4. Equality and mutual benefit
5. Peaceful co-existence

The Chinese immediately violated every one of these principles, and have continued to do so happily. For instance, even while the treaty was being negotiated, the Chinese were building a road through Aksai Chin in Jammu and Kashmir [ Images ], and in perhaps the most unbelievable aspect of this whole sorry mess, India was actually supplying rice to the Chinese troops building the road through Indian territory! This is distinctly surreal!

The problem was that Nehru had no sense of history. He should have read RC Majumdar: "There is, however, one aspect of Chinese culture that is little known outside the circle of professional historiansÂ… It is characteristic of China that if a region once acknowledged her nominal suzerainty even for a short period, she would regard it as a part of her empire for ever and would automatically revive her claim over it even after a thousand years whenever there was a chance of enforcing it."

And this was the 'ally' Nehru found against the 'imperialists' of the West! He went so far as to decline a seat at the UN Security Council because the China seat was held by Taiwan. He did not want India to be in the Security Council until China was there too!

Since many people are curious about this, here is chapter and verse: it is in the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series II, Vol. 29, Minutes of meeting with Soviet Leaders, Moscow [ Images ], 22 June 1955, pp. 231. Here is the conversation between Nehru and Soviet Premier Marshal Bulganin:

"Bulganin: While we are discussing the general international situation and reducing tension, we propose suggesting at a later stage India's inclusion as the sixth member of the Security Council.

Nehru: Perhaps Bulganin knows that some people in USA have suggested that India should replace China in the Security Council. This is to create trouble between us and China. We are, of course, wholly opposed to it. Further, we are opposed to pushing ourselves forward to occupy certain positions because that may itself create difficulties and India might itself become a subject of controversy. If India is to be admitted to the Security Council it raises the question of the revision of the Charter of the UN. We feel that this should not be done till the question of China's admission and possibly of others is first solved. I feel that we should first concentrate on getting China admitted."

The casual observer might wonder whether Nehru was India's prime minister, or China's. Besides, the Chinese have now repaid all this support. India insisted that India should not be in the Security Council until China was in it, too. Now China insists that India should not be in the Security Council until Pakistan is in it, too. Seems fair, doesn't it?

What is the net result of all this for India? It is a strategic disaster. Forget the fact that the Tibetan civilisation has been decimated, and it is an Indic civilisation with practically no relationship to Han Chinese civilisation. Strictly from India's security perspective, it is an unmitigated catastrophe.

Analyst Ginsburg wrote in the fifties: 'He who holds Tibet dominates the Himalayan piedmont; he who dominates the Himalayan piedmont, threatens the Indian subcontinent; and he who threatens the Indian subcontinent may well have all of Southeast Asia within his reach, and all of Asia.'

Look at the situation in Tibet today.

The Chinese are planning the northward diversion of the Brahmaputra, also known as the Tsangpo. This would make North India a desert
The Chinese have on several occasions used 'lake bombs' to flood Indian territory: as the upper riparian state based on their occupation of Tibet, they are able to do this, for example on the Sutlej
Hu Jintao, who was the Butcher of Tibet, is now a top strongman in Beijing. Under his sponsorship, a railway line will be finished in 2007 linking Lhasa to eastern China. This would be an excellent mechanism for bringing in both large
numbers of Han immigrants to swamp the remaining Tibetan people, and also to deploy mobile nuclear missiles
The Chinese are deploying advanced nuclear missiles in Tibet, aimed at India, Russia [ Images ] and the US. With the railway line, they will be able to move these around and even conceal them quickly in tunnels and other locations
The Chinese dump large amounts of nuclear waste in Tibet, which will eventually make its way down to India via the rivers
The India-Tibet border is still not demarcated.
It is difficult to imagine a more disastrous foreign policy outcome than what happened between India and China. Claude Arpi is owed a debt of gratitude by all of us in India who care about the nation's progress and even its survival.

If the rather well-thought-of founding prime minister of the country was so uncaring about India's interests, one shudders to think what might be going on today with some of the ministers who are accused in criminal cases.

But even more than that, Arpi's detailed analysis and painstaking research on the process through which Tibet was enslaved is an instructive case study in how barbarians are always at the gates, and how, as Will Durant said, 'Civilisation is a precious good, whose delicate complex order and freedom can at any moment be overthrown by barbarians invading from without and multiplying from within'.

One of the profound lessons to be taken away is that it is the lack of respect for the spiritual that has led to this cataclysm. As Ministry of External Affairs observer, Apa Pant, pointed out about Tibet and the Han Chinese colonisation: 'With all its shortcomings and discomforts, its inefficiencies and unconquered physical dangers, here was a civilisation with at least the intention of maintaining a pattern of life in which the individual could achieve liberationÂ… The one so apparently inefficient, so human and even timid, yet kind and compassionate and aspiring to something more gloriously satisfying in human life; the other determined and effective, ruthless, power-hungry and finally intolerant... In the corridors of power [in official India], Tibet, Buddhism, the Dalai Lama, were all regarded as ridiculous, too funny for words; useless illusions that would logically cease to exist soon, thanks to the Chinese, and good riddance.'

In the final analysis, Tibet was lost because those in power in India were dismissive of matters spiritual. It is the Empire of the Spirit that has made India what she has been all these millennia, and once the rulers start dismissing that, it is clear that we are in the Kali [ Images ] Yuga, the Dark Ages. It is the end of living, and the beginning of survival.
 

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India pays for Nehru's folly


Republic Day is a day of celebration, but it also has its poignant moments, especially when the President confers gallantry awards on brave soldiers who lay down their lives in the line of duty. Often those who are honoured are young men in uniform who make the supreme sacrifice while pushing back militants trained in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and sent into Jammu & Kashmir to indulge in murder and mayhem. While we salute the latest batch of martyrs, we need to reflect on the events that led to Pakistan occupying one-third of the State and setting up the base to carry on a relentless proxy war against us.

One such event, which has cost the nation dear, was India's fateful decision to complain to the United Nations when Pakistan invaded Jammu & Kashmir in October 1947. Two books that have hit the stands in recent weeks throw fresh light on this historic blunder committed by India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. While leaders like Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the then Home Minister, wanted firm and swift military action to throw out the invaders, Nehru's pusillanimity led him to beseech the world body and later to meekly submit to the UN Security Council's advice to end military action. The ceasefire, ordered by Nehru, prevented the Indian Army from completely regaining the lost territory and was instrumental in the creation of a geographical entity that is known the world over as Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

The fact that Nehru's moves vis-Ã -vis Kashmir caused much disappointment and even anger among political leaders and Army commanders is reinforced by new evidence available in Air Marshal (rtd) KC Cariappa's eponymous biography of his father Field Marshal KM Cariappa, India's most distinguished soldier, and Prof Makkhan Lal's Secular Politics, Communal Agenda -- A history of Politics in India from 1860 to 1953, the first in a three-part series that covers events up to 2007.

According to Air Marshal Cariappa, the Government went against the advice of both military commanders who were directly involved in the operations:"Father was then the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Command, and Maj Gen Thimayya was the operational commander. They were convinced that capture of Muzzafarabad, now the capital of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, was imminent. The Army, however, was ordered to suspend all offensive operations with effect from January1, 1949 even though the enemy continued fighting." Field Marshal Cariappa had later said that the Army had its 'tail up' and was "confident of clearing most of Kashmir and re-investing Gilgit". But orders were received to cease fire. "He ( Field Marshal Cariappa) said the Army was very disappointed by the decision, but orders were orders."

This has been corroborated by other sources as well. For example, long years ago S Nijalingappa, former President of the Congress, had told this writer of his chance meeting with Maj Gen Thimmayya at Teen Murti Bhavan, the official residence of the Prime Minister, around the time Nehru was contemplating a ceasefire. According to Nijalingappa, the General told Nehru that the Army needed two weeks more to regain lost territory but the Prime Minister was adamant. The General found Nehru's attitude inexplicable. He left Teen Murti Bhavan in disgust.

Air Marshal Cariappa also reproduces Lt Gen SM Shrinagesh's comment on the Jammu & Kashmir fiasco. According to him, "Lt Gen Cariappa was ordered not to carry out offensive operations which would threaten Pakistan's security" and the air force was told not to attack vital bridges used by Pakistan! "The language which the RIAF used on receiving these instructions had to be heard to be believed."

Air Marshal Cariappa says a few years hence his father asked Nehru the reason for the ceasefire. Nehru, on hindsight, conceded that the ceasefire order ought to have been delayed. He reportedly told Cariappa, "Quite frankly, looking back on it now, I think we should have given you a few more days, ten or fifteen days more. Things would have been different."

Many of Nehru's colleagues in Government were also distressed by the complaint to the UN and all that followed. This included Sardar Patel, BR Ambedkar and several others.

In his book, Prof Makkhan Lal says that though Pakistan invaded Jammu & Kashmir on October 22, 1947, Nehru had information in September about Pakistan's aggressive designs but did not initiate any pre-emptive action. Prof Lal says that but for Sardar Patel's decisive action (getting the Maharaja to sign the Instrument of Accession and air-lifting troops to Srinagar in the early hours of October 27), India would have lost Jammu & Kashmir forever.

This view is reinforced by the reminiscences of VP Menon, who was then Secretary in the States Department, and NV Gadgil, a Minister in the Nehru Cabinet. Prof Lal quotes Gadgil as having said, "I am afraid Nehru is responsible for the prolongation of the problem through his willingness to compromise at every stage... Had Vallabhbhai been the man to handle the Kashmir question, he would have settled it long ago. At least, he would never have settled with a partial control of Jammu & Kashmir. He would have occupied the whole of the State and would never have allowed it to be elevated to international importance."

As we grieve with the families of those brave soldiers who lay down their lives defending India's territorial integrity, we need to ask ourselves as to what we need to do to put an end to this constant bleeding that Pakistan is subjecting us to. We can make a beginning by getting to the truth about Jammu & Kashmir. In order to do this, we must trash the mythology that prevails about Nehru's infallibility and greatness. We must also firmly reject attempts by historians patronised by the Nehru-Gandhi family to dwarf the contribution of Sardar Patel, Ambedkar, Field Marshal Cariappa, Gen Thimmayya, VP Menon and others, in their effort to sustain the myths they have created about Nehru.

While chronicling the integration of 554 princely states to form the Indian Union, Menon had said that since the time of Mahmud Ghazni, for eight centuries India has been subjected to periodical invasions from the North-West. Ghazni led 17 of these incursions. Keeping up this tradition, the very first act of the new state of Pakistan was to launch an invasion from the North-West.

Yet, Nehru, much against the advice of military commanders, allowed Pakistan to retain part of the looted territory, thereby jeopardising India's security forever. Recalling this, Menon warned, "A nation that forgets its history or its geography does so at its peril". It is never too late to heed this warning. But in order to do so, we must first get our history right and then remember it.
 

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Indian troops in Laddakh before the commencement of hostilities..1962 war photo collection

credit vivek @BR
 

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They fought to the last man for India


November 18, 2008
India may have lost the 1962 war with China, but it was not completely a saga of defeat. Hamstrung by an indecisive leadership and poor military equipment, the Indian army put up a valiant resistance along the McMahon Line. It is another matter the political leadership of the day did not back them.
One such spot where our soldiers fought back, and repelled, the Chinese incursions was at Razang La near Chushul, in the Himalayan heights. On November 18, 1962, 114 soldiers of the 13th Kumaon fought till the last man, and last bullet, in sub-zero temperatures, to beat back the huge Chinese army. A grateful nation acknowledged their valour by posthumously conferring the Param Vir Chakra on Major Shaitan Singh.

Forty-six years later to the day, Tarun Vijay undertook an emotional journey to Chushul and Razang La, site of a memorial to commemorate the brave souls who died so we may live in peace and security, to file this audio report.

'Sir, a national crisis has been created as a result of the Chinese attack on the northern border. China has expansionist designs, it has set its eyes like a vulture on 48,000 square miles of land belonging to India.

'On August 25, 1959, while speaking on the Kerala debates the prime minister (Jawaharlal Nehru) had stated that India would not remain India if per chance it becomes Communist. The same thing applies to China as well. The defence minister (V K Krishna Menon) has a doubtful past and his present conduct is dubious. He has Communist leanings. In his message on the Territorial Army Day he said that India should not keep a large army because keeping a large army was not compatible with our morality.'
-- Atal Bihari Vajpayee in the Lok Sabha, December 22, 1959

The ironies of history take strange shapes. In 1962, Nehru didn't listen to the warnings of the erstwhile Jana Sangh, believed 'the Chinese can never attack us' and lost face and land both to his 'bhai'-like friends. Then the government arrested more than 400 top Communist leaders on charges of sedition and invited volunteers of the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh to participate in the 1963 Republic Day Parade at Raj Path in New Delhi in full uniform, recognising its services during the war.

In 2008 the Communists have become the darlings of the Congress that still sources its legacy to Nehru, and the RSS is sought to be banned.

By 1962, China had taken Aksai Chin and invaded NEFA.

In 2008, China is still occupying Aksai Chin and has rebuffed our foreign minister with a renewed claim on Arunachal Pradesh (formerly known as NEFA).

But can the nation forget the 1962 war? Who were those who fought and died? For who? And to what avail?

One of the stories India can never forget is the battle we fought in the Indus valley, near Chushul village.

The battle of Rezang La, fought at an altitude of 17,000 feet, is one of the most incredible sagas of valour and courage that Indian soldiers have showed. That was November 18, 1962, exactly 46 years earlier. They fought and died for Indian soil.

In 2008, we are still waiting for a leader to show any will or resolute action to indicate we are serious to take back the land that China grabbed.

The Congress changed post-Nehru, so did the others. Politics and immediate interests have overpowered security concerns, and distinctions between the identities of the enemy and patriots are as blurred as they were in 1962.

Unanswered questions

Forty-six years later, the question remains still unanswered: why did we have to fight a war, and why was it that the brave 114 soldiers of the 13th Kumaon had to offer their supreme sacrifice fighting till the 'last man and last bullet' in sub-zero temperature (minus 15 degrees Celsius) at Rezang La on November 18, 1962? What were the causes of that war and what happened afterwards? Who remembers them except a few ex-soldiers and the patriotic crowd at Rewari (Haryana), hometown of most of the martyred Ahirs who had fought at Rezang La? Why does no politician think it a matter of honour to send his children to join the army? Why do we have an important road in Delhi named after Krishna Menon, the disgraced defence minister of the '62 war, and nothing significant to honour the men who gave their lives to save India in Chushul?

These were the thoughts on my mind when I set out for Chushul last fortnight to get a feel of 'November in Rezang La' and pay my homage to the bravehearts.

The 1962 war with China is a sad story of a completely incapable leadership, favouritism at the top echelons of the army, and a disregard of the nation's security needs by those who were hailed by the people as their saviours. Neville Maxwell, a British journalist, writes in his famous book India's China war: 'At the time of independence, [B M] Kaul appeared to be a failed officer, if not one disgraced. But his courtier wiles, irrelevant or damning until then, were to serve him brilliantly in the new order that independence brought, after he came to the notice of Nehru, a fellow Kashmiri Brahmin and, indeed, distant kinsman.'


Revisiting 1962's incredible saga of valour

November 18, 2008
Boosted by the prime minister's steady favouritism, Kaul rocketed through the Army structure to emerge in 1961 at the very summit of the Army HQ. Not only did he hold the key appointment of chief of general staff but the army commander, Thapar, was, in effect, his client. Kaul had, of course, by then acquired a significant following, disparaged by the other side as 'Kaul boys' ('call-girls' had just entered usage), and his appointment as CGS opened a putsch in HQ, an eviction of the old guard, with his rivals, until then his superiors, being not only pushed out but often hounded thereafter with charges of disloyalty. '
Those who didn't know their men, their land and the risks involved called the shots, yet our bravehearts stood firm for the honour of their motherland. The Rezang La battle saga is among the most inspiring stories of soldiers dying in the line of duty, yet our schools, which proudly prescribe the age-old narration of Romulus and Remus, find it unworthy to insert a lesson on how India was defended at Rezang La by Indian soldiers of the 13th Kumaon.

They fought till the last man, last bullet

They were ill-equipped, ill-prepared and heavily outnumbered by the Chinese. All the 114 jawans died in action, not a single soul retreated and neither did they let the Chinese intrude. For three months the government didn't know about them, about their extraordinary sacrifice, till in January-end in 1963, shepherds from Chushul found bodies of jawans scattered on the Rezang La, after the snow had melted. The dead bodies of the Chinese were far more in number, about eight hundred on our side, and it was estimated that more than a thousand might have fallen to the bullets of Indian soldiers. It was an unbelievable feat and the government decorated Major Shaitan Singh with a Param Vir Chakra, posthumously.

The PVC citation awarded to him reads: 'Major Shaitan Singh was commanding a company of an infantry battalion deployed at Rezang La in the Chushul sector at a height of about 17,000 feet. The locality was isolated from the main defended sector and consisted of five platoon-defended position. On 18 November 1962, the Chinese forces subjected the company position to heavy artillery, mortar and small arms fire and attacked it in overwhelming strength in several successive waves. Against heavy odds, our troops beat back successive waves of enemy attack. During the action, Major Shaitan Singh dominated the scene of operations and moved at great personal risk from one platoon post to another sustaining the morale of his hard-pressed platoon posts. While doing so he was seriously wounded but continued to encourage and lead his men, who, following his brave example fought gallantly and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. For every man lost to us, the enemy lost four or five. When Major Shaitan Singh fell disabled by wounds in his arms and abdomen, his men tried to evacuate him but they came under heavy machine-gun fire. Major Shaitan Singh then ordered his men to leave him to his fate in order to save their lives. Major Shaitan Singh's supreme courage, leadership and exemplary devotion to duty inspired his company to fight almost to the last man.'

The battle fired the imagination of young soldiers and Bollywood alike. A successful movie, Haqeeqat, based on the Chushul saga was made by Chetan Anand starring Dharmendra and Balraj Sahni. I was on my way to visit the same area, the village called Chushul and the Rezang La memorial, in the month November, 46 years after the battle had taken place.

Chushul, village of the bravehearts

November 18, 2008
The journey to Rezang La was the most scintillating pilgrimage for me, like the Kailas yatra. Interestingly, the best route to Kailas also goes through Chushul and connects Demchhok (on the Line of Actual Control, within Indian territory) to Nyari province of Tibet, running alongside the Indus river. There has been a longstanding demand from Ladakhis, supported by J&K leaders like Dr Farooq Abdullah, to have this route opened for the Kailas yatra.
The 80-minute flight from Delhi to Leh is itself a memorable one, and passes over Manali, Rohtang pass and snow-clad mountains before touching down at Kushok Bakula Rinpoche airport, Leh. The outside temperature was minus eight degrees and I straightway drove to a friend's house for a couple of hours of acclimatisation. At an altitude of 11,000 feet, it's mandatory to acclimatise before moving to another destination, and any violation may prove fatal. 'No Gama in the land of Lama', says the Border Roads Organisation's roadside advisory, meaning don't show undue haste and bravado in this land of high mountains and Buddhist lifestyle.

It would be seven hours to Chushul, said my guide Dorjey while putting my rucksack into the Innova. We left Leh early morning and passed through Stakna, the summer palace, Thikse Gompa, Sindhu Darshan, Upshi, Hemis Gompa, Karu and negotiated the tough Chang La Baba pass at 17,800 feet, saying hello at Chemday monastery. At Chang La jawans offer a cup of 'love tea' free to all travellers -- a kahva with cashew nuts and roasted almonds. It's really invigorating.

Next was Tsoltak, and Luking was a further 65 km and Chushul another 124 km away. Post Chang La, a continuous descent along the Tangtse took us to the breathtaking expanse of a mesmerising empire of salt water called Pangong Tso lake. It's a magic God created for the gods. Tourists are allowed only up to this point, and all non-resident Indians need an Inner Line Permit issued by the district magistrate, Leh, to enter this area. The lake is 134 km long and five km wide. Another 40 km, alongside this blue, turquoise green world of water, and we will be at Chushul.

The road is really a patchwork of scattered stones and pebbles, though a board announces that the Luking-Chushul road is under construction. A little before dusk we finally arrived at Chushul, which looked every bit a sleepy, dreamy-eyed village. It has a population of 993 persons to be exact, as informed by its 'numberdar'.

The wind was getting wilder by the minute. It was chillingly cold outside and it seemed almost impossible to push the shutters of the camera with bare fingers, frozen and numbed they were. At 4 pm the wind got ferocious and the waves it created in the lake were great fun to watch.

Chushul has hardly changed since 1962. There is no electricity, though solar power connection is given to the villagers with a dose of subsidies. "But we can't run colour TVs on that low voltage connection," complained the villagers. Lights are off early, usually there is only one bulb lit in each home, for cooking, evening gupshup and studies for the kids. So the usual schedule is to have a heavy peg of local rice brew, early supper and go to sleep. The dependable sources of news are transistors and B&W TVs, with Doordarshan's unchallenged monopoly. Though a few enterprising households have bought Dish TV receivers, and access other channels.

I had hardly taken the prescribed and mandatory rest at Leh, so the dreadful headache began at a deadly pace and soon the world turned colourless to me. The wintry chill coupled with a lack of oxygen, and horrific wind, made my task truly 'adventurous'. I cursed myself at leaving the comforts of electioneering in Delhi and other states to reach a place that no one even thinks about in winter.

Forgotten warriors

Suddenly 1962 flashed before my eyes. It's 2008, we have better woollen jackets, comfortable sleeping bags, well-connected communication system, a strong political opposition and an awakened and vocal leadership in the forces. But 1962 was different. Ill-equipped jawans, bad communication system hardly worth its name, poor clothing; the Chinese attacked in this very month, in this chilly winter, in the wee hours of the day.

In such sub-zero atmosphere I was unable to operate my camera, but they had to operate .303 guns, fire mortars and keep fighting! I was at a lower level in the village with comparatively warmer temperature. They were at the top of Rezang La, facing Trishul, at 17,000 feet. They defeated death and kept the flag high, but New Delhi forgot them and sang in praise of the defeatists.

Do the inhabitants of Chushul remember that story, I asked with excitement and waited for a reply. No one could say yes or recount what perhaps was told by his father or grandfather. There is hardly any remembrance of the battle the nation feels so proud of, in this village which once stood as the 'sword of the nation'. The Army's valour has hardly been passed on to the villagers, to the new generation. Like an unconcerned machine, some men in uniform come to the Rezang La memorial every year, perform rituals and go away. Without touching the lives of those locals who carry the burden of that great legacy.

'Give us upgraded school, bijli and SDM office'

November 18, 2008
Sir, you have come from Delhi, please tell the government to upgrade our school to the higher secondary level,'' said Sonam Paljor, ex-sarpanch, and Phunchuk Namgyal. ''Our children have to go to Leh for higher studies, we can't afford that, so no one has graduated from this village except one so far. '' I was surprised to hear that.Chushul is not as far as some would like us to believe. It's not an impossible country as politicians would like to offer as an excuse for not bestowing small mercies to this famously brave last frontier. No roads, no electricity, no upgraded school, no landline, no mobile, no hospital. This is how we honour the people and the village that fought our fiercest battle and is responsible for providing local infrastructural support to the armed forces, so vital and critical in times of crisis.
There is only one InmarSat telephone, with the local army post, and it's made available to 'civilians' only for two hours a day, in the afternoon. Suppose there is an emergency, someone is sick and has to be taken to Leh, I asked naively. ''Here no emergency, no one can do anything, the army post is closed after the evening and we can't reach them,'' said Phunchuk. There is a local, government-run public health clinic, but the doctor is hardly available, and even when he is there, few medicines, and no equipment. I saw some textbooks of the primary school; nothing is mentioned in it about the soldiers' lives. Or the Rezang La saga. How do we expect them to have respect for the armed forces unless they are introduced to them properly?

That night my roommate in the Buddhist guesthouse was Sonam Tsering, the man who has the glory of being the first post-graduate from Chushul, and the only one so far. He is an elected councillor in the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council from Chushul on a Ladakh Union Territory Front ticket. His father ran a transport business, and hence could afford sending him to Leh and then Chandigarh for higher studies. But his two younger brothers and sister couldn't follow him and have remained confined to Chushul. The local high school is a gift from the army.

It's a hundred percent Buddhist village and there is a permanent complaint that no one visits them from Delhi -- no politician, no minister has ever spoken to them about their lives and demands. Sometimes a minister comes in an army helicopter, stays with the army officers and goes back immediately. ''They come here to take pictures,'' smiled Phunchuk. An old village monk told me in the morning that his grandpa used to tell him stories about how they had brought the dead bodies of the Rezang La warriors from the mountaintop That's it. Nothing more. Even the village doesn't celebrate November 18, Rezang La day.

Sonam said, ''Sir, before the Chinese attack in 1962 Chushul was the sub-divisional headquarters and the sub-divisional magistrate used to have his office here. He was shifted after the war, and it's causing great difficulty to the villagers. Why was the office of the SDM shifted?''

The village depends solely on the army for everything; still the cordial touch is missing. It's too mechanised.

I had to recharge my camera batteries and there was nothing to help. Solar power won't do it, giggled Sonam. ''Sir, it's no use here, we sometimes hire a generator whenever there is an election meeting or any government officer arrives from Leh.'' Somehow the sarpanch brought an inverter as a cherished treasure and that worked well.

The darkness settled in a bit too early and in the thick of night I felt almost dead. I had two thick blankets underneath and a 'Siachen quality' sleeping bag covered with another heavy quilt. Yet the chill pierced through my bones and the headache rose to newer heights. Besides, the toilet was old-fashioned Tibetan type, with a hole in the floor and freezing water to wash. Do our soldiers at the mountaintop observation posts have heated bunkers to keep better watch on Chinese activities, I asked Sonam and the sarpanch. No one could answer. Perhaps I had asked a foolish question.

But the villagers had a lot to say. The Chinese look at them with contempt, and in flag meetings with their Indian counterparts they complain about how the Chushul villagers and shepherds often 'violate' the Line of Actual Control.

Saluting the martyrs

A dose of Paracetamol helped and the morning was a little comfortable. We set out for the Rezang La memorial at 6 am, bidding adieu to a hallowed village. I was thrilled and felt I should have taken some flower to lay as a wreath at the memorial. But nothing was available. Having taken the turn from Chushul, at every second mile I saw a board put up by the army showing the direction and miles to the memorial. Dorjey indicated the beautiful Trishul mountains on my left, bathing in the first rays of a nascent sunrise. The fields are vast and grand, we were cruising in a sea of openness, roads are either invisible or it's a sporty challenge to you to create your own path! Yet the danger looms large as the heights on our left are under Chinese control and they monitor our activities comfortably.

The Rezang La memorial is a simple marble pillar with names of all the 114 martyrs etched on two sides, in Hindi and in English. The third side has these inspiring words:

How can a Man die better than facing Fearful Odds,
For the Ashes of His Fathers and the Temples of His Gods,
To the sacred memory of the Heroes of Rezang La,
114 Martyrs of 13 Kumaon who fought to the Last Man,
Last Round, Against Hordes of Chinese on 18 November 1962.
Built by All Ranks 13th Battalion, The Kumaon Regiment.


The pilgrimage to the village that once was the 'Sword of India' was coming to an end. I had to go further, on the road to Demchhok, the route that finally reaches Kailas Manasarovar alongside the majestic Indus river. That's another story, another time.
 

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Google has started archiving of Life magazine's entire photo archive. Apparently the vast majority of these images have not been published, and go back as far as the 1860s. The resource is a goldmine for people interested in history, and the images come under the fair use agreement.


Their archive of photos of the 1962 Sino-Indian war is by far the most comprehensive I've ever seen, and in impressively high resolution. Here are just ten photos of it from the ~150 the archive holds:

Indian Army soldiers during the conflict with China.


An Indian military policeman, on the Northeast frontier, during the Red Chinese invasion of that border area.


Indian Army soldiers.


Gun being used by troops in fighting the Red Chinese in the mountains of Assam.


Refugee from Tibet.


Citizens watching as the indian Army passes through their town.


The Indian Army training for the boarder conflict with China.


Women trainees holding rifles, during the conflict with China.


A truck convoy on it's way to the Northeast border-Red China front.


A US plane dropping supplies to Indian troops, during the border war with Red China.


I'm sure the archive of India's other wars are just as impressive. I've found it is easiest using general keywords and the decade when searching.


**credit to rajkhalsa @BR
 

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Not their own wars

Tuesday 8 January 2008, by Tashi Dhundup
As the Indian Army's secretive Tibetan force celebrates its 45th birthday this year, Tibetan warriors in the Special Frontier Force commemorate more than four decades of fighting other people's wars.

While at school at the Central School for Tibetans in Mussoorie, my classmates and I used to sing a song that went, "Chocho mangmi la madro, haapen bholo yoki rae", which translates to "O brother don't go to the army, they will make you wear those loose half-pants". Although we sang this song in every grade, it was only years later that the true meaning of those words finally dawned on me. Each year as the seniors graduated, we would see trucks waiting at the school gate – Indian Army trucks, all set to cart many of the graduating students off to the barracks for training. At the time I was confused, and wondered why these new graduates were not simply going home.

It was only much later that I came to understand the involvement of Tibetans in the Indian Army. This is an issue that has still received scant attention, much less acknowledgement of the achievements of the Tibetan soldiers in the name of the Indian state. Indeed, to this day India has never officially recognised this debt, though Tibetans, around 10,000 of them, continue to serve in the Indian Army.

India's Tibetan troops have traditionally made up the vast majority of the Special Frontier Force, widely known as the SFF, which has been guarding Indian borders for 45 years. Following the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the SFF was created in Chakrata, around 100 km from Dehradun, a town with a large Tibetan refugee population. While a second force, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), was also created in the same year, its mandate was border patrol, while the SFF focused on guerrilla warfare. Later on, all of the Tibetans with the ITBP were sent to Chakrata, and the ITBP remained Tibetan largely in name only.

Over the following decades, despite involvement in the 1971 War of Liberation in Bangladesh, Indira Gandhi's Operation Bluestar in Punjab, the 1999 conflict in Kargil, as well as a continued presence on the Siachen glacier, the full extent of the SFF's role has remained shrouded in mystery. Indeed, much of what there is to know about the SFF's actions over the past four and a half decades has remained with two people: former Indian intelligence chief R N Kao and S S Uban, the SFF's first inspector-general, both of whom have remained notoriously tight-lipped about the group.

China advanced into Tibet in 1950, and nine years later the 14th Dalai Lama, then 24 years of age, fled south into exile. That same period saw the formation of a group called Chu-She-Khang-Druk (Four Rivers and Six Mountains, a name symbolising a unified Tibet), comprised mostly of Khampa, from the southeastern plains of Tibet. This relatively small group suddenly rose in violent revolt against Chinese subjugation and, though outmatched in military strength, the Chu-She-Khang-Druk fighters were able to inflict heavy damage on the People's Liberation Army. With the Dalai Lama's escape to India and a mass exodus of Tibetans following, the Khampa fighters felt that the best service they could provide at the time was to protect the escape route. Eventually, they too went into exile, with a base of the group eventually coming up in Mustang, in north-central Nepal.

On the global level, this was taking place at the height of the Cold War between the US and international communist forces, which subsequently led the Central Intelligence Agency in Washington, DC to decide to aid these Tibetan guerrillas. Though the details have always been somewhat hazy, the US continued to provide weapons and training until the early 1970s. But when Henry Kissinger, then Richard Nixon's Secretary of State, shook hands with Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong in 1971, the CIA abruptly cut off its quiet support for the Tibetans (see accompanying story, "On the altar of foreign relations").

Something similar had earlier taken place in India. Following the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement, Jawaharlal Nehru largely sacrificed Tibet on the altar of Indo-China friendship. At the time, Nehru was evidently assuming, or hoping, that the idea of 'Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai' relations would be firmly cemented. But this was not to be: instead, the dragon roared and breathed fire, and Nehru was jolted from his slumber. The India-China war of 1962 invoked a longstanding sense of paranoia in New Delhi, and in its aftermath Nehru looked towards the old neighbour he had forsaken to protect the Indian border from the new neighbour he had blindly trusted. With a ready stock of CIA-trained Tibetan guerrillas now available in India, Nehru decided to form an army unit consisting almost exclusively of Tibetans to guard its rugged northern frontier.

The Chu-She-Gang-Druk fighters welcomed the idea: through the new formation, they hoped that a Tibetan army could be formally maintained, and could be of ready use in the future. A tripartite agreement between India's Research & Analysis Wing (RAW), the US's CIA and the Chu-She-Gang-Druk subsequently brought into existence the Special Frontier Force. Initial recruiting gathered together around 12,000 men, commanded by two Chu-She-Gang-Druk leaders, who were oddly referred to as the "political leaders". Initial training was provided by the CIA and India's Intelligence Bureau. Within two years, a period of covert expeditions along India's northern borders had begun. Yet opportunities never did materialise for the unit to be used against its intended 'enemy', and indeed, in 1973 the SFF's orders were altered following alleged incursions into Tibet: the group was now longer allowed to deploy within 10 km of the Tibetan border. However, it was successfully deployed during the course of several other operations.

It would be appreciated"¦

16 December 1971 was the day the Bangladesh War of Liberation ended, and the date has come to connote freedom for the people of Bangladesh. Few in Bangladesh, India or Pakistan, however, remember – or have ever known of – the role played by the SFF in ensuring the Indian Army's victory on that day. In the lead-up to the SFF's deployment, Indira Gandhi wired a message to the Tibetan fighters, conveyed through their Indian commander: "We cannot compel you to fight a war for us," Gandhi wrote, "but the fact is that General A A K Niazi [the Pakistan Army commander in East Pakistan] is treating the people of East Pakistan very badly. India has to do something about it. In a way, it is similar to the way the Chinese are treating the Tibetans in Tibet, we are facing a similar situation. It would be appreciated if you could help us fight the war for liberating the people of Bangladesh."

In a dynamic that would be repeated several additional times, Tibetans subsequently began to fight a war that was not their own, and on the request of a woman whose father had played a significant part in betraying the Tibetan cause. Three thousand SFF Tibetan commandos were deployed, fighting under the cover of the Mukti Bahini (Bangladesh Liberation Army) along the Chittagong Hill Tracts. They infiltrated with orders to destroy bridges, dams and communication lines, thereby smoothening the way for the advance of the Indian Army. During the conflict, the SFF lost 56 men, while another 190 were wounded. After a little less than nine months, East Pakistan became Bangladesh. The new country's founder, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, personally called the SFF leaders to thank them for their part in that creation. But this had been a classified mission – one that, officially, still does not exist. As such, none of the SFF fighters have ever been decorated, nor have their contributions ever been officially recognised.

So began decades of fighting other people's wars, much as the Nepali Gorkhas serve in the Indian armed forces. As alluded to by Indira Gandhi's 1971 letter, the SFF was seen as a particularly effective force, and their service was used in 1984 Operation Bluestar to storm the Golden Temple to flush out Sikh militants. Years later, keeping in mind his mother's attachment to the SFF, Rajiv Gandhi called upon the Tibetan fighters to manage his security during part of his tenure as prime minister. Following the 1999 conflict in Kargil, a Tibetan jawan wrote a song that began, "Kargil la dhangpo yongdue, bomb ki phebso shoesong" (When I first came to Kargil, the bombs welcomed us). Inherent in those words are not just fearful sentiments as expressed by any young soldier, but also the fact that Kargil was India's conflict, not Tibet's. Likewise, one SFF battalion today continues to serve on the Siachen glacier – oddly close to their homeland, but facing the opposite direction.

Indeed, unofficial thanks notwithstanding, throughout these past decades it has fallen to the Tibetans themselves to sing the songs of the unsung heroes. One such song in Hindi, composed by a Tibetan trooper, is titled "We are Vikasi", referring to the term used for a regiment within the SFF. Its words allude not only to a push to keep the cause of Tibetan independence alive, but also to the formation of a new identity within the past half-century: the Tibetan-Indian, temporarily or otherwise.

Hum hai Vikasi, tibbat wasi
Desh ki shyan bharayenghye

Jab jab humko milega moka
Jaan pe khel dekhayenghye

Hum hai vikasi
Chin ne humse chean ke tibbat
Ghar se hame nikala hae
Phirbi bharat ne humko,
Apno ki tara sambhala hae
Ekna Ek din chin ko bhi hum
Nako channe chabayenghye
Jab jab hum ko milega moka
Jaan pe khel dekhayenghye

Sichan glaciar main humko
Moka mila dubara hai
Hamare vir jawano ko
Nahin koyi bhi gum
Kargil hoya Bangladesh
Himmat kabhi na hare hum
Jab jab hum ko milega moka
Jaan pe khel dekhayenghye

Jahan hamara mahel potala
Norbu lingka pyara hai
Pujya dalai lama singhasan
Tabse hi nyara hai
Yad karo aun viron ko
Jisne diya balidan hai
Au milkar gayen hum
Jai hamara Tibbat Jai
Jai hamara Tibbat Jai
Jai Hamara Tibbat Jai

We are the Vikasi, dwellers of Tibet
We will strengthen the pride of the country

Whenever opportunities arise
we will play with our lives.

We are the Vikasi
The Chinese snatched Tibet from us
and kicked us out from our home
Even then, India
kept us like their own
One day, surely one day
we will teach the Chinese a lesson
Whenever opportunities arise
we will play with our lives

In the Siachen glacier
we got our second chance
Our young martyrs
have no sadness whatsoever
Whether it is Kargil or Bangladesh
we will not lose our strength
Whenever opportunities arise
we will play with our lives

Where there is our Potala Palace
and lovely Norbu Lingka
The throne of the Dalai Lama
was dear even then
Remember those martyrs of ours
who sacrificed with their lives
Let's sing together
Hail to our Tibet!
Hail to our Tibet!
Hail to our Tibet!
 

ajtr

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Coping with rising China


K. Subrahmanyam

There is no reason to assume that India's rapidly rising neighbour, set to become the world's largest economy in the next two decades, will not play the normal game of nations. But the current hawkishness and jingoism in sections of the media and strategic circles in India is without basis and uncalled for, argues a veteran strategic affairs specialist.

In the last few weeks a number of accounts have appeared in our media of 'incidents' on the Indo-China Line of Actual Control (LoAC) that portrayed China as exerting military pressure on India. There were also reports of China objecting to the Asian Development Bank loan to a development project in Arunachal Pradesh on the ground that it is a disputed territory and issuing stapled instead of stamped visas for travellers, of Kashmiri residence to China.

Very hawkish articles appeared in the media on both sides. In China, an analyst repeated the argument of the 1960s that India cannot stay united. In India, the ghosts of 1962 were resurrected and there were predictions that there was likely to be a Chinese attack on India by 2012. The retiring Naval Chief's sober assessment that militarily India is not in a position to catch up with China on equality of forces and equipment in the conventional sense and therefore India should consider technological solutions to cope up with, and not confront a rising China, was misinterpreted as defeatist sentiment in certain media and strategic circles.

It is no doubt significant that while all this tension generation is in the media of the two countries the two governments have sought to reduce the tension and discourage the hype in the media. Some political parties, ex-service officers, and strategists have drawn totally inapt comparisons with 1962. I am one of the few surviving senior citizen civil servants who were in the Ministry of Defence at that time. I functioned as a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee from November 1962 till December 1964.

Year 2009 is not 1962. In 1962, China was isolated from the international system. It was conducting a 'Hate America' campaign annually and also denouncing the Soviet leadership as revisionists and capitalist roaders. The Chinese attack on India was launched to coincide with the Cuban missile crisis to make sure that the two superpowers would be preoccupied with each other and not be able to apply pressure on China. The Chinese also promptly withdrew from the Arunachal Pradesh territory they occupied back to the McMahon line.

At that time under the advice of American Ambassador J.K. Galbraith the Indian leadership did not use the Air Force for fear of superior Chinese retaliatory capability. The truth, which we did not know at that time, was that the Chinese Air Force was totally grounded as the Soviets had denied them spares and aviation fuel — not because of the attack on India but because of the ongoing ideological dispute. The debacle in Sela-Bomdila happened not because the Indian Army was outgunned and outmanned but because the divisional commander did not fight and attempted to withdraw from a well entrenched position due to sheer panic. There are books on the 'unfought war' by people who were there at that time. Since then the Indian Army has faced the Chinese under valiant leadership and acquitted itself very creditably.

China of today is not the Maoist country that argued that power grew out of the barrel of a gun and that even if 300 million Chinese perished in a nuclear war 300 million would survive to build a glorious civilisation. Times have changed since the ideology of countryside surrounding the cities was advanced during the Cultural Revolution. 'Dig tunnels deep and store grain everywhere' was the Maoist slogan in preparation for a nuclear war. China of the 1960s was an isolated country and today it is one of the largest trading nations of the world. Those who build skyscrapers and Three Gorges dam will not be thinking of war in the same way Mao did. China is energy-import dependent and its energy transit lanes through the Indian Ocean and Malacca Straits are very vulnerable

China has a much greater stake in Taiwan than it has in Arunachal Pradesh, which it totally vacated after occupying large sections of it in 1962. It has not risked a war on Taiwan over the last 60 years. It has been extraordinarily patient about it since it understands the risks involved in using force on Taiwan recovery. There was a time (the whole of the 1950s and 1960s) when U.S. aircraft and warships would violate Chinese airspace and Chinese territorial waters regularly. China issued the relevant 437th and 593rd serious warnings to the United States. That continued until it allied itself with the U.S. in 1971 faced with the perceived Soviet nuclear threat. Ideology did not stand in the way.

There are valuable lessons for India in China's patience and purposive response, untrammelled by ideological baggage or the overburden of memory. When Henry Kissinger started his secret trip to make up with Beijing, he told the doubters that the Chinese were pragmatists.

China is a rising power and is most likely to overtake the U.S. as the country with highest GDP in the next couple of decades. It wants to be the dominant power of Asia in the immediate future and that will mean an unequal relationship with other major Asian powers. The only nation that is perceived to have the potential to challenge China, not in the short run but over the longer period, is India — with a comparable population, a similar civilisational heritage, and the advantage of a younger age profile. While a meaningful challenge from India to China is not likely to come for at least a couple decades, India is in a position to play the role of a balancer in the ongoing rivalry between China and the U.S.
Chinese policies towards India have subtle elements of sophisticated coercion to attempt to prevent a closer partnership developing between India and the U.S. China may also have plans to shape a final settlement of the Tibetan issue on the passing of the present Dalai Lama. The pressure on Arunachal and procrastination in finalising the border may be a part of a long-term strategy to compel India to accept a post-Dalai Lama dispensation in Tibet and bring the matter to a closure.

China asserts that it will be rising peacefully. There is no disputing that peaceful rise is in its interest. But that does not preclude the normal practices in the game of nations of pressure, influence, and dominance — economically, politically and even militarily but without recourse to the actual use of force. That has happened all through history and there is no reason to assume that China will not practise the normal game of nations.

India has to learn to cope with this challenge without getting hysterical. Nor should it hamper in any way the growing trade relations between the two countries. There is, in fact, a good case to develop mutual dependencies in a globalised world, with due care to ensure that the dependency does not become unfavourably one-sided against our interest. The most effective way of doing it is to step up our economic growth to 10 per cent by exploiting all available favourable factors in the international economic and political system, as China is doing; develop rapidly our border infrastructure; augment our military capability without delays; and attempt to develop stakes for all major powers in our growth and security.

While doing all this, there is no need to indulge in jingoistic rhetoric. There can be firmness in dealing with the LoAC or other issues where there are attempts at exploiting unequal advantages in situations. India has arrived at a stage in international politics when it has to demonstrate maturity in playing the game of nations.

(The author, a retired civil servant, is an internationally known strategic affairs specialist and commentator.)
 

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Article from the time mag archives in Nov.1962

India: Never Again the Same

Friday, Nov. 30, 1962

Red China behaved in so inscrutably Oriental a manner last week that even Asians were baffled. After a series of smashing victories in the border war with India. Chinese troops swept down from the towering Himalayas and were poised at the edge of the fertile plains of Assam, whose jute and tea plantations account for one-fourth of India's export trade. Then, with Assam lying defenseless before her conquering army. Red China suddenly called a halt to the fighting.
Radio Peking announced that, "on its own initiative." Red China was ordering a cease-fire on all fronts. Further, by Dec. 1, Chinese troops would retire to positions 12½ miles behind the lines they occupied on Nov. 7. 1959. If this promise is actually carried out. it would mean, for some Chinese units, a pullback of more than 60 miles. These decisions. Peking continued, ''represent a most sincere effort" to achieve ''a speedy termination of the Sino-Indian conflict, a reopening of peaceful negotiations, and a peaceful settlement of the boundary question.'' War or peace, the message concluded, ''depends on whether or not the Indian government responds positively."
In New Delhi the government of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was taken completely by surprise. An Indian spokesman first denounced the Chinese offer as a "diabolical maneuver." which was later amended to the comment that India would "wait and see" exactly what the Chinese were proposing. A communique confirmed that, after the cease-fire deadline, there "had been no report of firing by the Chinese aggressors." Indian troops also stopped shooting, but Nehru warned India: "We must not imagine that the struggle will soon be over."
On closer examination, the Chinese cease-fire proved to be a lot less mysterious. It did offer India's battered armies a badly needed respite. But it left the Chinese armies in position to resume their offensive if Nehru refuses the Peking terms. And it puts on India the onus of continuing the war. Said the Hindustan Times: "The latest Chinese proposals are not a peace offer but an ultimatum."
Whatever the results of this peace bid tendered on a bayonet, India will never be the same again, nor will Nehru.
Barren Rock. In New Delhi illusions are dying fast. Gone is the belief that Chinese expansionism need not be taken seriously, that, in Nehru's words, China could not really want to wage a major war for "barren rock." Going too, is the conviction that the Soviet Union has either the authority or the will to restrain the Chinese Communists. Nehru's policy of nonalignment, which was intended to free India from any concern with the cold war between the West and Communism, was ending in disaster. Nearly shattered was the morally arrogant pose from which he had endlessly lectured the West on the need for peaceful coexistence with Communism. Above all. the Indian people, fiercely proud of their nationhood, have been deeply humiliated and shaken by the hated Chinese.
India, which is equally capable of philosophic calm and hysterical violence, showed, in the words of President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. a "great soul-awakening such as it has never had in all its history." The awakening took some curious forms. The Buddhist nuns and monks of Ladakh devoted themselves to writing an "immortal epic" of India's fight against Chinese aggression. A temple in the south Indian state of Andhra Pradesh converted its 85-lb. gold treasury into 15-year defense bonds, while New Delhi bank clerks shined shoes outside a restaurant after hours and gave their earnings to the government, men jammed the enlistment centers and showered Nehru with pledges to fight signed in blood.
The 73-year-old Nehru gave the impression of being swept along by this tumult, not of leading it. His agony was apparent as he rose in Parliament, three days before the Chinese cease-fire announcement, to report that the Indian army had been decisively defeated at Se Pass and Walong. The news raised a storm among the M.P.s. A Deputy from the threatened Assam state was on his feet, shaking with indignation and demanding, "What is the government going to do? Why can't you tell us? Are we going to get both men and materials from friendly countries to fight a total war, or is the government contemplating a cease-fire and negotiations with the Chinese?" Other gesturing Deputies joined in, shouting their questions in English and Hindi. "Are we nothing?" cried one Praja Socialist member. "Is the Prime Minister everything?"
While the Speaker asked repeatedly for order, Nehru sat chin in hand, obviously scornful of this display of Indian excitability, his abstracted gaze fixed on nothing. Finally Nehru rose again and tried to quiet the uproar by saying, "We shall take every conceivable and possible measure to meet the crisis. We are trying to get all possible help from friendly countries."
Attic Burglar. His critics accused him of still clinging to the language of nonalignment. Later, in a radio speech in which he announced the fall of Bomdi La,
Nehru sounded tougher. He no longer defended his old policies, denounced China as "an imperialist of the worst kind," and at last thanked the U.S. and Britain by name for arms aid, pledging to ask for more.
Nehru was coming close to admitting that he had at last discovered who were India's friends. The neutral nations, which so often looked to India for leadership in the past, were mostly embarrassingly silent or unsympathetic—a government-controlled newspaper in Ghana dismissed the war as "an ordinary border dispute." As for Russia, its ambiguously neutral position, argued Nehru, was the best India could hope for under the circumstances. Actually, Nehru had obviously hoped for more, and was shocked when, instead of helping India, Moscow denounced India's border claims and urged Nehru to accept the Red Chinese terms.
As India's poorly equipped army reeled under the Chinese blows, the West moved swiftly and without recrimination to India's defense. Shortly after the Chinese attack, frantic Indian officers simply drove round to the U.S. embassy with their pleas for arms and supplies. Eventually their requests were coordinated. During the tense week of the Cuban crisis, U.S. Ambassador to India Kenneth Galbraith was virtually on his own, and he promised Nehru full U.S. backing.
When Washington finally turned its attention to India, it honored the ambassador's pledge, loaded 60 U.S. planes with $5,000,000 worth of automatic weapons, heavy mortars and land mines. Twelve huge
C-130 Hercules transports, complete with U.S. crews and maintenance teams, took off for New Delhi to fly Indian troops and equipment to the battle zone. Britain weighed in with Bren and Sten guns, and airlifted 150 tons of arms to India. Canada prepared to ship six transport planes. Australia opened Indian credits for $1,800,000 worth of munitions.
Assistant Secretary of State Phillips Talbot graphically defined the U.S. mission. "We are not seeking a new ally," he said. "We are helping a friend whose attic has been entered by a burglar." In Washington's opinion, it mattered little that the burglar gratuitously offered to move back from the stairs leading to the lower floors and promised not to shoot any more of the house's inhabitants. "What we want," said Talbot, "is to help get the burglar out."
To that end, a U.S. mission headed by Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Averell Harriman and U.S. Army General Paul D. Adams flew to New Delhi to confer with Indian officials on defense requirements. Soon after, Britain's Commonwealth Secretary Duncan Sandys arrived with a similar British mission. Their most stunning discovery: after five years under Nehru's hand-picked Defense Minister, Krishna Menon, the Indian army was lamentably short of ammunition even for its antiquated Lee Enfield rifles.
Misbehaving People. So far, the fighting has shown that the Indians need nearly everything, except courage. Chinese burp guns fire 20 times faster than Indian rifles. The Indian 25-pounder is a good artillery piece, but is almost immobile in the mountains and cannot match the Chinese pack artillery, recoilless guns and bazookas. Each Chinese battalion has a special company of porters whose job it is to make sure the fighting men have ample ammunition and food. The Indians must rely on units from their unwieldy Army Service Corps, who were never trained to operate at heights of 14,000 feet and over mule paths. In addition to bulldozers and four-wheel-drive trucks, the Indians need mechanical saws that can match the speed of those the Chinese use to cut roads through forests.
India's catastrophic unreadiness for war stems directly from the policy of nonalignment which was devised by Nehru and implemented by his close confidant Krishna Menon. Says one Indian editor: "Nonalignment is no ideology. It is an idiosyncrasy."
Indians like to say that it resembles the isolationism formerly practiced by the U.S.. but it has moral overtones which, Nehru claims, grow out of "Indian culture and our philosophic outlook.'' Actually, it owes as much to Nehru's rather oldfashioned, stereotyped, left-wing attitudes acquired during the '20s and '30s ("He still remembers all those New Statesmen leaders." says one bitter critic) as it does to Gandhian notions of nonviolence. Nehru has never been able to rid himself of the disastrous cliche that holds Communism to be somehow progressive and less of a threat to emergent nations than "imperialism."
Nehru himself has said: "Nonalignment essentially means live and let live—but of course this doesn't include people who misbehave." During its 15 years of independence. India has dealt severely with the misbehavior of several smaller neighbors, but has been almost slavishly tolerant of Communist misbehavior.
The Communist Chinese invasion of Korea was "aggression." but the West was also "not blameless"; the crushing of the Hungarian rebellion was unfortunate, but all the facts were not clear; when the Soviet Union broke the nuclear test moratorium last year, Nehru deplored "all nuclear tests."

Like a Buddha. Yet in its way, nonalignment paid enormous dividends. India received massive aid from both Russia and the West. Getting on India's good side became almost the most important thing in the United Nations. At intervals, the rest of the world's statesmen came to India to pay obeisance to Nehru as though to a Buddha. And Nehru obviously believed that whatever he did. in case of real need the U.S. would have to help India anyway. Meanwhile, as he saw it. the object of his foreign policy was to prevent the two great Asian powers —Russia and China—from combining against India. In his effort to woo both, acerbic Krishna Menon, says one Western diplomat, "was worth the weight of four or five ordinary men. He was so obnoxious to the West that, almost alone, he could demonstrate the sincerity of India's neutrality to the Russians."

At the 1955 Bandung conference. Nehru and China's Premier Chou En-lai embraced Panch Shila, a five-point formula for peaceful coexistence. The same Indian crowds that now shout. "Wipe out Chink stink!" then roared "Hindi Chini bhai bhai" (Indians and Chinese are brothers). India refused to sign the peace treaty with Japan because Red China was not a party to it. At home, Menon harped on the theme that Pakistan was India's only enemy. Three years ago, when Pakistan proposed a joint defense pact with India, Nehru ingenuously asked, "Joint defense against whom?" Western warnings about China's ultimate intentions were brushed aside as obvious attempts to stir up trouble between peace-loving friends.

Even the Chinese conquest of Tibet in 1951 had rung no alarm bells in New Delhi—and therein lie the real beginnings of the present war.

Initialed Map. Under the British raj, London played what Lord Curzon called "the great game." Its object was to protect India's northern borders from Russia by fostering semi-independent buffer states like Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. In those palmy colonial days, Tibet was militarily insignificant, and China, which claims overlordship of Tibet, was usually too weak to exercise it.

When the Chinese Republic of Sun Yat-sen was born in 1912, Britain decided to look to its borders. At a three-nation meeting in Simla in 1914, Britain's representative. Sir Arthur McMahon, determined the eastern portion of the border by drawing a line on a map along the Himalayan peaks from Bhutan to Burma. The Tibetan and Chinese delegates initialed this map, but the newborn Chinese Republic refused to ratify it, and so has every Chinese government since.

The McMahon Line was never surveyed or delimited on the ground, and British troops seldom penetrated the NEFA hill country, where such tribes as the Apatanis. the Tagins and the Hill Miris amused themselves by slave-raiding and headhunting. As recently as 1953. the Daflas wiped out a detachment of the Assam Rifles just for the fun of it.

At the western end of the border, in Ladakh. the British made even less of an effort at marking the frontier, and the border with Tibet has generally been classified as "undefined." Red China was most interested in Ladakh's northeastern corner, where lies the Aksai Chin plateau, empty of nearly everything but rocks, sky and silence. For centuries, a caravan route wound through the Aksai Chin (one reason the Chinese say the plateau is theirs is that Aksai Chin means "China's Desert of White Stone"), leading from Tibet around the hump of the lofty Kunlun range to the Chinese province of Sinkiang. In 1956 and 1957 the Chinese built a paved road over the caravan trail, and so lightly did Indian border police patrol the area that New Delhi did not learn about the road until two years after it was built.
Time Immemorial. Firing off a belated protest to Peking, India rushed troops into the endangered area, where they at once collided with Chinese outposts. Attempts at negotiation broke down because India demanded that the Chinese first withdraw to Tibet, while the Chinese insisted that Aksai Chin, and much more besides in NEFA and Ladakh. was historically Chinese territory. Neither side has basically changed its position since.
On Oct. 25, strong Chinese patrols began penetrating the NEFA border, occupying Longju and Towang and threatening Walong. For once, Nehru was badly shaken. He said: "From time immemorial the Himalayas have provided us with a magnificent frontier. We cannot allow that barrier to be penetrated because it is also the principal barrier to India." But the barrier was being daily penetrated. Ten months ago, Nehru appointed Lieut. General Brij Kaul, 50, to command the NEFA area. Then, without consulting any of his military men, Nehru publicly ordered Kaul to drive out the Chinese invaders of NEFA.
The opposing armies were of unequal size, skill and equipment. The Chinese force of some 110,000 men was commanded by General Chang Kuo-hua, 54, a short, burly veteran of the Communist Party and Communist wars, who well understands Mao Tse-tung's dictum, "All political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." His army is made up of three-year conscripts from central China, but its officers and noncoms are largely proven cadres who served with distinction in the Korean war. The infantry is armed with a Chinese-made burp gun with not very great accuracy but good fire power, hand grenades, submachine guns and rifles. The light and heavy mortars, which have a surprising range, are also Chinese made, but the heavy artillery, tanks and planes are mostly of Soviet manufacture.
The Indian forces number some 500,000, but fewer than 100,000 men were committed to the Red border area—the bulk of the army, and many of its best units, being kept on guard duty in Kashmir watching the Pakistanis. A strictly volunteer army, with the men serving five-year terms, it drew its troops largely from the warrior races of the north—Jats, Sikhs, Gurkhas, Dogras, Garhwalis. Over the past century, the Indian army has fought from France to China, and has usually fought excellently, whether pitted against Pathan guerrillas, Nazi panzer grenadiers or Japanese suicide squads. In the 1947-48 war in Kashmir, the Indians were fighting a British-trained Pakistani army very like themselves. Since independence, the Indian army has not encountered a really first-rate foe. The guerrilla war with the rebellious Naga tribesmen of Eastern Assam and the walkover in Goa were little more than training exercises.
Infinite Testiness. For the past five years, the Indian army has also been plagued by Defense Minister Krishna Menon, who was both economy-minded and socialistically determined to supply the troops from state-run arsenals, most of which exist only as blueprints. Sharing Nehru's distrust of what he calls the "arms racket," Menon was reluctant to buy weapons abroad, and refused to let private Indian firms bid on defense contracts. Menon's boasts of Indian creativity in arms development have been revealed as shoddy deceptions. A prototype of an Indian jet fighter plane proved unable to break the sound barrier. Even the MIG-21 planes that the Soviet Union has promised to deliver in December are of questionable value, since jet fighters are useless without an intricate ground-support system, which India is in no position to set up.
A man of infinite testiness, Menon was soon squabbling with independent-minded generals. Lieut. General Shankar Thorat and Commander in Chief General K. S. Thimayya appealed to Nehru against Menon's promotion policies. When Nehru, who has long scorned the British-trained officers as men who "did not understand India," refused to listen to complaints about Menon, both generals retired from the army in disgust. Menon named as new commander in chief P. N. Thapar, a "paperwork general."
Skyward Zigzag. Before Kaul had a chance to try and "clear out" the Chinese in NEFA, the Chinese struck first on Oct. 20. Some 20,000 burp-gun-toting infantry stormed over Thag La ridge and swept away a 5,000-man Indian brigade strung out along the Kechilang River. The surprise was complete, and dazed survivors of the Chinese attack struggled over the pathless mountains, where hundreds died of exposure. In Ladakh the Chinese scored an even bigger victory, occupying the entire 14,000 square miles that Peking claims is Chinese territory.
While the Indians worked to build up a new defense line at Walong and in the lofty Se Pass, reinforcements were hurried to Assam. The effort to bring up men and supplies from the plains was backbreaking. TIME Correspondent Edward Behr made the trip over a Jeep path that was like a roller coaster 70 miles long and nearly three miles high. He reports: "The Jeep path begins at Tezpur, amid groves of banana and banyan trees, then climbs steeply upward through forests of oak and pine to a 10,000-ft. summit. Here the path plunges dizzily downward to the supply base of Bomdi La on a 5,000-ft. plateau, and then zigzags skyward again to the mist-hung Se Pass at 13,556 ft. Above the hairpin turns of the road rise sheer rock walls; below lie bottomless chasms. Rain and snow come without warning, turning the path to slippery mud. Even under the best conditions, a Jeep takes 18 hours to cover the 70 miles.
"At this height, icy winds sweep down from the snow crests of the Himalayas, and if a man makes the slightest exertion, his lungs feel as if they are bursting. Newcomers suffer from the nausea and lightheadedness of mountain sickness. Every item of supply, except water, must be brought up the roller coaster from the plains. There are few bits of earth flat enough for an airstrip, and helicopters have trouble navigating in the thin air."
Shell Plaster. After three weeks, Kaul felt emboldened to make a probing attack on the Chinese lines. Following an artillery barrage, 1,000 Indian jawans (G.I.s) drove the Chinese from the lower slopes of a hill near Walong. It was a costly victory, for the Chinese launched a massive counterattack through and around Walong, driving the Indians 80 miles down the Luhit valley. At Se Pass, the Chinese victory was even more spectacular. Having spotted the Indian gun emplacements, the Chinese plastered them with mortar and artillery shells, and then sent forward a Korea-style "human sea" assault. Two Chinese flanking columns of several thousand men each moved undetected and with bewildering speed through deep gorges and over 14,000-ft. mountains around the pass to capture the Indian supply base at Bomdi La, trapping an Indian division and throwing India's defense plans into chaos.
Panic spread from the mountains into the plains. Officials in Tezpur burned their files, and bank managers even set fire to stacks of banknotes. Five hundred prisoners were set free from Tezpur jail. Refugees jammed aboard ferry boats to get across the Brahmaputra River. Even policemen joined the flight.

Indian army headquarters was hastily moved from Tezpur to Gauhati, 100 miles to the southwest. Officers and men who had escaped from the fighting referred dazedly to the Chinese as swarming everywhere "like red ants." An Indian colonel admitted, "We just haven't been taught this kind of warfare."

Needed Intellect. Though India—like the U.S. after Pearl Harbor—could not yet afford scapegoats and recrimination, Defense Minister Krishna Menon was almost universally blamed for the inadequacy of Indian arms, the lack of equipment and even winter clothing. His fall from grace not only finished his own career but brought a turning point in Nehru's. The Prime Minister had tried to pacify critics by taking over the Defense Ministry and downgrading Menon to Minister of Defense Production, but Nehru's own supporters demanded Menon's complete dismissal.

On Nov. 7, Nehru attended an all-day meeting of the Executive Committee of the parliamentary Congress Party and made a final plea for Menon, whose intellect, he said, was needed in the crisis.

As a participant recalls it, ten clenched fists banged down on the table, a chorus of voices shouted, "No!"

Nehru was dumfounded. It was he who was used to banging tables and making peremptory refusals. Taking a different tack, he accurately said that he was as much at fault as Menon and vaguely threatened to resign. Always before, such a threat had been sufficient to make the opposition crumble with piteous cries of 'Tanditji, don't leave us alone!" This time, one of the leaders said: "If you continue to follow Menon's policies, we are prepared to contemplate that possibility." Nehru was beaten and Menon thrown out of the Cabinet. Joining him in his exit was Menon's appointee, Commander in Chief General P. N. Thapar, who resigned because of "poor health."

The Defense Department at once, but belatedly, got a new look and a firmer tone. Impatient of turgid oratory and military fumbling, all India turned with relief to the new Defense Minister, Y. B. Chavan. A big man in every sense of the word—including his burly 200 lbs.—Chavan

served for six years as Chief Minister of Bombay, the richest and most industrialized Indian state. The army's new commander in chief, Lieut. General J. N. Chaudhuri, the "Victor of Goa," who also saw action in World War II campaigns in the Middle East and Burma, is a close friend of Chavan's.
Though a socialist and a onetime disciple of Nehru, Chavan is cast in a different mold. Once a terrorist against the British and a proud member of the Kshra-triya warrior caste, Chavan says: "There can be no negotiations with an aggressor." Unlike Nehru, who still maintains that China's attack is not necessarily connected with Communism, Chavan declared: "The first casualties of the unashamed aggression of the Chinese on India are Marxism and Leninism."

Old Twinkle. There has been some grumbling that Nehru is no wartime leader. At 73, he often seems physically and mentally spent. His hair is snow-white and thinning, his skin greyish and his gaze abstracted. Since the invasion, he has not spared himself, and his sister, Mme. Pandit, thinks Nehru is "fighting fit-he's got that old twinkle in his eye." But he tires noticeably as the day goes on. One old friend says, "It makes a big difference whether you see him in the morning or the evening."

No one seriously suggests that Nehru will be replaced as India's leader while he lives. To his country, he is not a statesman but an idol. Each morning, large crowds assemble on the lawn outside his New Delhi home. Some present petitions or beg favors, but thousands, in recent weeks, have handed over money or gold dust for the national defense. Most come just to achieve darshan, communion, with the country's leader. The throng is comforted and reassured, not by the words, but by the presence of Nehru.

His widowed daughter, Indira Gandhi, 45, who is functioning as his assistant and has sometimes been mentioned as his favorite choice to succeed him, is still essentially right when she says: "Unity can only be formed in India behind the Congress Party, and in the Congress Party only behind my father."

Nevertheless, Nehru's power will be circumscribed from now on. His long years of unquestioned, absolute personal rule are at an end. For the first time, leaders of the ruling Congress Party are demanding that attention be paid to the majority sentiment in the party as well as to Nehru's own ideas. The 437 million people of India may cease being Nehru's children and may at last become his constituents.

This does not mean that Nehru no longer leads, but only that from now on he will have to lead by using the more orthodox methods of a Western politician. Conservative members of the Congress Party, notably Finance Minister Morarji Desai, have been strengthened, and expect that Nehru's dogmatic reliance on socialism and the "public sector" of industry will be reduced; if India is to arm in a hurry, they argue, it will need the drive and energy of the "private sector."

Moreover, the Indian army may not only at last get the equipment it needs but may also gradually emerge as something of a political force. While this view is still vastly unpopular, many army officers think it is time for India to come to terms with Pakistan over the nagging Kashmir issue, so that the two great countries of the subcontinent can present a united front to China.
Bartered Gains. There is still considerable dispute over how little or how much the Chinese were after in their attack on India. One theory held by some leading Indian military men is that the Reds want eventually to drive as far as Calcutta, thereby outflanking all of Southeast Asia. In such a drive, the Chinese would be able to take advantage of anti-Indian feeling along the way, notably among the rebellious Nagas in East Assam, and in the border state of Sikkim. Reaching Calcutta, perhaps the world's most miserable city, where 125,000 homeless persons sleep on the streets each night, they would find readymade the strongest Communist organization in India. According to this theory, the Reds could set up a satellite regime in the Bay of Bengal and, without going any farther with their armies, wait for the rest of India to splinter and fall. This strategy has not necessarily been abandoned for good, but it certainly has been set aside. For one thing, the Chinese attack shattered Communism as a political force even in Calcutta.

The prevailing theory now is that the Chinese had less ambitious aims to begin with: to take the high ground and the key military passes away from the Indians, and to finally establish, once and for all, Chinese control of the Aksai Chin plateau in Ladakh, so as to safeguard the vital military roads to Sinkiang province. The Chinese may have been unprepared to exploit the almost total collapse of India's armed forces and may even have been surprised by their swift success. On this reading, the terms of the Chinese cease-fire offer become intelligible. The Nov. 7 line would in effect barter away the sizable Chinese gains in NEFA for Indian acceptance of China's property rights in Aksai Chin.

Viewed from Peking, the difficulties of supply through the Himalayas in dead of winter might make the Communists hesitate to try to occupy Assam, especially since India's determined show of national unity, and the West's evident willingness to support India to the hilt. There is a significant indication of one Chinese anxiety in the cease-fire offer. After warning that renewed war will "bring endless disaster to India," Peking says: "Particularly serious is the prospect that if U.S. imperialism is allowed to become involved, the present conflict will grow into a war in which Asians are made to fight Asians, entirely contrary to the fundamental interests of the Indian people." Implicit in those words are Red Chinese memories of the prolonged Korean war. which ended in a gory stalemate.

India's angry millions, armed, trained and aided by the U.S., must be a prospect that not even Mao Tse-tung relishes facing. Instead, by in effect quitting while they are ahead, the Chinese can play the peacemakers in the short-sighted eyes of the neutral nations, while having dramatically demonstrated their military superiority over India and without having to abandon the long-range threat. Says Madame Pandit: "This attack was far more than just an attack on one border. India is completely and wholly dedicated to democracy and not to some kind of 'Asian democracy.' China's motive was to humiliate India and to prove democracy is unworkable in Asia."

Without Meaning. Even if Nehru were prepared to give away Ladakh in return for a Chinese pullback elsewhere, he is committed to clearing all Indian territory of the invaders. And Nehru must know that the situation has reached a point where he can never again trust a Red Chinese promise and that the relationship between India and China has changed irrevocably. His policy of nonalignment has not been jettisoned. It has just ceased to have any meaning.
But Americans in New Delhi last week were irritated by evidence that the Indian government still prefers equivocation to the plain truth. Official requests went out to the Indian press not to print photos showing the arrival of U.S. arms, and the twelve U.S. Air Force transport planes sent by Washington to ferry Indian troops were made to sound like leased aircraft flown by mercenaries. The crowds know better. A current slogan is a revision of the earlier cry for brotherhood with China: "Americans bhai bhai; Chini hai hail" (Americans are our brothers; death to the Chinese!).

An Indian Cabinet minister, who disagrees with Nehru politically but respects him, says passionately: "He will come to many changes now. You cannot imagine how difficult it was for him to get rid of Menon. Do not think it was easy for him to ask for American arms. Right now, it is important not to push him into a corner in public." Another Cabinet minister, who does not like Nehru, also counsels patience: "His will to resist will wear down. It is already worn down a long way. Hitherto, there was no opposition at all in India. Now, Nehru is relying on his opposition. He may hate it. He has been thrown into the company of people like me, people he does not like. We make strange bedfellows, but together we are going to win the war."

To Americans it may sound like a peculiar way to win a war. But though India moves at a different pace and speaks with a different voice few could doubt last week the Indian determination to see that the Himalayan defeats were avenged, however long it may take.
 

ajtr

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After independence indian leadership always went half-heartedly into all the war it fought except for the 1971.and we 've seen that in 1971 indian leadership went whole heardly into war and was solidly behind its armed forces.so 1971 paid rich dividends.

1.1947-48-1st kashmir war india after freeing up srinagar,baramulla etc didn't prees on military advantage it held and with ceasefire nehru went to UN.---lost 1/3rd POK.
2. china war-1962- nehru though taken by surprise didn't use airforce as he did in 1st kashmir war hence lost the war.
3. indo-pak war -1965-- shastri didnt use navy.though india held large swathes of pak land he returned all and war remain inconclusive with pakistan calling for ceasefire and shastri didnt press like nehru in 1947-48 even when he held the advantage.
4.ind-pak war of 1971- indira gandhi used all the arms of the defence forces and stood solidly behind her commanders hence she reaped rich victory in the form of surrender in east pakistan and formation of bangladesh.
5. 1999 kargil war--indian forces fought with one hand tied behind their back as vajpayee strictly forbade them not to cross LOC and making kargil as localized affair.
 

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The 1962 India-China War and Kargil 1999: Restrictions on the Use of Air Power



Abstract
The paper examines the utilisation of air power in the 1962 India-
China war and in the 1999 Kargil conflict. The study reveals a certain
continuity in the attitudes to the use of offensive air power in limited
conflicts. Both in 1962 and in 1999, the use of air power was hedged
about with various restrictions. Underlying these appears to be the
belief that the use of offensive air power is fundamentally escalatory.
Hence there is a hesitation to commit offensive air power assets.
— * —
Introduction
Between October 20 and November 21, 1962, India and China fought a
short, sharp border conflict in Ladakh and the then North East Frontier Agency
(NEFA). India suffered a series of reverses and lost extensive territory. On
November 21, 1962, China initiated a unilateral ceasefire and troop pullback
and repatriated Indian PoWs. The Indian Army bore the brunt of the action.
The IAF only carried out air supply and was not used for any offensive action.
In early May 1999, local shepherds spotted strangers digging in on the
Kargil heights in Jammu and Kashmir. Three army patrols sent to investigate
were repulsed with heavy casualties. By May 11, it had become clear that
intrusion was taking place on a large scale. The use of offensive air power
was sought as early as May 7. However, use was sanctioned by the Cabinet
only on May 25, with the stipulation that the Line of Control (LoC) was not
to be crossed. Eventually, through determined and concerted Army and Air
Force action, the intruders were pushed back with heavy loss of lives. Indian
casualties too were heavy, albeit lighter than Pakistan's.

Both the 1965 and the 1971 India-Pakistan wars saw the all-out use of
the IAF. These were clear-cut cases of conventional war, in which all the
three services participated. However, the 1962 India-China war and the 1999
Kargil conflict were not conventional, but limited wars. Offensive air power
was not used at all in 1962 and was used after some initial hesitation in 1999.
There are some parallels between these two cases, which deserve closer
scrutiny.
The 1962 India-China War
When the 1962 conflict began, India was the acknowledged leader of the
non-aligned movement and Jawaharlal Nehru its unquestioned leader. When
it ended in defeat, India lost prestige. Its non-aligned credentials were also
dented when she sought military intervention by the USA and the UK.
Pre-war Debate on the Use of Offensive Air Power
Maj. Gen. D. K. Palit was Director, Military Operations (DMO) under the
Chief of General Staff (CGS), Lt. Gen. B. M. Kaul, who was later blamed for
the debacle. In his book, Gen Palit says that the Directorate of Military
Operations had, as early as May 02, 1962, recommended the use of offensive
air power to redress the adverse force ratio in Ladakh.1 Offensive air action
was considered feasible in both NEFA and Ladakh.
The Army headquarters put forward the view that there was little reason
to fear strategic bombing, since there was no intelligence of bomber bases in
Tibet.2 Fighting, if any, was not likely to spread beyond border areas. Indian
air defences were capable of countering strategic bombing by the Chinese.
The Chinese were assessed as only capable of occasional raids, with no serious
effect on the border war. However, the issue was not broached with the Defence
Minister, since tension had subsided by then. Palit feels that a more deliberate
examination of the proposal would have resulted in a more reasoned response.
Indian Intelligence Assessments
Offensive air action was first discussed on or around September 18 during
one of the daily meetings chaired by the Defence Minister.3 In view of the
shortage of troops, it was proposed that that all troops be withdrawn from
outer Ladakh into inner Ladakh to concentrate around Leh. As this meant the
loss of the major part of Ladakh, including Chushul airfield, it was vehemently
opposed. The CAS, Air Chief Marshal Aspy Engineer, offered to fly reinforcements
and equipment to Chushul. He also offered to provide Close Air Support (CAS) missions against targets in West Tibet bordering Ladakh, if any troop
concentrations were noticed there. The IB was asked to make an assessment
of PLAAF strength, which could be brought to bear against India.4
B. N. Mullick was the Director of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) from 1950
to 1964. He claims that accurate intelligence assessments of Chinese intentions
were passed on to Service headquarters as early as June 1962.5 Information
was also received of Pakistani plans to attack India simultaneously from the
West, in coordination with the Chinese.6 Despite the withdrawal of support
after the rift with the USSR, the IB felt that the PLAAF would be capable of
undertaking missions at night as far as up to Madras, without interference,
due to our lack of night interceptors.7 Operations against Indian forces could
also be undertaken from Chinese airfields in Tibet, Yunnan and even Sinkiang.
The IB inputs indicated that the PLAAF already had MiG-21s supplied by the
USSR before the rupture. They also had night interception-capable MiG-19s
as well as MiG-17s. It was felt that this would make it difficult for our Canberras
to operate.
The PLAAF had expanded rapidly in the early 1950s, with Soviet assistance.
In the mid-1950s, American assessments ranked the PLAAF as the fourth
most powerful Air Force in the world.8 According to the official Indian history
of the war published by the MoD in 1992, the PLAAF was estimated to have
about 1,500 frontline fighters of the MiG-15, MiG-17 and MiG-19 class (refer
Table-1).9 The PLAAF had only six airfields in Tibet. The mainland airfields
were too far away to be effective. Because of the elevation, aircraft operating
from Tibet would be able to carry less weapon and fuel loads. As a result,
PLAAF capability to bomb Indian airfields would be extremely limited. The
PLAAF would also find it difficult to sustain operations from these airfields,
which still lacked adequate facilities.
The official history gives Indian Air Force strength as 559 fighters and
fighter bombers (Table-2).10 These included aircraft like the French Ouragan
and Mystere, the Hawker Siddeley Hunter and the Gnat. The Hunter and the
Gnat were among the most modern subsonic aircraft at the time. Of the
Chinese aircraft, only the MiG-19 was comparable in performance. Most IAF
aircraft were based in the western sector and would have been able to support
Army operations in Ladakh. However, two squadrons each of Ouragans
(Toofanis) and Vampires were also based in the eastern sector at Tezpur,
Bagdogra, Chabua, and Jorhat. Two squadrons of Hunters were also available
at Kalaikunda, close to Calcutta. Apart from these airfields, many second



......read it all in 25 page pdf file follow the link in heading.....
 
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ajtr

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This article tries to look into intelligence failure in 1962 indo-china and 1999 kargil wars.

Intelligence failures and reforms


SRINATH RAGHAVAN


A recurrent theme in the post-mortem of the latest Mumbai terror attacks was the ostensible failure of intelligence. The intelligence agencies sought to fend off these accusations by a series of leaks to the press. The agencies had apparently issued a stream of warnings in the months preceding the attacks: the latest one being given as late as 18 November 2008. The Union home minister has stated that there had been problems of coordination between the numerous agencies and their subsidiaries, and that the government had 'closed these gaps'.

A full assessment of the intelligence aspects of the Mumbai attacks will have to await adequate and credible information. Yet there are good reasons to be sceptical of the government's claims that the problems were only procedural and that they have now been rectified. Similar claims have been advanced in the past, but failures continue to occur. These might partly reflect the fact that the attempted procedural fixes were not fully implemented. The deeper problem, however, is that such changes are unlikely to set right the system.

There are broadly three types of intelligence failures: those pertaining to the collection of information, to its analysis, and to the response to the produced intelligence. Shortcomings in collection can be attributed to the agencies; but those in analysis and response tend to be as much failures of the political-strategic leadership as of any agency. Three categories of factors, either singly or in combination, account for these failures: external, organizational and innate.1

The external factors relate to our adversaries who would want to conceal or misrepresent their intentions and capabilities. A principal challenge of intelligence is to operate against forces that actively seek to outwit us. The organizational factors could include negligent intelligence agents, rivalry between agencies or their leadership, and firewalls between different agencies. These are the issues that tend to be the focus of efforts at intelligence reform. The innate factors are certain key aspects of intelligence that are inherently problematic and not amenable to being 'fixed'. Indeed, these innate factors render intelligence failures inevitable.

This essay seeks to shed light on some of these issues by drawing on the history of intelligence failures in India. In particular, I examine why New Delhi failed to anticipate the 'surprise attacks' by China in 1962 and Pakistan in 1999. These cases speak to our current predicament for two reasons. Acts of terrorism are classic instances of surprise attacks. Hence, understanding intelligence failures of this category would be useful. Moreover, in both these cases the intelligence agencies could rightly claim to have provided several inputs germane to the attack.



The Chinese attack of October 1962 came at the end of an armed stand-off that had lasted over three years. The first serious skirmishes had occurred along the disputed boundary in August and October 1959. Towards the end of 1961, the Indian government adopted a 'forward policy' of placing posts ahead of their present locations to deter further Chinese incursions. The Chinese responded by establishing posts encircling the new Indian ones.2



On 6 May 1962 about 100 Chinese troops, in assault formation, advanced towards an Indian post in the Chip Chap valley in the Ladakh sector. In the event, the Chinese backed off without attacking. The next flashpoint was the Galwan valley in Ladakh, where Indian forces established a picket on 4 July. The Chinese responded swiftly. By 10 July the PLA had surrounded the post, sealed off all possible withdrawal routes, and advanced within 100 yards of the post. The People's Daily carried a lurid headline: 'The Indian government should rein in on the brink of the precipice.' Yet again, the Chinese desisted from attacking the post. But the confrontation triggered further moves by the Chinese to surround Indian posts, actions that resulted in a rash of shooting incidents.

Meantime, the eastern sector of the frontier (now Arunachal Pradesh) was getting active too. In response to an Indian attempt to establish a post near the Namka Chu river, the Chinese occupied the ridge dominating the river. New Delhi sought to rush reinforcements to the area in order to evict the Chinese. Even as India tergiversated, China launched its attack on both sectors of the boundary on 20 October 1962.

Between April and October 1962 the Intelligence Bureau (IB), the agency then tasked with external as well as internal intelligence, prepared periodic assessments of Chinese disposition, movements, strength and build-up. The most pointed intelligence input came in late May. The IB learnt that the Chinese consulate in Calcutta had indicated to communists and fellow travellers Beijing's intention to forcefully remove Indian posts in Ladakh. The director of IB passed this on directly to the prime minister, the defence minister and the home minister.3



Why, then, did the Indian government fail to apprehend the coming Chinese attack? A combination of five factors helps to explain this failure. Consider first the organizational problem. The IB was asked not just to collect information but also to assess likely Chinese responses. This violated the fundamental principle that the reporting agency should not be asked to assess its own reports. This task fell under the purview of the joint intelligence committee (JIC), which was a sub-council of the chiefs of staff committee.

The JIC, however, was defunct. Its chairman, a senior ministry of external affairs (MEA) official, had no prior exposure to intelligence, and by his own admission he was unable to get the committee to function in a coordinated manner. The directorate of military intelligence was a key component of the JIC. But it neither possessed independent intelligence sources nor was effective in producing threat assessments. In consequence, the IB's inputs were not subjected to rigorous analysis and their political and military import was not well understood.

A second, and related, factor was that Indian officials' views tended to be coloured by the IB's analytical approach and conclusions. Prior to the decision to adopt the forward policy, the MEA and the army headquarters had asked the IB for an assessment of Chinese capabilities and intent. On 26 September 1961 the IB submitted a comprehensive paper stating that 'the Chinese would like to come right up to their claim of 1960 wherever we ourselves were not in occupation. But where even a dozen men of ours are present, the Chinese have kept away.' Drawing on past experience, the paper suggested that China would not react sharply to the new Indian moves.



This assessment soon became an article of faith among civilian and military officials alike. For instance, in June 1962, the chief of general staff wrote to the defence ministry: 'I am convinced that the Chinese will not attack any of our positions even if they [Indian posts] are relatively weaker than theirs.' Similarly, in mid-September 1962, when moves to evict China from the Namka Chu area were being debated, the foreign secretary insisted that the Chinese would not escalate the fighting – though Indian posts at one or two places could be threatened, this being indicated by the pattern of Chinese behaviour.

The foreign secretary's confidence stemmed from yet another source. The MEA's China division and the director of military operations at the army headquarters had together tried to assess China's logistical capabilities based on estimates of the road networks close to the frontier. They had concluded that the infrastructure was incapable of supporting a full-scale invasion deep into Indian territory. The chairman JIC recalled this belief holding sway in the MEA 'till the last moment.'

The fourth, and perhaps most important, factor was the political leadership's background assumptions about the unfolding crisis. At least since the end of 1950, Nehru had discounted the possibility of a major attack by China owing to international factors. He thought an attack on India would invariably carry the risk of great power intervention. From late 1959, Nehru also believed that the Soviet Union would act as a restraining force on China. Neither of these assumptions was wholly mistaken, but they were not immutable facts either. Furthermore, Nehru believed that by means of prudent management the crisis could be prevented from going critical.

The outcome of the stand-offs at Chip Chap and Galwan tended mostly to buttress Nehru's assumptions. During the latter, Nehru confessed that it was difficult to decide whether China's wordy warfare foreshadowed military action in the months ahead. Yet, he felt that there would be no major clash. Part of the problem – this was the fifth factor – was that the Chinese adopted a stand of reasonableness, which considerably masked their intentions to resolve the dispute by resort to force. As Nehru noted, the Chinese diplomatic notes had a 'characteristic ambivalence', at once breathing fire and advocating negotiations. Nehru revised his views only around 12 October. He now felt that the situation along the Namka Chu was 'definitely a dangerous one, and it may lead to major conflicts.' By then, of course, the attack was only a week in coming.



On 3 May 1999, the Indian Army received reports from local shepherds on the presence of armed intruders in the Kargil sector. It subsequently transpired that an estimated 1700 Pakistani Army regulars and militants had crossed the unheld gaps in the line of control and occupied positions on the Indian side. The Indian government was certainly taken by surprise.4

In the months preceding the intrusion, the intelligence agencies circulated several reports indicating the possibility of increased artillery shelling and infiltration in the Kargil sector. As early as June 1998, the IB reported 'increased activities at the border and continuing endeavour to infiltrate a large group of foreign mercenaries.' It also reported 'increased movement' of Pakistan Army opposite the Kargil sector. Importantly, this report was issued by the director IB; but bypassing the JIC (now subsumed under the National Security Council Secretariat) and the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) it was sent directly to the prime minister and the home minister as well as the director general of military operations. The military intelligence assessed that the inputs were consistent with the heightened activity in the aftermath of the nuclear tests of May 1998.



In October, the R&AW reported that 'Pakistan appeared hell-bent on interdicting our Dras-Kargil highway' by means of increased shelling. The report also observed that 'A limited swift offensive threat with possible support of alliance partners cannot be ruled out.' However, when the army headquarters sought further details on where such an offensive might occur, neither the R&AW nor the JIC responded with clarifications or elaboration. The following month, the IB reported that Pakistan was providing military training to Taliban, who were likely to be infiltrated into Kargil area in April 1999. The JIC issued a paper the same month stating the possibility of increased pressure on places like Siachen, Kargil, Rajouri/Poonch sectors and the likelihood of a 'new militant offensive next summer.'

The JIC's assessments of the wider political-strategic context were none too optimistic. The JIC noted in March 1999 that despite Prime Minister Vajpayee's bus journey and the Lahore declaration there was 'no let up on anti-Indian rhetoric"¦ no basic change in their overall approach towards India and the Kashmir issue.' Earlier, it had noted that the new Pakistan Army chief was a 'hardliner on India' and that his appointment may not augur well for India-Pakistan relations.



The Indian government's inability to foresee the intrusion arose from a combination of factors. For a start, the Pakistan Army made excellent use of stealth and deception in the run-up to the operation. Indian agencies could not pick up any of the tell-tale indicators: induction of additional troops, logistics build-up, and improvement in communications. The Pakistanis also managed to convey the impression that the activity in the area related to preparation for infiltration of militants. Indeed, even after the incursion was detected the Indians remained unclear about the composition of the intruding force.

Furthermore, the intelligence assessments remained focused on the possibility of increased infiltration and did not anticipate an intrusion of this scale. Infiltration had thus far been Pakistan's modus operandi. Past experience also suggested that such an intrusion was not likely to succeed in the Kargil sector. There had been no large-scale infiltration in the area since a major intrusion in 1993 in which the Pakistanis suffered 27 casualties. When the possibility of a limited offensive in Kargil was raised at a JIC meeting on 18 September 1998, the representatives of the agencies thought that Pakistan could not send intruders into this area owing to the difficult terrain and the fact that the Shiite population of Kargil was unlikely to support them.

The military, too, discounted the possibility of unheld gaps along the line of control being occupied by intruders. This was based on the assumption that militants do not prefer to occupy territory and hold defensive positions. As the then army chief subsequently observed, 'They normally follow "hit and run" tactics.'

Finally, the political leadership's assumptions about the state of India-Pakistan relations would have led them to disregard the possibility of such an intrusion. At one level, they believed that India's nuclear arsenal would deter Pakistan from threatening the use of nuclear weapons, and so enable India to use its conventional superiority in tackling Pakistan's support for the insurgency. India's deputy prime minister had warned Pakistan to 'roll-back its anti-India policy': otherwise it would 'prove costly'. From the Indian leaders' perspective, an intrusion of this scale would have appeared strategically irrational for Pakistan to undertake. At another level, they believed that relations with Pakistan were on the mend. The official and back-channel talks after the tests led to the Lahore summit in February 1999. The trip to Pakistan underscored the fact that Prime Minister Vajpayee was sanguine about ties with Pakistan. Once the intrusion came to light, Vajpayee's disappointment was evident.



Looking back at the failures of 1962 and 1999, it is obvious that procedural changes could have improved the quality of the assessment process. In 1962, the JIC was dysfunctional. In 1999, too, it could have been more effective. The Kargil Review Committee rightly observes that the assessment process and the JIC's function have been downgraded in importance. But this fixation on structure and process obscures more fundamental problems.

Consider the patterns that emerge from both cases. First, assessments of future behaviour of the adversary rested on extrapolations from patterns of past behaviour. This form of inductive reasoning is the most prevalent mode of making predictions about the way the world works. The problem with inductive reasoning is that it licenses a bias towards assuming continuity rather than deviance. And wars represent aberrant behaviour, displaying sharp discontinuities from the normal form of handling international disputes. The alternative to inductive reasoning is to adopt a deductive approach. We start with a hypothesis and examine how well the available data fits with it. The trouble here is that the information collected by the agencies might fit well with more than one hypothesis. The problem, therefore, is that there is no sound methodology for divining such abrupt shifts in behaviour.



It could be argued that the best response would be to proceed on the worst-case assumption. Such a response, however, is bound to pose high costs – costs that might come to be seen as unnecessary. For instance, if the Indian Army had tried to plug the gaps along the line of control in the winter of 1998-99, it would certainly have resulted in casualties owing to weather. Further, it is quite likely that the Pakistanis might have put off the operation because of Indian moves. This, in turn, might have led the Indians to reconsider the wisdom of incurring such costs when the anticipated development did not occur. Even if propounded in principle, worst-case thinking will be corroded in practice. The paradox here is of a 'self-negating prophecy.'

Second, the military leadership in both cases assessed that the adversary did not have the necessary logistical capability to undertake the requisite operation. This led to the assumption that it would be irrational for the adversary to attempt the operation. It is easy to criticize this belief in hindsight. The military might have been mistaken in assuming that the adversary would act rationally; but it is not clear what an assumption of irrationality would entail and what criteria can be applied to judge its validity. The Review Committee suggests that political-military war gaming would have helped. Hardly. War games are best suited to rehearse responses to certain contingencies, not to generate them. Most games, in fact, start out with stylized expectations about enemy moves.



Third, the political leadership in both cases held beliefs that led them to assume that the adversary would not launch an attack. Much of the information provided by the agencies was assimilated in a manner that fit with their preconceptions. This results from the physiology of our cognitive processes. Once we start thinking about an issue in a certain way, the same mental channels get reinforced when we return to the issue. This is essential for retrieving information, but also creates 'mental ruts' that make it difficult to view the information in a different pattern.5 The more ambiguous the information, the stronger is the role of preconceptions. This explains why drawing the top leadership's attention to specific pieces of important information is likely to be futile.

In order to avoid this problem, the idea of using a 'devil's advocate' is often suggested. But institutionalizing such a role is unlikely to help; for the 'devil' will likely be regarded as advancing arguments for the sake of it, and will seldom be taken seriously. Moreover, senior political leaders are usually not swayed by contrary assessments prepared by mid-ranking staffers. They tend to believe, with some justification, that their personal interaction and experience give them a better understanding of the mind-set of other leaders.

These innate problems of intelligence are by no means specific to India: they can be observed in intelligence failures across countries. Comparative studies also demonstrate that these are usually intractable. Intelligence failures are thus unavoidable.



This is not to make a case for despair. For one thing, arguing that intelligence failures are inevitable is not the same as suggesting that they will always fail. For another, it might be useful to view intelligence performances not as success or failure but as a 'batting average' over time. This will require our agencies to examine their own historical records and estimate the ratio of success to failure in making predictions. To be sure, this will not be a flawless number; but it will give us a reasonable idea of their comparative performance. It might also enable us to decide which analysts should be promoted to the top order of the batting line-up. Finally, sensitizing intelligence professionals and consumers to social sciences methodology and cognitive barriers might help them anticipate and limit the problems.

All of these would require resources and commitment from the top leadership. The tasks will be unremarkable, the resistance considerable, and the results slow in coming. Meantime if another 'surprise attack' occurs, we could well be back to structural and procedural reforms.
 

ajtr

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China's counterfactual history


A new, low-level conflict is threatening to brew between New Delhi and Beijing. China's other neighbours, especially those embroiled in border disputes with the rulers of the Middle Kingdom, should pay close attention to how this incident unfolds.
Tensions over border issues between China and India arise from Beijing laying claim to about 90,000 sq. km of Indian territory. During a Sino-Indian conflict in 1962, Chinese troops flooded into and occupied a large tract of disputed territory. While Beijing withdrew forces from what is the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, it expanded its control over an additional swathe of the Tibetan plateau.

In a move to take a mile while appearing to give back an inch, China continues to lay claim to the territory of Arunachal Pradesh. And it has been making probing moves into Sikkim while improving infrastructure near disputed areas that have military as well as commercial uses. In 2006, China's ambassador to India declared the "whole state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory...we are claiming all of that. That is our position".
For its part, New Delhi recently announced the deployment of two additional army divisions and two air force squadrons to positions near its border with China. Despite its own actions, Beijing denounced India's recent troop movements and insisted there will be no "compromises in its border disputes with India".
China's disagreements over borders are not limited to those with India. For its part, Beijing has made irredentist claims on all its borders and over all the waters that wash up onto its coasts. Indeed, it claims about 80% of the South China Sea, including the Spratlys and Paracels that are on a broad plateau up to 1,000 miles (1,609km) from China's eastern coastline.

Since China is not an archipelago country, it cannot use its continental shelf to claim natural resources on the continental shelves of the Philippines and Vietnam. Even so, an assertion of sovereignty over the Spratlys would allow it to apply the 200-nautical-mile economic zone from there to extend its claims.

Another ruse to consolidate claims over border territory shared with the Koreas involves an egregious distortion of the past. Beijing published books and articles known as the "Northeastern Project", asserting that much of Korea's ancient history began in China.
The claim is that the geographic overlapping of two Korean kingdoms with north-eastern China implies that they belong to China's ancient history. This prompted vigorous protests from South Korea's political parties and many in its academic community.
It is likely that the incident is part of a well-orchestrated and purposeful attempt to increase its political influence in north-east Asia. This probably reflects concern over the large numbers of ethnic Koreans living in the north-eastern provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang that were granted considerable autonomy during the early 1950s.

Koreans confronted a historical affront relating to these kingdoms when China tried to rewrite the past in a similar matter in 2004. Then, officials in Seoul issued an objection when Korean learned societies demanded that Beijing put the kingdom of Koguryo in its proper historical perspective. In turn, the Chinese government issued a verbal agreement not to repeat such remarks.
On the face of it, fudging a historical moment might seem small potatoes. But territorial claims based on history have enormous strategic, political and diplomatic importance.
If Beijing successfully fakes history to extend its borders, it can then rigorously apply its doctrine of "absolute sovereign rights" that is a central tenet of its foreign policy. Under this dogma, it rejects outside criticisms about events or policies within its declared borders and refuses to compromise on this point regardless of the consequences.
As it is, Beijing insists that other countries exercise the highest standards of historical probity. For example, Chinese media and diplomatic channels have been used to criticize the content of Japanese history textbooks. Beijing is blatantly hypocritical in insisting that others engage in correct renderings of past deeds and misdeeds.

But hypocrisy, duplicity and deception are recognized skills, and among the most valuable tools, of international diplomacy. To ignore Chinese intent and ability to wield these dark arts to promote the interests of the Middle Kingdom would be to do so at one's own peril.
To extend its reach in the region, China has developed a "string of pearls" along the southern coast of Asia consisting of naval bases, commercial ports and listening posts. These include port facilities in Bangladesh, radar and refuelling stations in Myanmar, a deep-water port in Gwadar, Pakistan, and access to the port of Hambontota in Sri Lanka.
Given these steps, it remains to be seen whether China's insistence on being engaged in a "peaceful rise" will be contradicted by its future actions.
 

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